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The effect of social capital on financial capital. (2009). Tribo, Jose Antonio ; Aguilar, Jorge Surroca ; Kim, Moshe.
In: IC3JM - Estudios = Working Papers.
RePEc:cte:imrepe:id-09-02.

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  1. Entrepreneurs’ social capital and venture capital financing. (2021). Sun, Lingxia ; Shao, Yan.
    In: Journal of Business Research.
    RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:136:y:2021:i:c:p:499-512.

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  2. The non-linear effect of CSR on firms’ systematic risk: International evidence. (2021). Shamsuddin, Abul ; Li, Zhicheng ; Farah, Tazrina.
    In: Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money.
    RePEc:eee:intfin:v:71:y:2021:i:c:s104244312100007x.

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  3. Over?investment or risk mitigation? Corporate social responsibility in Asia?Pacific, Europe, Japan, and the United States. (2018). Utz, Sebastian.
    In: Review of Financial Economics.
    RePEc:wly:revfec:v:36:y:2018:i:2:p:167-193.

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  4. Corporate social responsibility and Eurozone corporate bonds: The moderating role of country sustainability. (2015). Stellner, Christoph ; Zwergel, Bernhard ; Klein, Christian.
    In: Journal of Banking & Finance.
    RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:59:y:2015:i:c:p:538-549.

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