WO2014190828A1

WO2014190828A1 - Method, apparatus and system for security key management

Info

Publication number: WO2014190828A1
Application number: PCT/CN2014/076167
Authority: WO
Inventors: 和峰
Original assignee: 中兴通讯股份有限公司
Priority date: 2013-05-27
Filing date: 2014-04-24
Publication date: 2014-12-04
Also published as: CN104185177B; CN104185177A

Abstract

Disclosed are a method, apparatus and system for security key management. A master control base station and/or a terminal maintain/maintains two sets of base station key for the master control base station: a present base station key and a non-present base station key. The non-present base station key is the key not used by the master control base station and the terminal at present, and is derived from the present base station key or Next Hop (NH) or a prior non-present base station key. The present base station key is the key used by the master control base station and the terminal at present, and is used for deriving other control panel and/or user panel keys. There exists one and only one present base station key simultaneously.

Description

Security key management method, device and system

The present invention relates to the field of communications, and in particular, to a security key management method, apparatus, and system. Background technique

With the continuous evolution of wireless communication technologies and standards, the mobile packet service has been greatly developed, and the data throughput capability of a single terminal is constantly increasing. Taking the Long Term Evolution (LTE) system as an example, the downlink maximum rate of 100 Mbps data transmission can be supported in a 20 M bandwidth. In the subsequent enhanced LTE (LTE Advanced) network, the data transmission rate will be further improved, and even Reached 1Gbps.

The existing user plane data protocol stack of LTE is shown in Figure 1. The downlink data received from the core network via the User Channel GPRS Tunneling Protocol (GTP-U, GPRS Tunneling Protocol for the User Plane) is packetized and then passed through the packet data. The PDCP (Packet Data Convergence Protocol) sublayer, the Radio Link Control (RLC) protocol sublayer, the Medium Access Control (MAC) Medium Sublayer, and the Physical Layer (PHY) For user equipment (UE, User Equipment); the transmission of uplink data is exactly the opposite of the downlink. Currently, the data transmission link between the network and the terminal is a one-to-one dedicated link, so the signal quality of the link and the size of the resources used determine the data transmission performance between the two. If the resources used by the link are limited or the signal quality is poor, the user experience of the terminal will decrease. This is a huge challenge that mobile operators are facing now. Although the network capacity is expanding year by year, it still cannot keep up with the increase in the number of terminals. User demand for data traffic.

In order to meet the growing demand for data traffic and the geographically uneven nature of services, operators are also adding low power nodes (LPNs) in the process of deploying next-generation communication networks (such as LTE) (or Small cell or micro base station (Pico eNB) To carry out hot spot enhancements. As the number of LPN cells increases, the network deployment environment becomes more complex and brings some problems. First, because the coverage of the LPN cell is much smaller than that of the Macro Cell, and the capacity is relatively small, some LPN cells may be easily occupied by users and the load may be too high, thereby affecting the throughput of user data. The other LPN cells or macro cells are at a relatively low load level. If the load is to be balanced, the network side needs to perform load balancing operations, but the process is not flexible enough, especially when there are many cells. In addition, the load imbalance caused by the lack is more serious. In addition, because the number of LPN cells is relatively large, when a user equipment (or terminal) moves within the network, frequent inter-cell handover (Handover) is caused, resulting in frequent Data service terminals are even dropped calls, which can also lead to a decline in user data throughput and user experience. At the same time, such frequent handovers may also cause the terminal and the network, especially the core network, to receive a large amount of signaling impact, which may cause system resources to be congested or even paralyzed. With the increase in the number of LPN cells deployed by operators and individuals in the future, the above situation will become more and more serious. Therefore, many companies and operators are eager to seek a new enhancement solution. Dual Connectivity is one of them. First, the dual-connected terminal can simultaneously connect with two (or more than two, the dual connectivity of the present invention is only a generic term, and does not limit the number of connections), for example, the terminal keeps connected with the macro cell and the LPN cell at the same time. When the network load is unbalanced, the network side can adjust the amount of data transmitted by the terminal on the two nodes in real time, and if the terminal moves or other reasons cause the LPN cell to change, another cell can still maintain the connection, and the change is not Can cause excessive signaling impact.

However, the above dual connectivity method has security problems, especially when the terminal has a PDCP protocol layer entity on two (or several) network nodes, because of the control plane signaling and user plane data of the radio access network. Security protection (including encryption and decryption and integrity protection) is done at the PDCP layer. Therefore, when several PDCP entities exist, how to implement security protection on different network nodes is an important issue that must be solved.

According to the existing protocol, as shown in Figure 2, between the radio access network side (such as an eNB) and the terminal The Access Stratum (AS) has the same security context, including the base station key KeNB, according to which the AS control plane encryption key (KRRCenc) and the integrity protection key (KRRCint) can be derived, and User side encryption key (KUPenc). When data transmission is performed between the eNB and the terminal, the sender uses the control plane integrity protection key (KRRCint) and the encryption key (KRRCenc), and the specified algorithm to perform integrity protection and encryption on the control plane data, and at the receiving end. Reverse operations (decryption and integrity protection verification) are performed based on the same key and algorithm. For user plane data transmission and reception, both parties use the user plane encryption key.

(KUPenc) Encrypts and decrypts user plane data. The base station key KeNB is initially calculated by the core network and then transmitted to the eNB. In the subsequent process, for example, to prevent the PDCP serial number from being flipped or the terminal switching, the KeNB also updates. Taking handover as an example, if an S1 handover occurs, the KeNB of the handover target side is still calculated by the core network; but if an X2 handover occurs, the derivative method of the KeNB (or KeNB*) of the handover target side may have two As shown in FIG. 3, one is derived from the KeNB on the switching source side, and the other is derived from the Next Hop (NH), where the NH is calculated by the core network and sent to the eNB. . Which method is used depends on whether there is an unused NH on the source side (that is, it is not used for key derivation). If there is an unused NH on the source side, KeNB* NH derived; otherwise, KeNB * is derived from KeNB.

According to the above description, in the dual connectivity scenario, according to the existing protocol, the security protection of several network nodes accessed by the terminal can only be configured by using the same key for several nodes on the network side. As shown in Figure 4, the terminal accesses the macro base station (Mac) and the micro base station simultaneously in a typical deployment scenario.

(Pico eNB/LPN) These two nodes, if the two nodes use the same security configuration (such as the same encryption key), the terminal side only needs to use a set of security context configuration. The problem with the above method is that it is not secure because the micro base station (or LPN, small cell base station, etc.) deployed by the operator is considered to be deployed in a public environment (such as a downtown area or a street), so the micro base station is compared to Acer. The station is not safe enough, that is, the base station itself has security risks, if the micro base station and the macro The base station uses the same security configuration. After the micro base station is compromised, the security protection of the macro base station is also broken. When the micro base station changes frequently, the risk of the key being cracked is greater, and the key is compromised. Sex is also proportional to the number of insecure micro-base stations it has experienced. So in this respect, using the same set of security contexts is a potential security hole. However, in addition to this, existing protocols cannot support the security protection mechanism under dual connectivity, especially the security key management mechanism. Summary of the invention

In view of the above, it is a primary object of the present invention to provide a security key management method, apparatus and system that improve security under multiple connections.

In order to achieve the above object, the technical solution of the present invention is achieved as follows:

A security key management method, the method comprising:

The master base station and/or the terminal maintains the base station keys of the two sets of master base stations: a current base station key and a non-current base station key; wherein, the non-current base station key refers to a secret that is not currently used by the master base station and the terminal. The key is derived from the current base station key or the next hop NH or the old non-current base station key; the current base station key refers to the key currently used by the master base station and the terminal, and is used to derive other control planes and/or User plane key, the current base station key has one and only one exists.

The base station key of the controlled base station to which the terminal and the access control station are derived from the key of the master control base station (including the current base station key or the non-current base station key), but the same master base station key can only be used once at most. To derive a controlled base station key.

The first controlled base station key of the controlled base station with which the terminal is connected is derived by the master base station based on the current base station key or the non-current base station key or NH.

If the terminal accesses other controlled base stations, the corresponding controlled base station key is derived by the master base station according to the master base station key or NH that has not been used before.

The controlled base station key is calculated/derived by the master base station and then transmitted to the controlled base station through the interface between the master base station and the controlled base station. The method further comprises the method of selecting a non-current base station key as: using the latest base station key, ie the last derived base station key, the base station key being the current base station key or a non-current base station key.

The key derivation method is: calculating a derived key according to a specific key derivation function based on an initial key, wherein the specific key derivation function comprises a one-way function.

When the terminal and the controlled base station to which it accesses need to perform a key update, the corresponding new controlled base station key is derived from the old controlled base station key.

A security key management device, the device is a master control base station, and the device is configured to maintain a base station key of two sets of master control base stations: a current base station key and a non-current base station key; wherein, the non-current base station is dense Key refers to the key currently not used by the master base station and the terminal, by the current base station key or

The NH or the old non-current base station key is derived; the current base station key refers to a key currently used by the master base station and the terminal, and is used to derive other control planes and/or user plane keys, the current base station key At the same time, there is only one and only one exists.

The controlled base station key is calculated/derived by the master base station and then transmitted to the controlled base station through the interface between the master base station and the controlled base station.

When the primary control base station selects the non-current base station key, it is used to: use the latest base station key, that is, the base station key that was derived last time, and the base station key is the current base station key or the non-current base station key. The master base station, when deriving a key, is configured to: calculate a derived key according to a specific key derivation function based on the initial key, where the specific key derivation function includes a one-way function.

When the terminal and the controlled base station to which it accesses need to perform key update, the corresponding new controlled base station key is derived by the master base station based on the old controlled base station key.

The master base station is a radio access network side base station in a Long Term Evolution LTE system.

A security key management device, the device is a terminal, and the device is configured to maintain a base station key of two sets of main control base stations: a current base station key and a non-current base station key; wherein, the non-current base station key refers to The key currently not used by the master base station and the terminal is derived from the current base station key or NH or the old non-current base station key; the current base station key refers to the key currently used by the master base station and the terminal, To derive other control planes and/or user plane keys, the current base station key has both one and only one presence.

A security key management system, the system includes a master base station and a terminal, wherein the master base station and the terminal are respectively used to maintain base station keys of two sets of master base stations: a current base station key and a non-current base station key; The non-current base station key refers to a key that is not currently used by the master base station and the terminal, and is derived from the current base station key or the NH or the old non-current base station key; the current base station key refers to the current master control The key used by the base station and the terminal is used to derive other control planes and/or user plane keys, and the current base station key has both one and only one.

The master base station is a radio access network side base station in an LTE system.

The security key management technology provided by the present invention can provide sufficient security protection for multiple connections of the terminal, and the security under multiple connections can be significantly improved, and multiple connections can be prevented when the micro base station connected to the terminal changes frequently. The risk of a key being compromised or compromised is proportional to the change, which guarantees that the security strength of multiple connections is within the controllable range. DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an LTE user plane protocol stack;

2 is a schematic diagram of a key derivation and protection mechanism in an existing network; 3 is a schematic diagram of a method for deriving a base station key in a handover scenario;

Figure 4 is a schematic diagram of a dual connection scenario;

FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of a dual-connection security key management method;

Figure 6 is a schematic diagram of a key derivation algorithm;

Figure 7 is a schematic diagram of a dual-connection security key management scenario;

Figure 8 is a schematic diagram of a dual-connection security key derivation mechanism;

FIG. 9 is a schematic structural diagram of a structure of a main control base station according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 10 is a schematic structural diagram of a terminal structure according to an embodiment of the present invention. detailed description

An exemplary embodiment of the present invention provides a security key management method, which enables a terminal to have a strong security key or security configuration when accessing two (or more) wireless access network nodes simultaneously, thereby ensuring Dual connectivity security.

As shown in FIG. 5, the master base station and/or the terminal maintains the base station keys of the two sets of master base stations: a current base station key and a non-current base station key; wherein, the non-current base station key refers to not currently being controlled. The key used by the base station and the terminal is derived from the current base station key or the next hop NH or the old non-current base station key; the current base station key refers to the key currently used by the master base station and the terminal, and is used for derivation Other control planes and/or user plane keys, the current base station key has both one and only one presence.

Preferably, the method of selecting a non-current base station key is: using the latest base station key, i.e., the base station key that was recently derived, which may be the current base station key or a non-current base station key.

As shown in FIG. 5, the base station key of the controlled base station to which the terminal and the access terminal are derived is derived from the key of the master base station (including the current base station key or the non-current base station key), and the key of the same master base station is the most. The key used to derive the controlled base station can only be used once.

As shown in FIG. 5, the first controlled base station key S-KeNB of the controlled base station to which the terminal and the access control station Derived by the master base station according to the current base station key or the non-current base station key or NH.

Preferably, if the terminal accesses other controlled base stations, the corresponding controlled base station key is derived by the master base station according to the previously used master base station key or NH.

Optionally, when the terminal and the controlled base station accessed by the terminal need to perform key update, the corresponding new controlled base station key S-KeNB* is derived from the old controlled base station key S-KeNB.

Preferably, as shown in FIG. 6, the derivation method is: calculating a derived key (key 2) according to a specific key derivation function based on an initial key (key 1), wherein the specific key derivation function may include any single To the function, the specific calculation method can be determined according to the specific implementation, and there is no limitation here.

Preferably, on the network side, the base station key of the controlled base station is calculated/derived by the master base station, and then sent to the controlled base station through an interface between the master base station and the controlled base station.

Preferably, the master base station and the controlled base station are collectively referred to as a radio access network side base station in an LTE system, and may be a macro base station or a micro base station or a low power node (LPN) or a small cell base station (Small Cell) or a home. Base station (HeNB), etc. In the specific implementation depends on the network deployment. The invention will now be further described in conjunction with various embodiments.

Embodiment 1

As shown in FIG. 7, a macro base station (ie, a master base station) and a plurality of micro base stations (ie, multiple controlled base stations) are present in the deployment network, where the terminal 1 is in the macro base station and in the coverage of the first controlled base station, And maintain a double connection with both. This embodiment takes the key management of the terminal 1 in the master base station and the first controlled base station as an example.

The terminal 1 has a security context at the master base station; the security context includes a current master base station key KeNB, and the macro base station and the terminal 1 derive a control plane and/or a user plane key according to the KeNB to protect the information of the terminal 1 and the macro base station. transfer.

The master base station derives the controlled base station key KeNB* according to the KeNB or NH and transmits it to the first controlled base station.

Wherein, if there is an unused NH on the master base station side, the NH derived KeNB* is used, Otherwise KeNB is used to derive KeNB*; Terminal 1 also performs the same derivation to get the same KeNB*.

The terminal 1 and the first controlled base station respectively derive a control plane and/or a user plane key according to the KeNB* as a base station key to protect information transmission between the terminal 1 and the micro base station.

At this time, two sets of security keys are used between the terminal 1 and the two access network elements on the network side to protect their respective wireless connections. Specific Embodiment 2: Based on the scenario of the specific embodiment 1. This embodiment further takes the key management at the time of generating a key update as an example.

The terminal 1 needs to perform key update during the connection process of the first controlled base station. The specific reason may be that the serial number of the PDCP layer is to be reversed, or the network side algorithm or security requirement.

Then, the macro base station derives a new controlled base station key KeNB** according to the controlled base station key KeNB* of the first controlled base station, and transmits the key to the first controlled base station. Accordingly, terminal 1 also performs the same key derivation operation to obtain the same KeNB * *.

The terminal 1 and the first controlled base station respectively derive a control plane and/or a user plane key according to the KeNB** as a base station key to protect information transmission between the terminal 1 and the first controlled base station.

Preferably, the derivation of the network side by KeNB* to KeNB** can also be done by the first controlled base station without the need for macro base station calculation.

Preferably, in the subsequent process, the terminal 1 and the first controlled base station may further repeat the foregoing operations to complete a new key update. Specific embodiment 3:

As shown in FIG. 7, a macro base station (ie, a master base station) and a plurality of micro base stations (ie, a controlled base station) exist in the deployment network, and the terminal 2 first establishes a dual connection with the macro base station and the first controlled base station, and then the terminal 2 moves to In the coverage of the second controlled base station, the dual connection with the macro base station and the second controlled base station is re-completed. In this embodiment, the key management of the terminal 2 in the master base station and the second controlled base station is example.

The terminal 2 has a security context at the macro base station, including the current master base station key KeNB, and is used to protect the information transmission between the terminal 2 and the macro base station according to the control plane and/or the user plane key derived by the KeNB.

As shown in FIG. 8, if the macro base station determines that the currently existing base station key has been used to derive the controlled base station key, the macro base station derives a new non according to the current base station key KeNB or the old non-current key KeNB'. The current master base station key KeNB" then derives the second controlled base station key KeNB* according to the new non-current master base station key KeNB and passes it to the second controlled base station. The method for the macro base station to select a new non-current base station key is: using the latest base station key (ie, the base station key that was last derived, the base station key may be the current base station key or the non-current base station key); If the macro base station determines that there is currently a controlled base station key that is not used for the derivation operation, then the second controlled base station key is derived directly from the key. The terminal 2 performs the same key derivation as the macro base station to obtain KeNB*.

The terminal 2 and the second controlled base station respectively derive a control plane and/or a user plane key according to the KeNB* as a base station key to protect information transmission between the terminal 2 and the micro base station. Specific Embodiment 4:

Based on the scenario of the third embodiment, this embodiment further describes a key update method of the master base station.

If the key between the terminal 2 and the macro base station needs to be updated (the specific reason may be that the PDCP sequence number is to be flipped, or is in security or algorithm consideration), Bay' J:

In the first method, the latest non-current base station key in the current security context is converted into the current base station key. At this time, the macro base station only needs to perform the same operation as the terminal 2, and replaces the current base station key with the latest non-current base station key. As the new current base station key (that is, the key update of the master base station is completed);

Method two, according to the latest base station key in the current security context (may be the current base station secret The key or the non-current base station key) derives the current key of the new master base station. Embodiment 5:

As shown in FIG. 7, a macro base station (ie, a master base station) and a plurality of micro base stations (ie, controlled base stations) exist in the deployment network, and the terminal 3 is simultaneously connected to the macro base station, the third controlled base station, and the fourth controlled base station. Status (double connection at this time is actually multiple connections). In this embodiment, the key management of the terminal 3 in the primary control base station, the third controlled base station, and the fourth controlled base station is taken as an example, where the connection establishment sequence is controlled from the macro base station to the third controlled base station to the fourth control. The base station is taken as an example.

The terminal 3 has a security context at the macro base station, including the current master base station key KeNB, and protects the information transfer between the terminal 3 and the macro base station according to the control plane and/or the user plane key derived by the KeNB.

If the macro base station determines that there is currently an unused NH, the NH is used to derive the third controlled base station key KeNB*-3, otherwise the macro base station determines whether there is currently an unused master base station key, and if so, uses the The master base station key derives the third controlled base station key KeNB*-3, otherwise the new master base station key KeNB' needs to be derived from the latest master base station key, and then the third one is derived according to the new KeNB. Control the base station key KeNB*-3.

Since the latest master base station key has been used to derive the third controlled base station key, the macro base station first derives a new master base station key KeNB based on the nearest master base station key KeNB', and then further according to The KeNB "derives the fourth controlled base station key KeNB*-4.

Terminal 3 obtains KeNB*-3 and KeNB*-4 using the same key derivation. And the third controlled base station and the fourth controlled base station respectively derive a control plane and/or a user plane key according to the KeNB*-3 and the KeNB*-4 as the controlled base station key to protect the terminal 3 and the corresponding controlled base station. Information transfer.

At this time, three sets of security keys are used between the terminal 3 and the three access NEs on the network side to protect their respective wireless connections.

Preferably, if the key of the master base station or the controlled base station needs to execute the key in the above process The update can be performed by referring to the methods described in the fourth embodiment and the second embodiment. It can be seen from the above embodiment that the master base station flexibly determines the derivative method of the controlled base station key according to the base station key, thereby obtaining a relatively independent controlled base station key, so that even if the controlled base station key is broken, It affects the data transmission of the master base station. At the same time, if the controlled base station or the master base station generates a key update, it will be relatively independent without affecting the other party. In addition, the above derivation method also avoids the possibility of using duplicate keys in all controlled base stations, minimizing the risk of key leakage.

It should be noted that the foregoing embodiments of the present invention only provide a feasible implementation scheme for some typical processes of a macro base station and a micro base station deployment scenario, but are also applicable to other deployment scenarios, such as a macro base station and a macro base station, and a micro base station. The micro base station, the macro base station and the HeNB or the LPN, and the HeNB and the micro base station and the like can be combined in any manner, and the flow of the present invention is not limited to other message flows.

Device embodiment 1

The master control base station provided by the embodiment of the present invention, as shown in FIG. 9, includes:

The storage unit 91 is configured to maintain a current base station key and a non-current base station key corresponding to the terminal; the key generating unit 92 is configured to generate a non-current base station key corresponding to the terminal;

The non-current base station key refers to a key that is not currently used by the master base station and the terminal, and is derived from the current base station key or NH or the original non-current base station key; the current base station key refers to the current master control The key used by the base station and the terminal is used to derive other control planes and/or user plane keys, and the current base station key has both one and only one.

The key generation unit 92 is configured as a base station key of the controlled base station to which the terminal and the terminal are connected, and is derived from the current base station key or a non-current base station key, but the same master base station key can be used only once. Derived controlled base station key.

The key generation unit 92, configured as the first controlled base station key of the controlled base station to which the terminal and the access is connected, is derived by the master base station according to the current base station key or the non-current base station key or NH. The key generation unit 92 is configured to: if the terminal accesses other controlled base stations, the corresponding controlled base station key is derived by the master base station according to the master base station key or NH that has not been used before.

The key generation unit 92 is configured to calculate/derive the controlled base station key by the master base station, and then send the signal to the controlled base station through an interface between the master base station and the controlled base station.

The key generation unit 92 is configured to use the latest base station key as the master base station key, i.e., the most recently derived base station key, which is the current base station key or the non-current base station key.

The key generation unit 92 is configured to: when the master base station derives a key, to: calculate a derived key according to a specific key derivation function based on the initial key, where the specific key derivation function includes a one-way function.

The key generation unit 92 is configured to, when the terminal and the controlled base station accessed by the terminal need to perform key update, the corresponding new controlled base station key is derived by the master base station according to the old controlled base station key.

The embodiment of the present invention further provides a terminal, as shown in FIG. 10, the terminal includes: a storage unit 1001 configured to maintain a current base station key and a non-current base station key; and a receiving unit 1002 configured to receive the primary control base station The non-current base station key is sent; wherein the non-current base station key refers to a key that is not currently used by the master base station and the terminal, and is derived from the current base station key or the NH or the original non-current base station key; The current base station key refers to a key currently used by the master base station and the terminal, and is used to derive other control planes and/or user plane keys, and the current base station key has both one and only one.

A security key management system provided by an embodiment of the present invention includes a master control base station and a terminal, where the master control base station and the terminal are respectively used to maintain base station keys of two sets of master control base stations: a current base station key and a non-current base station. a key; wherein the non-current base station key refers to a key that is not currently used by the master base station and the terminal, and is derived from a current base station key or NH or an original non-current base station key; the current base station key refers to a current The key used by the master base station and the terminal to derive other controls Face and/or user plane key, the current base station key has both one and only one.

In summary, whether the method, the device or the system uses the security key management technology provided by the present invention, sufficient security protection can be provided for multiple connections of the terminal, and the security under multiple connections can be significantly improved, and When the frequent change of the micro base station connected to the terminal is prevented, the risk of the multi-connection key being cracked or leaked is proportional to the change, that is, the security strength of the multiple connection can be guaranteed to be within the controllable range.

The above is only the preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the scope of the present invention.

Claims

claims

1. A security key management method, the method includes:

The master base station and/or terminal maintains the current base station key and non-current base station key;

Wherein, the non-current base station key refers to a key that is not currently used by the master base station and the terminal, and is derived from the current base station key or the next hop NH or the old non-current base station key;

The current base station key refers to the key currently used by the master base station and the terminal, and is used to derive other control plane and/or user plane keys. There is only one current base station key at the same time.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein the base station key of the controlled base station to which the terminal is connected is derived from the key of the master base station, but the same master base station key can only be used once at most. to derive a controlled base station key; the key of the master base station includes a current base station key or a non-current base station key.

3. The method according to claim 2, wherein the method further includes: the master base station deriving the secret key of the terminal and the first controlled base station it accesses based on the current base station key or the non-current base station key or NH. key.

4. The method according to claim 2, wherein the method further includes: if the terminal accesses other controlled base stations, the corresponding controlled base station key is determined by the master base station according to the master base station that has not been used before. Key or NH derivation.

5. The method according to claim 2, wherein the controlled base station key is calculated/derived by the master base station, and is sent to the controlled base station through the interface between the master base station and the controlled base station.

6. The method according to claim 1, wherein the method further comprises: using the latest base station key, that is, the most recently derived base station key, which is the current base station key or a non-current base station key. .

7. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, wherein the derivation is: based on the initial key, calculating the derived key according to a specific key derivation function, wherein the specific key derivation function includes a one-way function.

8. The method according to claim 1, wherein when the terminal and the controlled base station accessed need to perform a key update, the corresponding new controlled base station key is derived from the old controlled base station key.

9. A main control base station, the main control base station includes:

The storage unit is configured to maintain two sets of base station keys of the main control base station: the current base station key and the non-current base station key;

A key generation unit configured to utilize the current base station key for deriving other control plane and/or user plane keys;

Wherein, the non-current base station key refers to a key that is not currently used by the master base station and the terminal, and is derived from the current base station key or NH or an old non-current base station key; the current base station key refers to a key that is currently used by the master base station. The key used by the control base station and the terminal is used to derive other control plane and/or user plane keys, and only one of the current base station keys exists at the same time.

10. The master base station according to claim 9, wherein the key generation unit is configured as the base station key of the controlled base station to which the terminal and its access are derived from the key of the master base station, but the same master base station The key can only be used once at most to derive the key of the controlled base station; the key of the master base station includes the current base station key or the non-current base station key.

11. The master base station according to claim 10, wherein the key generation unit is configured so that the terminal and the first controlled base station key of the controlled base station it accesses are generated by the master base station according to the current base station key or a non-control base station key. Current base station key or NH derivation.

12. The master base station according to claim 10, wherein the key generation unit is configured so that if the terminal accesses other controlled base stations, the corresponding controlled base station key is generated by the master base station based on the key that has not been used before. Master base station key or NH derivation.

13. The master base station according to claim 10, wherein the key generation unit is configured so that the controlled base station key is calculated/derived by the master base station, and then sent to the master base station through the interface between the master base station and the controlled base station. Controlled base station.

14. The main control base station according to claim 9, wherein the key generation unit is configured as The latest base station key is used, that is, the most recently derived base station key, which is the current base station key or a non-current base station key.

15. The master base station according to any one of claims 9 to 14, wherein the key generation unit is configured so that when the master base station derives a key, it is configured to: based on the initial key, according to the specific key The derivation function computes a derived key, where the particular key derivation function includes a one-way function.

16. The master base station according to claim 9, wherein the key generation unit is configured so that when the terminal and the controlled base station it accesses need to perform a key update, the corresponding new controlled base station key is generated by the master base station. The base station is derived from the old controlled base station key.

17. The main control base station according to claim 9, wherein the main control base station is a radio access network side base station in the Long Term Evolution LTE system.

18. A terminal, the terminal includes:

a receiving unit configured to derive other control plane and/or user plane keys;

19. A security key management system. The system includes a main control base station and a terminal. The main control base station and the terminal are respectively used to maintain two sets of base station keys of the main control base station: the current base station key and the non-current base station key. ; Wherein, the non-current base station key refers to a key that is not currently used by the master base station and the terminal, and is derived from the current base station key or NH or an old non-current base station key; the current base station key refers to a key that is currently used by the base station. The key used by the master control base station and the terminal is used to derive other control plane and/or user plane keys, and only one of the current base station keys exists at the same time.

20. The system according to claim 19, wherein the main control base station is an LTE system wireless access network side base station.