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The Electoral Impact of Wealth Redistribution: Evidence from the Italian Land Reform. (2021). Venturini, Miriam ; Casaburi, Lorenzo ; Caprettini, Bruno.
In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15679.

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  1. Mimicking the Opposition: Bismarcks Welfare State and the Rise of the Socialists. (2023). Kersting, Felix.
    In: Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series.
    RePEc:rco:dpaper:448.

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  2. Fascistville: Mussolini’s new towns and the persistence of neo-fascism. (2022). Carillo, Mario F.
    In: Journal of Economic Growth.
    RePEc:kap:jecgro:v:27:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1007_s10887-022-09211-7.

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  3. Welfare Reform and Repression in an Autocracy: Bismarck and the Socialists. (2022). Kersting, Felix.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hes:wpaper:0227.

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  4. The Making of Social Democracy: The Economic and Electoral Consequences of Norways 1936 Folk School Reform. (2021). Sarvimäki, Matti ; Salvanes, Kjell G ; Acemoglu, Daron ; Pekkarinen, Tuomas.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp14617.

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  5. The Making of Social Democracy: The Economic and Electoral Consequences of Norway’s 1936 Folk School Reform. (2021). Sarvimäki, Matti ; Salvanes, Kjell G ; Acemoglu, Daron ; Pekkarinen, Toumas.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hka:wpaper:2021-040.

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  6. The Making of Social Democracy: The Economic and Electoral Consequences of Norway’s 1936 Folk School Reform. (2021). Sarvimäki, Matti ; Salvanes, Kjell G ; Acemoglu, Daron ; Pekkarinen, Tuomas.
    In: Discussion Paper Series in Economics.
    RePEc:hhs:nhheco:2021_014.

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  42. Cassa del Mezzogiorno dummy. We delimit the area affected by the Cassa del Mezzogiorno as described in the law that created it in 1950 (L.646/1950). A small number of municipalities in the control group of our North sample are included in this area. We construct a dummy equal to 1 for municipalities included.
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  44. Casse Mutue Casse Mutue elections. We digitize new data on board elections of Casse Mutue: farmers’ local healthcare providers. From 1955, elections of Casse Mutue’s board of directors were generally held every three years (L.1136/1954). We digitize all available election results (1955-1970) from the fonds of the All. Naz. dei Contadini (1970) at the National Historical Archive of Italian Farmers’ Movements conserved by the Istituto Alcide Cervi in Gattatico (RE). The 15 members of the board of directors of each Cassa Mutua were chosen among candidates in two slates using a plurality at-large electoral system. Using plurality rules, fifty percent of the voters can win all the seats, since the 15 candidates receiving the highest number of votes are elected and no quota is provided for the minority slate. We compute the per capita votes earned by the slate of candidates connected to Coldiretti (Bonomiana) and per capita number of casted votes.
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  45. Change in log active population: 1936-1951. The variable is the natural logarithm of active population in 1951 minus the natural logarithm of active population in 1936. We made no adjustment for zeros as there were none. Change in sectoral share (agriculture, manufacturing, public sector): 19361951.
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  46. Change in log population: 1936-1951. The variable is the natural logarithm of population in 1951 minus the natural logarithm of population in 1936. We made no adjustment for zeros as there were none.
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  48. Column 4 and 7: RDD with heterogeneity in share of town limits touching the reform border. Column 1: dependent variable is land invasions in 1951-52. Columns 2-4: dependent variable is Christian Democrat (DC) vote share. Columns 5-7: dependent variable is Communist (PCI) vote share. For PCI we use the vote share of the Popular Democratic Front (FDP) in 1948. Share of agricultural workers is from the population census. Units of observation are town-years. Columns 1-3 and 5-6: the sample consists of all towns within 25 km to the reform borders of Delta Padano and Maremma. Column 4 and 7: the sample consists of all towns touching the border of either Maremma or Delta Padano. Standard errors clustered at the town level in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Table C.6: Donut Panel RDD.
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  49. Columns 2, 4 and 6 control for Christian Democrat vote share in 1948. Panel A: Dependent variable is Forza Italia vote share (Berlusconi’s party). Panel B: Dependent variable is vote share of the major post-1992 right-wing parties: Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale, Lega Nord (all years) and Christian Democratic Center and the Christian Democratic Union (in 2001). Electoral data are from Corbetta and Piretti (2009). Units of observation are towns. The sample consists of all towns within 25 km to the reform borders of Delta Padano and Maremma. The towns of Bieda (Viterbo province), Colle di Tora, Contigliano (Rieti), Rocca Santo Stefano (Rome), Rosolina (Rovigo), San Vincenzo (Livorno), Santa Luce Orciano (Pisa) and Stroncone (Terni) have missing data in the 1948 elections. Heteroschedastic robust standard errors in parentheses.
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  51. Coordinates. Towns’s latitude and longitude corresponds to the coordinates of their centroids in the 1951 map. They are measured in degrees in the WGS84 UTM32N coordinate system.
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  64. Distance to actual reform border. We define continuous reform borders by conflating all contiguous towns inside reform areas. We then use ArcGIS to compute the distance between the centroid of each town and the closest reform area border. 38 We find these lists on http://www.elesh.it. 39 From ISTAT. ISTAT provides a shapefile for 1991 towns, but ELESH website does not have a 1991 list of towns. 40 Nicastro, Sambiase and Sant’Eufemia Lamezia were joined into Lamezia Terme; Carrara San Giorgio and Carrara Santo Stefano were joined into Due Carrare; Contarina and Donada were joined into Porto Viro. Other small holes in our map, inside the 50km buffer, are caused by towns created from territories that in 1951 were part of several towns. For example: Semproniano was created in 1963 with territories taken from Manciano, Roccalbegna and Santa Fiora; Sellia Marina was created in 1957 with territories from Albi, Soveria Simeri, Sellia, Cropani and Magisano.
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  65. Distance to coast. We compute the distance to the coast of towns’ 1951 centroid in ArcGIS.
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  66. Distance to proposed reform border. We define continuous reform borders of the 1950 legge di riforma agraria by conflating all contiguous towns inside the “Zone B” (P.L.977/1950). We then use ArcGIS to compute the distance between the centroid of each town and the closest proposed reform area border.
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  67. Distance to Rome. We compute the distance between Rome’s centroid and towns’ 1951 centroid in ArcGIS.
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  68. Distance to the Gothic line. We draw the “Gothic line” using the map from Oland’s map contained in North Apennines: The US Army Campaigns of World War II (1995). We compute the distance between every town’s 1951 centroid and the line in ArcGIS.
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  69. Divorced couples per 10’000 married couples: 1981. Civil status of the population is from Table 3 of the 1981 census. The variable is number of divorced couples divided by the number of married couples, both measured in 1981. We multiply the variable times 10’000.
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  72. Economic and demographic characteristics Most economic and demographic characteristics come from the province records of decadal population (1936, 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981,1991, 2001) and economic censuses (1951, 1961, 1971, 1981 , 1991, 2001). We digitized the earliest population and economic censuses (ISTAT, 1937, 1955, 1954). Additionally, we use Marbach and Ciapparelli (1983) to measure 1981 income.
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  73. Election year A. 1919-48: pre-trends DC -15% -10% -5% 0% 5% 10% 1 9 1 9 1 9 2 1 1 9 2 4 1 9 4 6 1 9 4 8
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  74. Election year B. 1919-48: pre-trends PSI -15% -10% -5% 0% 5% 1 9 1 9 1 9 2 1 1 9 2 4 1 9 4 6 1 9 4 8
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  75. Election year C. 1919-48: pre-trends PCI Notes: The Panels display coefficients βt from the panel RDD Equation (1), which controls for year × reform area and town fixed effects.
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  76. Election year Notes: The Figure displays coefficients βt from the panel RDD Equation (1), which controls for year × reform area and town fixed effects. The omitted category is the β of 1948. Dependent variable is votes cast divided by number of eligible voters. Units of observation are town-years. The sample consists of all towns within 25 km from the reform borders of Delta Padano and Maremma. The vertical line marks the 1951 land reform. We estimate standard errors clustered at the town level and plot 95% confidence intervals as bars around the coefficients.
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  77. Electoral outcomes Town-level electoral results in 1919-24 and 1946-2001 come from Corbetta and Piretti (2009). We correct vote shares larger than 100% with data from the Ministry of the Interior. 1946 elections nominated members of the Constitutional Assembly. For the years 1919-24 1948-2001 we look at elections for the lower chamber of the Italian Parliament.
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  78. Elevation. Elevation data is from the US Geological Survey database (USGS, 2005). The data is defined on 3-arc seconds grid covering the entire planet (approximately 462.5 × 462.5 meters). We join the raster to the map of 1951 Italian towns and assign to every town the average elevation of all grid cells falling inside the town limits.
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  84. Figures Figure 1: Reform Areas and Buffers Notes: Panel A: land reform areas as defined in the 1951 Law. In dark red the areas of Delta Padano (north-east) and Maremma (centerwest) . In light brown the areas of Fucino (centre), Opera Combattenti (south-west), Puglia and Lucania (south-east), Sila (south). In pink the islands of Sicily and Sardinia. Panel B: 25 km buffers inside and outside the border of Delta Padano and Maremma (preferred bandwidth).
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  109. Home ownership: 1951-2001. Home ownership data is from the following tables of the decadal population censuses: Table 9 (1951), Table 10 (1961), Table 17 (1971), Table 16 (1981), Table 5.18 (1991), Table 2.12 (2001). The town-level is number of homes owned by their residents divided by total population.
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  112. In the case of a town splitting after 1951, we aggregate the data for the towns that were a unique entity in 1951. When more towns merged after 1951, we assign weights based on population or area and we match the weighted measures to the relevant 1951 towns. This procedure causes variables for different years to have a different number of observations.
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  113. In the post-1992 elections we consider DC the following parties: Italian Popular Party and Patto Segni (1994); Italian Popular Party, Lista Dini, the Christian Democratic Center and the Christian Democratic Union (1996); Margherita, Christian Democratic Center and the Christian Democratic Union (2001).
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  114. ISTAT (1936). Catasto Agrario. Roma: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato.
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  115. ISTAT (1937). 8th Censimento Generale della Popolazione. 1936. Volume II. Province. Roma: Tipografia Ippolito Failli.
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  116. ISTAT (1954). 3rd Censimento Generale dell’Industria e del Commercio. 1951. Volume I. Risultati Generali per Comune. Roma: Istituto Centrale di Statistica.
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  117. ISTAT (1955). 9th Censimento Generale della Popolazione. 1951. Volume I. Dati Sommari per Comune. Roma: Societa A.B.E.T.E. ISTAT (1962a). 1st Censimento Generale dell’Agricoltura. 1961. Volume II. Dati Provinciali.
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  118. July 21, 1950 (P.M.). Percoco, M. (2019). Land invasions and land reform in basilicata, italy: an evaluation of place-based policies. Territory, Politics, Governance, 1–17.
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  119. King, R. (2019). Land reform: a world survey. Routledge.
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  120. Kitschelt, H., S. I. Wilkinson, et al. (2007). Patrons, clients and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition. Cambridge University Press.
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  121. Land distribution Share of expropriable estates (number): 1948. Expropriable estates data is from Medici (1948), Table 2. The table reports town-level number of estates in 1948, broken down by 11 separate categories of estate value. We use this information to construct the share of estates that the reform allowed to expropriate. We consider estates that could be expropriated as those with value in one of the top 4 categories of value. All estates in these categories were worth at least ₤20’000. Share of expropriable estates (number) is the number of expropriable estates divided the total number of estates.
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  122. Lanza, O. (1991). L’agricoltura, la Coldiretti e la DC. In L. Molino (Ed.), Costruire la democrazia. Gruppi e partiti in Italia, pp. 41–125. Bologna: Il Mulino.
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  123. Larreguy, H., J. Marshall, and L. Trucco (2018). Breaking clientelism or rewarding incumbents ? Evidence from an urban titling program in Mexico. Working paper, Harvard University and New York University.
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  124. Larreguy, H., J. Marshall, P. Querubin, et al. (2016). Parties, brokers, and voter mobilization: How turnout buying depends upon the party’s capacity to monitor brokers. American Political Science Review 110(1), 160–179.

  125. Levitt, S. D. and J. M. Snyder Jr (1995). Political Parties and the Distribution of Federal Outlays. American Journal of Political Science 39(4), 958–980.
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  126. log DC votes: 1946-2001. The variable is the natural logarithm of total DC votes. We made no adjustment for zeros as there were none.
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  127. log income per capita: 1981. Town-level income is from Marbach and Ciapparelli (1983).
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  128. log Marshall Plan aid per capita. Information on US aid transferred through the Marshall Plan is from the “Mutual Security Agency” bulletins and was newly digitized by Bianchi and Giorcelli (2018): we thank them for sharing their data. The variable is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus the value of projects funded divided by 1951 population (from the census).
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  129. log of eligible voters: 1946-92. Between 1946 and 1972 all citizens above 21 were eligible to vote. In 1975 the age limit was reduced to 18. The variable is the natural logarithm of elegible voters.
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  130. log PCI votes: 1946-2001. The variable is the natural logarithm of total PCI votes. We made no adjustment for zeros as there were none.
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  131. log population: 1936-2001. Population data is from the following tables of the decadal population censuses: Table 4 (1951, 1961 and 1981); Table 3 (1971), Table 5.2 (1991), Table 2.2 (2001). The variable is the natural logarithm of total population. We made no adjustment for zeros as there were none.
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  132. Ludwig, J. and D. L. Miller (2007). Does Head Start improve children’s life chances? Evidence from a regression discontinuity design. Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(1), 159–208.

  133. Manacorda, M., E. Miguel, and A. Vigorito (2011). Government transfers and political support. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 3(3), 1–28.

  134. Marbach, G. and G. Ciapparelli (1983). Il Reddito dei Comuni Italiani nel 1981: Dati Comunali. Volume I. UTET.
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  135. Marciani, G. E. (1966). L’esperienza di Riforma Agraria in Italia. Roma: Giuffrè Editore.
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  136. Martinez-Bravo, M. (2014). The role of local officials in new democracies: Evidence from indonesia. American Economic Review 104(4), 1244–87.

  137. Marzano, M. (1996). Il cattolico e il suo doppio. Organizzazioni religiose e Democrazia Cristiana nell’Italia del dopoguerra. Milano: Franco Angeli.
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  138. Marzotto, A. and G. Schachter (1983). Allocation of investments and electoral behavior in the italian south. Quaderni dell’Osservatorio Elettorale 10, 66–88.
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  139. Mayor affiliation: 1946. We compile a new database with the affiliation of mayors at the time of the reform from historical newspapers published after the mayor elections in 1946. We use L’Avvenire d’Italia, L’Unitá and La Voce Repubblicana.
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  140. McCrary, J. (2008). Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity design: A density test. Journal of econometrics 142(2), 698–714.

  141. Medici, G. (1948). Distribuzione della proprieta fondiaria in Italia. Roma: INEA.
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  142. Ministry of Agriculture’s Spokesman (1951). Press Release on the Land Reform Debate. In Archivio Segni.
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  143. Ministry of Interior (1952). Fascicoli Occupazione Terre. In Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Ministero dell’Interno; Fascicoli correnti (dal giugno 1944), Anni 1950-1952.
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  144. Ministry of Interior (1977). Referendum Popolare del 12 Maggio 1974. Risultati. Roma: Direzione Generale dell’Amministrazione Civile. Servizio Elettorale.
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  145. Missiroli, A. (1934). Lezioni sulla epidemiologia e profilassi della malaria, impartite agli allievi della R. Università durante l’anno scolastico 1933-34. Roma: Tipografia Armani di M. Courrier.
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  146. Montero, E. (2018). Cooperative Property Rights and Development: Evidence from Land Reform in El Salvador.
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  147. Mura, S. (2017). Antonio Segni. La politica e le istituzioni. Bologna: Il Mulino.
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  148. Negri, A. (1949). Tabelle preparatorie per la riforma agraria. In Archivio Segni.
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  149. Nigrelli, F. and G. Bonini (2017). I paesaggi della riforma agraria. Storia e gestione del paesaggio nelle aree rurali. Number 13 in Quaderni. Ist. Alcide Cervi.
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  150. Notes: Posters for electoral propaganda by Coldiretti, supporting DC (1955-1962). The poster on the left states: Farmer, agricultural worker, against communism, criminal killer of Hungarian farmers and workers, vote DC. The poster on the right states: Self-employed farmer, against Nenni and Togliatti [communist leaders] accomplices of the slaughterers of 10 million Russian farmers, vote DC. On the bottom, the name of the association sponsoring the poster: Confederazione Nazionale Coltivatori Diretti, in short Coldiretti. Catalogo Generale dei Beni Culturali (http://www.catalogo.beniculturali.it/), Crea - Centro Grafico Pubblicitario, Treviso.
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  151. Notes: The columns beneath β report the coefficient of separate regressions of the RDD specification in Equation (2). Dependent variables are specified on the first column, and their average in control towns is reported in the columns beneath “Control mean”. Refer to Appendix B for a detailed description of each of these variables and their sources. Units of observation are towns. The sample consists of all towns close to the reform borders of Delta Padano and Maremma. We report estimates for the preferred bandwidth (25 km) and two alternative bandwidths (10 km and 50 km). In Panel A, the sample is approximately 17% smaller due to missing data in Medici (1948). The columns beneath “[s.e.]” report heteroschedastic robust standard errors. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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  152. Notes: The Table reports coefficients βt from the panel RDD Equation (1), which controls for year × reform area and town fixed effects. Panel A: omitted category is 1951 and dependent variable is the share of public sector employment (patronage). Panel B: omitted category is 1952 and dependent variable is log of per capita fiscal transfers from the central government to the municipal governments (pork spending). The sample consists of all towns close to the reform borders of Delta Padano and Maremma. We report estimates for the preferred bandwidth (25 km) and two alternative bandwidths (10 km and 50 km). Standard errors clustered at the town level in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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  153. Other public policies Transfers per capita: 1952, 1955, 1959. Municipal budgets are from ISTAT, 1962b.
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  154. P.L.977/1950. Proposta di Legge comunicata alla Presidenza il 5 aprile 1950, n.977. Riforma fondiaria. Disegni di legge e relazioni 1948-1950, Senato della Repubblica.
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  155. Panel A: dependent variable is share of farms managed by the farms owner in 1961. Panel B: dependent variable is the share of land managed by the farm owner in 1961. Columns 2, 4 and 6 control for the dependent variable observed in 1929. Source of 1961 farm management is the 1961 Agricultural Census; source of 1929 variables is ISTAT (1936). Units of observation are towns. The sample consists of all towns close to the reform borders of Delta Padano and Maremma. We report estimates for the preferred bandwidth (25 km) and two alternative bandwidths (10 km and 50 km). Heteroschedastic robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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  156. PCI vote share: 1921-48. The Communist Party (PCI) was founded in 1921 and ran in both 1921 and 1924 elections. After the war, it ran as Italian Communist Party (PCI) in 1946 and together with the Socialist Party in the Popular Democratic Front (FDP) in 1948. Vote share is total votes for one of these parties divided the total votes cast.
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  157. PCI vote share: 1946-2001. Vote share is total PCI votes divided the total votes cast.
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  158. Pecoraro, A. (1950). Address to the Italian Chamber of Deputies. Atti Parlamentari Camera.
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  159. Piano Casa dummy. Information on Piano Casa housing projects built between 1949 and 1955 is from Ministry of Labour’s Piano incremento occupazione operaia case per lavoratori, (1959). The variable is an indicator for the presence of at least one project.
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  160. Piano Casa houses per 100’000 inhabitants . Information on Piano Casa housing projects built between 1949 and 1955 is from Ministry of Labour’s Piano incremento occupazione operaia case per lavoratori, (1959). The variable is equal to the total number of apartment built divided by 100’000 inhabitants (from the 1951 census).
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  161. Piattoni, S. (2001). Clientelism, interests, and democratic representation: the European experience in historical and comparative perspective. Cambridge University Press.
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  162. Piazza, R. (1974). Dibattito teorico e indirizzi di governo nella politica agraria della democrazia cristiana (1944-51). Italia contemporanea 117, 49–72.
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  163. Potential yield: maize. Potential yield data is from FAO-GAEZ (FAO, 2015). This data is defined on a 9.25 × 9.25 km grid covering the entire planet. We join the raster to the map of 1951 Italian towns and assign to every town the average potential yield of maize with medium-level of inputs of all grid cells falling inside the town limits. Share of border exposed to treatment. The variable is the length of the town limits that touch treated towns divided by the total length of these limits.
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  164. Potential yield: wheat. Potential yield data is from FAO-GAEZ (FAO, 2015). This data is defined on a 9.25 × 9.25 km grid covering the entire planet. We join the raster to the map of 1951 Italian towns and assign to every town the average potential yield of wheat with medium-level of inputs of all grid cells falling inside the town limits.
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  165. Preferred Alternative Bandwidth Bandwidths < 25km < 10km < 50km (1) (2) (3) A. Public sector employment (patronage): 1936-1991 Treatment × 1936 0.005 0.006 0.002 [0.004] [0.007] [0.004] Treatment × 1961 0.007∗ 0.011∗ 0.009∗∗∗ [0.004] [0.006] [0.003] Treatment × 1971 0.005 0.011 0.007 [0.006] [0.011] [0.005] Treatment × 1981 0.021∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ [0.007] [0.012] [0.006] Treatment × 1991 0.012 0.018 0.013 [0.010] [0.014] [0.008] Mean Y Control Group 0.05 0.06 0.05 Number of Towns 490 222 863 Observations 2939 1331 5177 B. Municipal transfers per capita (pork): 1952, 1955, 1959 Treatment × 1955 0.052-0.216 0.054 [0.156] [0.289] [0.122] Treatment × 1959 0.266∗ 0.089 0.268∗∗ [0.160] [0.293] [0.121] Mean Y Control Group 1.14 1.15 1.11 Number of Towns 483 220 840 Observations 1438 659 2488 Table 5: The impact of the reform on patronage and pork spending.
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  166. Preferred bandwidth Alternative bandwidths < 25km < 10km < 50km (1) (2) (3) A. Home ownership: 1951-2001 Treatment × 1961 0.001-0.002 0.001 [0.003] [0.004] [0.002] Treatment × 1971-0.005-0.009-0.004 [0.005] [0.009] [0.005] Treatment × 1981-0.006-0.009-0.006 [0.006] [0.011] [0.005] Treatment × 1991-0.005-0.005-0.007 [0.009] [0.014] [0.007] Treatment × 2001-0.003-0.011-0.008 [0.009] [0.015] [0.007] Mean Y Control Group 0.20 0.19 0.19 Number of Towns 490 222 863 Observations 2940 1332 5178 B. log income per capita: 1981 Treatment 0.011 0.155 0.069 [0.091] [0.162] [0.076] Mean Y Control Group 8.46 8.46 8.45 Observations 490 222 862 Notes: Panel A: the Table reports coefficients βt from the panel RDD Equation (1), which controls for year × reform area and town fixed effects. Dependent variable is per capita homes occupied by the owner.
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  167. Primavera, N. (2018). La gente dei campi e il sogno di Bonomi. La Coldiretti dalla fondazione alla Riforma agraria. Roma-Bari: Laurana Editore.
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  168. Prinzi, D. (1956). La riforma agraria in Puglia, Lucania e Molise nei primi cinque anni. Roma-Bari: Laterza.
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  169. PSI vote share: 1919-48. The Socialist Party ran under the name of Italian Socialist Party (PSI) in 1919, Official Socialist Party (PSU) in 1921 and United Socialist Party (PSU) in 1924. After the war, it ran as Italian Socialist Party (PSI) in 1946 and together with the Communist Party in the Popular Democratic Front (FDP) in 1948. Vote share is total votes for one of these parties divided the total votes cast.
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  170. Rivera, V. (1950). Opinion of the Minority Party on the Land Reform Law. Address to the Chamber of Deputies. Atti Parlamentari Camera. July 24, 1950 (P.M.). Robinson, J. A. and T. Verdier (2013). The political economy of clientelism. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 115(2), 260–291.
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  171. Roma: Societa A.B.E.T.E. ISTAT (1962b). Bilanci delle amministrazioni regionali, provinciali e comunali. Conti consuntivi 1952-53, 1954-55 e 1959. Roma: Istituto Centrale di Statistica.
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  172. Rossi-Doria, M. (1958). Dieci anni di politica agraria nel Mezzogiorno. Bari: Laterza.
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  173. Rossi, S. (2019). Mercato immobiliare, economia e politiche economiche.
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  174. Ruini, M. (1951). Letter to the Ministry of Agriculture Antonio Segni. In Archivio Segni.
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  175. Salomone, R. (1950). Opinion of the Majority Party on the Land Reform Law. Address to the Italian Senate. Atti Parlamentari Senato della Repubblica. October 5, 1950.
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  176. Segni, A. (1952). Address to the Italian Chamber of Deputies. In Archivio Segni.
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  177. Servizio Statistica UNSE (1949). Appunti per la riforma agraria. In Archivio Segni.
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  178. Share “yes” in divorce referendum: 1974. Town-level returns from the 1974 divorce referendum is from Ministry of Interior (1977). Share of “yes” votes is total votes for repealing the divorce law divided total votes cast.
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  179. Share of active population: 1936-2001. Active population data is from the following tables of the decadal population censuses: Table 6 (1951, 1961 and 1971), Table 7 (1981), Table 5.4 (1991), Table 2.5 (2001). The variable is active population divided total working age population. In 1936 the working age is not specified. In 1951 and 1961 working age is 10 and in 1971 14. From 1981 on we observe population by detailed age group, and use 14 as the cutoff for working age population to allow comparison with 1971.
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  180. Share of expropriable estates (value): 1948. Expropriable estates data is from Medici (1948), Table 2. The table reports town-level value of estates in 1948, broken down by 11 separate categories of estate value. We use this information to construct the share of estates value that the reform allowed to expropriate. We consider estates that could be expropriated as those with value in one of the top 4 categories of value. All estates in these categories were worth at least ₤20’000. Share of expropriable estates (value) is the total value of expropriable estates divided by the total value of estates.
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  181. Share of males: 1951-2001. Population data is from the following tables of the decadal population censuses: Table 4 (1951, 1961 and 1981); Table 3 (1971), Table 5.2 (1991), Table 2.2 (2001). The variable is number of males divided by total population.
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  182. Share of owner-operated farms (number): 1929. Data on number of farms by type of operation is from ISTAT (1936), Table III.I.4. Share of owner-operated farms (number) is number of owner-operated farms divided the total number of farms.
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  183. Share of owner-operated farms (number): 1961. Data on number of farms by type of operation is from ISTAT (1962a), Table 11. Share of owner-operated farms (number) is number of owner-operated farms divided the total number of farms.
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  184. Share of people in age groups (<21, 21-45; 46-65; >65): 1951-2001. Population data is from the following tables of the decadal population censuses: Table 4 (1951, 1961 and 1981); Table 3 (1971), Table 5.2 (1991), Table 2.2 (2001). The variable is population in specific age groups divided by total population.
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  185. Share of workers in agriculture: 1936-2001. Sector of employment of workers is from the following tables of the decadal population censuses: Table 6 (1951 and 1961), Table 7 (1971), Table 8 (1981), Table 5.5 (1991), Table 2.7 (2001). The variable is number of workers employed in agriculture divided total active population. In 1961 and 1971 forestry is included in agriculture.
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  186. Share of workers in ECSC affected sectors: 1951. Share of workers employed in firms affected by the Coal and Steel Community Agreement (1951). Firms affected by the agreement are in extraction (metallic and non-metallic minerals), metallurgy, mechanical engineering and manufacturing of non-metallic minerals: we source this information from the 1951 economic census. We normalize by the total number of workers from the 1951 population census.
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  187. Share of workers in GATT affected sectors: 1950. Sector of employment of workers is from Table 6 of the 1951 population Census. Sectors affected by the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade are defined roughly as those sectors producing goods that are easier to trade: agriculture, manufacturing and transport. The variable is number of workers employed in these three sectors divided total active population.
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  188. Share of workers in manufacturing: 1936-2001. Sector of employment of workers is from the following tables of the decadal population censuses: Table 6 (1951 and 1961), Table 7 (1971), Table 8 (1981), Table 5.5 (1991), Table 2.7 (2001). The variable is number of workers employed in manufacturing divided total active population. The manufacturing sector includes extractive and manufacturing industry. In 1981 manufacturing is the sum of economic sectors 2, 3 and 4 in Table 8.
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  189. Share of workers in public sector: 1936-2001. Sector of employment of workers is from the following tables of the decadal population censuses: Table 6 (1951 and 1961), Table 7 (1971), Table 8 (1981), Table 5.5 (1991), Table 2.7 (2001). The variable is number of workers employed in manufacturing divided total active population. In 1981 public sector is economic sector 9.A. In 2001 public sector combines workers in public administration and other public employees.
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  190. Share owner-operated farms (land): 1929. Data on farm size by type of operation in 1961 is from ISTAT (1936), Table III.I.4. Share owner-operated farms (land) is total land of owner-operated farms divided total farmland.
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  191. Share owner-operated farms (land): 1961. Data on farm size by type of operation in 1961 is from ISTAT (1962a), Table 11. Share owner-operated farms (land) is total land of owner-operated farms divided total farmland.
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  192. Shefter, M. (1977). Party and patronage: Germany, England, and Italy. Politics & Society 7(4), 403–451.
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  193. Slope. Slope data is from the US Geological Survey database (USGS, 2005). The data is defined on 3-arc seconds grid covering the entire planet (approximately 462.5 × 462.5 meters).
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  194. Stokes, S. C. (2005). Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics with evidence from argentina. American political science review, 315–325.

  195. Stokes, S. C., T. Dunning, M. Nazareno, and V. Brusco (2013). Brokers, voters, and clientelism: The puzzle of distributive politics. Cambridge University Press.
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  196. The omitted category is the β of 1948. Panel A: dependent variable is DC vote share. For DC we use the vote share of the Italian Popular Party (PPI) in the years 1919-24. Panel B: dependent variable is Italian Socialist Party (PSI) vote share. For PSI we use the vote share of the Official Socialist Party (PSU) in 1921, of the United Socialist Party (PSU) in 1924 and of the Popular Democratic Front (FDP) in 1948. Panel C: dependent variable is PCI vote share. For PCI we use the vote share of the Popular Democratic Front (FDP) in 1948. Units of observation are town-years. The sample consists of all towns within 25 km from the reform borders of Delta Padano and Maremma. We estimate standard errors clustered at the town level and plot 95% confidence intervals as bars around the coefficients.
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  197. The omitted category is the β of 1948. Panel A: dependent variable is log of eligible voters. Panel B: dependent variable is log of Christian Democrat (DC) votes. Panel C: dependent variable is log of Communists (PCI) votes. For PCI we use the vote share of the Popular Democratic Front (FDP) in 1948 and the vote share for the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) in 1992. Electoral data are from Corbetta and Piretti (2009). Units of observation are town-years. The sample consists of all towns within 25 km from the reform borders of Delta Padano and Maremma.
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  198. The omitted category is the β of the elections of 1951. Source is the decadal population censuses. Units of observation are town-years. Panel B: the Table reports coefficients β of separate regressions of the RDD specification in Equation (2). Dependent variable is log per capita income in 1981. The source of 1981 income is Marbach and Ciapparelli (1983) and the source of population is the population census. The sample consists of all towns close to the reform borders of Delta Padano and Maremma. We report estimates for the preferred bandwidth (25 km) and two alternative bandwidths (10 km and 50 km). Standard errors clustered at the town level (Panel A) and heteroschedastic robust (Panel B) in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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  199. The variable is the natural logarithm of 1981 income divided by 1981 total population. We made no adjustment for zeros as there were none.
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  200. The variable is transfers from the central government divided by 1951 total population.
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  201. The vertical lines mark the 1951 land reform. We estimate standard errors clustered at the town level and plot 95% confidence intervals as bars around the coefficients.
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  202. These variables are the difference between the share of active population in agriculture, manufacturing and public sector in 1951 and the share of the same sectors in 1936.
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  203. Toldo, A. (1957). La Riforma Agraria e la bonifica nel Delta Padano. Aggiornamenti Sociali, 17–34.
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  204. Treated town (proposed reform). Treated towns in the proposed reform lie inside the “Zone B” as defined in Table 3 of 1950 legge di riforma agraria, which was proposed but never enacted (P.L.977/1950). The definition of “Zone B” formed the basis of the actual reform borders, although these were closer to the proposal in the North than in the South (see Section 2).
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  205. Ufficio DC (1956). Dal latifondo al podere. Atti del Convegno assegnatari Dc delle terre di Riforma fondiaria. Roma: Cinque Lune.
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  206. Units of observation are towns. The sample consists of all towns close to the reform borders of Fucino, Opera Combattenti, Puglia and Lucania and Sila. We report estimates for the preferred bandwidth (25 km) and two alternative bandwidths (10 km and 50 km). In Panel A, the sample is approximately 14% smaller due to missing data in Medici (1948). The columns beneath “[s.e.]” report heteroschedastic robust standard errors.
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  207. USGS (2005). Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM).
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  208. Voter turnout: 1946-92. This variable is number of votes cast by number of eligible voters.
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  209. We join the raster to the map of 1951 Italian towns and assign to every town the average slope of all grid cells falling inside the town limits.
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  210. We pool all years and add year × reform area fixed effects. Units of observation are town-years. Cols. 2, 4 and 6 control for 1929 share of farm-owned farms. We report estimates for the preferred bandwidth (25 km) and two alternative bandwidths (10 km and 50 km). Standard errors heteroschedastic robust (Panel A and B) and clustered at the town level (Panel C and D) in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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  211. We take into account splitting and merging events to add data from years after 1951.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  212. We use the total votes for the Popular Democratic Front (FDP) in 1948 and the total votes for the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) in 1992. In the post-1992 elections we consider PCI the following parties: Democratic Party of the Left (1992); Democratic Party of the Left and Communist Refoundation Party (1994-96); Democrats of the Left, Communist Refoundation Party and Communist Party (2001).
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  213. Wolfe, M. D. (2017). Watering the revolution: An environmental and technological history of agrarian reform in Mexico. Duke University Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  214. Zucco Jr, C. (2013). When payouts pay off: Conditional cash transfers and voting behavior in Brazil 2002–10. American Journal of Political Science 57(4), 810–822.

  215. Zucco, P., S. Pezzoli, and I. Fabbri (2011). Terre Nuove. Immagini dell’archivio fotografico dell’Ente Delta Padano. Bologna: Editrice Compositori.
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Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. Democracy and self-rated health across 67 countries: A multilevel analysis. (2015). Krueger, Patrick M ; Denney, Justin T ; Dovel, Kathryn .
    In: Social Science & Medicine.
    RePEc:eee:socmed:v:143:y:2015:i:c:p:137-144.

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  2. Technology Diffusion: Measurement, Causes and Consequences. (2014). Mestieri, Martí ; Comin, Diego.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10163.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. Myopia or strategic behavior? Indian regimes and the East India Company in late eighteenth century India. (2012). Swamy, Anand ; Oak, Mandar.
    In: Explorations in Economic History.
    RePEc:eee:exehis:v:49:y:2012:i:3:p:352-366.

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  4. The Democratic Transition. (2011). Wacziarg, Romain ; MURTIN, Fabrice.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17432.

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  5. The Vanishing Bequest Tax: The Comparative Evolution of Bequest Taxation in Historical Perspective. (2007). Bertocchi, Graziella.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2578.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  6. Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions. (2007). Lagunoff, Roger.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000876.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  7. Enfranchisement, Intra-Elite Conflict and Bargaining. (2006). Proto, Eugenio ; Ghosal, Sayantan.
    In: The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS).
    RePEc:wrk:warwec:750.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  8. The Control of Land Rent in the Fortified Farming Town. (2006). Hartwick, John.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:qed:wpaper:1096.

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  9. The Age of Mass Migration: Economic and Institutional Determinants. (2006). Strozzi, Chiara ; Bertocchi, Graziella.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2499.

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  10. On the Link Between Democracy and Environment. (2006). Drosdowski, Thomas .
    In: Hannover Economic Papers (HEP).
    RePEc:han:dpaper:dp-355.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  11. Does the Liberalization of Trade Advance Gender Equality in Schooling and Health?. (2006). Schultz, T..
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:egc:wpaper:935.

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  12. The Coevolution of Economic and Political Development. (2006). Huang, Fali.
    In: DEGIT Conference Papers.
    RePEc:deg:conpap:c011_066.

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  13. Why did (not) the East Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Intra-Elite Conflict and Risk Sharing. (2006). Proto, Eugenio ; Ghosal, Sayantan.
    In: DEGIT Conference Papers.
    RePEc:deg:conpap:c011_032.

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  14. Dynamic Stability and Reform of Political Institutions. (2006). Lagunoff, Roger.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000051.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  15. CHEAP HOME GOODS AND PERSISTENT INEQUALITY. (2006). Cavalcanti, Tiago ; Alexopoulos, Joanna.
    In: Anais do XXXIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 34th Brazilian Economics Meeting].
    RePEc:anp:en2006:165.

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  16. Dynamic Stability and Reform of Political Institutions. (2005). Lagunoff, Roger.
    In: Game Theory and Information.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0505006.

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  17. Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions. (2005). Lagunoff, Roger.
    In: Game Theory and Information.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0501003.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  18. Economic Rights, Human Development Effort and Institutions. (2005). Kimenyi, Mwangi.
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:uct:uconnp:2005-40.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  19. Testing Out Contractual Incompleteness: Evidence from Soccer. (2005). Comin, Diego ; Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol.
    In: Departmental Working Papers.
    RePEc:rut:rutres:200501.

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  20. Testing out Contractual Incompleteness: Evidence from Soccer. (2005). Comin, Diego ; Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11110.

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  21. Endogenous Redistributive Cycles An Overlapping Generations Approach to Social Conflict and Cyclical Growth. (2005). Clemens, Christiane ; Heinemann, Maik .
    In: Working Paper Series in Economics.
    RePEc:lue:wpaper:5.

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  22. Democracy Deficits, Inequality and Pollution. A Politico-Economic Analysis. (2005). Drosdowski, Thomas .
    In: Hannover Economic Papers (HEP).
    RePEc:han:dpaper:dp-323.

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  23. Voting, Inequality, and Redistribution. (2005). Borck, Rainald.
    In: Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin.
    RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp503.

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  24. Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model. (2005). Lagunoff, Roger ; Jack, William.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000534.

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  25. Das Human Kapital: A Theory of the Demise of the Class Structure. (2004). Moav, Omer ; Galor, Oded.
    In: GE, Growth, Math methods.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpge:0410003.

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  26. Why the US and not Brazil? Old Elites and the Development of a Modern Economy. (2004). Frijters, Paul ; Dulleck, Uwe.
    In: Vienna Economics Papers.
    RePEc:vie:viennp:0408.

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  27. Immigration and the survival of the welfare state. (2004). Ortega, Francesc.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:upf:upfgen:815.

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  28. Partisan competition, growth and the franchise. (2004). Oxoby, Robert ; Llavador, Humberto.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:upf:upfgen:730.

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  29. The Political Economy of Social Exclusion with Implications for Immigration Policy. (2004). Schiff, Maurice ; Gradstein, Mark.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1087.

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  30. Dynamic Enfranchisement. (2004). Lagunoff, Roger ; Jack, William.
    In: Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings.
    RePEc:ecm:nasm04:24.

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  31. The Dynamic Reform of Political Institutions. (2004). Lagunoff, Roger.
    In: Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings.
    RePEc:ecm:latm04:47.

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  32. Inequality, Democracy and the Emergence of Institutions. (2004). Gradstein, Mark.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4187.

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  33. Institutions and Development: The Interaction between Trade Regime and Political System. (2004). Grossmann, Volker ; Falkinger, Josef.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1279.

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  34. Dynamic Enfranchisement. (2003). Lagunoff, Roger ; Jack, William.
    In: Public Economics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0306002.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  35. Dynamic Enfranchisement. (2003). Lagunoff, Roger ; Jack, William.
    In: Wallis Working Papers.
    RePEc:roc:wallis:wp36.

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  36. The Law of Primogeniture and the Transition from Landed Aristocracy to Industrial Democracy. (2003). Bertocchi, Graziella.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3723.

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  37. Dynamic Enfranchisement. (2003). Lagunoff, Roger ; Jack, William.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000030.

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  38. Economic Growth, Inequality, Democratization, and the Environment. (2002). Eriksson, Clas ; Persson, Joakim.
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:hhs:fiefwp:0178.

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  39. Investment in the Absence of Property Rights: The Role of Incumbency Advantages. (2002). Konrad, Kai.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_698.

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  40. The Role of Freedom, Growth and Religion in the Taste for Revolution. (2002). Pezzini, Silvia ; MacCulloch, Robert.
    In: STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cep:stidep:36.

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  41. Investment and Instability. (2001). Nugent, Jeffrey ; Campos, Nauro ; JeffreyB. Nugent, .
    In: Development and Comp Systems.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpdc:0012015.

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  42. Three Steps Towards More Effective Development Assistance. (2001). Rose, Jim ; Hay, Simon.
    In: Treasury Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:nzt:nztwps:01/26.

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  43. Investment in the Absence of Property Rights: The Role of Incumbency Advantages. (2001). Konrad, Kai.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3050.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  44. What Makes a Revolution?. (2001). MacCulloch, Robert.
    In: STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cep:stidep:30.

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  45. Investment and Instability. (2000). Nugent, Jeffrey ; Campos, Nauro ; JeffreyB. Nugent, .
    In: William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series.
    RePEc:wdi:papers:2000-337.

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  46. Does Liberté = Egalité? A Survey of the Empirical Evidence on the Links between Political Democracy and Income Inequality. (2000). Milanovic, Branko ; Gradstein, Mark.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_261.

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  47. Inequality and the Dynamics of Poverty and Growth. (1999). Ali, Ali A. ; Elbadawi, Ibrahim A..
    In: CID Working Papers.
    RePEc:wop:cidhav:32.

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  48. A Theory of Political Transitions. (1999). Robinson, James ; Acemoglu, Daron.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2277.

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  49. The Politics of Cooptation. (1999). Spagat, Michael ; Bertocchi, Graziella.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2156.

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  50. Demokratische Beteiligung und Staatsausgaben: Die Auswirkungen des Frauenstimmrechts. (). Stutzer, Alois ; Kienast, Lukas.
    In: IEW - Working Papers.
    RePEc:zur:iewwpx:210.

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