Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods
Juan Moreno-Ternero
No 10.02, Working Papers from Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics
Abstract:
We analyze the problem of choosing the most appropriate method for apportioning taxes in a democracy. We consider a simple model of taxation and restrict our attention to piece-wise linear tax methods, which are almost ubiquitous in advanced democracies worldwide. In spite of facing an impossibility result saying that if we allow agents to vote for any piece-wise linear tax method no equilibrium exists, we show that if we limit the domain of admissible methods in a meaningful way, albeit not restrictive, an equilibrium does exist. We also show that, for such a domain, a wide variety of methods can be supported in equilibrium. This last result provides rationale for some activities of special interest groups.
Keywords: voting; taxes; majority; single crossing; special interest politics. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2010-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.upo.es/serv/bib/wps/econ1002.pdf First version, 2010 (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods (2011)
Working Paper: Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods (2011)
Working Paper: Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods (2010)
Working Paper: Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pab:wpaper:10.02
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics Carretera de Utrera km.1, 41013 Sevilla. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Publicación Digital - UPO ().