- Anheier, H. K., Haber, M., & Kayser, M., Eds. (2018). Governance Indicators: Approaches, Progress, Promise. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
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- Apaza, C. (2009). Measuring Governance and Corruption through the Worldwide Governance Indicators: Critiques, Responses, and Ongoing Scholarly Discussion. PS: Political Science & Politics 42(1): 139-143.
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- Arriola, L. R. (2009). Patronage and Political Stability in Africa. Comparative Political Studies 42(10): 1339-1362.
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- Bäck, H., Teorell, J., & Lindberg, S. I. (2019). Cabinets, Prime Ministers, and Corruption: A Comparative Analysis of Parliamentary Governments in Post-War Europe. Political Studies 67(1): 149-170.
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- Besley, T. (2005). Political Selection. Journal of Economic Perspectives 19(3): 43-60.
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- Cheibub, J. A. (2007). Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy. New York, NY, Cambridge University Press.
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Cruz, C., & Keefer, P. (2015). Political Parties, Clientelism, and Bureaucratic Reform.
- Data Appendix Cabinet: The number of ministers with full cabinet rank, excluding other members of the executive without cabinet rank, notably junior or deputy ministers, and individuals with lowerlevel executive functions. Source: Arriola (2009) plus authors’ updates from later editions of Europa Publications, Africa South of the Sahara. Control of Corruption (CC): Captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests. Rescaled so that most scores lie between about 0 and about 100, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes.
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- Defense minister: Indicator of whether the defense minister is a military officer. 1 = military officer, 0 = not a military officer. Source: Inter-American Development Bank, Database of Political Institutions 2017, DEFMIN.
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- Electoral democracy: Measure of the extent to which the ideal of electoral democracy is achieved. Ranges from 0 (not at all) to 1 (fully achieved). Source: July 2018 version of the VDem data set, v2x_polyarchy.
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- Executive Corruption Index (ECI), reversed: Measures how routinely members of the executive, or their agents grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use. Rescaled to range from 0 (corrupt) to 100 (not corrupt). Source: July 2018 version of the V-Dem data set, v2x_execorr.
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Francois, P., Rainer, I., & Trebbi, F. (2015). How Is Power Shared in Africa? Econometrica 83(2): 465-503 Hallerberg, M., & Wehner, J. (2018). When Do You Get Economists as Policy Makers? British Journal of Political Science (forthcoming).
- GDP per capita: Log of GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$). Source: Word Bank, World Development Indicators, March 2019, NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.
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- Government Effectiveness (GE): Captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Rescaled so that most scores lie between about 0 and about 100, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes. Source: September 2018 update of the Worldwide Governance Indicators, GEE.
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- Government fractionalization: The probability that two deputies picked at random from among the government parties will be of different parties. Ranges from 0 to 1. Source: Inter-American Development Bank, Database of Political Institutions 2017, GOVFRAC.
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https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123417000497 Langbein, L., & Knack, S. (2010). The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Six, One, or None? Journal of Development Studies 46(2): 350-370.
- https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123417000801 House of Commons [UK] (2010). Too Many Ministers? Public Administration Select Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2009-10, HC 457, 16 March. London, The Stationery Office.
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- Hyden, G. (2006). African Politics in Comparative Perspective. New York, NY, Cambridge University Press.
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- Indridason, I. H., & Bowler, S. (2014). Determinants of Cabinet Size. European Journal of Political Research 53(2): 381-403.
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Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2010). The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5430. Washington, DC, World Bank.
Keefer, P. (2013). Organizing for Prosperity: Collective Action, Political Parties and the Political Economy of Development. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6583. Washington, DC, World Bank.
- Kramon, E., & Posner, D. N. (2011). Kenya's New Constitution. Journal of Democracy 22(2): 89-103.
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- Kroeger, A. M. (2018). Dominant Party Rule, Elections, and Cabinet Instability in African Autocracies. British Journal of Political Science (forthcoming).
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La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. (1999). The Quality of Government. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15(1): 222-279.
- Left: Party of the chief executive is communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing. 1 = left, 0 = not left. Source: Inter-American Development Bank, Database of Political Institutions 2017, EXECRLC.
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- LeVan, A. C., & Assenov, A. (2016). Parties or Portfolio? The Economic Consequences of Africa's Big Cabinets. Government and Opposition 51(4): 661-690.
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- Lindberg, S. (2010). What Accountability Pressures Do MPs in Africa Face and How Do They Respond? Evidence from Ghana. Journal of Modern African Studies 48(1): 117-142.
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- Martínez-Gallardo, C. (2010). Inside the Cabinet: The Influence of Ministers in the Policymaking Process. In C. Scartascini, E. Stein, & M. Tommasi (Eds.) How Democracy Works: Political Institutions, Actors, and Arenas in Latin American Policymaking. Washington, DC, Inter-American Development Bank: 119-145.
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- Military: Indicator of whether the chief executive is a military officer. 1 = military officer, 0 = not a military officer. Source: Inter-American Development Bank, Database of Political Institutions 2017, MILITARY.
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- Mills, L. (2012). Questionable Assumptions and Unintended Consequences: A Critical Assessment of the International Donor Community’s Fight against Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa. PhD thesis. London, London School of Economics and Political Science. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/467/ Olken, B. A. (2007). Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia. Journal of Political Economy 115(2): 200-249.
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Perotti, R., & Kontopoulos, Y. (2002). Fragmented Fiscal Policy. Journal of Public Economics 86(2): 191-222.
- Polity: Revised Combined Polity Score ranging from-10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). Source: October 2018 version of the Polity IV data set, polity2.
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- Programmatic parties: Following Cruz and Keefer (2015), the share of the largest three government parties and the largest opposition party that are right, left, or center in their orientation. When the orientation of a political party is either not discernible in the sources employed or unrelated to economic policy, it is counted as non-programmatic. Ranges from 0 to 1. Source: Inter-American Development Bank, Database of Political Institutions 2017, GOV1RLC, GOV2RLC, GOV3RLC, OPP1RLC.
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- Regulatory Quality (RQ): Captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Rescaled so that most scores lie between about 0 and about 100, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes. Source: September 2018 update of the Worldwide Governance Indicators, RQE. Rule of Law (RL): Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
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- Rescaled so that most scores lie between about 0 and about 100, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes. Source: September 2018 update of the Worldwide Governance Indicators, RLE.
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- Reuters (2017). Ghana Opposition Slams President Over 'Elephant Size' Government. March 16. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ghana-politics/ghana-oppositionslams -president-over-elephant-size-government-idUSKBN16N2TU.
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- Reuters (2019). South Africa's Ramaphosa Retains Mboweni, Gordhan in New, Leaner Cabinet. May 29. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-politics/southafricas -ramaphosa-retains-mboweni-gordhan-in-new-leaner-cabinetidUSKCN1SZ1VG Roessler, P. (2011). The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa. World Politics 63(2): 300-346.
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- Source: September 2018 update of the Worldwide Governance Indicators, CCE. Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI): Measure of perceived levels of public sector corruption according to experts and businesspeople. Ranges from 0 to 100, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes. Source: Transparency International, data compiled by Jeffry Jacob.
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- Torgler, B., & Frey, B. S. (2012). Politicians: Be Killed or Survive. Public Choice 156(12) : 357-386.
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- van de Walle, N. (2001). African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 19791999. New York, NY, Cambridge University Press.
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- van de Walle, N. (2007). Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss? The Evolution of Political Clientelism in Africa. In H. Kitschelt & S. I. Wilkinson (Eds.) Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition. New York, NY, Cambridge University Press: 50-67.
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- van de Walle, N. (2012). The Path from Neopatrimonialism: Democracy and Clientelism in Africa Today. In D. C. Bach & M. Gazibo (Eds.) Neopatrimonialism in Africa and Beyond. Abingdon and New York, NY, Routledge: 111-123.
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Volkerink, B., & de Haan, J. (2001). Fragmented Government Effects on Fiscal Policy: New Evidence. Public Choice 109(3-4): 221-242.
Wehner, J. (2010). Cabinet Structure and Fiscal Policy Outcomes. European Journal of Political Research 49(5): 631-653.
Woo, J. (2003). Economic, Political, and Institutional Determinants of Public Deficits. Journal of Public Economics 87(3-4): 387-426.
- Years in office: The number of years that the chief executive has been in office. Source: InterAmerican Development Bank, Database of Political Institutions 2017, YRSOFFC.
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- Years to election: Years left in the current electoral term of the executive. Source: InterAmerican Development Bank, Database of Political Institutions 2017, YRCURNT.
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