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Limited Commitment in Multi†agent Contracting*. (2007). Hofmann, Christian ; Feltham, Gerald A.
In: Contemporary Accounting Research.
RePEc:wly:coacre:v:24:y:2007:i:2:p:345-375.

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  1. Access to the Internet and Access to Finance: Theory and Evidence. (2018). Chu, Chien-Chi ; Gong, Xiaolin ; Chen, Yinghui ; Cao, Yang.
    In: Sustainability.
    RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:10:y:2018:i:7:p:2534-:d:158807.

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