Dicionário de Política I Norberto Bobbio
Dicionário de Política I Norberto Bobbio
Dicionário de Política I Norberto Bobbio
Carmen C,
Varriale et ai.; coord. trad. João Ferreira; rev. geral João Ferreira e Luis Guerreiro Pinto Cacais. - Brasília
: Editora Universidade de Brasília, 1 la ed., 1998. Vol. 1: 674 p. (total: 1.330 p.) Vários Colaboradores.
Obra em 2v.
Guerra.
Várias foram as definições deste conceito. Entre as mais conhecidas estão as que se inspiram no
direito. Os internacionalistas estudaram os critérios com base nos quais é possível distinguir
exatamente o estado de Guerra do estado de paz, a fim de aplicar as normas denominadas de direito
bélico. Estas definições, porém, não visam tanto colher a essência do fenômeno, quanto evidenciar
seus determinados momentos formais, os quais, contudo, vão desaparecendo cada vez mais na praxe
atual. O resultado é que também os juristas devem prestar cada vez mais atenção à natureza
substancial deste e de outros fenômenos, quando recorrem ao chamado princípio da "efetividade".
Do ponto de vista substancial, Q. Wright define a Guerra, numa primeira análise, como "um violento
contato de entidades distintas mas semelhantes". Obviamente, esta definição compreende
numerosas facetas, mas está também sujeita a duas críticas: 1) não consegue exaurir o conceito de
Guerra; 2) nem tudo aquilo que ela compreende é catalogável, conforme o sentido comum, como
Guerra.
A tradição doutrinal tem insistido muito sobre o fato de que a violência se expressa na Guerra por
meio da "força armada". Isto reduziu bastante os casos que podemos configurar como Guerra; mas,
mesmo assim, se se ganhou em matéria de precisão, perdeu-se um pouco o contato com a realidade
do nosso tempo. Hoje, a "força" não se expressa mais (nem é mais assim concebida) apenas em termos
militares, mas em termos econômicos, psicológicos, e de outros tipos. Conforme, porém, o direito
bélico, suas normas são hoje aplicáveis somente ao fenômeno da Guerra entendida como contato
violento mediante a força armada. Todos os outros tipos de Guerra (Guerra psicológica ou Guerra fria,
Guerra econômica, etc), que têm tanta influência sobre as relações internacionais atuais, fogem a esta
norma específica. Tudo isto equivale a dizer que é muito vago o limite entre a Guerra e a paz e os
escritores que se ocuparam deste assunto têm pleno conhecimento do problema.
Von Clausewitz, fixando-se na forma exterior das relações internacionais, sustentou que a Guerra é a
continuação da política por outros meios. Outros quiseram aprofundar-se mais e declararam que a
essência da Guerra depende do grau de hostilidade psicológica que caracteriza, num dado tempo, as
relações entre Estados. Também Hobbes afirmou: "the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting,
but in the known disposition thereto...". Observando o que foi dito por Hobbes, verificamos que tudo
está estritamente ligado à conhecida problemática sobre a paz negativa e a paz positiva. Na tentativa
de conciliar as várias interpretações do fenômeno, Q. Wright concluiu que a Guerra é a "condição
jurídica que permite, igualmente a dois ou mais grupos hostis, conduzir um conflito com a força
armada". É claro, porém, que também esta definição, como todas as fórmulas de compromisso, não
é imune a críticas no plano substancial. Deve-se destacar, contudo, como a doutrina não foi muito
além desta definição, e isto é uma prova da complexa natureza do fenômeno.
Para Bouthoul, por exemplo, as características distintivas da Guerra são três: 1) é um fenômeno
coletivo; 2) é luta a mão armada; 3) tem caráter jurídico. A partir da individualização de tais elementos,
o autor apresenta a seguinte definição de Guerra: "Luta armada e cruenta entre grupos organizados",
onde a caracterização jurídica, porém, não aparece em toda a sua evidência.
A análise da doutrina nos leva a concluir que não existe uma definição unívoca do conceito de Guerra.
Mais próxima da realidade poderia estar uma definição que considerasse — como propõe alhures Q.
Wright — a análise dos fatos históricos concretos, que foram chamados "Guerras". Tais fatos se
caracterizam por: a) atividade militar; b) alto grau de tensão na opinião pública; c) adoção de normas
jurídicas atípicas, referentes às vigentes no período de paz; d) uma progressiva integração política
dentro das estruturas estatais dos beligerantes. Assim, a Guerra se configura, ao mesmo tempo, como
uma espécie de conflito, uma espécie de violência, um fenômeno de psicologia social, uma situação
jurídica excepcional e, finalmente, um processo de coesão interna.
São muitos os critérios segundo os quais pode ser decomposto o conceito de Guerra. Por exemplo,
com referência aos grupos em luta, a Guerra se classifica como internacional quando conduzida entre
grupos sujeitos ao ordenamento jurídico internacional; interna ou civil, se conduzida entre membros
de um mesmo grupo organizado (cidadãos de um mesmo Estado); colonial, se os grupos contendentes
são povos de civilizações diferentes, uma das quais é considerada inferior à outra. Conforme a
intenção ou a psicologia dos protagonistas, a Guerra se subdivide em ofensiva, defensiva, preventiva,
de nervos. Com referência ao tipo de armamentos utilizados, a Guerra pode ser convencional ou
nuclear. Finalmente, com referência às finalidades perseguidas, ela pode ser limitada (Guerra política,
segundo o conceito de Clausewitz) ou então total ou absoluta (quando ela é levada às suas
consequências extremas).
A Guerra merece uma consideração particular como instrumento político. Enquanto a Guerra absoluta
tem como objetivo a destruição total do adversário, a Guerra limitada (a que R. Aron chama de
"Guerra real") é instrumental, ligada a uma finalidade desejada. A política, "inteligência do Estado
personificado", utiliza-se de dois instrumentos: a diplomacia e a Guerra. Porém, se os meios são
diferentes, é único o desígnio que guia a ação. A diplomacia se retira quando seus fins podem ser
conseguidos somente através da força armada, sempre pronta, no entanto, a fazer sentir o peso de
sua ação, logo que isso seja considerado possível. O objetivo final não é a anulação completa do
contendor, mas sim a modificação de algumas de suas motivações.
A história da Guerra pode dividir-se em quatro fases histórico-qualitativas: a Guerra animal (em
sentido psicológico), a Guerra primitiva (em sentido sociológico), a Guerra histórica entre grupos
civilizados (em sentido jurídico), a Guerra atual (em sentido tecnológico). Assim, a definição da Guerra
se enriquece cada vez mais de novas dimensões com o progresso da civilização, ficando cada vez mais
perto da natureza complexa do fenômeno. Correlativamente, as interpretações sobre as causas da
Guerra são de ordem psicológica, sociológica, jurídica e tecnológica.
O estudo da Guerra animal é extremamente instrutivo para uma compreensão cada vez mais clara dos
instintos que movem os homens a combater entre si. Apesar das semelhanças, são também
importantes as diferenças, que refletem as diferentes funções da Guerra animal e da Guerra humana.
Por exemplo, a Guerra animal é, sobretudo, uma Guerra entre espécies diferentes, enquanto a Guerra
humana é um conflito entre membros da mesma espécie. As estatísticas mostram uma alta correlação
entre Guerra e grau de interdependência entre Estados (Q. Wright, 1942).
Assim, a primeira deve ser interpretada funcionalmente em termos de espécie, enquanto a segunda
deve ser interpretada funcionalmente em termos de sociedade e cultura. A primeira assegura o
equilíbrio, a segunda a mudança. Como declara, porém, Q. Wright, "mesmo quando a Guerra teve
como função assegurar mudanças na civilização, seu efeito último foi o de produzir oscilações no
surgimento e na queda de Estados e de civilizações. Toda e qualquer evolução persistente que tenha
acontecido na história humana nunca dependeu da Guerra, mas do pensamento. Os Alexandres, os
Césares e os Napoleões produziram oscilações, mas os Aristóteles, os Arquimedes, os Agostinhos e os
Galileus produziram o progresso".
Uma análise das causas das Guerras pode levar a resultados tanto mais concretos quanto mais nos
referimos a dados oferecidos pela realidade histórica. O estudo cuidadoso de um grande número de
Guerras reais (Q. Wright) mostra, como conclusão, que as causas dos conflitos bélicos podem ser
subdivididas em cinco categorias: causas ideológicas, econômicas, psicológicas, políticas e jurídicas.
Dizer isto, porém, não é suficiente. O analista deve indagar mais profundamente, e faz isso a três níveis
distintos (D. V. Edward): o individual, o de grupo (Estado) e o de sistemas de grupos (sistema
internacional).
Aqui a análise coloca-se a nível de sistema internacional (sistema de grupos). Com base no fato de que
cada sistema tende à auto conservação (conceito de homeostase), a Guerra é explicada em termos
sistêmicos como um instrumento para manter o equilíbrio (balance of power). A nosso ver, este nível
de análise é particularmente adequado para o estudo das possíveis causas de uma Guerra nuclear.
Neste caso, a interação parece prevalecer sobre a ação.
Herman Kahn enumera quatro hipóteses sobre sua origem: 1) Guerra não-intencional; 2) Guerra como
resultado de um cálculo errado; 3) Guerra calculada; 4) Guerra catalítica (quando é provocada por
uma terceira parte). Como se vê, o ambiente externo assume um papel predominante, apreciável
somente no plano da análise sistêmica.
Obviamente, uma explicação completa dos conflitos bélicos pressupõe uma pesquisa cuidadosa para
cada um desses níveis. As explicações oferecidas situam-se numa escala temporal, que vai das
condições-bases, que são inelutáveis (nível do processo decisório), até as causas indiretas ou
mediatas, que necessitam de um fato ou evento particular (nível de grupo) e até as específicas e
imediatas (nível do sistema de grupos).
Vistas de um outro ângulo, as causas da Guerra podem ser classificadas com base nas propostas
substancialmente homogêneas feitas por cientistas, historiadores e publicistas, mesmo quando tais
categorias de escritores — conforme lembra Wright — dão significados diferentes ao conceito de
causa: 1) forças materiais (os cientistas falam de balance of power, os historiadores de fatores políticos
e os publicistas de necessidade); 2) influências racionais (direito internacional, interesse nacional,
razão); 3) instituições sociais (organização internacional, ideologia, cultura ou costumes); 4) reações
da personalidade (opinião pública, fatores psicológicos e econômicos, capricho ou emoção).
É óbvio que serão bem diferentes as concepções sobre as causas da Guerra, de acordo com o
significado atribuído a este último conceito (Guerra como conflito de armas, de leis, de culturas e de
indivíduos).
Entre as causas dos conflitos bélicos, poderiam e deveriam ser medidas as conexas com a opinião
pública. A instituição e a atualização contínua dos "mapas" da tensão coletiva deveriam ser tarefa das
Nações Unidas ou também da UNESCO, que assim assumiriam o papel de instituições sentinelas, tão
necessárias ao nosso tempo.
Na via da medição dos fatores úteis para o estudo das causas da Guerra, colocou-se há tempos J. David
Singer (The correlates of War project), o qual construiu uma "taxonomia" geral para a descrição e
análise dos conflitos internacionais que, em diferentes níveis de análise, prevê três classes de
variáveis: os atributos — físicos ou materiais, estruturais e culturais — das entidades sociais, os liames
e relações entre elas e o comportamento que as mesmas manifestam. Uma das hipóteses importantes
que está na base da pesquisa é que a estrutura do sistema é mais importante do que seus atributos
culturais e talvez mesmo do que seus atributos físicos ou materiais.
Com base na hipótese de que a probabilidade de uma Guerra é função das "distâncias" intercorrentes
entre os Estados e das políticas por eles perseguidas, e na tentativa de evitar previsões vãs, Q. Wright
distingue oito aspectos ou categorias de tais "distâncias": tecnológica (T), estratégica (Est), intelectual
(I), jurídica ou legal (L), social (S), política (P), psíquica (Ps) e de expectativa (atitude diante da força,
expectancy) (E). Tais "distâncias" são mensuráveis mesmo que não seja de maneira perfeita, e
constituem importantes índices de previsão.
A análise das políticas dos Estados é, porém, mais importante para os fins de previsão do que o exame
das "distâncias" entre eles. Entre os métodos utilizados para avaliar a probabilidade de um conflito
armado, devemos lembrar o que consiste em extrapolar as tendências de certos índices, como, por
exemplo, os balanços militares e o comércio internacional (L. F. Richardson), e que mede
periodicamente (usa-se falar de "tensiômetros" internacionais) algumas variáveis relevantes, como
atitude, comportamento, capacidade (O. Holsti).
Fala-se frequentemente da função social das Guerras. Estas têm sido vistas como mecanismos de
estabilização do poder ou da economia, ou da regulação da pressão demográfica, ou de desvio das
tendências antissociais, ou ainda de promoção do desenvolvimento da ciência e da tecnologia. Pode-
se afirmar, porém, que o advento das armas nucleares privou-as praticamente de qualquer das
funções acima citadas.
Como consequência disto, desenvolveu-se uma tendência cada vez maior a buscar, seguindo o
caminho científico e tecnológico, quais os meios de controle de que o homem dispõe e quais as
alternativas que existem para os conflitos armados. Esta busca parte da constatação de que os
instrumentos tradicionais de controle, ou seja, as normas jurídicas e éticas, não conseguiram impedir
o deflagrar das Guerras (segundo estudos recentes, em 3.400 anos da história da humanidade, o
mundo teve apenas 234 anos de paz, definível em termos de ausência de conflitos armados; conforme
os cálculos de Singer, desde o Congresso de Viena até hoje, ocorreram 93 Guerras). Diante disto, faz-
se necessário trilhar os caminhos do "ser" e não os do "dever ser". Damos o exemplo de Etzioni, que
sugeriu, como muito útil para estes fins, o estudo de como as indústrias aprendem a mudar seus
objetivos de competição, de negativos e destrutivos (Guerra de preços), em positivos e construtivos
(concorrência qualitativa). Esta pesquisa, que tem a finalidade de controlar a Guerra e de construir
para ela várias alternativas, é hoje conhecida pelo nome de peace research.
A história da avaliação moral da Guerra pode ser dividida em três fases, ao menos com referência às
obras relativamente mais recentes: a do bellum justum, a da raison d'État e a da Guerra como crime.
O que equivale a afirmar que, com o desenvolvimento da consciência social dos povos e com o
progresso da tecnologia militar, a Guerra transformou-se, cada vez mais, num problema "quente" que
exige uma solução pronta e radical.
As justificações da Guerra com base no direito, já bastante frequentes, quando ainda vigorava a tese
do bellum justum, mas não mais consideradas necessárias, quando estava no auge a teoria da raison
d'État, encontraram novamente uma função bem precisa do quadro de um sistema internacional que
agora considera ilícita a Guerra como instrumento de solução para os conflitos internacionais. A Carta
de São Francisco, que instituiu as Nações Unidas, é muito clara neste ponto. Num certo sentido, pode-
se dizer que voltou à atualidade a distinção medieval entre jus ad bellum e jus in bello. Resumindo,
nas três frases citadas, o direito considerou a Guerra: 1) como um possível meio de justiça; 2) como
uma prerrogativa da soberania; 3) como um crime.
Não há dúvida de que a fase da raison d'État coincidiu com a afirmação de um paradigma
interpretativo das relações internacionais já superado pela doutrina, que vê o sistema internacional
como sede de anarquia e de conflitos permanentes e necessários. De acordo com esta teoria, que teve
início com os preceptistas italianos dos séculos XVI e XVII e chegou ao seu ápice com a doutrina do
Estado-potência no século XIX e princípios do século XX com Hegel, Ranke, Treitschke e Meíneck,
qualquer Estado, independentemente de sua estrutura interna, é condicionado em sua política
externa pela natureza anárquica do sistema internacional. Por isso, tende continuamente a buscar a
consolidação da própria potência, em prejuízo da dos outros Estados, mesmo à custa de violar toda e
qualquer norma moral e jurídica. Conforme esta teoria, a Guerra seria justa, porque necessária.
Um paradigma interpretativo diferente está implícito nas fases 1) e 3), mas especialmente na última
fase. De acordo com esta interpretação, que precede e, em parte, segue a explicitada na teoria da
raison d'État, a Guerra é necessária quando é considerada justa. É interessante, portanto, insistirmos
no estudo da evolução da doutrina do bellum justum.
A primeira distinção entre Guerra justa e Guerra injusta é de Santo Agostinho, mas é com Santo Tomás
que são teorizadas as condições — uma formal e objetiva, as outras duas substanciais, mas subjetivas
— de uma Guerra justa. Elas são: 1) A declaração de Guerra deve ser formulada pela autoridade
legítima. 2) Deve existir uma "justa causa". 3) O beligerante deve possuir uma "justa intenção". Uma
quarta condição especificada na doutrina será a da necessidade, isto é, da impossibilidade de fazer-se
justiça com outros meios. Com o emergir dos Estados-nação cristãos, cada um dos quais invocava a
mesma doutrina, ficou confirmada, na visão de Grócio, a posição escolástica, segundo a qual, diante
de uma única justiça "objetiva", podiam coexistir duas ou mais inocências "subjetivas". Tal visão,
teoricamente, levou a conferir aos Estados neutros determinadas obrigações, que tinham como
conteúdo uma discriminação entre as partes beligerantes.
As tentativas feitas para incorporar a doutrina do bellum justum no direito positivo foram,
infelizmente, inúteis. Assim sendo, a tendência do direito internacional foi a de desenvolver as normas
para o controle das hostilidades, quando fossem iniciadas (jus in bello). O sistema do balance of power
do século XIX foi o quadro político ideal para uma tal concepção realista do aspecto lícito da Guerra.
O que foi dito acima não diminui a grande importância que a doutrina do bellum justum teve a partir
da Idade Média. Tal importância, porém, mostrou, provavelmente, também efeitos negativos no
sentido de que atrasou o desenvolvimento de um sistema de normas jurídicas, capazes de impedir a
atuação desenfreada dos conflitos bélicos. É, porém, indubitável que buscou, sem grande êxito, fazer
derivar as normas do jus in bello das premissas jus ad bellum (uso da força proporcional à injúria
sofrida, direito dos combatentes e dos prisioneiros, etc). É fato que o jus in bello desenvolveu-se
depois separadamente, como consequência da perda da convicção de se poder estabelecer, de forma
concreta, a legitimidade do recurso à Guerra, já então considerado como um fato extrajurídico.
Com o nascimento do jus contra bellum, começam também as tentativas para uma definição
concordante dos atos de agressão. Obviamente um estudo mesmo sumário do problema da
legitimidade da Guerra não pode prescindir do exame da teoria leninista que trata da matéria,
segundo a qual somente as Guerras resultantes das lutas de classe podem ser definidas como justas.
Pertencem a esta categoria, por exemplo, as Guerras nacionais revolucionárias contra as potências
imperialistas. A atitude do partido comunista e do proletariado em relação a uma Guerra nunca é,
nem deve ser, determinada por força das razões de oportunidade política. Por exemplo, não se deve
apoiar uma Guerra "justa" que possa dar lugar a consequências reacionárias a nível mundial. Devido
a isto, a importância da doutrina leninista do bellum justum está subordinada, especialmente nas
interpretações sucessivas dos escritores marxistas, a considerações concernentes à praxe política.
Pode-se sustentar que, apesar das indubitáveis diferenças entre as posições do marxismo-leninismo
e as sustentadas pelo pensamento político contemporâneo não comunista, a propósito da liceidade
das Guerras, tanto umas quanto outras evoluíram de preferência em direção ao jus contra bellum.
Acompanharam esta tendência as teorias produzidas recentemente nos Estados de nova formação e
nos Estados em desenvolvimento.
O argumento principal, porém, contra a doutrina do bellum justum parece que se refere ao mesmo
pressuposto que lhe dá vida, ou seja, ao fato de que ela postula a liceidade de fazer justiça por si e —
implicitamente — a iliceidade do não recurso às armas, quando exista uma causa justa. O assunto é
bastante complexo e se apoia na problemática da paz e da não-violência. Parece, porém, que se pode
afirmar que, num sistema internacional profundamente mudado e numa situação de tecnologia
destrutiva como a atual, o perigo maior para os Estados deriva, exatamente, da área de "domínio
reservado", que foge ao controle e ao consenso da comunidade internacional. A exigência de
assegurar a justiça não pode, portanto, prescindir da exigência paralela de seguir processos
multilaterais, que encontram substância jurídica, política e moral nas normas das Nações Unidas.
BIBLIOGRAFIA. — R. ARLON, Pace e guerra tra le nazioni (1962), Feltrinelli, Milano 1970; G.
BOUTHOUL, Traité de sociologie: les guerres, élements de polémologie. Payot, Paris 1951; K. VON
CLAUSEWITZ, Delta guerra (publicado depois de 1831), Mondadori, Firenze 1970, 2 vols.; S. A.
COBLENTZ, From arrow to atom bomb, Barues, New York 1953; D. V. EDWARDS, International political
analysis. ibid. 1969; F. FORNARI e AUT. VÁR., Dissacrazione della guerra. Dal pacifismo alla scienza del
conflitti, Feltrinelli, Milano 1969; Satura e orientamenti delle ricerche sulla pace. ao cuidado de li.
GORI. F. Angeli, Milano 1978; H. KAHN, Thinking about the unthinkable, Avon, New York 19662; On
thermonuclear war (1960), ibid. 19692; A. P. SERENI, Diritto internazionale — IV, Giuffrè, Milano 1965;
J. D. SINGER, et alii, Explaining war: Causes and correlates of war. Sage, London 1980; War. in The
international encyclopedia of the social sciences. XVI, Free Press. New York 1968. [UMBERTO GORI]
Among the numerous issues engaging the actors in international relations, security issues are the most
salient, the most prevalent, and indeed the most intractable. States exist in an anarchic world. While
there may be formal and informal rules that give rise to a type of international system structure, there
is no international supreme authority, no centralized government empowered to manage or control
the actions of individual elites, sovereign states, or even international intergovernmental
organizations. Within states, individuals have recourse to governments and have protection under
governments. States themselves have some avenues of recourse – international law and international
organizations – but these avenues are weak.
In ancient Greece when Melos was physically surrounded by the fleet of its archenemy Athens, Melos
had few alternatives. It could appeal to a distant ally – another city-state, whose interests may have
been fundamentally different from those of Melos – or it could rely on its own resources – its military
strength and the men and women of Melos. Just as Melos was ultimately responsible for its own
security, so, too, are states in anarchic system. This is similar to the position of each prisoner in the
prisoner’s dilemma game; fearing the worst possible outcome, each player confesses to ensure
himself a better outcome – other states’ amassing more and better armaments than they – choose to
arm. The people of Melos, each prisoner, and states all rely on self-help.
Yet ironically, if a state prepares to protect itself, it takes self-help measures – building a strong
industrial base, constructing armaments, mobilizing a military – then other states become less secure.
Their response is to engage in similar activities, increasing their own level of protection but leading to
greater insecurity on the part of others. This situation is known as the security dilemma: in the absence
of centralized authority, one state’s becoming more secure diminishes another state’s security. As
political scientist John Herz describes, “Striving to attain security from attack, [states] are driven to
acquire more and more power in order to escape the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others
more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in
such a world of competing units, power competition ensue, and the vicious circle of security and
power accumulation is on.” The security dilemma, then, results in a permanent condition of tension
and power conflicts among states. Thus, it is imperative to examine the ways that the security dilemma
has been managed (short of war) over the decades.
There are five approaches to managing insecurity for states. Each approach recognizes the power
disparity between states and s cognizant of the anarchic international environment. Two of these
approaches fall under the liberal theoretical perspective and thus focus largely on multilateral
responses by groups of states acting to coordinate their policies. Two other approaches are realist,
requiring states themselves to maintain an adequate power potential. The final approach we will
consider combines elements of the liberal and realist perspectives.
Liberal Approaches
Liberal approaches to managing the security dilemma call on the international community or
international institutions to coordinate actions in order to manage power.
The Collective Security Ideal Collective security is captured in the old adage “one for all and all for
one”. Based on the proposition that aggressive and unlawful use of force by any state against another
must be stopped, collective security posits that such unlawful aggression will be met by united action:
all (or many) other states will join together against the aggressor. Potential aggressors will know this
fact ahead of time, and thus will choose not to act.
Collective security makes a number of fundamental assumptions. One assumption is that although
wars can occur, they should be prevented, and they are prevented by restraint of military action. In
other words, wars will not occur if all parties exercise restraint. Another assumption is that aggressors
should be stopped. This assumption presumes that the aggressor can be identified easily by other
members of the international community. (In some conflicts, for example, it is difficult to differentiate
between the aggressor and the victim.) Collective security also assumes moral clarity: the aggressor is
morally wrong because all aggressors are morally wrong, and all those who are right must act in unison
to meet the aggression. Finally, collective security assumes that aggressor know that the international
community will act to punish an aggressor.
Of course, the underlying hope of collective security proponents is compatible with the logic of
deterrence (a realist strategy). If all countries know that aggression will be punished by the
international community, then would-be aggressors will refrain from engaging in aggressive activity.
Hence, states will be more secure with the belief that would-be aggressors will be deterred through
the united action of the international community.
Collective security does not always work. In the period between the two world wars, Japan invaded
Manchuria and Italy overran Ethiopia. In neither case did other states act as if it were in their collective
interest to respond. Were Manchuria and Ethiopia really worth a war? In this instance, collective
security did not work because of a lack of commitment on the part of other states and an unwillingness
of the international community to act in concert. In the post-World War II era, collective security could
not work because of fundamental differences in both state interests and ideologies. Agreement
among the most powerful states was virtually impossible. And a collective security response against
one of the Big Five powers themselves – the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain France, or
China – was impossible due to the veto power that each held in the U.N. Security Council. Two major
alliance systems – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact – arrayed
states in two separate camps. States dared not engage in action against an ally or a foe, even if that
state was an aggressor, for fear of embarking on another world war.
Collective security is also likely to be unworkable because of the problematic nature of its
assumptions. Can the aggressor always be easily identified? Clearly not. In 1967 Israel launched an
armed attack against Egypt: this was an act of aggression. The week before, however, Egypt had
blocked Israeli access to the Red Sea. Clearly that, too, was an act of aggression. Twenty years earlier
the state of Israel had been carved out of Arab real estate. That, too, was an act of aggression. Many
centuries before, Arabs had ousted Jews from the territory they inhabited, also an aggressive action.
So who is the aggressor? Furthermore, even if an aggressor can be identified, is that party always
morally wrong? Collective security theorists argue, by definition, yeas. Yet trying to right a previous
wrong is not necessarily wrong; trying to make just prior injustice is not unjust. Like the balance of
power, collective security in practice supports the status quo at a specific point in time.
Arms Control and Disarmament Arms control and general disarmament schemes have been
the hope of many liberals over the years. The logic of this approach to security is straightforward:
fewer weapons means greater security. Be reducing the upward spiral of armaments (arms control)
and by reducing the amount of arms and the types of weapons employed (disarmament), the costs of
the security dilemma are reduced.
During the Cold War, many arms control agreements were negotiated. For example, in the 1972 Treaty
on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems (ABM treaty), both the United States and the Soviet
Union agreed not to use a ballistic missile defense as a shield against a first strike by the other. The
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in 1972 and 1979 (SALT I and SALT II, respectively) put ceilings ont the
growth of both Soviet and U.S. strategic weapons. However, due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
in 1979, the second SALT treaty was never ratified by the U.S. Senate. The Treaty on the
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was negotiated in 1968 at the United Nations in response
to the Cuban missile crisis.
Most of the important arms control agreements negotiated to date, be they bilateral or multilateral,
call for individual states to reduce either the number or the type of armaments already deployed. A
few are designed to halt the spread of particular weapons to states that do not yet have them. At least
one major treaty has utilized formal, multilateral processes to verify whether the terms of the treaty
are being met. Nevertheless, virtually all arms control treaties are fraught with difficulties.
The NPT provides both a positive and a negative example of the impact of such treaties. The NPT spells
out the rules of nuclear proliferation since 1970. In the treaty, signatory countries without nuclear
weapons promise not to transfer the technology to nonnuclear states. Like many of the arms control
treaties, however a number of key nuclear states and threshold nonnuclear states (i.e., states that
probably have or could quickly assemble nuclear weapons) remains outside the treaty, including India,
Israel, Pakistan, and Brazil. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a U.N.-based agency
established in 1957 to disseminate knowledge about nuclear energy and promote its peaceful uses, is
designated guardian of the treaty. The IAEA created a system of safeguards, including inspection
teams that visit nuclear facilities and report on any movement of nuclear material, in an attempt to
keep nuclear material from being diverted to nonpeaceful purposes and to ensures that states that
signed the NPT are complying. Inspectors for IAEA visited Iraqi sites after the Persian Gulf War, and
North Korean sites in the mid-1990s. their purpose in the first case was to verify that illegal materials
had been destroyed and, in the second case, to confirm the existence of nuclear materials in that
country.
The end of the Cold War and the dismemberment of the Soviet Union have resulted in major new
arms control agreements. More arms control agreements between the United States and Russia and
its successor states are likely, as the latter are forced by economic imperatives to reduce their military
expenditures. Yet the logic of arms control agreements is not impeccable. Arms control does not
eliminate the security dilemma. You can still feel insecure if your enemy has a bigger or better rock
than you do.
Complete disarmament schemes as envisioned by utopian liberal thinkers are unlikely, given how risky
such a scheme would be. Unilateral disarmament would place the state involved in a highly insecure
position. But incremental disarmament, such as represented by the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC), which bans the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons, remains a
realistic possibility. Liberals place their faith in international institutions like IAEA to monitor
adherence to such limited disarmament schemes.
Realist Approaches
Realist approaches to managing security place less faith in the international community and more faith
in individual state power.
Balance-of-power theorists posit that, to manage insecurity, states make rational and calculated
evaluations of the costs and benefits of particular policies that determine the state’s role in a balance
of power. Should we enlarge our power by seeking new allies? Is our enemy (or friend) altering the
balance of power to our detriment? What can we do to make that balance of power shift in our favor?
By either explicitly or implicitly asking and responding to such questions, states minimize their
insecurity by protecting their own interests. All states in the system are continually making choices to
increase their own capabilities and to undermine the capabilities of others, and thereby the balance
of power is maintained. When that balance of power is jeopardized, insecurity leads states to pursue
countervailing policies.
Alliances represent the most important institutional tool for enhancing one’s own power and meeting
the perceived power potential of one’s opponent. If a state is threatening to achieve a dominant
position, the threatened state will join with other against the threat. This is external balancing. Formal
and institutionalized military alliances play a key role in maintaining a balance of power, as the NATO
and Warsaw Pact alliances did in the post-World War II world. States may also engage in internal
balancing, increasing their own military and economic capabilities to counter potential threatening
enemies.
A balance of power operates at both the international and regional levels. At the international level
during the Cold War, for instance, a relative balance of power was maintained between the United
States and the Soviet Union. If one of the superpowers augmented its power through the expansion
of its alliances of through the acquisition of more deadly, more effective armaments, the other
responded in kind. Absolute gains were not as critical as relative gains; no matter how much power
accrued, neither state could afford to fall behind. Gaining allies in the uncommitted part of the Third
World, through foreign aid or military and diplomatic intervention, was one way to ensure that the
power was balanced. To not maintain the power balance was to risky a strategy; national survival was
at stake.
Balances of power among state in specific geographic regions are also a way to manage insecurity. In
South Asia, for example, a balance of power works to maintain peace between India and Pakistan, a
peace made more forceful by the presence of nuclear weapons. In East Asia, Japan’s alliance with the
United States creates a balance of power vis-à-vis China. In the Middle East, the balance of power
between Israel and its Arab neighbors continues. In some regions a complex set of other balances has
developed: between the economically rich, oil-producing states of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf
and the economically poor states of the core Middle East; between Islamic militants (Iran, Libya),
moderates (Egypt, Tunisia), and conservatives (Saudi Arabia). With the breakup of the Soviet Union,
the newly independent states of central Asia are struggling for place and position within a newly
emerging regional balance of power.
Realist theorists assert that the balance of power is the most important technique for managing
insecurity. It is compatible with the nature of man and that of the state, which is to act to protect self-
interest by maintaining one’s power position relative to others. If a state seeks preponderance
through military acquisitions or offensive actions, then war is acceptable under the balance-of-power
system. But if all states act similarly, the balance can be preserved.
A major limitation of the balance-of-power approach, however, is its inability to manage security
during periods of fundamental change. A balance-of-power approach supports the status quo. When
change occurs, how should other states respond? Fundamental change occurred at the end of the
Cold War, for example, with the dismemberment of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact alliance. A balance-of-power strategy would have suggested that the United States also
reduce its power potential, particularly its military capability, since the military capability, since the
military of its rival had been impaired. Yet such a rational response is politically difficult to make. Fear
of a resurgence of power from the opponent, fear of a return to the old order, and pressure from
domestic constituencies to maintain defense spending and employment all make dramatic changes in
policy difficult to accommodate.
One outcome of the change brought about by the end of the Cold War has been a reexamination of
the role of NATO, the major Western alliance formed after World War II to counter the threat posed
by the Soviet Union. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a state and the end of communist
leadership in it and neighboring states, what role does NATO play now? Should NATO be expanded to
include the states of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union? Should Russia be asked to join?
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary have become members, and discussions with other countries
continue. But if all states are included? What is the purpose of the alliance? Who is the enemy? What
balance of power is being preserved or maintained? Realists see NATO expansion as an opportunity
to expand Western influence during an era of Russian weakness. Liberals view the expansion as a way
to support fledgling democracies and identities in eastern Europe and extend mechanisms for conflict
management in the system. But the difficult questions posed by realists and liberals alike remain
unanswered.
Deterrence: Balance of Power Revisited The goal of deterrence theory, like that of the balance
of power, is to prevent the outbreak of war. Deterrence theory posits that war can be prevented by
the threat of the use of force.
The theory as initially developed is based on a number of key assumptions. First and most important
is the realist assumption of the rationality of decision makers. Rational decision makers are assumed
to want to avoid resorting to war in those situations in which the anticipated cost of the aggression is
greater than the gain expected. Second, it is assumed that nuclear weapons pose an unacceptable
level of destruction, and thus that decision makers will not resort to armed aggression. Third, the
theory assumes the existence of alternatives to war that are available to decision makers irrespective
of the situation. Thus, under deterrence, war will not occur and insecurity is reduced, as long as
rational decision makers are in charge, the threat is sufficiently large, and other nonmilitary options
are available.
For deterrence to work, then, states must build up their arsenals in order to present a credible threat.
Information regarding the threat must be conveyed to the opponent. Thus, knowing that an aggressive
action will be countered by a damaging reaction, the opponent will decide, according to deterrence
theorists, not to resort to force and destroy its own society.
The basic ideas of deterrence were developed with respect to conventional arms. The development
and subsequent buildup of nuclear weapons in the second half of the twentieth century, however, has
made deterrence an even more potent approach for managing power. with each superpower having
second-strike capability – the ability to respond and hit the adversary even after the adversary has
launched a first strike – then destruction of both sides is assured. According to deterrence, no rational
decision maker will make the decision to start a nuclear war since his or her own society would be
destroyed in the process. Decision makers thus turn to other alternatives to achieve their goals.
As logical as deterrence sound and as effective as it has proved to be – after all, there was no nuclear
war during the Cold War – the assumptions of the theory are troublesome. Are all top decision makers
rational? Might not one individual or a group risk destruction? Might some states sacrifice a large
number of people, as Adolf Hitler, Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini, and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein were willing
to do? How do states convey to a potential adversary information about their own capability? Why
not choose to bluff or lie to feel more secure? For states without nuclear weapons, or nuclear-
weapons states who are launching an attack against a nonnuclear state, the costs of war may not be
that unacceptable their own society may not be threatened with destruction. In such cases,
deterrence will fail.
Both the balance of power and deterrence rely on the unilateral use of force or the threat of using
force to manage power, whereas liberal approaches depend on collective efforts. Periodically, these
approaches fail. In these situations, when conflict has already broken out, realists and liberals alike
have turned to peacekeeping to manage insecurity.
Peacekeeping: The Stepchild of Liberals and Realists During the Cold War, when collective security
was an impossibility, peacekeeping evolved as a way to limit the scope of conflict and prevent it from
escalating into a Cold War confrontation. Peacekeeping operations fall into two types, or generations.
In first-generation peacekeeping, multilateral institutions such as the United Nations seek to contain
conflicts between two state through third-party military forces. Ad hoc military units, drawn from the
armed forces of nonpermanent members of the U.N. Security Council (often small, neutral members),
have been used to prevent the escalation of conflicts and to keep the warring parties apart until the
dispute can be settled. These troops operate under U.N. auspices, supervising armistices, trying to
maintain cease-fires, and physically interposing themselves in a buffer zone between warring parties.
First-generation peacekeeping efforts are most effective under the following conditions:
In the post-Cold War era, U.N. peacekeeping has expanded to address different types of conflicts and
to take on new responsibilities. Whereas first-generation activities primarily address interstate
conflict, second-generation peacekeeping activities respond to civil war and domestic unrest, much of
it stemming from the rise of ethnonationalism. To deal with these new conflicts, second-generation
peacekeepers have taken on a range of both military and nonmilitary functions. Militarily, they have
aided in verification of troop withdrawal (Afghanistan) and have separated warring factions until the
underlying issues could be settled (Bosnia). Sometimes resolving underlying issues has meant
organizing and running national elections, such as in Cambodia and Namibia; sometimes it has
involved implementing human rights agreements, such as in Central America. At other times U.N.
peacekeepers have tried to maintain law and order in failing or disintegrating societies by aiding in
civil administration, policing, and rehabilitating infrastructure, as in Somalia. And peacekeepers have
provide humanitarian aid, supplying food, medicine, and a secure environment in part of an expanded
version of human rights, as followed in several missions in Africa. Second-generation peacekeeping
has vastly expanded in the post-Cold War period. This expansion has creates difficulties for the
international community.
Although the techniques used to manage insecurity are many, sometimes the approaches fail and
wars do break out. There have been approximately 14,500 armed struggles throughout history, with
about 3.5 billion people dying either as a direct or indirect result. In the contemporary era (since 1816),
there have been between 224 and 559 international, internal, and colonialist wars, depending on how
war is defined.
But while the security dilemma explains why states are insecure, it does not explain why war breaks
out. An analysis of any war – Vietnam, Angola, Cambodia, World War II, or the Franco-Prussian War –
would find a variety of reasons for the outbreak of violence. Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State, and
War posits that the international system is the primary framework of international relations. But that
framework exists all the time, so to explain why sometimes wars occur and sometimes they do not,
we also need to consider the other levels of analysis. Characteristics of individuals, both leaders and
masses, and the internal structure of states are some of the forces that operate within the limitations
of the international system. Waltz finds that all three different levels of analysis can be applied to
explaining the causes of war.
Both the characteristics of individual leaders and the general attributes of people have been blamed
for war. Some individual leaders are aggressive and bellicose; they use their leadership positions to
further their causes. Thus, according to some realists and liberals, war occurs because of the personal
characteristics of major leaders. It is impossible, however, to prove the veracity of this position. Would
past wars have occurred had different leaders – perhaps more pacifist one – been in power? We can
only speculate.
If it is not the innate character flaws of individuals that cause war, is there a possibility that leaders,
like all individuals, are subject to misperceptions? According to liberals, misperceptions by leaders –
seeing aggressiveness where it may not be intended, imputing the actions of one person to a group –
can lead to the outbreak of war. Historians have typically given a key role to misperceptions. There
are several types of misperceptions that may lead to war. One of the most common is exaggerating
the hostility of the adversary, believing that the adversary is more hostiles than it may actually be or
that the adversary has greater military or economic capability than it actually has. This miscalculation
may lead a state to respond, that is, take actions like building up its own arms which, in turn, may be
viewed as hostile activities by its adversary. Misperceptions thus spiral, potentially leading to war.
Events leading to World War I are often viewed as a conflict spiral, causes by misperceived intentions
and actions of the principal protagonists. We can only speculate.
If not because of the leaders, perhaps characteristics of the masses lead to the outbreak of war. Some
realist thinkers – St. Augustine and Reinhold Niebuhr, for example – take this position. St. Augustine
wrote that every act is an act of self-preservation on the part of individuals. For Niebuhr the link goes
even deeper; the origin of war reside in the depths of the human psyche. This approach is compatible
with that of sociobiologists who study animal behavior. Aggressive behavior is adopted by virtually all
species to ensure survival; it is biologically innate. Yet this view does not explain subtle differences
among species; some do engage in cooperative behavior. And human beings are seen by many as an
infinitely more complex species than animal species. If true, these presumptions lead to two possible
alternative assessments, one pessimistic and the other optimistic. For pessimists, if war is the product
of innate human characteristics or a flawed human nature then there is no reprieve; wars will
inevitably occur all the time. For optimists, if war, or aggression, is innate, the only hope of eliminating
war resides in trying to fundamentally alter human nature.
Yet war does not, in fact, happen all the time; it is the unusual event, not the norm. So characteristics
inherent in all-individuals cannot be the only cause of war. Nor can the explanation be that human
nature has, indeed, been fundamentally changed, since wars do occur. Most experiments aimed at
changing mass behavior have failed miserably, and there is no visible proof that fundamental attitudes
have been altered.
Thus the individual level of analysis is unlikely to provide the only cause of war, or even the primary
one. Individuals, after all, are organized into societies and states.
State and Society: Liberal and Radical Explanations
A second level of explanation suggests that war occurs because of the internal structures of states.
States vary in size, geography, ethnic homogeneity, and economic and political preferences. The
question, then, is how do the characteristics of different states affect the possibility of war? Which
state structures are most correlated with the propensity to go to war?
State and society explanations are among the oldest. Plato, for example, posited that war is less likely
where the population is cohesive and enjoys a moderate level of prosperity. Since the population
would be able to thwart an attack, an enemy is apt to refrain from coercive activity. Many thinkers
during the Enlightenment, including Kant, believed that war was more likely in aristocratic states.
Drawing on the Kantian position, liberals posit that republican regimes (ones with representative
government and separation of powers) are least likely to wage war; that is the basic position of the
theory of the democratic peace. Democracies are pacific because democratic norms and culture
inhibit the leadership from taking actions leading to war. Democratic leaders hear from multiple voices
that tend to restrain decision makers and therefore lessen the chance of war. Such states provide
outlets for individuals to voice opposing viewpoints, and structural mechanisms exist for replacing
war-prone or aggressive rulers. To live in such a state, individuals learn the art of compromise. In the
process, extreme behavior like waging war is curbed, engaged in only periodically and then only if
necessary to make a state's own democracy safe.
Other liberal tenets hold that some types of economic systems are more war prone than others.
Liberal states are also more apt to be capitalist states whose members enjoy relative wealth. Such
societies feel no need to divert the attention of the dissatisfied masses into an external conflict; the
wealthy masses are largely satisfied with the status quo. Furthermore, war interrupts trade, blocks
profits, and causes inflation. Thus, liberal capitalist states are more apt to avoid war and to promote
peace.
But not every theorist sees the liberal state as benign and peace loving. Indeed, radical theorists offer
the most thorough critique of liberalism and its economic counterpart, capitalism. They argue that
capitalist liberal modes of production inevitably lead to conflict between the two major social classes
within the state, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, for both economic dominance and political
leadership. This struggle leads to war, both internally and externally, as the state dominated by the
entrenched bourgeoisie is driven to expand the engine of capitalism at the expense of the proletariat
and for the economic preservation of the bourgeoisie.
In this view, conflict and war are attributed to the internal dynamics of capitalist economic systems.
Capitalist systems stagnate and slowly collapse in the absence of external stimulation. Three different
explanations have been offered for what happens to capitalist states and why they must turn outward.
First, the English economist John Hobson (1858-1940) claimed that the internal demand for goods will
slow down in capitalist countries, leading to pressures for imperialist expansion to find external
markets to sustain economic growth. Second, to Lenin and others, the problem is not one of
underdemand but one of declining rates of return on capital. Capitalist states expand externally to
increase the rates of return on capital investment. Third, Lenin and many twentieth-century radicals
pointed to the need for raw materials to sustain capitalist expansion; external suppliers are needed to
obtain such resources. So according to the radical view, capitalist states inevitably expand, but radical
theorists disagree among themselves on precisely why expansion occurs.
While radical explanations are viable for colonialism and imperialism, the link to war is more tenuous.
One possible link is that capitalist states spend not only for consumer goods but also for the military,
leading inevitably to arms races and eventually war. Another link points to leaders who, in order to
avert domestic economic crises, resort to external conflict.
support the notion that the Argentinian military used the FaIIdandiMalvinas
conflict in 1982to rally the population around theflag and draw attention
away from -the country's economic contraction. Still another link suggests
that the masses may push a ruling elite toward war. This View is clearly at
odds. with the liberal belief that the masses are basically peace loving. Adherents
the public might have pushed the leaders into aggressive action.
Those who argue. that contests over the structure of states are a basic
cause of war have identified another explanation for the outbreak of some
wars. Numerous civil wars have been fought over what groups, what ideologies,
and which leaders should control the government of the state. The
United States's own civil war (1861-65) between the North and the South,
Russia's civil war (1917-19) between liberal and socialist forces, China's
civil war (1927,...49) between nationalist and communist forces, and the
among competing economic systems and among groups vying for scarce
resources within the state illustrates further the proposition that internal
structures are responsible for the outbreak of war. The United States's civil
war was not just over which region should control policy but over a belief
by those in the South that the government inequitably and unfairly allocated
that poured economic resources into the region of the capital. Yet in virtually
every case, neither characteristics of the state nor the state structures
were solely responsible for the outbreak of war. State structure is embedded
oYerarching rule of law, which is easily dispensed with when states deter-
Sun-tzu, the famous Chinese military expert, began his book The Art of War with the words ‘Warfare
is the greatest affair of state, the basis of life and death, the Way (Tao) to survival or extinction. It must
be thoroughly pondered and analyzed.’ These words, 2,500 years later, still hold true: war has grown
more deadly, and more damaging to human existence.
In the twentieth century alone, over 250 formally declared wars took over one 100 million lives.
Undeclared wars, including political repression, communal violence, and tribal genocide took millions
more; for example between 50–100 million tribal people have been killed by forces and citizens of
states in the twentieth century. If we expand the definition of war to include such conflicts as ‘the war
on drugs’ and gang warfare, casualties figures rise, though accurate statistics are not available on
these forms of violence.
As we enter the third millennium, one-third of the world’s countries are engaged in some form of
political violence. Whether these conflicts are called war or not often depends more on political
rhetoric than on an accepted definition of the term. In addition, approximately two thirds of the
world’s security forces use human rights abuses to control their populations. The victims tend to label
this violence war or dirty war, while the state tends to classify this as defense or counterinsurgency.
The world has not always been characterized by such high levels of violent warfare. Wars today are
longer in duration, more deadly, and kill higher numbers of civilians than wars of preceding centuries.
The reasons behind war and the ways in which it is waged change across cultures and time. The
changing characteristics of war demonstrate that organized violence is not a fixed and eternal fact of
biology, nor an inescapable feature of a Freudian psyche, but a human practice guided by norms of
behavior and codes of conduct situated in cultural values.
1. Defining War
Neither the two world wars nor the several hundred local and regional wars since 1900 have brought
us closer to a shared understanding of war. Most scholars accept a basic definition of war as the
deployment of violence to force opponents to comply with one’s will.
War is organized, group-level, armed aggression rooted in hierarchies of dominance which assume
winners and losers in a contest over resources, people, and power. Yet war is defined differently by
the winners and the losers, by historical perspective, by soldiers and pacifists—and in each case the
definitions are more politically charged than factually correct.
For example, freedom fighter, terrorist, insurgent, rebel, traitor, and soldier are all terms variously
applied to the same actors by different groups seeking to maximize their own political and moral
justifications.
Governments define war in their own interests, and militaries are loath to admit strategies that entail
civilian casualties, torture, and human rights abuses.
The most basic understanding of war is affected by differential and biased reporting; for example,
casualty statistics for World War Two vary by millions, depending on the nationality and viewpoint of
the researcher. Controlling the definitions of war are integral to the waging of war (Sluka 1992).
The ethnographic study of war and peace has added a new dimension in the understanding of political
violence. This academic research has demonstrated that war is a far more complex reality than
classical definitions positing a violent contest between two or more armed forces seeking a military,
and thus political, victory (Warren 1993, Nordstrom and Robben 1995). Soldiers often battle unarmed
civilians and not each other—evident from the ethnic cleansing of the Yugoslav forces in Bosnia and
Kosovo or the two million deaths in Sudan’s civil war. Paramilitaries, private militias, death squads,
and roving bands of armed predatory gangs patrol warzones. Some operate at the behest of state
forces while others are independent of all sovereign or rebel control. Mercenary forces are a global
phenomenon today, and range from informal groups such as the Yugoslav mercenaries fighting in
Central Africa to the formal Executive Outcome organization, comprised of former apartheid South
African soldiers, who broker with governments as well as rebel groups. Battlezones are also home to
looters, sex workers, criminals, and profiteers. Warzones are a bazaar of international arms and
supplies merchants who reap billions of dollars yearly worldwide.
International nongovernmental organizations are found in all warzones today, providing services
ranging from conflict resolution to humanitarian and development aid. Finally, the fronts of wars are
home to the inhabitants. Regardless of formal military regulations mandating the legal role of women,
children, and the aged in war, all of these people fight for survival when they find themselves on the
frontlines. Armed or unarmed, women defend homes and towns, children are forced to take up arms
and fight, and the aged battle forced sieges. The unscrupulous sell out their neighbors for a few coins,
and the altruistic set up medical clinics, schools and trade routes to provide critical resources under
bombardment
War is a fairly recent invention, in terms of the anthropological expanse of human existence. Humans,
as a species, have lived 90 percent of their history without war. Social hierarchies and concepts of
ownership appear necessary for the advent of war. The earliest form of human organization was the
band: fluid egalitarian groups of nomads. The archeological record indicates that while interpersonal
violence was known in bands—determined by puncture and crushing wounds from weapons—it was
limited. It did not reach the level of formalized intergroup violence among contending warriors.
territory.
modern state.
pointing out that this era saw the advent of world war,
5. Theorizing War
to control, war.
(Gregor 1996).
helpingtoerasearbitrarydistinctionsbetween
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1. Patterns of Warfare
2. Theoretical Approaches
escalate to war.
deterrence fails.
battle-related deaths).
democratic transitions.
military defeat.
3. Conclusion
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unprecedented scale.
required to pay for war with high taxes and their lives,
allies.
best.
6. Conclusion
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1.1 Technology
closely linked.
solutions helped the Greeks win, but the unity that the
military problems.
1.2 Organization
elections.
by trampling.
recover the pila after the battle and reshape them. The
retirement benefits.
1.3 Purposes
2.1 Technology
cavalry.
numbers.
2.2 Organization
fighting.
other.
2.3 Purposes
3.1 Technology
3.2 Organization
the men feared their officers more than they feared the
enemy.
3.3 Purposes
4.1 Technology
eight.’
4.2 Organization
result.
4.3 Purposes
the British empire more than two and a half years and
5.1 Technology
the battlefield.
5.2 Organization
them.
5.3 Purposes
capitalist–communist struggle.
War, Sociology of
Bibliography
Black J 1998 War and the World: Military Power and the Fate of
CT
Press, Oxford, UK
Oxford, UK
Oxford, UK
York