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A Dynamic Theory of Optimal Capital Structure and Executive Compensation. (2005). Cole, Harold ; Atkeson, Andrew.
In: NBER Working Papers.
RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11083.

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  1. Dynamic delegation in promotion contests. (2023). Durandard, Th'Eo.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2308.05668.

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  2. Information Transparency of Firm Financing. (2021). Noël, Antoine ; Sun, Amy Hongfei ; Nol, Antoine L.
    In: Working Paper.
    RePEc:qed:wpaper:1459.

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  3. Financial frictions, investment, and Tobin’s q. (2019). Walentin, Karl ; Lorenzoni, Guido ; Cao, Dan.
    In: Journal of Monetary Economics.
    RePEc:eee:moneco:v:103:y:2019:i:c:p:105-122.

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  4. Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans. (2014). Mele, Antonio.
    In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
    RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:42:y:2014:i:c:p:69-85.

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  5. Financial Frictions, Investment and Tobin’s q. (2013). Walentin, Karl ; Lorenzoni, Guido ; Cao, Dan.
    In: 2013 Meeting Papers.
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  6. Financial architecture and corporate performance: evidence from Russia. (2013). Stepanova, Anastasia ; Kokoreva, Maria.
    In: HSE Working papers.
    RePEc:hig:wpaper:21/fe/2013.

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  7. Managerial Turnover in a Changing World. (2012). Pavan, Alessandro ; Garrett, Daniel.
    In: Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/668836.

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  8. A Critical Review of Capital Structure Theories. (2012). Saif-ur-Rehman, ; Jahanzeb, Agha ; Javed, Syed Muhammad .
    In: Information Management and Business Review.
    RePEc:rnd:arimbr:v:4:y:2012:i:11:p:553-557.

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  9. Recursive Contracts, Lotteries and Weakly Concave Pareto Sets. (2012). Kubler, Felix ; Cole, Harold.
    In: Review of Economic Dynamics.
    RePEc:red:issued:11-266.

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  10. Technological change and the growing inequality in managerial compensation. (2011). Van Nieuwerburgh, Stijn ; Syverson, Chad ; Lustig, Hanno.
    In: Journal of Financial Economics.
    RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:99:y:2011:i:3:p:601-627.

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  11. Some aspects regarding the financial structure theories. (2009). Micuda, Dan ; Visinescu, Sorin .
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:30412.

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  12. A REVIEW OF THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORIES. (2009). Luigi, Popescu ; Sorin, Visinescu .
    In: Annals of Faculty of Economics.
    RePEc:ora:journl:v:3:y:2009:i:1:p:315-320.

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  13. Self-Enforcing Stochastic Monitoring and the Separation of Debt and Equity Claims. (2008). Cole, Harold.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14480.

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References

References cited by this document

  1. [1] Aghion, P. and P. Bolton, 1992. An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, Review of Economic Studies, 59(3): 473-94.

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  8. [16] Townsend, R. 1979. Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Verification, Journal of Economic Theory, 21(2): 265-93.

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  10. [18] Zweibel, J. 1996. Dynamic Capital Structure under Managerial Entrenchment, American Economic Review, 86 (5), 1197-1215.

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  13. [5] Atkeson, A., International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation, Econometrica, 79:14-31, 1991.

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