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Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: The GSM spectrum auction in Germany. (2001). Wolfstetter, Elmar ; Riedel, Frank ; Grimm, Veronika.
In: SFB 373 Discussion Papers.
RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200131.

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Cited: 4

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Cites: 11

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Cocites: 50

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Coauthors: 0

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Citations received by this document

  1. Advances in Auctions. (2014). Zamir, Shmuel ; Kaplan, Todd.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:54656.

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  2. CO 2 emission allowance allocation mechanisms, allocative efficiency and the environment: a static and dynamic perspective. (2007). .
    In: European Journal of Law and Economics.
    RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:24:y:2007:i:1:p:29-70.

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  3. Design of the 3G Spectrum Auctions in the UK and Germany: An Experimental Investigation. (2005). Seifert, Stefan ; Ehrhart, Karl-Martin.
    In: German Economic Review.
    RePEc:bla:germec:v:6:y:2005:i:2:p:229-248.

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  4. What Really Matters in Auction Design. (2002). Klemperer, Paul.
    In: Journal of Economic Perspectives.
    RePEc:aea:jecper:v:16:y:2002:i:1:p:169-189.

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References

References cited by this document

  1. Ausubel, L. and J. Schwartz [1999], “The ascending auction paradox,” Working paper, University of Maryland.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  2. Back, K. and J. Zender [1993], “Auctions of divisible goods,” Review of Financial Studies, 6, 733–764.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  3. Cramton, P. and J. A. Schwartz [2000], “Collusive bidding: lessons from the FCC spectrum auctions,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, 17, 229–252.

  4. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. and C. Kahn [1998], “Low revenue equilibria in simultaneous auctions,” Working paper, University of Illinois.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  5. Klemperer, P. [2000], “What really matters in auction design,” Working paper, Nuffield College, Oxford University.

  6. McAfee, R. and J. McMillan [1996], “Analyzing the airwaves auction,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 159–176.

  7. Menezes, F. M. [1996], “Multiple–unit English auctions,” European Journal of Political Economy, 12, 671–684.

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  9. Rubinstein, A. [1982], “Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining game,” Econometrica, 50, 97–109.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  10. Weber, R. J. [1997], “Making more from less: strategic demand reduction in the FCC spectrum auctions,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 6, 529–548.

  11. Wilson, R. [1979], “Auctions of shares,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93, 675–689.

Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. Collusion with a Greedy Center in Position Auctions. (2016). Lorenzon, Emmanuel.
    In: Cahiers du GREThA.
    RePEc:grt:wpegrt:2016-08.

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  2. Using spatial econometrics to test for collusive behavior in procurement auction data. (2015). Lundberg, Sofia ; Bergman, Mats A ; Stake, Johan Y.
    In: Umeå Economic Studies.
    RePEc:hhs:umnees:0917.

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  3. Leveraged Buyout Activity: A Tale of Developed and Developing Economies. (2014). Lloyd, Blenman ; Nischala, Reddy .
    In: Journal of Financial Management, Markets and Institutions.
    RePEc:mul:jdp901:doi:10.12831/78757:y:2014:i:2:p:157-184.

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  4. Bid Roundness Under Collusion in Japanese Procurement Auctions. (2014). Ishii, Rieko.
    In: Review of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:kap:revind:v:44:y:2014:i:3:p:241-254.

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  5. Demand reduction and preemptive bidding in multi-unit license auctions. (2013). Sloof, Randolph ; Goeree, Jacob ; Offerman, Theo.
    In: Experimental Economics.
    RePEc:kap:expeco:v:16:y:2013:i:1:p:52-87.

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  6. Royalty bargaining in Public–Private Partnership projects: Insights from a theoretic three-stage game auction model. (2013). Kang, Chao-Chung ; Lee, Tsun-Siou ; Huang, Szu-Chi .
    In: Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review.
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  7. Water Cooler Ostracism: Social Exclusion as a Punishment Mechanism. (2013). Davis, Brent ; Johnson, David.
    In: Working Papers.
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  8. Nonlinear Incentive Schemes and Corruption in Public Procurement: Evidence from the Czech Republic. (2013). Palguta, Jan.
    In: CERGE-EI Working Papers.
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  9. Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case. (2012). Lavi, Ron ; Oren, Sigal .
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:76:y:2012:i:2:p:439-456.

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  10. The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders. (2012). Lamy, Laurent.
    In: Journal of Econometrics.
    RePEc:eee:econom:v:167:y:2012:i:1:p:113-132.

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  11. Forensic Economics. (2012). Zitzewitz, Eric.
    In: Journal of Economic Literature.
    RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:50:y:2012:i:3:p:731-69.

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  12. Carbon Allowance Auction Design: An Assessment of Options for the United States. (2011). Murray, Brian ; McAdams, David ; Marx, Leslie ; Lopomo, Giuseppe.
    In: Review of Environmental Economics and Policy.
    RePEc:oup:renvpo:v:5:y:2011:i:1:p:25-43.

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  13. Unintended Consequences of Price Controls: An Application to Allowance Markets. (2010). Stocking, Andrew.
    In: MPRA Paper.
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  14. Club deals in leveraged buyouts. (2010). Sensoy, Berk A. ; Ozbas, Oguzhan ; Officer, Micah S..
    In: Journal of Financial Economics.
    RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:98:y:2010:i:2:p:214-240.

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  15. Yardstick Competition, Franchise Bidding and Firms’ Incentives to Collude. (2009). HUET, Freddy ; Chong, Eshien.
    In: Review of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:kap:revind:v:35:y:2009:i:1:p:149-169.

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  16. Auction design and tacit collusion in FCC spectrum auctions. (2009). Yeo, Jungwon ; Bajari, Patrick.
    In: Information Economics and Policy.
    RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:21:y:2009:i:2:p:90-100.

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  17. Auction Design and Tacit Collusion in FCC Spectrum Auctions. (2008). Yeo, Jungwon ; Bajari, Patrick.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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  18. Economics at the FCC: 2007–2008. (2008). Crawford, Gregory ; Levy, Jonathan ; Kwerel, Evan.
    In: Review of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:kap:revind:v:33:y:2008:i:3:p:187-210.

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  19. Crossholdings, concentration and information in capacity-constrained sealed bid-offer auctions. (2008). Micola, Augusto Ruperez ; Bunn, Derek W..
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:66:y:2008:i:3-4:p:748-766.

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  20. Market performance and collusion in sequential and simultaneous multi-object auctions: Evidence from an ascending auctions experiment. (2008). Sherstyuk, Katerina ; Dulatre, Jeremy.
    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:eee:indorg:v:26:y:2008:i:2:p:557-572.

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  21. Revenues in the 700 MHz Spectrum Auction. (2007). Wilson, Robert ; Skrzypacz, Andrzej ; Cramton, Peter.
    In: Papers of Peter Cramton.
    RePEc:pcc:pccumd:07rev700.

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  22. Antitrust. (2007). Shapiro, Carl ; Kaplow, Louis.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12867.

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  23. Economics at the Federal Communications Commission. (2006). Marx, Leslie.
    In: Review of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:kap:revind:v:29:y:2006:i:4:p:349-368.

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  24. Detecting Cartels. (2005). Harrington, Joseph.
    In: Economics Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:jhu:papers:526.

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  25. The Landscape of Electronic Market Design. (2005). Anandalingam, G. ; Raghavan, S. ; Day, Robert W..
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  26. Auctions with bidder-determined allowable combinations. (2005). Rothkopf, Michael H. ; Park, Sunju .
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  27. The Italian Auction for Radio Spectrum Licences. (2005). Bartolini, David.
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  28. Demand Reduction and Preemptive Bidding in Multi-Unit License Auctions. (2004). Sloof, Randolph ; Goeree, Jacob ; Offerman, Theo.
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  29. Taking the Lab to the Field: Experimental Tests of Alternative Mechanisms to Procure Multiple Contracts. (2004). Nilsson, Jan-Eric ; Lunander, Anders.
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  30. Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities. (2004). Lopomo, Giuseppe (Pino) ; Brusco, Sandro.
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  31. Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Privately Known Budget Constraints. (2004). Lopomo, Giuseppe (Pino) ; Brusco, Sandro.
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  32. Combinatorial Auction Design. (2003). Pekevc, Aleksandar ; Rothkopf, Michael H..
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  33. Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions. (2002). Cramton, Peter ; Schwartz, Jesse .
    In: Papers of Peter Cramton.
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  34. Some Results on Anti-Competitive Behavior in Multi-Unit Ascending Price Auctions. (2002). Sherstyuk, Katerina.
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  35. Collusion in private value ascending price auctions. (2002). Sherstyuk, Katerina.
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  36. The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences. (2002). Klemperer, Paul ; Binmore, Ken.
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  37. On some collusive and signaling equilibria in ascending auctions for multiple objects. (2002). Lovo, Stefano ; Germano, Fabrizio ; Albano, Gian Luigi.
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  38. The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences. (2002). Klemperer, Paul ; Binmore, Kenneth.
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  39. A Laboratory Study of Auctions for Reducing Non-Point Source Pollution. (2002). Gangadharan, Lata ; Cason, Timothy ; Duke, Charlotte .
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  40. Subasta de telefonía móvil: ¿una experiencia inconclusa en Uruguay?. (2001). Pereyra, Andres .
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  41. Spectrum Auctions. (2001). Cramton, Peter.
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  42. Collusion via Signaling in Multiple Object Auctions with Complementarities- An Experimental Test*. (2001). Sherstyuk, Katerina ; Kwasnica, Anthony M..
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  43. Strange Bids: Bidding Behaviour in the United Kingdoms Third Generation Spectrum Auction. (2001). dustmann, christian ; Börgers, Tilman ; Borgers, Tilman .
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  44. Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory. (2000). Klemperer, Paul.
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  45. 5th Helsinki Workshop on Standardization and Networks, 13-14 August, 2000. (2000). Niskanen, Esko ; Holler, Manfred J. ; Coenen, Heide.
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  46. What Really Matters in Auction Design: the European Spectrum Auctions. (2000). Klemperer, Paul.
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  47. Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions. (2000). Cramton, Peter ; Schwartz, Jesse .
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  48. What Really Matters in Auction Design. (2000). Klemperer, Paul.
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  49. A Review of ISO New Englands Proposed Market Rules. (1998). Wilson, Robert ; Cramton, Peter.
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  50. Carbon Allowance Auction Design: An Assessment of Options for the U.S.. (). Murray, Brian ; Marx, Leslie ; Lopomo, Giuseppe (Pino) ; McAdams, David .
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