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Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: The GSM spectrum auction in Germany

Veronika Grimm (), Frank Riedel and Elmar Wolfstetter

No 2001,31, SFB 373 Discussion Papers from Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes

Abstract: The second-generation GSM spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a theoretical explanation of low price equilibria in simultaneous, ascending-bid auctions. In particular it is shown that the low price equilibrium that implements the efficient allocation is the unique perfect equilibrium of that game.

Keywords: multi-unit auctions; spectrum auctions; telecommunications; industrial organization; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/62770/1/724885277.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany (2003) Downloads
Working Paper: Low Price Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions: The GSM Spectrum Auction in Germany (2001) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200131

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