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Labor in the Boardroom. (2019). Jager, Simon.
In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14151.

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  1. Economic Policies for Innovative Enterprises: Implementing Multi-Stakeholder Corporate Governance. (2022). Palladino, Lenore.
    In: Review of Radical Political Economics.
    RePEc:sae:reorpe:v:54:y:2022:i:1:p:5-25.

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  2. Choice over Payment Schemes and Worker Effort. (2022). Burger, Rulof ; Abel, Martin.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp15769.

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  3. Dividend taxes, employment, and firm productivity. (2021). Jacob, Martin.
    In: Journal of Corporate Finance.
    RePEc:eee:corfin:v:69:y:2021:i:c:s0929119921001620.

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  4. Corporate Hierarchies and Labor Institutions. (2020). Burdín, Gabriel ; Belloc, Filippo ; Landini, Fabio.
    In: Department of Economics University of Siena.
    RePEc:usi:wpaper:827.

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  5. Robots and Worker Voice: An Empirical Exploration. (2020). Burdín, Gabriel ; Belloc, Filippo ; Landini, Fabio.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp13799.

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  6. Corporate Hierarchies under Employee Representation. (2020). Burdín, Gabriel ; Belloc, Filippo ; Landini, Fabio ; Burdin, Gabriel.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp13717.

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  7. A model of unions, two-tier bargaining and capital investment. (2020). Sulis, Giovanni ; Conti, Maurizio ; Cardullo, Gabriele.
    In: Labour Economics.
    RePEc:eee:labeco:v:67:y:2020:i:c:s0927537120301408.

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  8. Marginal Jobs and Job Surplus: A Test of the Efficiency of Separations. (2019). Zweimüller, Josef ; Jäger, Simon ; Schoefer, Benjamin ; Jager, Simon.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25492.

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  1. /Total A. 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 Bandwidth (Years around August 10, 1994) 1% Winsorization 2% W’n 5% W’n Pref’d Spec: 1% W'n + 2-Yr Bwidth Control Mean, Young Stock Cs: 0.572 (b) Leverage -.1 -.05 0 .05 .1 Leverage 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 Bandwidth (Years around August 10, 1994) 1% Winsorization 2% W’n 5% W’n Pref’d Spec: 1% W'n + 2-Yr Bwidth Control Mean, Young Stock Cs: 0.278 (c) Cost of Debt -.2 -.15 -.1 -.05 0
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  2. 1. We exclude all firms with an incorporation date before December 31, 1989. We keep the most recent incorporation date in case there are multiple entries per firm identifier. 2. Our version of the data includes two variables for the incorporation date. One only includes the year of incorporation, while the other contains more detailed information on this date. The detailed variable was extracted from a more recent version of the Orbis database. We restrict the sample to cases in which the year of incorporation in the more recent and detailed variable matches with the year information in the less detailed version of this variable.
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  3. 6. In order to form occupational groups we rely on the classification introduced by Blossfeld (1987).
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  4. 7. We construct the firm- and worker-level AKM effects by following Card, Heining, and Kline (2013) but relying on the firm level rather than establishment-level information and drawing on information from 1990 to 2009. We also conduct this analysis on the basis of the fuller Orbis-ADIAB firm sample before restricting the sample to the firms observed in our main sample, described in Appendix Section B.1.1. B.1.8 Additional Data Sources We draw on two additional, separate data sources.
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  38. Cost of Debt 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 Bandwidth (Years around August 10, 1994) 1% Winsorization 2% W’n 5% W’n Pref’d Spec: 1% W'n + 2-Yr Bwidth Control Mean, Young Stock Cs: 0.206 (d) Long-term Debt / Total Debt -.1 -.05 0 .05 .1 L. term Debt /Tot.
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  41. Diff-in-Diff 0.084∗∗ 0.040-0.005 (0.036) (0.038) (0.021) DiD 0.092∗∗ 0.047-0.009 Industry FE (0.037) (0.039) (0.022) Control Mean: Stock Cs 0.579 0.532 0.107 00, LLCs 0.317 0.275 0.044 N, Stock Cs 452 452 452 N, LLCs 37,268 37,268 37,268 Panel B: Parent of Corporate Domestic Corp. Corp. Group Group Group w/ > 2000 Emp.
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  47. Emp. 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 Bandwidth (Years around August 10, 1994) 1% Winsorization 2% W’n 5% W’n Pref’d Spec: 1% W'n + 2-Yr Bwidth Control Mean, Young Stock Cs: 2.5e+05 (d) Fixed Assets per Worker (Log) -.5 0 .5 1 Log FA /
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  48. Emp. 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 Bandwidth (Years around August 10, 1994) 1% Winsorization 2% W’n 5% W’n Pref’d Spec: 1% W'n + 2-Yr Bwidth Control Mean, Young Stock Cs: 9.0e+04 (b) Value Added per Worker (Log) -.5 0 .5 Log VA /
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  49. Emp. 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 Bandwidth (Years around August 10, 1994) 1% Winsorization 2% W’n 5% W’n Pref’d Spec: 1% W'n + 2-Yr Bwidth Control Mean, Young Stock Cs: 9.859 (c) Fixed Assets per Worker 0 50000 100000 150000 Fixed Assets /
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  51. Establishment-History-Panel (BHP) Data The Establishment History Panel (BetriebsHistorik -Panel, BHP) data contains aggregations of individual social security records by establishment ID. It is composed of cross-sectional data sets since 1975 for West Germany and 1991 for East Germany. Every cross section contains all establishments in Germany with at least one employee subject to social security on June 30th. Since 1999, also establishments consisting solely of one marginal part-time employee are included. The BHP data contains information about the branch of industry and the location of the establishment.
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  53. Figure 5: Share of Workers on the Supervisory Board 0 10 20 30 40 Share of Workers on Supervisory Board Incorporation in/before 1994 Incorporation after 1994 ≤500 Employees >500 Employees Note: The figure shows the share of workers on the supervisory board of stock corporations based on data from the Hoppenstedt Aktienführer. We restrict the sample to stock corporations founded between 1989 and 1999 for which board composition data and the incorporation year is reported. The two columns on the left report statistics for corporations with at most 500 employees, and the two columns on the right report those with more than 500 employees. The navy-colored bars represent corporations incorporated during or before 1994, the maroon-colored bars represent corporations incorporated during or after 1995. The dashed horizontal line at 33.33% indicates the mandated worker share under one-third codetermination.
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  54. Figure C.6: Effect of Shared Governance on Supervisory Board Composition (a) 1(Woman on Board) 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 1(Women > 0) 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 Bandwidth (Years around August 10, 1994) No Winsorization Pref’d Spec: No W'n + 2-Yr Bwidth Control Mean, Young Stock Cs: 0.350 (b) Share Women on Board (0-1.00) -.05 0 .05 .1 .15 Share Women 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 Bandwidth (Years around August 10, 1994) 1% Winsorization 2% W’n 5% W’n Pref’d Spec: 1% W'n + 2-Yr Bwidth Control Mean, Young Stock Cs: 0.125 (c) 1(Doctorate Holder on Board) -.1 0 .1 .2 .3 1(PhD /
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  55. Figure C.7: Effect of Shared Governance on Executive Board Composition (a) 1(Woman on Board) -.1 0 .1 .2 .3 1(Women > 0) 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 Bandwidth (Years around August 10, 1994) No Winsorization Pref’d Spec: No W'n + 2-Yr Bwidth Control Mean, Young Stock Cs: 0.595 (b) Share Women on Board (0-1.00) -.05 0 .05 .1 Share Women 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 Bandwidth (Years around August 10, 1994) 1% Winsorization 2% W’n 5% W’n Pref’d Spec: 1% W'n + 2-Yr Bwidth Control Mean, Young Stock Cs: 0.160 (c) 1(Doctorate Holder on Board) -.05 0 .05 .1 .15 .2 1(PhD /
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  56. Figure C.8: Effect of Shared Governance on Firm Scale (a) Revenue (Log) -1 -.5 0 .5 Log Revenue 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 Bandwidth (Years around August 10, 1994) 1% Winsorization 2% W’n 5% W’n Pref’d Spec: 1% W'n + 2-Yr Bwidth Control Mean, Young Stock Cs: 14.134 (b) Value Added (Log) -1 -.5 0 .5 Log Val.
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  57. Firm Panel Data: Mannheim Enterprise Panel (MUP) We draw on data from the Mannheim Enterprise Panel provided by Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim, a firm panel data set containing information on incorporations and exits (see Bersch et al., 2014, for detailed information). Comprehensive data on incorporations are provided by Creditreform e.V., Germany’s largest credit rating agency, based on official registers and are available from 1991 onward for corporations. We apply the same industry restrictions in the MUP data as in our overall sample as described below in Section B.2.3. Importantly, we cannot apply the same restrictions regarding state and family ownership since such information is not recorded in the data. In addition, we cannot restrict the analysis to firms above the 10 employee threshold as employment is not comprehensively recorded in the relevant sample years.
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  58. First Year Observed 46,363 2001.93 1997 1998 1999 2006 2012 Last Year Observed 46,363 2009.51 2002 2003 2013 2015 2015 Observations per Firm 46,363 6.02 2 3 6 8 11 Calendar Year (Firm-Year Observations) 278,878 2005.70 1998 2000 2003 2012 2014 Note: The table documents the first and last appearance as well as the observations per firm for the firms in our BvD data set. The sample is restricted to stock corporations (AGs) and limited liability companies (LLCs, GmbHs) with 10 or more employees incorporated within two years of the reform date of August 10, 1994. See Appendix Section B for more information on the sample construction. See Appendix Figure C.1 for the distribution of firm-years in the sample.
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  90. Incorporation Date (b) LLCs 0 1/3 Worker Share on Board 08/10/1992 08/10/1994 08/10/1996 Incorporation Date Note: The figure illustrates the mandates for shared governance by incorporation date in corporations with fewer than 501 employees (see Table 1 and Appendix Figure C.2 for rules for larger firms). Stock corporations incorporated before August 10, 1994 are mandated to have one-third worker representation on the supervisory board. Stock corporations incorporated on or after August 10, 1994 cannot have workers on the supervisory board if they have fewer than 501 employees. The rules for LLCs follow those for stock corporations incorporated on or after August 10, 1994, and were not changed as part of the reform. See Section 3 for additional information.
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  91. Incorporation Date >2000 employees 500< employees ≤2000 ≤500 employees (b) Limited Liability Companies 0 1/3 1/2 Worker Sharre on Board 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 0 8 / 1 0 / 9 4
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  109. Linking the Data Schild (2016) and Antoni et al. (2018) describe the linking process in detail. The data set was created by linking administrative employer-employee data at the establishment level with Orbis financial and production data at the firm level. In a first step, a cross-walk between BvD company IDs and BHP establishments and hence BHP ID was established by applying records linkage techniques based on firms’ names, industry and other characteristics. The match rate for stock corporations, i.e. the legal form affected by the reform we study, is the highest among all legal forms at 70.34% (see Schild, 2016; Antoni et al., 2018, , who also describe the linking process and the data set more generally).
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  110. Log Fixed Assets 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 Bandwidth (Years around August 10, 1994) 1% Winsorization 2% W’n 5% W’n Pref’d Spec: 1% W'n + 2-Yr Bwidth Control Mean, Young Stock Cs: 13.832 (h) Tangible Assets (Log) -.5 0 .5 1 Log Tang.
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  125. Non-indicator outcomes are winsorized at the 1% level by year. See Appendix Section B for more information on the sample construction. See Appendix Figure C.9 for the specification with industry-year fixed effects at additional bandwidths and winsorization levels; Appendix Tables D.12 and D.13 for rank and percentile robustness checks for value added per worker, fixed assets per worker, capital share, and value added / revenue; Appendix Table D.15 for robustness checks excluding former East German states; and Appendix Table D.8 for checks on placebo reforms in 1998 and 2002. The control means refer to observations of firms incorporated on or after August 10, 1994. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Stars denote statistical significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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  128. Old LLCs (controls) New LLCs (controls) Note: The figure is based on the linked BvD Orbis-ADIAB data and shows the average number of establishments for firms incorporated in the 1990s. The navy line with solid circles plots the number of establishments for stock corporations incorporated before August 10, 1994 and the maroon line with hollow circles plots the number for stock corporations incorporated after the cutoff date. The green line with solid triangles and purple line with hollow triangles do so for old and new LLCs respectively. Figure C.5: BvD Firms’ Sum of IAB Employment Relative to BvD Incorporation Date (a) arcinsh(IAB Employment) 0 1 2 3 4 asinh(IAB Employment) -5 0 5 10 15 Year of Firm Incorporation (BvD) Old Stock Corps. (Shared gov.) New Stock Corps. Old LLCs (controls) New LLCs (controls) (b) Level of IAB Employment 0 50 100 150 IAB Employment -5 0 5 10 15 Year of Firm Incorporation (BvD) Old Stock Corps. (Shared gov.) New Stock Corps.
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  129. Old LLCs (controls) New LLCs (controls) Note: The figure is based on the Orbis-ADIAB data and shows employment data for firms incorporated in the 1990s. Panels (a) and (b) plot employment as arcinsh(employment) and in levels, respectively. The navy line plots employment for stock corporations incorporated before August 10, 1994 and the maroon line employment for stock corporations incorporated after the cutoff date. The green line with solid triangles and purple line with hollow triangles do so for old and new LLCs respectively.
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  130. Other Shareholders Fundst+1 − P/L for Periodt+1 − Other Shareholders Fundst + P/L for Periodt P/L for Periodt • Retained Earningst Other Shareholders Fundst Total Assetst • Average Debt Maturityt Long Term Debtt + Loanst Loanst B.3.2 Firm-Level TFP Construction Using the sample of firms incorporated five years around the reform cutoff date (i.e. 1989 to 1999), we keep all observations between 2005 and 2015 with non-missing values for industry classification, wage bill, and value-added. We apply the sample restrictions described in Appendix Section B.2.3. We then calculate industry-specific labor shares: 1. For each 2-digit NACE industry i and year t, we calculate the total wage bill and total value-added and divide the first by the second. Call this αit. 2. Within i, we replace any αit ≥ 1 with the highest αit among all t that is less than 1. 3. We calculate the industry-specific average share αi across all years t.
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  131. Pencavel, John. 2013. “Worker Cooperatives and Democratic Governance.” In Handbook of Economic Organization: Integrating Economic and Organization Theory, edited by Anna Grandori. Edward Elgar Publishing, 462.
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  132. Qualified Manual 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 Bandwidth (Years around August 10, 1994) 1% Winsorization 2% W’n 5% W’n Pref’d Spec: 1% W'n + 2-Yr Bwidth Control Mean, Young Stock Cs: 0.132 (e) Share Qualified Service -.03 -.02 -.01 0 .01 .02 %
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  133. Raiser, Thomas, Rüdiger Veil, and Matthias Jacobs. 2015. Mitbestimmungsgesetz und Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz. Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG.
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  134. Rapp, Marc Steffen, Michael Wolff, Jan Hennig, and Iuliia Udoieva. 2019. “Mitbestimmung im Aufsichtsrat und ihre Wirkung auf die Unterenhmensführung: Eine empirische Analyse vor dem Hintergrund der Finanz-und Wirtschaftskrise.” Study Nr. 424, HansBöckler -Stiftung .

  135. Redeker, Nils. 2019. “The Politics of Stashing Wealth: The Demise of Labor Power and the Global Rise of Corporate Savings.” Center for Comparative and International Studies (CIS) .
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  136. Rehder, Britta. 2003. Betriebliche Bündnisse für Arbeit in Deutschland: Mitbestimmung und Flächentarif im Wandel. Campus Verlag.

  137. Revenue 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 Bandwidth (Years around August 10, 1994) 1% Winsorization 2% W’n 5% W’n Pref’d Spec: 1% W'n + 2-Yr Bwidth Control Mean, Young Stock Cs: 0.617 Note: The figure plots difference-in-differences estimates of the reduced-form effect of shared governance on productivity at different bandwidths of incorporation dates relative to August 10, 1994 and different winsorization levels. All specifications include industry-by-year fixed effects. The square maroon marker denotes our preferred 2-year bandwidth and 1% winsorization specification. The vertical bars denote confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the firm level.
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  138. Saez, Emmanuel, Benjamin Schoefer, and David Seim. 2019. “Payroll Taxes, Firm Behavior, and Rent Sharing: Evidence from a Young Workers’ Tax Cut in Sweden.” American Economic Review 109 (5):1717–63.

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  140. Schild, Christopher-Johannes. 2016. “Linking "Orbis" Company Data with Establishment Data from the German Federal Employment Agency.” German Record Linkage Center, Working Paper .
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  141. Scholz, Robert and Sigurt Vitols. 2019. “Board-Level Codetermination: A Driving Force for Corporate Social Responsibility in German Companies?” European Journal of Industrial Relations 25 (3):233–246.

  142. See Appendix Section B for more information on the sample construction and Appendix Figure C.10 for the specification with industry-year fixed effects at additional bandwidths and winsorization levels. The control means refer to observations of firms incorporated on or after August 10, 1994. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Stars denote statistical significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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  143. See Appendix Section B for more information on the sample construction and Appendix Figure C.13 for specifications at additional bandwidths and winsorization levels. The control means refer to observations of firms incorporated on or after August 10, 1994. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Stars denote statistical significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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  144. See Appendix Section B for more information on the sample construction. The control means refer to observations of firms incorporated on or after August 10, 1994. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Stars denote statistical significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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  145. Shleifer, Andrei and Lawrence Summers. 1988. “Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers.” In Corporate takeovers: Causes and Consequences. University of Chicago Press, 33–68.

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  149. Svejnar, Jan. 1981. “Relative Wage Effects of Unions, Dictatorship and Codetermination: Econometric Evidence From Germany.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 63:188–197.

  150. Tenure 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 Bandwidth (Years around August 10, 1994) 1% Winsorization 2% W’n 5% W’n Pref’d Spec: 1% W'n + 2-Yr Bwidth Control Mean, Young Stock Cs: 0.012 Note: The figure plots difference-in-differences estimates of the reduced-form effect of shared governance on tenure at different bandwidths of incorporation dates relative to August 10, 1994 and different winsorization levels. The square maroon marker denotes our preferred 2-year bandwidth and 1% winsorization specification. Indicator outcomes are not winsorized. All specifications include industry-by-year fixed effects. The vertical bars denote confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the firm level.
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  151. Tenure 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 Bandwidth (Years around August 10, 1994) 1% Winsorization 2% W’n 5% W’n Pref’d Spec: 1% W'n + 2-Yr Bwidth Control Mean, Young Stock Cs: 0.043 (f) Separations: 9+ Years -.01 -.005 0 .005 Outflow, >9 Yrs.
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  152. Tenure 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 Bandwidth (Years around August 10, 1994) 1% Winsorization 2% W’n 5% W’n Pref’d Spec: 1% W'n + 2-Yr Bwidth Control Mean, Young Stock Cs: 0.118 (e) Separations: 4-9 Years -.005 0 .005 .01 .015 Outflow, 4-9 Yrs.
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  153. The 1994 reform of the Corporation Law stipulates that the incorporation date relevant to the worker representation mandate is the date of entry into the German Trade Register (Handelsregister). In the 1990s, the firm’s date of trade register entry was often up to a few months after the establishment date of its charter (Feststellung der Satzung). To use the most accurate legally relevant incorporation date, we replace the incorporation date in the Orbis Historical/EBDC data sets with the date of first trade register entry from the Dafne data set if the date of first trade register entry is within one year (365 days) of the firm’s assigned incorporation date. If the Dafne date is more than a year before or after the incorporation date in the Orbis Historical/EBDC data sets, we assume that the first trade register entry date reported in the Dafne data set is not the true first entry date.
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  154. The control means refer to observations of firms incorporated on or after August 10, 1994. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Stars denote statistical significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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  155. The control means refer to observations of firms incorporated on or after August 10, 1998 or August 10, 2002. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; we do not cluster here as we only have one observation per firm. Stars denote statistical significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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  156. The control means refer to observations of firms incorporated on or after August 10, 1998 or August 10, 2002. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; we do not cluster here as we only have one observation per firm. Stars denote statistical significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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  157. The reason is that even before 1994, the law always exempted stock corporations wholly owned by one family from one-third codetermination so that such firms were not affected by the 1994 reform. We describe how we identify such family stock corporations in Appendix Section B.1 above.
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  158. The table reports the results of DiD specifications as in (11). The sample is restricted to stock corporations (AGs) and limited liability companies (LLCs, GmbHs) with 10 or more employees incorporated within two years of the reform date of August 10, 1994. We use 2-digit NACE designations for industry fixed effects.
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  159. Thelen, Kathleen Ann. 1991. Union of Parts: Labor Politics in Postwar Germany. Cornell University Press.
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  160. This BvD ID/establishment ID crosswalk is conducted for cross sections from 2006 to 2014. Based on the resulting crosswalk, additional waves of BHP establishment data for previous years were merged. Preparation of the Linked Data For the preparation of our final analysis data, we start with the Orbis component of the Orbis-ADIAB data.
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  161. Tirole, Jean. 1986. “Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations. ” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 2:181–214.

  162. Van der Ploeg, Frederick. 1987. “Trade Unions, Investment, and Employment: a NonCooperative Approach.” European Economic Review 31 (7):1465–1492.
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  163. We cannot credibly calculate the presence of one-third codetermination at the corporate group level because a stricter legal standard for defining corporate groups applies there: business entities are only counted towards a corporate group for the purposes of one-third codetermination if they are completely integrated into the group (Eingliederung) or if a domination agreement of the group over the unit exists ( 2 (2) DrittelbG). Domination agreements are empirically rare (e.g., Lieder and Hoffmann, 2017, find that 3 to 7% of stock corporations are governed by such agreements) and not reported in the data. The regression results reveal a higher probability of being a part of a corporate group but not on membership in a domestic corporate group or in a group with more than 2,000 employees at domestic business entities. Across specifications, we do not find statistically significant effects and point estimates are close to zero with standard errors of about 2 to 4ppt.
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  164. We report the results of DiD specifications as in (11). The sample is restricted to stock corporations (AGs) and limited liability companies (LLCs, GmbHs) with 10 or more employees incorporated within two years of August 10, 1998 on Panel A and within two years of August 10, 2002 on Panel B. We use 2-digit NACE designations for industry fixed effects. See Appendix Section B for more information on the sample construction.
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  165. We report the results of DiD specifications as in (11). The sample is restricted to stock corporations (AGs) and limited liability companies (LLCs, GmbHs) with 10 or more employees incorporated within two years of August 10, 1998 on Panel A and within two years of August 10, 2002 on Panel B. We use 2-digit NACE designations for industry fixed effects. See Appendix Section B for more information on the sample construction.
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  166. We use 2-digit NACE designations for industry fixed effects. Non-indicator outcomes are winsorized at the 1% level by year. See Appendix Section B for more information on the sample construction and Appendix Figure C.9 for the specification with industry-year fixed effects at additional bandwidths and winsorization levels. The control means refer to observations of firms incorporated on or after August 10, 1994. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Stars denote statistical significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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  28. WAGE DETERMINATION: PRIVATISED, NEW PRIVATE AND STATE OWNED COMPANIES. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM PANEL DATA. (2003). Mickiewicz, Tomasz ; Bishop, Kate.
    In: William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series.
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  29. Ownership, Firm Size and Rent Sharing in a Transition Country. (2003). Dobbelaere, Sabien.
    In: Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium.
    RePEc:rug:rugwps:03/170.

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  30. Wage Bargaining with On-The-Job Search: Theory and Evidence. (2003). Robin, Jean-Marc ; Postel-Vinay, Fabien ; Cahuc, Pierre.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
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  31. Wages and International Trade. (2003). Kramarz, Francis.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
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  32. Product Market Deregulation and Labor Market Outcomes. (2002). Haefke, Christian ; Ebell, Monique.
    In: Working Papers.
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  33. Who benefits from training and R&D: The firm or the workers? A study on panels of French and Swedish firms. (2002). Taymaz, Erol ; FAKHFAKH, Fathi ; Ballot, Gérard.
    In: ERC Working Papers.
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  34. The Impact of the Unemployment Benefit System on International Spillover Effects. (2002). Beissinger, Thomas ; Buesse, Oliver.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp656.

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  35. Gender Differences in Rent Sharing and its Implications for the Gender Wage Gap. (2002). Nekby, Lena.
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  36. Does Micro Evidence Support the Wage Phillips Curve in Canada?. (2002). Fares, Jean .
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    RePEc:bca:bocawp:02-4.

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  37. Rent-sharing, hold-up, and manufacturing wages in Cote dIvoire. (2001). Ris, Catherine ; Azam, Jean-Paul.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2600.

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  38. Wages, Profits and Individual Unemployment Risk : Evidence from Matched Worker-Firm Data. (2001). Heyman, Fredrik ; Arai, Mahmood.
    In: Working Paper Series.
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  39. International Trade and Rent Sharing in Developed and Developing countries. (2001). Mirza, Daniel ; Fontagné, Lionel.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:cii:cepidt:2001-09.

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  40. A Structural Model of Tenure and Specific Investments. (2001). Teulings, C. N. ; van der Ende, Martin A..
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_532.

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  41. The effects of increased labour market flexibility in the United Kingdom: theory and practice. (2000). Millard, Stephen.
    In: Bank of England working papers.
    RePEc:boe:boeewp:109.

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  42. Oligopsony and the Distribution of Wages. (1999). To, Ted ; Bhaskar, V.
    In: Labor and Demography.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpla:9903003.

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  43. Liquidity Constraints Faced by Firm and Employment. (1999). Piekkola, Hannu ; Haaparanta, Pertti .
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:rif:dpaper:695.

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  44. Do Scientists Pay to Be Scientists?. (1999). Stern, Scott.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7410.

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  45. From the Invisible Handshake to the Invisible Hand? How Import Competition Changes the Employment Relationship. (1999). Bertrand, Marianne.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6900.

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  46. Immigration and Skill Formation in Unionised Labour Markets. (1999). Thum, Marcel ; Fuest, Clemens.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_214.

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  47. The Determinants of Child Care Workers Wages and Compensation: Sectoral Differences, Human Capital, Race, Insiders and Outsiders. (1997). Mocan, Naci ; Viola, Deborah.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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  48. What We Know and Do Not Know about the Natural Rate of Unemployment. (1997). Katz, Lawrence ; Blanchard, Olivier.
    In: Journal of Economic Perspectives.
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  49. Institutions and Labor Reallocation. (1996). Rogerson, Richard ; Bertola, Giuseppe.
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  50. High-Wage Workers and High-Wage Firms. (1994). MARGOLIS, David ; Kramarz, Francis ; Abowd, John.
    In: CIRANO Working Papers.
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