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Local Dominance. (2020). Xue, Jingyi ; Catonini, Emiliano.
In: Papers.
RePEc:arx:papers:2012.14432.

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  1. Ashlagi, I. and Y. A. Gonczarowski (2018): “Stable Matching Mechanisms are not Obviously Strategy-Proof”, Journal of Economic Theory, 177, 405-425

  2. Bo, I and R. Hakimov (2020): “Pick-an-object Mechanisms”, working paper.
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  3. Bonkoungou, S. and A. Nesterov (2020): “Students incentives under partial information”, working paper.
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  4. Borgers, T. and J. Li (2019): “Strategically simple mechanisms”, Econometrica, 87(6), 2003-2035.
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  5. Li, S. (2017): “Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms”, American Economic Review, 107(11), 307-352, 3257-87.
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  6. Mackenzie, A. and Y. Zhou (2020): “Menu mechanisms”, working paper.

  7. Pycia, M. and P. Troyan (2018): “Obvious Dominance and Random Priority ”, working paper.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  8. Pycia, M. and P. Troyan (2019): “A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design”, working paper.

  9. Troyan, P. (2019): “Obviously Strategy-Proof Implementation of Top Trading Cycles”, International Economic Review, 60(3), 1249-1261.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

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