Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]
create a website
Education, Job Signaling, and Dual Labor Markets in Developing Countries. (1992). Mohtadi, Hamid ; Kim, Sunwoong.
In: Bulletins.
RePEc:ags:umedbu:7503.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Cited: 0

Citations received by this document

Cites: 16

References cited by this document

Cocites: 50

Documents which have cited the same bibliography

Coauthors: 0

Authors who have wrote about the same topic

Citations

Citations received by this document

    This document has not been cited yet.

References

References cited by this document

  1. Banks, J. and Sobel, J, Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games, Econometrica vol. 55, 1987: 647-663.

  2. Basu, K. , i~ Less Developed Economy: A Critiaue ~ Contenrnorarv Theory, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1984.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  3. Cho, I. K. and Kreps, Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria, quarterly Journal ~ Economics vol. 102, 1987: 179-221.

  4. Dickens, W. and K. Lang, A Test of Dual Labor Market Theory, American Economic Review vol. 75, 1985: 792-805.

  5. Dore, R., Diploma Disease: Education. qualification. ~ DeveloDment, George Allen and Unwin Ltd, London, 1976.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  6. Fields, C. The Allocation of Resources to Education in Less Developed Countries, Journal ~ Public Economics vol. 3, 1974: 133-143.

  7. Fields, G., Rural-Urban Migration, Urban Unemployment and Underemployment, and Job-Search Activity in the LDCs, Journal ~ Development Economics vol. 2, 1975: 165-187.

  8. Harris, J. and M. Todaro Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two-Sector Analysis, American Economic Review vol. 60, 1970: 126-142.

  9. Illich, I., Deschooling Society, Harper & Row, New York, 1970.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  10. Lewis, W. A., Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor, ii~ Manchester School, 1954: 139-91.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  11. Noldeke, G. and E. Van Dwnme, Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market, Review ~ Economic Studies vol. 57, 1990: 1-23.

  12. Psacharopoulos, C. and M. Woodhall, Education for Development: ~ Analysis ~ Investment Choices, Oxford University Press, New York, 1985.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  13. Salop, S. A Model of the Natural Rate of Unemployment, American Economic Review vol. 69, 1979: 117-25.

  14. Schultz, T., Investment in Human Capital, American Economic Review vol. 51, 1961: 1-17.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  15. Shapiro, C. and J. Stiglitz, Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device, American Economic Review vol. 74, 1984: 433-44.

  16. Spence, A. Michael, Market Signaling, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1974.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. Policy Making with Reputation Concerns. (2010). Li, Ming ; Fu, Qiang.
    In: Cahiers de recherche.
    RePEc:mtl:montec:09-2010.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. On Forward Induction. (2008). Wilson, Robert ; Govindan, Srihari .
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000001859.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. Revision of conjectures about the opponent’s utilities in signaling games. (2007). Vermeulen, Dries ; Perea, Andrés ; Peters, Hans ; Schulteis, Tim .
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:30:y:2007:i:2:p:373-384.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  4. Stock Price Manipulation: The Role of Intermediaries. (2007). Siddiqi, Hammad.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:6374.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  5. Strategic Information Transmission through the Media. (2007). Jung, Hanjoon.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:5556.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  6. Campaign Rhetoric and the Hide-and-Seek Game. (2007). Bhattacharya, Sourav .
    In: Working Paper.
    RePEc:pit:wpaper:326.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  7. Imperfect information, self-selection and the market for higher education. (2007). Regev, Tali.
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:fip:fedfwp:2007-18.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  8. Dynamic signaling and market breakdown. (2007). Skrzypacz, Andrzej ; Kremer, Ilan.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:133:y:2007:i:1:p:58-82.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  9. On Forward Induction. (2007). Wilson, Robert ; Govindan, Srihari .
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:321307000000000825.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  10. Credible Ratings. (2006). Suen, Wing ; Li, Hao ; Damiano, Ettore.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-219.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  11. The Groucho Effect of Uncertain Standards. (2006). Maxwell, John ; Harbaugh, Rick ; Roussillon, Beatrice .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:iuk:wpaper:2006-09.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  12. Sufficient Conditions for Stable Equilibria. (2006). Wilson, Robert ; Govindan, Srihari .
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000267.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  13. Discretionary Bonuses as a Feedback Mechanism. (2006). van de Ven, Jeroen ; Suvorov, Anton.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0088.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  14. Reliability and Responsibility: A Theory of Endogenous Commitment. (2006). Triossi, Matteo.
    In: Carlo Alberto Notebooks.
    RePEc:cca:wpaper:21.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  15. Robust Deviations from Signaling Equilibria. (2005). Schummer, James ; Eso, Peter.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1406.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  16. Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation. (2005). Tommasi, Mariano ; spiller, pablo ; Iaryczower, Matias.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11317.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  17. Job Market Signaling and Screening: An Experimental Comparison. (2005). Normann, Hans-Theo ; Müller, Wieland ; Kübler, Dorothea ; Muller, Wieland.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1794.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  18. Prospect Theory or Skill Signaling?. (2005). Harbaugh, Rick.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:iuk:wpaper:2005-06.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  19. Essays in Political Influence. (2005). Iaryczower, Matias.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000945.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  20. Continuous Signaling Within Partitions: Capital Structure and the FIFO/LIFO Choice. (2004). Thakor, Anjan ; Schwartz, Eduardo S. ; Hughes, Patricia J..
    In: Finance.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpfi:0411054.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  21. Information, Investment Horizon, and Price Reactions. (2004). Thakor, Anjan.
    In: Finance.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpfi:0411029.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  22. Few bad apples or plenty of lemons: which makes it harder to market plums?. (2004). Deidda, Luca.
    In: Working Paper CRENoS.
    RePEc:cns:cnscwp:200413.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  23. Partnership Dissolution, Complementarity, and Investment Incentives. (2004). Wolfstetter, Elmar ; Li, Jianpei.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1325.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  24. The Economics of Acting White. (2003). Fryer, Roland ; Austen-Smith, David ; Jr., .
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9904.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  25. Adding the Noise: A Theory of Compensation-Driven Earnings Management. (2003). Kandel, Eugene ; Guttman, Ilan ; Kadan, Ohad.
    In: Discussion Paper Series.
    RePEc:huj:dispap:dp355.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  26. Peer Pressure and Job Market Signaling. (2002). Austen-Smith, David.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1352.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  27. Trade Policy Under Asymmetric Information. (2002). Melkonyan, Tigran ; Lapan, Harvey.
    In: Staff General Research Papers Archive.
    RePEc:isu:genres:10026.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  28. Banking stability, reputational rents, and the stock market: should bank regulators care about stock prices?. (2002). Thakor, Anjan.
    In: Conference Series ; [Proceedings].
    RePEc:fip:fedbcp:y:2002.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  29. The physician-patient relationship as a game of strategic information transmission. (2001). De Jaegher, Kris ; Jegers, Marc.
    In: Health Economics.
    RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:10:y:2001:i:7:p:651-668.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  30. Campaigning and Ambiguity when Parties Cannot Make Credible Election Promises. (2001). Westermark, Andreas.
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0568.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  31. Price dynamics in a two-period reputation model. (2001). Filipovich, Dragan.
    In: Estudios Económicos.
    RePEc:emx:esteco:v:16:y:2001:i:2:p:185-201.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  32. Tax evasion, corruption, and the remuneration of heterogeneous inspectors. (2000). Wane, Waly.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2394.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  33. Dumping and Double Crossing: The (In)Effectiveness Of Cost-Based Trade Policy Under Incomplete Information. (1999). Prusa, Thomas ; Kolev, Dobrin.
    In: Departmental Working Papers.
    RePEc:rut:rutres:199901.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  34. Dumping and Double Crossing: The (In)Effectiveness of Cost-Based Trade Policy Under Incomplete Information. (1999). Prusa, Thomas ; Kolev, Dobrin R..
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6986.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  35. Too Cool for School? A Theory of Countersignaling. (1998). To, Ted ; Harbaugh, Rick ; Feltovich, Nick.
    In: Game Theory and Information.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9811002.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  36. Tariff Policy for a Monopolist Under Incomplete Information. (1998). Prusa, Thomas ; Kolev, Dobrin.
    In: Departmental Working Papers.
    RePEc:rut:rutres:199705.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  37. Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement. (1998). Palfrey, Thomas ; Cramton, Peter.
    In: Papers of Peter Cramton.
    RePEc:pcc:pccumd:95geb.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  38. Education and Job Market Signalling: A Comment.. (1997). Giannini, Massimo .
    In: Game Theory and Information.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9704002.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  39. Tariff Policy for a Monopolist Under Incomplete Information. (1997). Prusa, Thomas ; Kolev, Dobrin R..
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6090.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  40. Choosing Among Signalling Equilibria in Lobbying Games. (1996). Rasmusen, Eric.
    In: Game Theory and Information.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9607004.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  41. Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium. (1996). Kohlberg, Elon ; Hillas, John .
    In: Game Theory and Information.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9606002.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  42. Monitored finance, liquidity, and institutional investment choice. (1996). Winton, Andrew .
    In: Working Papers (Old Series).
    RePEc:fip:fedcwp:9616.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  43. Fully Revealing Equilibria with Suboptimal Investment. (1995). Persons, John C..
    In: Research in Financial Economics.
    RePEc:wop:ohsrfe:9507.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  44. Disclosure of Information in Regulatory Proceedings. (1995). poitevin, michel ; Lewis, Tracy.
    In: CIRANO Working Papers.
    RePEc:cir:cirwor:95s-01.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  45. Learning to Signal in Markets. (1994). Samuelson, Larry ; Nöldeke, Georg.
    In: Game Theory and Information.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9410001.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  46. Settlement Negotiations with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information Distribution and Efficiency. (1994). Reinganum, Jennifer ; Daughety, Andrew.
    In: Game Theory and Information.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9403009.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  47. Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. (1990). Manuelli, Alejandro M. ; Iorio, Karl.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:nwu:cmsems:915.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  48. Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria. (1990). Postlewaite, Andrew ; Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro ; Matthews, Steven.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:nwu:cmsems:892r.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  49. Sorting Out the Differences Between Signaling and Screening Models. (1990). Weiss, Andrew ; Stiglitz, Joseph.
    In: NBER Technical Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberte:0093.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  50. Signaling, Globality, and the Intuitive Criterion. (). Wichardt, Philipp ; Ewerhart, Christian.
    In: IEW - Working Papers.
    RePEc:zur:iewwpx:189.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Coauthors

Authors registered in RePEc who have wrote about the same topic

Report date: 2025-03-04 17:18:14 || Missing content? Let us know

CitEc is a RePEc service, providing citation data for Economics since 2001. Sponsored by INOMICS. Last updated October, 6 2023. Contact: CitEc Team.