- (1 − G)ei (3) where G > 0 denotes the level of altruism in the group according to Chen and Chen (2011). They assume that the in-group has a higher G than the neutral group which has a higher G than the outgroup. D > 0 represents any incentive payments as before. We can use the unique potential maximizing equilibrium as our prediction for the case of many effort levels, our predictions would be the same as Chen and Chen (2011). However we interpret G as being higher when people are socially connected, rather than having the same identity - denoting GC as the parameter for a connected group and GU for an unconnected group we assume that GC > GU . We would get qualitatively the same results with an alternative utility function used in Chen and Chen (2011) - players utility is a convex combination of own and other’s payoffs with weights, α > 0 on the other player’s payoff. Thus Ui = DY − c a
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