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Using Evolutionary Game Theory to Examine U.S. and EU Agricultural Policy Institutions. (2005). Bullock, David ; Mittenzwei, Klaus.
In: 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark.
RePEc:ags:eaae05:24538.

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