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Showing posts with label Auckland. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Auckland. Show all posts

Tuesday, 20 August 2024

Responding to Simon Wilson of the NZ Herald on Auckland congestion pricing

First a warning. I don't use this blog as a place for debate or polemics, but on this occasion, I have decided to respond to an article which is quite damning, as an example of the sort of debate one endures around the topic of road pricing. This article is by no means the worst I've ever seen, but it is full of assertions with little to no evidence, mistakes and bold claims that appear to be more motivated by a desire to undermine the policy itself (and perhaps this is because it is from a government he himself does not support), than to critically review the merits of it.

The NZ Herald is Auckland’s (New Zealand) newspaper of record. Simon Wilson (no relation) is the NZ Herald’s senior writer on transport issues. Given the NZ Government’s recent announcement of its intention to advance congestion pricing (called time of use pricing), he has written a column on the topic, which is arguably a polemic of weak argument against it. Note it is behind a paywall. I am a subscriber, but it is not worth you paying to read his article though. 

It is possible to critique time of use pricing in Auckland on some grounds, such as whether it could be expanded at reasonable cost sufficiently to significantly address congestion, or whether net revenues should be redistributed through tax cuts rather than spending on infrastructure, or if it is better to introduce road pricing more generally, so driving outside congested time and locations is cheaper.  It is possible to argue that there should be more and better public transport to accompany road pricing, or that it could cause government to delay or cancel some new road projects, but none of that is apparent.  

I’ve spent over 20 years working on road pricing policy around the world and I have seen arguments against road pricing from a range of perspectives. Some on the right see it as an additional tax that intends to limit motorists’ freedom and increases the power of the state against them or is used to invade their privacy through "tracking". Some on the left see it as unfair that a scarce resource (road space) is allocated on the basis of price rather than queuing.  Wilson is on the left.

Simon Wilson has written many columns in the past about the importance of tackling climate change, of getting more people out of their cars and into public transport or active modes. He is a fervent believer in behaviour change in urban transport policy. Now he is making himself perhaps the highest profile campaigner against the one policy that could achieve more of what he claims to want than any other – more efficient road pricing.

He titles his article “Sorry Simeon Brown, congestion charges are not the key to freeing up the roads”. 

He’s wrong. I doubt Wilson can identify a city in the world that has freed up its roads without road pricing, he certainly doesn’t name any. Short of Pyongyang (or Covid lockdowns), I don’t know of any major city in the world without road pricing that has significantly reduced congestion, although certainly some that have it do still have severe congestion (notably London). Singapore and Gothenburg certainly have much less congestion than before either city had congestion pricing, Stockholm has much lower congestion approaching its central city and along its main bypass route (although there remains congestion elsewhere in its network). Milan still has bad congestion, although it is better with pricing.  Wilson does not indicate which cities on a scale of Auckland have freed up their roads without either road pricing or depopulation

So what else did he have to say?

He repeatedly asserts that time-of-use pricing, congestion charging etc is a “tax”, which presumably he is saying for pejorative impact to appeal to readers on the right of politics (new taxes are "bad" from a traditional rightwing perspective).  Whether or not it is a tax would be a legislative matter. I’m not sure if he thinks water meters are a “tax” or electricity meters, but applying a price, that varies by time-of-day, and is periodically reviewed as to user demand (as in Singapore), is not very much like a tax. In Sweden, congestion pricing is called the “congestion tax” for legal reasons, in Singapore the term “Electronic Road Pricing” is used to describe simply a fee for using the roads. Does he see bus fares as a tax? Does he see the existing toll roads in NZ as a tax? This is hardly a major point, but it sets the tone for this article, which is a not particularly coherent piece, sometimes opposing road pricing and in one place saying "it has a role". 

Although he admits that congestion pricing works, he then makes several claims that do not stand up to scrutiny, namely:

They can “do a lot of harm”;

They are “not the key to reducing congestion”.

He also says they are not popular, which is hardly a surprise, as reports from The Congestion Question (the last major study into the topic from 2016-2020) indicated that public acceptability is the greatest challenge to implementing congestion pricing. Wilson’s column is of course helping to add to this challenge. I don't think you should complain about something being unpopular by contributing to its unpopularity sans the merits.

What about "do a lot of harm”? He doesn’t elaborate, and in fact provides zero evidence of a "lot of harm" anywhere, so why say it? Why scaremonger?

He then acknowledges that for commercial traffic, congestion is a cost, whether for freight delivery or simply providing services that require getting between sites.  However, he then describes Stockholm, London and Singapore as all being cordon schemes, which isn’t quite accurate. Although he cites The Congestion Question report, he clearly did not read the report on international experience (PDF) (disclaimer: I wrote that with colleagues of mine).

Let's be clear, Singapore is predominantly a corridor scheme (with two small cordons), with most charging points on major roads and arterial routes approaching the downtown. Stockholm is a cordon (PDF), but also now has a corridor charge for the Essingeleden motorway that passes through the city.  London is strictly an area charge (it charges circulation within the cordon as well as crossing it).  

Wilson mentions this because he prefers cordons it seems but sees corridor charging (which the Mayor of Auckland did propose last year) as being flawed because they are easy to avoid by rat-running on local roads. That’s true, if you don’t put in place measures to price that rat-running (e.g. by pricing exiting and then re-entering a road to avoid a priced point). 

This appears to be a very weak attempt to condemn road pricing schemes that aren't cordons, but the Government's policy is not that there should not be cordons, or that there should be any specific type of congestion pricing scheme at all.  

Of course, there has been no decision at all about what proposal to introduce in Auckland, but the Congestion Question did recommend a downtown cordon supplemented by corridor charges, on the most congested routes on the Isthmus and towards the North Shore first. More work has to be done on what the first scheme would look like. So it seems rather premature to be antagonistic to the very concept as a whole at this stage.

The Congestion Question indicative downtown cordon

His next point is to appear to be critical of the timeframe, as he claims the first scheme would not be in place until 2028. This seems pessimistic. Sure the legislation and approvals will not be finished until 2025, but it is entirely plausible for a scheme to be operational within two years of that. He indicates that the timing of elections (local in 2025, national in 2026) is driving this, but it’s unclear that this could be accelerated to be significantly faster. He says it should be operational when the City Rail Link opens, which I agree, but it seems unlikely that even if approved today, that a scheme could be operational in 18 months. Yet surely if that is the best time, the second best time is as soon as possible afterwards?

Then Wilson goes back to how unpopular it would be. He claims it is a “regressive tax”, yet I don’t recall him calling the introduction of the Auckland Regional Fuel Tax that, even though there is a study that explicitly concluded that (PDF). The fuel tax applied 12.5c/l on petrol and diesel sold in Auckland, and of course meant everyone driving paid it, except those able to afford an EV or hybrid vehicle. Wilson did support the regional fuel tax when it was introduced, and he said “It does hurt the poor disproportionately …. But it also targets almost everyone who's clogging up the roads”.

That’s nonsense. It targeted nobody. He also said “one day we’ll have better ways to manage demand” saying essentially road pricing would be that but “we don't have the technology in place to do that yet and it's controversial”. The regional fuel tax was not introduced as a demand management tool, but moreover the technology to do road pricing exists now.

Now the government is now advancing it, and he opposes it, not because of the unavailability of technology. Of course the regional fuel tax is now history, but that measure improving the cost of living for most Aucklanders is unnoticed, because this is a polemic.

He gives no evidence for road pricing being particularly regressive, although as a concept it is no more “regressive” than pricing water, electricity or indeed public transport or food. As part of developing proposals for Ministerial approval, an impact analysis of the proposed “time of use” pricing scheme will need to be undertaken.  Perhaps Wilson could focus on what that analysis should look like, rather than dismissing the whole idea of pricing as regressive. Now the Gothenburg congestion tax IS regressive, there is evidence of this (PDF), but it was a scheme set up to raise revenue and is far larger in scope than the scheme that would have been needed to relieve congestion.  The NZ Government is proposing time of use pricing specifically to improve network productivity, not to raise revenue, but Wilson ignores that, as it doesn't fit his polemic. Of course congestion is regressive, as the richest don't commute at peak times or can buy homes close to work.

He claims “It’s not the key to solving congestion. And one of the most common arguments for it is economic gibberish”. This is rather embarrassing. If you don’t understand an economic argument then the best way of understanding it is not to call it gibberish, in fact it displays astonishing ignorance. His understanding of the value of time and the economic impacts of congestion is poor indeed.

He claims “These charges will be a cost of doing business that companies will pass on to their customers. For the general public, they will raise the cost of living”. Will they? Having claimed correctly that less congestion will make all sorts of businesses more productive, whether it be for freight deliveries or services such as the building trades, they will be able to undertake more jobs for the same cost (wasting less time and fuel). Pretty much all benefit/cost analysis indicates businesses save much more than congestion pricing costs, so it would not be passed onto customers. Of course congestion costs are passed on.

It's his next claim that is the most embarrassing.

Alan McDonald from the Employers and Manufacturers Association (EMA) has said much the same. “Recent traffic monitoring data has found that Aucklanders are losing 22 million hours per year out of their lives while they sit in traffic,” he declared. “That equates to a $1.3 billion annual hit to GPD.”

Gibberish. You can’t link private travel to productivity because very few people drive to work on company time. However long your commute takes, it’s your own time you’re wasting.

Everyone resents it, and fair enough. But the economic value – the “annual hit to the GDP” – is zero.

Wilson claims that the economic cost of congestion to private individuals is zero. He claims this doesn’t impact on GDP.  Let’s set aside the obvious social cost. Congestion means commuters leave home earlier and get home later than they would otherwise. That’s less time with family, less personal time, less time to cook, to exercise, to sleep even. Wilson understands what externalities are, I think, so he could at least acknowledge that.  However, what he misses out is what congestion does to opportunities for individuals.

You see the available job pool for most people is directly related to the duration of commute from wherever they live to wherever jobs are located. Most people are happy to commute for up to half an hour, and many in a larger city for up to an hour, although those with children to look after are more challenged. Beyond an hour those able to spare that amount to time to travel to and from work are much more limited in number. In short, congestion reduces the opportunities people have to increase their incomes with better employment, and it also reduces the labour pool available to employers to improve their productivity. I’m always a little sceptical of the methodologies used to “cost” congestion, but to dismiss traffic congestion as not imposing costs on GDP as it applies to private individuals is ignorant. There is literature to back this up.

Wilson then determines that the answer isn’t road pricing, but more rapid transit. Yet he doesn’t seem to be able to explain why cities like Paris, Amsterdam, Tokyo, New York, Sydney or San Francisco all have chronic congestion WITH lots of rapid transit? The Northern Busway is a great piece of infrastructure, but it hasn’t fixed congestion on the Northern Motorway, although it has absorbed a lot of demand growth. Buses do carry a lot of people over the Auckland Harbour Bridge, but the idea that this is a substitute for road pricing is simply absurd. He may as well say that you don’t need parking fees if there are free buses.  It’s completely false to equate the impacts of the Congestion Question, which was a network wide reduction in congestion, from the effects of the Busway on one corridor.  He claims rapid transit reduces emissions. This only happens if it enables modal shift from driving cars, which of course congestion pricing promotes as well (bearing in mind transport emission in NZ are capped with the Emissions Trading Scheme anyway). 

The article explains all of the benefits from a lot of public transport, without even really noting that the costs of all of this infrastructure he wants need to be paid for, and one way of doing it would be through congestion pricing. That doesn’t mean I think that’s how the money should be spent, but surely that connection could be made? Furthermore, all of the rapid transit he touts does absolutely nothing for freight or tradies or other commercial traffic, as they can’t use it.

He then makes this remarkable failure to connect thoughts:

Our roads are appallingly congested, we are failing to reduce carbon emissions and our road safety record is among the worst in the developed world. The opportunity is for a rethink about how and why we use the roads, so we can build ourselves a more functional, friendlier city. Instead, the Government proposes a new tax.

He claims “a great many people will not be able to avoid a congestion tax”. How does he know? If it is a downtown cordon, where only 13% of employment is based and half of commuters already travel by public transport or active modes then hardly anyone will be affected. Even if it is just the Mayor’s two corridors, that wont affect most commuters either. Again, this is just nonsense. 

If Simon Wilson can’t see the link between road pricing, reducing congestion and emissions, and making a city more functional and friendly, then he is either ignorant or deliberately disingenuous. I fear he is simply a polemicist seeking a headline and he can’t give any credit to a politician he doesn’t like or support for implementing a policy that does more for what he wants than any other single measure at the lowest cost.

Opposing the very concept of time-of-use road pricing at this critical stage indicates he is not really interested in enabling all of the potential tools to reduce congestion, lower demand for emissions and encourage modal shift at all, but rather is just writing polemics for headlines. 

Wilson would be better placed to focus not on opposing the first government in NZ’s history to advance road pricing to implementation, but rather to focus on the design of the first scheme proposal for Auckland, to ensure it has a positive impact on reducing congestion, minimal impact on those with low incomes and limited choice, and to encourage creative solutions, such as those used elsewhere, to address any issues. If he wants a cordon, then talk about it. If he wants a different option, then fine. However, if he doesn’t know anything much about the topic at all, he might prefer to read a bit more, talk to people who do and not try to undermine a policy that actually has general support across the political spectrum from the Greens on the hard-left to ACT on the classically-liberal right. 

Time-of-use pricing could help Auckland look much more like what Simon Wilson wants it to, it’s just a shame he wants to get in its way, on grounds that are spurious and almost entirely baseless.

The Congestion Question evaluation of impacts

Friday, 16 February 2024

Crucial next steps for Auckland congestion pricing

 I wrote on my Rational Transport policy blog on this topic, largely because it was around transport governance issues.  The article is here.

Tuesday, 21 November 2023

Auckland's Mayor and Council vote overwhelmingly for congestion charging, but there are some issues

The big road pricing news in New Zealand in the past week was the Mayor of Auckland, Wayne Brown, calling for congestion charging and appearing on media declaring how critical it was for the city. This was not in terms of raising revenue, but in addressing congestion.  On Radio NZ he said Auckland could not afford another motorway, and that the charge would be avoidable by driving outside of peak times.

“I am of the view that this should be on our motorways in the central areas of Auckland, which are the most congested, and this is also where public transport works best, which gives some people an option rather than paying the charge”

He ridiculed concerns about equity around trade businesses, saying that to pay $5 to save 20 minutes was a small fraction of the price the tradespeople charge their customers in an hour. He also said that schoolchildren “don’t’ have a right to be taken to school in a BMW” and more should walk, bike or use public transport. 

The Mayor was elected in 2022 and has a three year term, but his support for the concept was only solidified when Auckland Council voted 18-2 in favour of setting up a team to oversee implementation of congestion charging.

Despite that report, Auckland is not going to get congestion pricing in two years. Legislation will take around a year to introduce and pass at best, and it will take around 18 months to procure and install a system at best. However, you have to admire the ambition.

The astonishing level of local political support for the concept is unheard of in any other city where the private car is by far the dominant transport mode.  In 2018 (according to the Census), around two-thirds of Aucklanders commuted by car (whether as driver or passenger), 11% by bus, 9% walked and 8% worked from home, 3% by train and just over 1% by bicycle. It seems likely that the proportion working from home, cycling and using public transport has increased since then. 

Let's be clear to those unfamiliar with Auckland. The Mayor is ostensibly "centre-right" and got elected opposing the "war on cars". The Council as well is fairly balanced between left and right wing members.

Unlike New York and almost all other US cities that have been investigating congestion pricing, Auckland is regarding the net revenues as secondary (although the Mayor is interested in revenue, as the incoming government has pledged to abolish the regional fuel tax of NZ$0.10 per litre that raises revenue for transport projects in the city). The primary focus is reducing congestion and encouraging behavioural change. However, it would clearly generate net revenue and would also have positive environmental benefits.

Why does this matter?

All of the cities that have introduced congestion pricing around the world so far have been quite different from Auckland, and indeed all of the predominantly car-oriented low density cities that are seen in New World cities in New Zealand, Australia and North America. Singapore, Oslo, London, Stockholm and Milan all have significant mode shares for public transport. However, Dubai and Abu Dhabi (and soon Doha) are car dependent cities, even moreso than Auckland, whereas Gothenburg in Sweden is much closer to the mode shares seen in New World cities. 

Although New York will be the first US city to introduce some form of congestion charging, it is being implemented in lower Manhattan, which is much more like central London than most US cities, and it is being introduced 24/7 (with peak charges) primarily to raise revenue. New York is not a model for other North American cities.

Auckland on the other hand, has around 87% of its employment outside the central city, it has around a 50% mode share for public transport and active modes for trips to the central city at peak times, but a much lower mode share for trips to other parts of Auckland at peak times. In short, congestion in Auckland is primarily about trips across the city, not to the downtown.  Pricing in Auckland will work only in part by encouraging modal shift, but will in a large part be about encouraging a small proportion of trips to shift time of day or frequency of driving. 

Furthermore, unlike many other developed cities, Auckland has had over 20 years of billions of dollars in continuous major capital spending on its transport networks.  During that time, the road network has been significantly upgraded, with additional lanes on motorways and a ring route around the west bypassing the congested central motorway junction. The commuter rail network was extended to the downtown, electrified with new trains, adding new lines, and is now being expanded with an inner city loop. Bus services have been expanded, with busways and new buses, routes and expanded frequencies.  In short, Auckland has seen extensive capital spending on its transport infrastructure and it has been unable to keep up with demand, and congestion has not been resolved.  

Supply of transport infrastructure does not sustainably reduce traffic congestion. 

If Auckland successfully implements congestion pricing, it will be a world leader in implementing road pricing in a city with automobile dominance.

What has been proposed?

The Mayor has specifically proposed a charge on two segments of motorway of NZ$3.50 - $5 per trip.  It would operate in the AM and PM peaks only on the North Western Motorway (SH16) between Lincoln Road and Te Atatu Road, and on the Southern Motorway (SH1) between Penrose and Greenlane. These are two of the most congested parts of Auckland’s motorway network.  The map below depicts the short section of North Western Motorway, the segment of Southern Motorway and the earlier proposed downtown cordon (which is bypassed by the motorway network which goes from south to the Auckland Harbour Bridge and from the west to the Ports of Auckland).

Auckland congestion pricing concepts.

Undoubtedly the motorway proposals would have a positive impact. While the North Western motorway at this location has no reasonable alternative route, the Southern motorway does have a wide at-grade arterial road, albeit with multiple sets of traffic signals and a much lower speed limit. Some measures would need to be taken to minimise diversion onto the parallel routes. 

It's worth noting that a major study into congestion pricing in Auckland, called The Congestion Question, was carried out from 2016-2020, and recommended that a downtown cordon be introduced, followed by corridor charges on major routes in the isthmus and beyond.  The Mayor is proposing the second stage, but that is good as the downtown cordon concept was likely to have a less dramatic impact than the proposed corridor charges.

The proposed technology would be automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) cameras.

What needs to happen?

Congestion pricing is currently illegal in New Zealand. The outgoing Labour Government had draft legislation prepared to implement it, but this will be revised with the incoming National led Government. National included congestion pricing in its transport policy, so there is little chance of the policy being rejected by the new government. Until legislation is introduced and passed, congestion pricing cannot be implemented, but in the meantime, it is possible for Auckland Council and Auckland Transport (a separate entity under the auspices of Auckland Council) to plan and prepare for road pricing. 

The motorways in Auckland are not under the control of Auckland Transport, as they are State Highways. They are Crown owned (and fully funded by) and managed by the New Zealand Transport Agency/Waka Kotahi. It seems unlikely that central government would devolve power to impose pricing on motorways it owns and manages to local government. However, it seems much more likely that a joint entity, between central and local government could be set up to manage pricing across roads in Auckland. 

What are some of the big issues?

Oversight

A key issue is how much control central government, in particular the forthcoming Minister of Transport and/or Cabinet, wish to have in approving and later amending congestion pricing schemes. At present the Minister approves tolling schemes, which are only for new roads. At present there are only three toll roads in New Zealand (one in outer Auckland). It seems unlikely that government will want to give road controlling authorities free rein to implement congestion pricing, but it would also be unwise to require changes in pricing to go through a political process. 

A middle approach would be to require Ministerial approval for a road pricing proposal (by a road controlling authority on specific roads within certain time periods) concept but grant powers to road controlling authorities to adjust pricing and business rules within set parameters, with oversight by an economic regulator (such as the Commerce Commission or a more specialised highway economic regulator).  The oversight would be to ensure prices were not set to be higher than necessary to relieve congestion, or to be unduly burdensome on different types of road users, and to monitor use of net revenues (which is another issues). Ultimately the need for political approval could be reduced, if the economic regulator has sufficient powers to protect consumers.

Governance

The other governance issue is what entity should be responsible for pricing? It could be left to the relevant road controlling authority, but for Auckland it would make sense to have a joint-governance entity for both Auckland Transport and NZTA roads, with sufficient delegated authority to manage pricing within set parameters. A joint entity would mean that there could be a single road pricing account, and that enforcement, communications and information could be unified. It would also provide a structure for managing net revenues, contracting for equipment and services.

Use of Net Revenues

The Mayor would like pricing to replace the regional fuel tax in Auckland, which raises around $150m per annum. However, this is likely to be controversial. There are clearly a range of options available such as:
Capital funding for public transport and active transport projects
Capital funding for road improvements
Offsetting ratepayer funding for road maintenance and improvements (reduces rates)
Offsetting ratepayer funding for public transport subsidies (reducing rates)
Dividend to ratepayers, households or residents

Internationally, the most popular options have been to use the net revenues to support some mix of road and public transport projects. If that option is selected, the projects ought to be high-quality (i.e. net economic benefits) and ideally be related to the locations subject to pricing (i.e. new transport capacity). However, it is likely to be tempting to simply replace the regional fuel tax as a revenue source (as removing that tax will benefit all Auckland motorists). It may also be tempting to use it to offset ratepayer funding on transport capital projects in any case, but if done on the scale proposed by the Mayor, it seems unlikely to gain much support if revenue from specific locations is used to benefit transport users not using those corridors. If motorways are going to be priced, it seems unlikely that central government will want to pass on control of use those revenues to local government. However, if a joint pricing entity is established, it may be reasonable to get agreement across both levels of government as to the use of net revenues for several years in advance.  

Prices, products, discounts and exemptions

Rates should be set at levels that will achieve enough behavioural change to relieve traffic, they should only be applied at peak times, and have a shoulder rate either side (for say half an hour) to avoid rushes to avoid the peak.  Rates should only apply in the peak direction (which may be both ways).  Exemptions and discounts should be minimised, and focused on local buses, emergency services, drivers with mobility disabilities and motorcycles, and there is a case for higher charges for heavy trucks and coaches (due to the amount of road space they occupy). A daily caps on charges might be considered, but if pricing is implemented on the scale proposed by the Mayor it seems likely to be unnecessary.

Motorists could be billed directly through direct debit, or have prepaid accounts able to be topped up through internet banking, phone banking or manually using cash at selected retail outlets.  Visitors could be offered “daypasses” for unlimited driving of congestion priced routes, but if only operating at peak times, it seems easier to simply send an invoice to a registered vehicle owner through post/email. 

Is it a good idea?

The biggest strategic decision is whether the Mayor’s idea of pricing a couple of sections of motorway should be the first step or if the downtown cordon concept should be.  There are advantages and disadvantages of each option.

Undoubtedly the pricing of two sections of motorway would have a more direct and obvious impact to motorists and could be seen as demonstrating more clearly how pricing could work, and be implemented incrementally around Auckland. It is likely to be higher risk than implementing a downtown cordon because of that impact, but will be more effective.  Given that, it makes sense to seriously consider the Mayor’s proposal.

On the other hand, the downtown cordon would be an effective pilot. It is clear that almost all drivers into downtown Auckland have modal alternatives, and with the opening of CRL (City Rail Link) which provides an underground rail loop around downtown Auckland, that case is strengthened.  Such a cordon would improve congestion on a range of routes approaching the city centre, including three motorways, but the effects of that reduction would drop significantly a good kilometre or two away, as so much traffic in Auckland is not focused on trips to downtown. 

If it were up to me, I’d say it would be preferable to implement the Mayor’s proposal of pricing on two stretches of motorway as a first step, rather than the downtown cordon.  The downtown cordon should be implemented, but in and of itself it doesn’t demonstrate to Aucklanders the effectiveness of pricing a corridor, which is as much about shifting time of demand as it is about shifting mode. The downtown cordon should be timed to be implemented shortly after CRL opens (CRL needs to work seamlessly first). 

The North Western Motorway corridor ideally wouldn’t have pricing until the North Western Busway is built, but the existing bus lanes could provide sufficiently additional services to make pricing worth implementing there. The Southern Motorway corridor parallels a railway line, and some bus services, so that shouldn’t be a problem in terms of alternatives.

If rat running is an issue (which it may be for the Southern Motorway) then technology can be used to deter it, by identifying vehicles leaving the motorway early to avoid a charging point and returning to it after. Pricing could be set at levels to make diverting not worth the time penalty.

What do stakeholders think?

The Employers and Manufacturer’s Association (EMA) head of advocacy and strategy Allan McDonald was supportive according to RNZ saying “You come back to getting the most out of the system you can and finding different ways to help those who may be disadvantaged by the cost but there are significant benefits too”. He noted Auckland needed better public transport, but the road network needed to work better too. 

Automobile Association Auckland issues spokesperson Martin Glynn said there were benefits, but he was concerned about the impacts on low-income drivers with few alternatives. 

Public Transport Users Association chairperson Niall Robertson was concerned that there needed to be better public transport alternatives. 

What next?

First and foremost, a new Government needs to be formed, and the incoming Minister needs to make it clear the parameters within which congestion pricing will be authorised. 

Secondly, the policy and the messaging around congestion pricing needs to be clear, to address fears and concerns, and to avoid the public guessing, wrongly, about what may be implemented, why and how.  It needs to be clear it is about reducing congestion and pricing should be based on meeting performance standards. It also needs to be clear that pricing does not need public transport alternatives for all drivers, to be implemented, but that the choices drivers have range from changing time of travel, mode of travel, route of travel or to drive less frequently. 

Thirdly, legislation needs to be drafted and introduced to implement the intended policy.

Fourthly, Auckland Council, Auckland Transport and NZTA need to work together on a detailed design and implementation of a phased plan for congestion pricing in Auckland. Starting with either two corridors or a downtown cordon. 

Fifthly, NZTA and Wellington and Tauranga local authorities also need to work together to undertake more detailed studies for both cities, consistent with legislation and central government policy.

What NOT to do?
  1. Don't see London as an example to copy. London is an area charge, it has a flat all day rate and has not enabled traffic to flow relatively efficiently for over 10 years because it is too blunt. London may be seen as culturally closest to Auckland, but it is vastly different. Better examples are in Singapore and Stockholm.
  2. Don't make this project about raising revenue. When the focus becomes revenue raising, the design will change and it becomes a lot more difficult to get the public on-board, because you are designing a tax, rather than a traffic management and pricing scheme.
  3. Don't make this about reallocating road space. While there will be localised cases where there is merit in doing this (specifically for cycling safety or bus priority at intersections), a successful congestion pricing system should enable all traffic to flow efficiently, including buses, and will improve conditions for all modes on the roads.  Some advocates for congestion pricing see it as a tool to penalise driving and to make it more difficult for motorists to drive. If this is the policy adopted, it will be rejected by the public (as it has been in many many cities), as pricing need not be a tool of penalty, but a tool to make existing networks work better. 
  4. Don't play with technology yet. There would be nothing wrong in eventually linking the current eRUC telematics systems to congestion pricing so their users (almost all commercial vehicles) pay charges automatically, alongside RUC.  However, ANPR is just fine for now.
  5. Don't make any announcements on details until you have decided on most of them, and have responses as to why you made certain decisions. Don't let the media and public discourse determine policy. Design a good system with defensible policies, and then present it to the media and public, so you can make clear what might be negotiable and what is not.  A litany of failures elsewhere are due to letting policy debates get out of control, raising fears and uncertainty, and consigning the concept to the "too hard" basket.

(Disclaimer: I worked on The Congestion Question project from 2016 to 2019)  


Friday, 11 November 2022

Congestion pricing doesn't require public transport to be an alternative for most trips - the Mayor of Auckland makes a common mistake

Does congestion pricing need all motorists to have a "reasonable alternative", by mode of transport?

No.

The alternatives to congestion pricing include:

  • Modal choices (public transport and cycling/walking for shorter trips)
  • Time of day choice (driving outside charging periods)
  • Route choice (avoiding driving on priced roads if possible)
  • Trip frequency choice (driving less frequency if a trip is regular)

The single biggest reason cars have become ubiquitous in cities is because they enable trips to be undertaken between origins and destinations that are not, and are likely to never be efficient to take by other modes. For trips to city centres, public transport can be an option for many, at peak times and indeed for trips between locations on public transport corridors, they obviously can be undertaken instead of driving, but for many cities, especially lower density cities like Auckland, characterised by houses on blocks of land in outer suburbs. It is not ever going to be efficient to have bus services that are always walkable to all of those suburban outlying areas.

So those that claim public transport alternatives need to exist for everyone are mistaken or actually just opposed to congestion pricing.  I hope the Mayor of Auckland is simply mistaken.

Background

I've written before about Auckland, New Zealand's, experience in investigating congestion pricing.  A major report was released just before the pandemic (see here) and I wrote about it here.

In short it was recommended that Auckland implement congestion pricing, starting with a small inner city cordon (effectively as a pilot, but consistent with Auckland Council's objectives to reduce car use in the inner city and provide more space for pedestrians, cyclists and buses) followed by corridor based charging, in some ways resembling how Singapore's excellent ERP system was rolled out. 

The pandemic stopped further progress, but in the meantime the Government of the day was re-elected, with a majority for the ruling Labour Party, and it followed up with a Parliamentary Inquiry into congestion pricing in Auckland. which recommended that congestion pricing proceed.

It's worth noting that congestion pricing is not controversial at the level of national politics, although there is debate about how to use the money, and the priority of objectives. The Green Party supports it, so do the Opposition centre-right National and free-market liberal ACT parties.  However, it would be fair to say that progress in advancing congestion pricing in Auckland has been glacial over the past year.

To enable congestion pricing, the Government needs to introduce legislation to permit it to be introduced and this has not yet occurred.  However, in the meantime there were local elections in New Zealand. Auckland's Mayor had retired, and he has been replaced by the centre-right candidate Wayne Brown, who has reportedly now said that congestion charging is a "distraction" and 

"Congestion charging could only make sense once every Aucklander has the option of catching a bus or a train that they know will show up on time, every time – and we are two years away from that, at the very least"

There are two big mistakes with this:

  1. If it were decided to introduce congestion pricing, it would take at least two-three years before it could be ready in any case.  Indeed, the argument has been made that the right time to introduce it is when Auckland's underground city rail loop is completed in 2025 or so.
  2. There is no reason for EVERY person to have a public transport option to substitute every possible car trip, indeed it is neither possible nor rational nor necessary.  This is because many trips will simply change time or frequency of travel, especially more discretionary trips.
What does congestion pricing do?

Fundamentally, congestion pricing is applying a time and location sensitive price to road use directly, with the intention that it shall alter behaviour of marginal users of the road network (those sensitive to price relative to the value of the trip by road at that time and location), so that they do not use congested roads at specific times, reducing congestion to more economically efficient levels.

In most cases congestion pricing has not been mostly about people shifting modes of travel, although modal shift is very important, it is a common mistake to think that if, say, 5000 car trips are priced off the road at 0800 that the occupants of those 5000 cars (which will be more than one per car on average) all catch a train or bus.

In Stockholm congestion pricing reduced trips over the cordon by 25% (Source: Centre for Transport Studies, Stockholm, CTS Working Paper 2014:7), but of that 25% the percentage breakdown of behaviour change varied:
  • around 10% points were commuters that shifted mode (so only around 40% of car occupants went to other modes)
  • around 6% points were discretionary trips (likely social, recreational, retail) that changed either the destination of travel at charging times or travelled less frequently.  So they still drove, just fewer times per week (consolidating trips) or to another destination not subject to pricing.
  • around 5% of trips were commercial trips (deliveries, tradespeople, taxis) that disappeared, again likely due to consolidation of trips (deliveries being managed more efficiently, tradespeople booking work for a single trip across the cordon rather than multiple ones during a day)
  • <2% changed route (using the bypass motorway to avoid the charged cordon).
  • <1% changed time of travel, noting the Stockholm scheme operates all day, but has lower prices between the peaks. 
The key conclusion being that a great deal of behaviour change is having fewer discretionary trips and more efficient management of trips.

In London most shifted mode it is believed, to buses, but it is difficult to be sure because there was a significant uplift in the level of bus service, which is believed to have resulted in more trips in any case.

For Auckland it is proposed to only have charging during the peaks, so the potential for changing time of driving is significant, much more like Singapore, which only applies charges at times when demand slows traffic below stated performance levels (very few routes have charges outside peaks, especially post-Covid).

What would happen in Auckland?

If the first stage of congestion pricing were introduced, it is likely a significant proportion of motorists would shift mode of travel, assuming bus service reliability were back to pre-pandemic levels, and the City Rail Link is opened.  However, the majority would still drive. Of those that wouldn't, many would drive off-peak instead, some discretionary trips might go elsewhere at the peak, and some would not travel at all.  

It's worth noting that the highest peak charge was assumed to be NZ$3.50 (US$2.10). Over a work week this would be NZ$17.50, this is less than the normal public transport fares (there is currently a 50% discount applied by the Government to address the cost of living temporarily) and of course for many they also pay for parking.  

The inner city cordon is estimated to reduce car trips across Auckland by only 0.4%, and even if the FULL corridor scheme were eventually introduced, there would be a 1.3% reduction in trips.  This is enough to make a significant impact on travel times and trip reliability for the vehicles that ARE paying, plus of course buses.

It's also worth remembering that freight/logistics trips mostly cannot shift modes, and in many cases can't shift time of travel, but that isn't a reason not to price those vehicles using a scarce resource (road space) when they will benefit from it operating more efficiently.

Bus services can be improved significantly because of the effects of pricing

This is the almost instant "win" of congestion pricing, ignoring any money that might be raised and diverted into public transport. Reducing traffic congestion improves travel times for buses, improves trip reliability for buses, and enables more services to be operated with the same number of buses and drivers. FHWA (US) noted that in London:

 “Excess wait time” at bus stops fell by 24 percent across Greater London during the first full year of charging, with a 30-percent decrease within the zone itself.

Stockholm also saw such an improvement in trip times, that bus services that had been enhanced were cut back somewhat because too many services were operating with too few passengers. 

Congestion pricing CAN be designed to make life better for those driving

Many who support congestion pricing do so because they want fewer car trips, as an objective, but it is worth remembering that the goal of the original Congestion Question study was to improve network performance. Less congestion benefits those who pay to use the roads at peak time, because they have more reliable travel times, shorter travel times and also save on vehicle fuel/energy costs. Moreover, the use of net revenues can be applied to reducing or abolishing other motoring taxes, such as the NZ$0.125/l Auckland regional fuel tax (including GST), which apply to ALL road users, regardless of where and when they drive.  

Mayor Wayne Brown expressed concern that transport policy in Auckland under the previous Mayor was increasingly antagonistic towards drivers, but he could embrace road pricing as enabling better conditions for drivers and public transport users, and as a tool to reduce the burden on motorists outside peak times. 

What SHOULD happen?

The New Zealand Government should announce it is going to introduce legislation enabling congestion pricing under certain conditions. This won't force the Mayor of Auckland and Auckland Council to proceed with pricing, but will raise the question more explicitly, and it will enable Wellington (and other cities) to progress it, if they so wish.  

Given 2023 is election year in New Zealand (and polls indicate there is a reasonable likelihood the governing Labour Party would be voted out of office), it might be too much to expect this level of courage, but this IS a government that has set a target of reducing total kilometres driven by light vehicles, across the country, by 30% to meet climate change targets. To implement that requires measures much more intrusive than a congestion charge for central Auckland.

Congestion pricing in Auckland should not be delayed because the Mayor doesn't fully understand the impacts it will have. Government should enable it to happen, and progress detailed design for the preferred scheme options, with the intention of being able to implement it by 2026 at the latest (and if the Government changes after the election, it might help replace the Auckland regional fuel tax, which was implemented by the current government. 

A focus on making Auckland public transport more reliable and frequent is fine, but road pricing can help with that, and it would be wrong to lose momentum on Auckland road pricing because of concerns that can be easily addressed in the detailed design phase.





Thursday, 12 May 2022

Western Australia to implement RUC for EVs, Auckland congestion charging to be announced, Virginia launches RUC in July 2022

I've been very busy, but there are some announcements worth noting as follows

Western Australia announces it will introduce distance-based RUC on EVs in 2017

As part of an package of measures to incentivise increased sales of electric vehicles, the Western Australian Premier has announced that the state government will introduce 

 introduce a distance-based road user charge for zero and low emission light vehicles commencing from July 1, 2027 to ensure all motorists pay their fair share towards the maintenance and construction of WA roads.

A base rate of 2.5 cents per kilometre for electric and hydrogen vehicles and two cents per kilometre for plug-in hybrid electric vehicles will apply, with both rates indexed to the Consumer Price Index.

This parallels what has already been announced in New South Wales, what has been introduced in Victoria in 2021 and what was also announced for South Australia (but for which the recently elected Labor Government has vowed to repeal).

Western Australia has some history in looking at heavy vehicle RUC, but it will be interesting to see how this may be implemented, as it could be a simple odometer reporting based system given there is little interstate light vehicle traffic. 

New Zealand Government to make announcement on progressing congestion pricing in Auckland next week

It has been studied and investigated for some time, but Radio New Zealand is reporting (alongside other media outlets) that when the New Zealand Government Emissions Reduction Plan is released on Monday 16 May, it will also announce it will implement congestion pricing for Auckland.  It is likely to be focused on a downtown inner city cordon-style scheme at peak times only, but with the potential to expand into corridor charging beyond that. It also appears that the net revenue may be used to offset a cut and eventual abolition of the Auckland Regional Fuel Tax established only in 2018 to help fund transport projects in the city.  That tax is currently at NZ$0.125 per litre including Goods and Service Tax.

Virginia to launch RUC for EVs on 1 July 2022

Virginia will be the third US state to implement distance-based RUC for light vehicles on 1 July according to NBC12.  Branded "Mileage Choice" it will offer EV, hybrid or other ultra fuel efficient vehicle owners the choice of paying by mile instead of paying a flat annual fee for registration (currently US$109 per annum).  Distance will be measuredly a plug-in device supplied by Emovis, with an initial odometer reading captured by smartphone imaging to register.  

Monday, 21 June 2021

New Zealand Parliament holds inquiry into congestion charging for Auckland

Yesterday, New Zealand's Transport and Infrastructure Select Committee started hearing submissions on proposals for congestion charging for the city of Auckland.  I am strongly in support of this, and have sent in a written submission and hope to present it virtually later this week. 

Written submissions can be found here and hearings are available via Facebook here including all of the submissions presented yesterday.  

Once all submissions have been considered, the Committee will present a report to Parliament with its recommendations.  A majority of Committee members belong to the ruling centre-left Labour Party, but it is worth noting that the other parties on the Committee (National (centre-right), Greens (left-environmentalist) and ACT (liberal-right))  have been supportive of congestion pricing, indeed the current work on congestion charging in Auckland commenced under the previous National-led government.  The officials papers are available here.

What has been recommended so far is a city-centre cordon during morning and evening peak periods, followed by strategic corridor charging on congested routes. It will be interesting to see how the Committee responds to submissions. It is led by a Wellington based Labour MP, Greg O'Connor, and deputised by former transport planner and Green MP, Julie Anne Genter.  I am cautiously optimistic that the momentum achieved so far in Auckland congestion pricing is not slowed down by the Committee process, and that it can be advanced, especially given the significant spending that has been made and continues to be made in upgrading Auckland's transport network, including a multi-billion dollar underground rail loop to increase the capacity of Auckland electric commuter rail network.  

Disclosure: I worked on both Phase 1 and Phase 2 of The Congestion Question project as a consultant for Milestone Solutions (then D'Artagnan Consulting).

Monday, 7 December 2020

Auckland congestion charging to go to Parliamentary select committee

Following the release of the Phase Two report and significant numbers of reports on congestion pricing in Auckland, Stuff reports that a Parliamentary Select Committee (presumably Transport and Infrastructure) will conduct an inquiry into the issue.  This arose from comments from both the New Zealand Transport Minister Michael Wood (who is new to the portfolio, since Labour won the general election in October 2020) and Finance and Infrastructure Minister, Grant Robertson, alongside the naming ceremony for a railway tunnel boring machine - part of the NZ$4.4 billion Auckland City Rail Link project

The congestion charging report indicated that the two scheme options with the greatest merit are:

  • City Centre peak time cordon scheme;
  • Congested Strategic Corridors scheme.
The significance of the Auckland City Rail Link project is that it adds considerable capacity to Auckland's electric commuter railway system, by replacing the terminus arrangement of the downtown railway station at Britomart, with an underground loop, connecting the three main railway lines (to the west, south and east-south) in both directions. The Mayor of Auckland has suggested that congestion pricing for the downtown area be introduced to coincide with the opening of the rail project, as it significantly enhances the capacity of public transport along some major corridors into downtown Auckland. 

It was notable that although the Mayor of Auckland spoke favourably about congestion pricing after the reports were released, both Ministers were non-committal about the proposals in the reports. Deputy Chair of the Transport and Infrastructure Select Committee, Green MP Julie-Anne Genter has been reported as supportive of congestion pricing stating:

"The Green Party is supportive, and believes the government should be driving this forward, especially if there are mitigations in place to ensure it doesn’t disproportionately penalise low-income households...Replacing the regional fuel tax with a congestion charge would do that because it is disproportionately high income people who drive into the city centre...We are disappointed the report didn't focus more on the impact on greenhouse gas emissions, I suspect congestion charging could make a big diff[erence]."

This is a positive start and she is correct, there should be positive impacts on low-income households if introduction of congestion pricing replaces the regional fuel tax, so that only those driving at peaks on congested roads are paying more, but everyone else is paying less. 

It is also worth noting that there have been no statements opposing congestion pricing from Opposition political parties on the centre-right (National) and free-market right (ACT) (both supported congestion pricing as a concept before the election). There has been no statement to date from the Maori Party (centre-left) either.

However, there are much greater impacts from congestion pricing on strategic corridors, compared to the Auckland city centre. Already around half of all commuting trips to downtown Auckland use public transport, cycling or walking, so there is less scope to shift mode compared to all other commuting, which is dominated by car use. 

Key to the next steps is how to conduct public engagement and consultation, with Auckland Council's planning committee approving ongoing work on the project last week.

Part of this absolutely has to be to present the case as to how congestion pricing can replace the regional fuel tax, and what to do with additional revenue generated assuming that, as it scales up in size, it raises more than the regional fuel tax does now. It could replace ratepayer funding for new capital transport projects, but there will be a range of views including reducing ratepayer contributions to road maintenance and public transport subsidies. Questions around governance and delivery of congestion pricing must also be considered, particularly as there will be pricing on a mix of local roads and state highways, and governance will affect decisions on operational policy, rate setting and use of net revenues.

The Congestion Question project has been innovative in developing options for congestion pricing in a city dominated by car use, with most employment not located in the downtown area, and with 74% of commutes by private motor vehicle (11% by public transport, 5% by active modes, remainder work from home or "other means"). Auckland is a new world city, with relatively low density development, so is much more akin to many North American cities than European cities. If it can pioneer congestion pricing that effectively reduces congestion across the city, for lower density cities, it will be an example for others to follow.

Monday, 30 November 2020

Auckland congestion charging reports released - Phase Two recommends two preferred options

Auckland Transport and the New Zealand Ministry of Transport today released a series of reports that represent Phase Two of The Congestion Question study, that has been investigated the merits and options for congestion pricing in Auckland. The point of the study is to investigate congestion pricing to improve network performance a stark contrast to more recent examples discussing road pricing (see Australia on electric vehicles, the UK on road pricing) which are about raising revenue. In fact, the Auckland Mayor has already stated that he sees this as replacing the regional fuel tax (NZ$0.10/litre plus 15% GST), which is likely to have positive economic, environmental and social impacts, as it would mean only those travelling at peak times on congested roads would pay. 

t is a joint project between central and local government, and the technology option proposed is use of Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) cameras, although other options were considered.  The proposal for pricing is peak only, with the sample tariff below considered for the city centre cordon option:



The purpose of the study was to undertake a detailed investigation of the options and established some preferred options for more detailed design and possible implementation.  Given transport in Auckland is dominated by use of the private car (and trip patterns that are highly dispersed, with only 13% of employment in the central business district).  Transport in Auckland has had literally billions of NZ$ spent on it in the past twenty years, this includes:

  • Completion of the Western Ring Route of the motorway network, allowing through traffic between south-west and north Auckland to avoid the Central Motorway Junction and Auckland Harbour Bridge, and multiple upgrades to other parts of the motorway network, including grade separation, new lanes and ramps, and targeted capacity increases;
  • Transformation of the commuter rail network, including opening of a downtown railway station, electrification of the network with new rolling stock, additional tracks, upgraded stations and a significant uplift in service frequencies. A city centre underground railway loop is now under construction to increase capacity of the network;
  • Busways on corridors without railways (North Shore and now eastern and north western under development);
  • Significantly enhanced bus and ferry services, some bicycle lanes and park and ride facilities.

The table below summarises the analysis of impacts of the shortlisted options:


The key conclusion from the reports is that the two preferred options are:

Auckland City Centre Cordon congestion pricing option

  1. City Centre Cordon scheme: This scheme simply places a cordon around downtown Auckland, bounded in part by the central motorway junction (which would still be free to drive along to bypass the cordon) and the harbour.  It would only operate at weekday peak times in inbound and outbound directions. It would be easy to implement, has a high standard of public transport accessibility, high levels of public transport and active travel already.  It would generate annual benefits of around NZ$27m per annum, mostly from travel time savings, but also improved trip reliability and reduced vehicle operating costs (mostly fuel consumption).  It was calculated at having a benefit/cost ratio of 1.7.  It would reduce vehicle trips by 4,500 in the AM peak, so it is on a small scale, but is seen as a good starting point.

Monday, 11 July 2016

Auckland road pricing should be full network charging says report

I've written about Auckland plenty of times, not least because I am originally from New Zealand. (NZ)  There have been two major discussions about road pricing in Auckland in the past 12 years, the third has now come from the interim report of the Auckland Transport Alignment Project (PDF).

Auckland motorway network
Later I will write a more detailed look at road pricing in Auckland and New Zealand, but for now a quick summary.

Summary

Auckland Council and the NZ Government have been disagreeing about a future transport strategy for the city for the past few years.  It has focused on the priority Auckland Council has given to an underground railway loop through the city's downtown Central Business District (CBD), but has wider implications.  Auckland Council has prioritised significant capital spending in fixed public transport infrastructure, but the NZ Government has been sceptical about the economic efficiency and value for money for such spending.  Auckland Council's primary revenue raising instrument is property rates, and it is political unsustainable to fund the proposed capital works from rates alone (rates already pay for around 60% of the costs of maintaining and upgrading local roads, not motorways and state highways), and pay for around 50% of the costs of subsidising public transport).  The NZ Government fully funds motorways/state highways and pays for 40% of the costs of maintaining and upgrading local roads, and the other 50% of the costs of subsidising public transport, it also owns the railway network and motorways/state highways.  The funds spent on transport by central government are mostly raised from hypothecated motoring taxes on road users, being fuel tax, a weight/distance tax on heavy vehicle and light diesel vehicles, and  registration/licensing fees.

The Auckland Transport Alignment Project (ATAP) as the project name suggests, is a joint project between NZ Government and Auckland Council representatives to get alignment between both levels of government on a 30 year strategy for transport in the city.

Talk of road pricing goes back over ten years, with an initial report (Auckland Road Pricing Evaluation Study) concluding the blatantly obvious, that you can reduce congestion and raise revenue from introducing road pricing.  However, the options considered were limited, in part because the lead consultant and the client decided that only point based charging was proven and feasible (that is charging using DSRC/tag and beacon, or automatic number plate recognition technologies).  The only options modelled at the time were cordon charges, area charges and motorway charges.  The cordon/area charge options had to be large to have any meaningful impact (a downtown cordon would have little impact on traffic and generate limited revenue).  Furthermore, by placing cordons across suburbs, there would be significant impacts on businesses and residences either side of these artificial boundaries, as those just inside would lose value and those just outside would benefit, and congestion impacts would be blunt.  Motorway only charging was ruled out because it would greatly increase congestion on local streets.

Subsequently, Auckland Council has proposed motorway charges, as a way of raising additional revenue to pay for rail projects, but as the motorways are owned by the NZ Government (and Auckland Council has no powers to introduce any form of road pricing on existing roads), it has been a point of difference with the NZ Government.  With that issue, and a broader concern about the need for a coherent strategy for Auckland transport, to address congestion and accommodate a growing population, ATAP was set up.

The first report of ATAP (Foundation Report-PDF) was published in February 2016, outlining the key strategic issues, which are:
- ensuring access of residents to employment and employers to labour;
- reducing congestion;
- increasing the mode share for public transport, to help reduce congestion (and to ensure adequate utilisation of considerable capital spending on public transport infrastructure).

The interim report which has just been released came to the conclusion that changing the scope and type of capital investment in the next 30 years will not make a substantial difference in transport outcomes.  Much heavier spending on public transport instead of roads or targeted investment on specific high value road and public transport projects will have localised impacts, but will not adequately address the key challenges.  It also concluded that shared mobility options and connected vehicle technologies (and greater automation) could contribute towards improving "network performance".  However, it also came to the conclusion that variable network pricing by time of day and location, could significantly relieve congestion.

Urban network pricing or beyond?

There is no specific proposal on pricing, but two suggestions made in the report indicate a direction that hasn't been picked up by the NZ media.  One suggestion was that heavy vehicles be the first to move towards such pricing and the other was that fuel tax could be replaced with such pricing.

NZ has long had a weight/distance road user charge (RUC) applied to all heavy vehicles and all diesel vehicles (including cars and light commercial vehicles) on all public roads (fuel tax is only applied to petrol, LPG and CNG, not diesel).  A prepaid distance permit is bought by road users, by reference to the vehicle's hubodometer reading for heavy vehicles and odometer reading for light vehicles.  In the past six years the option of having a GPS based on board unit and paying a certified service provider has been available, although it is still to pay for prepaid electronic permits.

Where to go from here?

Rather than have an Auckland specific variation on this, a logical policy path would be to evolve the existing road user charge, because the only way that variable network charging is going to work effectively will be if all vehicles are on it.  To do that would mean:

- Providing a post-payment option for RUC (even with a prepaid account) so that road users can more closely relate usage to what is paid, linked to electronic measurement of distance.  This would best be provided by private account managers;
- Transition away from hubodometers and paper RUC licences to all heavy vehicles being on electronic systems that are capable of charging by time of day and location.  One way to do this would be to make electronic systems mandatory for all newly registered heavy vehicles or to have a transition period of say five years;
- Introduce some location based charging to heavy RUC, based on infrastructure costs (e.g. cheaper on motorways than local roads) and even time of day incentives for off peak driving in urban areas;

That alone would enable heavy vehicles to be charged with more disaggregation, but the much bigger step will be for light vehicles.

- There are options now for electronic measurement of distance for light vehicles paying RUC, but this should be encouraged further.  A transition towards universal electronic light RUC could be achieved by making it compulsory for newly registered diesel vehicles.  Lessons should be learned from the Oregon and California pilots on how this may best be achieved;
- Transition dual-fuel vehicles towards light RUC by piloting a mechanism to deliver fuel tax refunds for such vehicles, and removing fuel tax on LPG and CNG (which will also remove a costly compliance burden on many users of those fuels who are not using it on road and claim fuel tax refunds as a result). This should also be a time to remove the exemption on RUC for electric vehicles;
- Introduce RUC as an option for petrol powered vehicles instead of paying fuel tax;
- Develop a process to transition petrol powered vehicles to RUC.

Of course all of this raises big questions.  One is privacy, another is what sort of organisation should be responsible for price setting of disaggregated variable road charges.  I doubt it should be any that exist now, and there is a strong case for transitioning road management towards more commercial entities with the power to set such prices and vary them based on demand conditions.  That means taking the power to set RUC away from central government politicians and moving the management of roads from central and local government entities to independent companies.  I doubt ATAP will go quite that far, but the greatest benefits from dynamic variable road pricing will come when roads can be priced according to changes in demand, supply and infrastructure costs.

ATAP is about a thirty year time horizon for transforming Auckland.  To implement the sort of road pricing that will deliver the greatest benefits for Auckland will need around half that time, but it will be for all of New Zealand, and will also challenge both road and public transport capital spending ambitions.  Most of all, it will change the relationship between road users and road providers, and also provide a major challenge to assumptions around all transport modes.  After all, once roads are priced relatively efficiently, so congestion is significantly reduced, what remains the case for subsidising peak provision of public transport, when road users are paying fully for the costs of their road use (and incentivising the use of other modes)?



Monday, 1 February 2016

Auckland motorway tolls re-emerge as revenue raising option

With news that the New Zealand Government has decided to fund its 50% share of the capital costs of the NZ$2.5 billion (US$1.6 billion) proposed underground rail loop in central Auckland, the issue has emerged as to how the Auckland Council can raise the revenue to pay for its share.  A previously floated proposal of tolling all of the motorways has re-emerged, as it would appear to offer both a source of revenue and introduce a mild form of congestion charging.

Auckland's motorway network
However, it faces some major challenges:

1.  It has been assessed before and been found wanting.  The option of charging motorways only in Auckland was appraised in the Auckland Road Pricing Evaluation Study in 2006.  It concluded that the main problem with this option was that it would divert sufficient traffic onto parallel local roads (a 6% increase in traffic on those roads) to worsen congestion on those roads, exposing local residents to increased pollution.   It also concluded that there would be barely any modal shift (0.1%) (Source: Table 4.5, Appendix 15, Economic Impact Assessment) and that it was the worst performing of any of the options considered in terms of net economic impact (with a BCR of around 0.7) (Source: p6. Appendix 19, BCR analysis).  Indeed it showed that the revenue raised was barely over half of the benefits to users, indicating a net loss - as congestion savings on the motorways are significantly offset by delays on local roads.  Overall speed changes would be less than 1 km/h.

An illustration is seen in the map below, showing how easy it is to use parallel routes between two of the most heavily used points on Auckland's motorway network.  In red is the Southern Motorway with between seven and ten lanes, in blue are the local streets that could be used to bypass part of it.


Southern motorway at Newmarket, with some parallel routes

The conclusion of that study is rather damning (comparing it to cordon charging options and parking levies):

This scheme is relatively simple in concept and targeted in terms of tackling particular congestion problems.  It also provides fewer social mitigation challenges as free alternatives are provided (the uncharged network).

This is, however, a significant weakness of the scheme.  Essentially it reduces the incentives to motorists to change behaviour through switching modes or travel patterns. Instead they simply change their route.  This has the effect of diverting traffic from the strategic network onto local roads and while congestion is reduced on the charged strategic network it tends to increase on the local roads which are the only alternatives to the charged routes.  The higher the charge is set, the more pronounced this effect becomes.  As a consequence the charge which can be realistically imposed is relatively low and the cost of collection represents a high proportion of the charge... Furthermore the cost of increasing capacity on the local uncharged road network is high and more than consumes the net scheme revenues.

In short, it will jam up Auckland's local roads and if the money raise is diverted into the rail scheme, it will leave nothing to fix the local road bottlenecks. 

2.  Motorways are State Highways.  Auckland Council has no authority over them as they are owned by central government.  Without central government authority (which shows no sign of being granted), it cannot happen.  Bear in mind government already effectively charges for using these motorways (and local roads) through New Zealand's weight/distance road user charges for heavy and light diesel vehicles, and fuel tax.


The issue has emerged this year as it is the year of local body elections including Mayoral elections.  Incumbent Mayor, the left of centre Len Brown, is in favour of the proposal, despite there being clear opposition to it expressed by the Government.  Other announced candidates are either opposed or lukewarm towards it, and Len Brown is not contesting the next election (candidacy is still open). 

Clearly the idea is technically fairly easy, as either DSRC technology with ANPR, or ANPR alone could deliver a system with gantries located either at on and off ramps or a series of strategic points along the motorway network, but Auckland's well established motorway network has one major problem - its interchanges are very closely spaced by global standards.  This means it is quite feasible to use motorways for short trips and to avoid motorways for such trips.

My view is that with a few exceptions (e.g. Auckland Harbour Bridge, Mangere Bridge, SH16 west of Waterview) the benefits are likely to be not worth the cost, but then it is not being driven by the objective of congestion management, but revenue raising. 

Auckland Council's primary revenue raising instrument is taxation on property prices (rates).  Given reports of the significant gains that CBD property owners and investors would get from the underground rail loop, it probably is more appropriate to look at rates on the "winners" from the rail project than to adopt a road pricing scheme that may have net negative economic impact.

Tuesday, 30 April 2013

Auckland transport funding report promotes urban road pricing and tolls

Auckland has 1.4 million people, and its local politicians have ambitious aspirations for expanding the city's highway and public transport networks, but like many cities face a funding problem.  It can't raise enough money from existing funding sources to meet its aspirations for spending on transport. 

New Zealand has a comparatively efficient system for charging road users across the country and allocating the revenue, largely, on economically efficient grounds.  Fuel tax (notably on petrol only) of US$0.4285 a litre is all hypothecated into the National Land Transport Fund (NLTF), this is supplemented by a weight/distance charge on all diesel vehicles (and vehicles over 3.5 tonnes) which varies by vehicle tonnage, and a small ownership tax (motor vehicle registration and licensing fees).  That fund is used to fully fund state highways (the national highway network) and to part fund local roads and subsidies for urban public transport.   Local authorities submit bids for road maintenance and construction funding, and funding for public transport subsidies and capital works, and these get allocated according to a mix of benefit/cost criteria and reflection of overall government priorities (e.g. congestion reduction).  The NLTF funding provides between 40 and 75% of the cost of local authority transport activities, so local authorities usually fund the rest from rates - a tax on the value of land and properties on it. 

Local authorities have no powers to toll existing roads or raise taxes on fuel, but most do obtain some revenue from parking (there is a tiny historic tax on fuel dedicated to local authorities, which raises very little)

Tolls are in place on two roads.  One is a state highway north of Auckland (where it is being used to pay the debt of half of the construction cost of the road), another is a local road in Tauranga (which has received no NLTF funding because it had a poor benefit/cost ratio).  A third motorway under construction near Tauranga is also to be tolled to provide part of the funding for the road.  Tolling legislation means that any local authority and the NZ Transport Agency (which operates the state highways) can apply to the Executive for authorisation to toll any projects which involve new capacity only.  It provides a solid framework for more tolling within those grounds.

Auckland's problem is that the Mayor and the Council want to spend an additional NZ$400 million (US$339 million) annually over the next 30 years on transport in the city region on top of what is currently provided through that national funding system.  Given there is little need to boost spending elsewhere in the country (much of it simply needs continued road maintenance and minor improvements to networks), raising national fuel tax or road user charges appears inequitable.   

So Auckland Council set up the Alternative Transport Funding Group, which itself set up a Consensus Building Group of stakeholders to produce a report on funding options, which included representatives across business, social, motoring, public transport, cycling, construction and other sectors.  

Auckland has several times mulled over road pricing, so this report is the latest incarnation, and of course, it has sparked debate as it presents two options for the city (and central government, as legislation will be needed to allow for road pricing on existing roads).

What did it say?

The report considered many options including:
- tolls on specific roads;
- 6 "road pricing" options specified as being a single cordon, double cordon, area charging, motorway only charging, full distance charging and managed toll lanes.

I'm amused at "full distance charging", which ignores that there already is distance charging for heavy and diesel vehicles.  It would seem odd to consider layering another system on top of one that works.

"Managed toll lanes" were ruled out because they wouldn't raise enough revenue or were too expensive to administer for the revenue that could be raised.  That means they couldn't even fund additional lanes.  Curious when you consider how widespread they are in the US (although the policy goal in the US of providing a congestion free alternative does come into the fore).

Parking levies were also ruled out, which is significant as this is often seen as an alternative to congestion charging.

The options that got more consideration were:
- Fuel taxes 
- Public transport fares
- Rating-based sources
- Road pricing
- Tolls on new roads

Two packages of options were finally proposed for public consultation

1:  Increases in rates (NZ$90m US$76m additional per annum).  Increases in fuel taxes of 0.6c/l (US$0.51) nationally (regional fuel tax seen as complex as there is no diesel tax at present, and a significant proportion of diesel usage is off road, so that diesel tax would need to be refunded). Tolls on major new roads (two are listed as being eligible for tolls) and increases in public transport fares.

2. Road pricing charging motorways only, or a single cordon charge, to generate NZ$250 million a year (US$212 million) plus increases in rates and public transport fares.  

The tone of the report clearly indicates the second option is preferred, but that requires a law change the current government appears to not support.

Review of conclusions