RU2432544C1 - Method of protecting transport ship from attack and capture by pirates - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: physics. ^ SUBSTANCE: method involves using a non-lethal neutralising agent based on a CS irritant. For this purpose, a system with drones - surveillance and impact, in a set with the neutralising charge, is mounted on the ship. Surveillance is carried out at least 30 miles from the dead-reckoning position of the ship on its path. The impact apparatus is directed to a detected potentially dangerous object, while ensuring preventive neutralisation of suspects. ^ EFFECT: high security of shipping. ^ 10 cl, 3 dwg

Description

The invention relates to the field of technology related to the development of methods and means of protecting maritime transport (cargo vessels of an unlimited navigation area) on the move on the high seas and in coastal waters from attack and capture by pirates, in the absence of police and other emergency response forces.

Armed criminals operate from the nearest coast or from a base vessel on the high seas. Usually this is a small fishing vessel - fishing trawler, seiner, etc. As a rule, they attack large (with a deadweight of 10 thousand tons or more) transport vessels in groups on several high-speed motor boats. Boats made of material indistinguishable by radar reach speeds of up to 60 km / h (up to 32 knots) / 1.2 /. This allows criminals observing a busy sea lane to exit at the right time to intercept a transport vessel, reaching it from their chosen position within a period of 15 minutes to half an hour.

As a prototype for the claimed one, a method is considered based on the use of a DP-64 marine anti-sabotage grenade launcher in a complete set with a non-lethal action grenade based on a standard FG-45 / 3.4 /. It is proposed to equip specially trained crew members with such grenade launchers. A grenade with a diameter of 44 mm and a mass of 0.65 kg, modified to be equipped with a CS type irritant (mass not specified), can create a veil in the form of an aerosol cloud of irritant particles on the path of the attacking boat. Intolerable for human perception in an open area, the inhalation concentration of the irritant is maintained on an area of up to 60 m ² , three times greater than that of the well-known Lilac-7. According to the same sources, according to this indicator, a VGM-93.200 shot with a 43 mm irritating grenade weighing 0.24 kg, used in ground conditions from a GM-94 grenade launcher, is more effective. The mass of irritant CS in pomegranate is 0.066 kg (27.5% of the total mass), with a body weight of up to 0.09 kg (37.5%). Up to 0.084 kg (about 35%) is obviously accounted for by an irritant ejection / spraying device. The effectiveness of the use of this grenade for delinquents in an open area is characterized by an area of non-lethal damage of up to 100 m ² , in enclosed spaces - an affected volume of up to 300 m ³ . The author accepted similar indicators for a specialized grenade, which can be created anew instead of the modified FG-45. The range of targeted fire from grenade launchers of the DP-64 and GM-94 type remains unchanged - up to 400 m. This speed boat travels in about 30 seconds, and the aerosol cloud with a characteristic size of up to 12 m - in less than a second. Therefore, in the “instant reaction” mode, it is necessary to form a continuous curtain of sufficient size along the front and in depth in front of a group of boats randomly dispersed in the attack on the vessel. To do this in conditions of sea waves and wind, under a blocking fire of attackers is difficult even for professional shooters. The shooting itself with an attempt to put a cloud-curtain does not exclude the direct hit of a grenade in a boat or boat and can lead to serious injuries and even death. Thus, the use of a grenade launcher in typical naval circumstances for the emergency neutralization of attackers on a ship is ineffective and at the same time life-threatening. The disadvantages of the method of protection using grenade launchers and other means of close combat with portable ammunition should also include the possible uncontrolled or erroneous use of a combat grenade. That is, for a number of signs, the method can be qualified as contrary to the law of the sea. It does not allow not only the arming of civilian ships with military weapons, but also the use of escort ships against the "alleged" pirates to defeat. In turn, the criminals, realizing this, in some cases acted with impunity, not only ignoring the patrol forces present in the area, but also trying to attack transport vessels in full view of the guard ships.

The objective of the invention is the creation of a method of protecting the ship, carried out preventively - upon the discovery of allegedly "pirate" boats or boats, for example, at twice the longest direct line of sight of the ship. Or, which is practically the same for a typical object, such as a small base trawler or a seiner (hereinafter referred to as the object) with outdated navigation equipment, no closer than at the radar range of the vessel. For definiteness, you can take both of these ranges equal to 30 miles. As a rule, in open sea conditions from these lines, pirate boats are brought to the line of sight, from where they rush at full speed to the directly observed vessel. Independent exit of boats from the coastal mooring towards the vessel, for example, traveling along the coastal channel or in the narrow, and attack on it are possible only from the moment of its detection at a direct line of sight in actual weather conditions. Including when warning attackers about the upcoming passage of the vessel in the nearest section of the water area. The proposed method, as well as the known one, should be based on the use of non-lethal weapons, but with a greater range of use (at least 30 miles from the ship’s numbered position) than a grenade launcher, and with a charge of more than two orders of magnitude charge irritant, with the corresponding dimensions of the affected area. The means of protection used by this method against an obvious or possible attempt to capture a ship by suspicious persons should not pose a threat to their life. In turn, the ship’s own protective equipment should be used in conjunction with a means of detecting and identifying a potentially dangerous object at an appropriate range. As a result, the actions performed during the protection of this method should provide, with acceptable legal consequences, not only the suppression of the obvious, but also the prevention of a possible attempt by suspicious persons to attack the ship.

The problem is solved by installing on a ship and using a reconnaissance-strike complex of weapons (a single universal or conjugated two corresponding purposes) with small-sized remote-controlled unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Use devices with a radius of at least 100 km. Flight duration - from two or more hours at a speed of about 100-150 km / h for reconnaissance and 200-250 km / h for percussion devices. The UAV’s flight height above the sea surface - from 2-3 km to almost “zero” allows them to be used for detection, inspection and attack of a potentially dangerous object, including a single boat, in conditions of extremely limited visibility. The information given hereinafter to substantiate the feasibility of the method on the composition of the complexes, on individual characteristics and tactics of using UAVs is known as of the last quarter of the 20th century 151. Thus, on an impact UAV of this period, the mass of a warhead can reach 25 kg or more. For use in the proposed method, the combat charge is replaced by a neutralizing one, transforming the device from a military weapon to a special one. The mass of the irritant in it can accordingly be two orders of magnitude higher than that in the grenade of the VGM-93.200 shot. It is obvious that the complexes and devices created on the basis of the latest technologies are more advanced technically and can have specialized performance to solve the task.

In the open sea, reconnaissance of a dangerous area is carried out in the line of sight - up to ± 15 miles (in the sector ± 30º at a distance of 30 miles) relative to the ship’s route along preliminary laying, directing the device directly to the object detected by the ship’s radar or other means. When the vessel moves in a narrow position, exploration of the water area at a given distance from the vessel’s numbered position is carried out on both sides of the channel axis to the coastline or in the line of sight, holding the device at a height that allows the object to be detected under actual weather conditions.

Acting in a similar way, they leave time for additional exploration of the object, classification of it according to the degree of danger, and for adoption, if necessary, of a decision on the preventive use of shock UAVs before the ship and high-speed boats enter the mutual direct visibility position. So, the resolution of the surveillance equipment on the reconnaissance UAV allows the complex’s operators, performing a covert flight around the detected object at extremely low altitude, to distinguish clearly expressed actions of people, including armed ones, on it. The information obtained is used to justify (together with skippers) further actions in relation to suspicious persons, including the use of an attack UAV.

A percussion device with a specified flight speed already about 15 minutes after detecting an object at a distance of 30 miles can be withdrawn at a minimum height in a stealth attack on an observed target several meters in size. For example, - on a single boat, boat, on a superstructure of a trawler or a seiner. The neutralizing charge device for use on an impact UAV is reproduced similarly, for example, to a VGM-93.200 shot in a grenade, on an appropriate scale. With the same mass-size ratios, the mass of the irritant itself, for example, in a 25-kilogram charge will be up to 6-7 kg - about 100 times more than in a grenade charge. The aerosol cloud formed by such a charge will accordingly provide a neutralizing effect on an area of at least 10,000 m ² and in a volume of at least 30,000 m ³ . For comparison: a group of people on the deck of a trawler with a displacement of up to 400 tons or in several boats moving to intercept a transport vessel, one can imagine the so-called “Reduced target” with dimensions in the plan of up to 40x10 m and a height of up to 3-5 m. Such an object moving at a speed of 10-30 knots, once in a cloud (cloud-curtain) with a zone of destruction of the indicated sizes, will be in it much longer than in the cloud from a grenade. Outside this zone, the effect of the irritant will also not stop "instantly", but will weaken gradually as it moves away from the epicenter of the cloud, leaving the attackers unable to quickly restore normal vision and breathing. Covering the object with a cloud (setting the curtain) provides the necessary combination of parameters of the final section of the vehicle’s trajectory when approaching the target with the range and height of the pre-contact operation of the irritant ejection / spraying device relative to the target. The values of the trajectory parameters at the time of activation of the ejection device are determined by an algorithm similar to the known ones developed for shock UAVs in combat equipment. For example, it is equipped with a thermobaric warhead and a non-contact fuse with a rangefinder and / or altimeter operating principle.

Depending on the observed and predicted state of the detected object, the following tactics are performed

demonstrative and preventive flight around the reconnaissance vehicle of an object classified by the operators of the complex, together with the skippers as safe at the time of detection (for example, observe a trawler, fishing, boats with people at fishing gear, etc.), in order to prevent a possible attempt to attack passing ship;

demonstrative and preventive attack by the percussion apparatus of an object classified as potentially dangerous (observe an accelerated sampling of fishing gear, lifting boats on the trawler’s deck, etc.), to suppress an alleged attempt to attack the vessel by placing an aerosol cloud at a distance R from the object, defined by condition

R = 0.5D ± d,

wherein:

D is the known transverse size of the expanding cloud, after which the inhalation concentration of the irritant in it decreases to be tolerated by a person,

d is the on-site component of the cloud drift in the direction of the object or in the opposite;

hidden by the smallest possible height attack by the percussion apparatus of a moving object classified as dangerous (according to the elements of the observed movement, etc.), with a cloud-curtain placed in front of it, in order to prevent the capture of the ship by suspicious persons through their preventive neutralization.

The minimum height (N _t ) of the final section of the vehicle’s trajectory during a covert attack of an object is selected from a condition that excludes direct hit of the UAV fuselage in the target after pre-contact setting of a cloud or cloud-curtain:

H _t = H ₀ + h _w + h _t .

On the right side of the equality

H ₀ - the greatest height of the silhouette of the target (excluding the mast) relative to the sea surface in the absence of unrest;

h _w - correction for the largest increase in the height of the silhouette of the target relative to the zero level when it sprouts to the top of the wave, equal to 0 in the absence of excitement;

h _t - the minimum technically feasible excess of the apparatus trajectory over the upper boundary of the target silhouette.

By such actions, from making a decision to neutralize an object to selecting the characteristics of the final section of the trajectory of the attacking apparatus and the conditions for covering the target with an aerosol cloud, the possibility and severity of the consequences of errors regarding the true intentions of suspicious persons are minimized. That is, when using the proposed method non-traumatic means of non-lethal damage, such an error is acceptable for the upcoming legal consequences. To substantiate the feasibility of the method, hereinafter, information is given on the possibility of using for this known complexes and samples of UAVs, well-known vehicles, etc., including with reference to graphic images of the corresponding content.

A brief description of the drawings (graphic images) includes the following explanations.

Figure 1. To the selection of ports - locations for deploying technical positions for complexes with UAVs on the coast near a dangerous navigation area. The arrows show the ports located to the north (a) and south (b) of the “African horn”.

Figure 2. The tactical complex BRAVE-200 with shock UAV UCGN-121A. Above is a general view of the complex at the starting position at the time of the launch of the UAV from the transport-launch block section. Below is a view of the UAV in plan (with the wing open and folded) and side view.

Figure 3. Placement of elements of the BRAVE-200 impact complex in a 40-foot container of type 1A - view from the side of the remote side wall of the container:

1 - control car;

2 - power unit (deployed in a transverse position);

3 - shot from the car chassis starting block of 15 starting sections;

4 - container body;

the arrow shows the direction of rolling the power unit and the car into the container through the doorway in the front end wall;

the launch block is installed and fixed in place close to the side and rear end walls.

The proposed method does not provide for special preparation of the vessel, such as redevelopment or the allocation of additional premises necessary for maintenance of the complex, with the possibility of replacing equipment on the shock UAV. That is, it excludes the replacement in ship conditions of a neutralizing charge by a combat charge and the restoration of the apparatus in the class of combat controlled weapons. Structurally and functionally, the main elements of the complex are also not associated with a carrier vessel. They are loaded onto a ship only on a voyage with the passage of dangerous areas of navigation and placed on it as adjacent cargo places, or as a single enlarged cargo place, placing them on one platform or in one container. For example, in a 40-foot standard container of type 1A with dimensions of 12.2 x 2.4 x 2.4 m / 6 /. To reduce (with an unchanged number of equipped vessels) the total number of complexes used and possible losses on a specific vessel of actual cargo spaces, the complex is loaded onto the vessel at its port in the port closest to the dangerous navigation area, with its subsequent transfer to the vessel designated for departure direction. In the territories of ports of the appropriate location, for example, in the “Horn of Africa” region shown in Fig. 1, technical base positions are deployed to keep the used systems in good working order and ready for transfer (transfer) to another vessel. The post of an international or national body for the supervision of the use of non-lethal equipment on drone UAVs can also be placed here. The location of the position in the port is chosen based on the delivery of the used systems by regular or attracted transport to the operating area, directly to a specific section of the cargo mooring front, without hauling or re-mooring the vessel. If there is a technical and organizational possibility, by agreement between the consignor, the consignee and the carrier, the complex is transferred, like transshipment of cargo, in the direct version - directly from ship to ship.

According to the total weight and dimensions for installation on the vessel with a “cargo place”, for example, the tactical complex BRAVE-200 with non-returnable UAVs of shock version 151 is suitable, as shown in Fig. 2. The overall dimensions of the UCGN-121A UAV in the starting position (with the wing folded) are 2 , 12x0.61 x 2.60 m. The transport and launch unit of the complex, assembled from 15 starting sections, is installed on the chassis of the M35 series car with a dimensions of 7.3x2.4 m in plan, with a lifting capacity of 2.5 tons. The control unit is placed in a body- a van mounted on the chassis of a military-grade HUMMER car, in dimensions 4.7x2.2x 2.1 m, with a loading capacity of 1.1 tons. Special power supply to control equipment and starting devices in the field is provided by a towed (portable) power unit. From the images in figure 2, it is possible to compare the visible dimensions of the main elements of the complex with the known overall dimensions of the vehicles used and the UAV itself. The comparison shows that the launch block is assembled in dimensions of the order of 5.6 x 2.2 x 2.1 m; the largest unit size does not exceed, obviously, 1.5 m. That is, put in a row along the length, all three elements of the complex, with the exception of the M35 platform car, can be placed in a container of type 1A. Preparing the complex for installation on a ship, the launch block (in this example, removed from the platform) is laid with the bottom face on the floor of the container (see figure 3). There, a power unit and a control vehicle are rolled in and fixed (for example, in a transverse arrangement) through a doorway. Previously, the longitudinal side wall of the container is removed, opening the way for devices from sections of the starting block having their own pressure-tight closures, and for operators - access to the machine (control panel). Similarly, as an “enlarged cargo unit”, only the launch block can be installed separately in a 20-foot container of type 1C. The container is installed on the deck or in the cargo (container) stack, orienting the open wall and the exits of the starting sections into the free space, for example, on the beam. If necessary, removable or portable ladders are used to access operators to the complex. Or all the elements of the complex are placed separately as “piece goods”, and only the launch units are properly oriented. The remaining elements of the complex can be placed among other packages arbitrarily - as far as the length of the connecting cables allows. The option of loading “single loads” of single launchers can be accepted, for example, when using a complex with a Locus strike UAV. Mass and size characteristics of this device and its transport and launch container are comparable with those of the UCGA-121A UAV and its launch section in the transport and launch unit of the BRAVE-200/5 / complex. The use of a complex with single starts can be preferable when limiting the required ammunition to several devices, as well as during cargo handling at intermediate berths, with the necessary change in starting positions. Obviously, several Locus UAV launch containers can, in turn, be assembled into a single launching position - an “enlarged cargo place”. For example, also in a 20-foot container. The specific initial variant of loading the complex is accepted and entered into the preliminary cargo planter 161, taking into account the possibility of its functioning after moving by ship or port cargo devices during the subsequent cargo handling of the vessel according to the mission.

To carry out reconnaissance functions and demonstrative warning flights around objects, it is possible to use, for example, a specialized complex with returnable devices, such as a mini-helicopter Sprite RPH with a take-off mass of 36 kg and with a horizontal projection in the form of a circle with a diameter of 1.6 m (on the rotor) / 5/. With such dimensions and weight, it can be placed on any free platform, including the roof of the container with an impact complex. In normal mode, such devices are used for reconnaissance of “targets of the battlefield,” such as small military units, single vehicles, firing points, etc. The flight of the device is controlled from a portable remote control. The time spent in the air of a Sprite RPH helicopter, at a flight speed of 110 km / h at altitudes of up to 3 km, is about 2 hours. Therefore, for continuous monitoring of the abovementioned area of the water area, it is enough to use 2-3 vehicles alternately. The dimensions and the total mass of vehicles with a fuel supply (6 kg per refueling) remain negligible to account for them as separate packages.

The technical methods used when loading the complex and moving it as a cargo unit during cargo handling of the vessel are not offered as an integral part of the method. According to the author, these operations are certainly feasible with the possibility of using the complex as intended by the specialized structures and specialists on the vessel of any of the main classes. If necessary, preliminary full-scale testing of loading and moving options of the complex is carried out on ships of a cool or slop fleet, including target testing on a vessel of a certain subclass. Either similar testing is performed on the model (mock) of its surface part, using mock-ups of typical packages and elements of the complex. The model and mock-ups are made on a scale, for example, not more than 1: 100 for the convenience of working on a limited production area and indoors.

From the point of view of the feasibility of the proposed method, a significant factor along with the combat characteristics is the ability to maintain and use the complex personnel (combat crew) of the minimum number. So, on the BRAVE-200 complex and similar preflight training and flight control apparatus perform two operators. The service room for them is the body of the control vehicle. It is enough to organize the watch service on duty on the vessel only for the duration of the passage of the dangerous navigation area (approximately up to 3-5 days). It will have to provide continuous monitoring by reconnaissance UAVs of a given section of the water area along the vessel’s route, readiness for launching an attack device and controlling its flight to attack the detected object. The number of combat crews can be minimized by setting it from the condition of two combat operators on duty on a regular schedule and in cooperation with the ship's watch service. It should also be borne in mind that initially the combat crew of the complex is prepared to perform functional duties in the field with the minimum necessary autonomous household support.

Evaluation of the economic effect of the implementation of the proposed method by the author was not performed due to the lack of input data in the required amount. An indicative assessment is possible by comparing the levels of expected costs of a potential investor (for example, a group of shipowners) for the technical implementation of the proposed method and the damage prevented by its use. According to the UN, during 2008 alone, in the “Horn of Africa” area, out of 120 attempts at pirate attacks, 16 resulted in the seizure of transport ships with their crews. As of 2009, there are data on 68 captured vessels, and the forecast for the visible future remains unfavorable. The direct damage in the form of paying a ransom to the pirates for the release of the crews they captured was, according to various estimates, amounts (including indirect costs) from several to several tens of millions of US dollars. The total losses of shipowners / carriers, consignors and consignees caused by prolonged downtime of seized vessels, delivery interruptions, damage and partial or complete loss of goods were calculated, apparently, in billions of dollars. Comparable expenses should be borne by the states that periodically send detachments of warships and support vessels for patrolling dangerous areas of navigation and escorting transports. For comparison: according to a Lenta.ru source, on March 22, 2005, the price of the planned purchase of a batch of 36 tactical UAVs Predator by the US military department was set at the rate of 4 million for one copy and amounted to 144 million dollars.

From the above description it should follow that the proposed invention is technically feasible with reasonable costs on cargo ships of ocean navigation. Using the proposed method of reconnaissance-strike weapon systems with remotely piloted (unmanned) aircraft provides high-efficiency protection of the vessel from pirate hijacking by proactively neutralizing suspicious persons with their obvious or justifiable alleged intention to seize the ship. A possible error in this assessment of the alleged actions of suspicious persons is admissible for the upcoming legal consequences. The invention is not known from the available sources of information on the prior art, which clearly does not follow for a specialist in the creation and use of non-lethal means of destruction in order to neutralize terrorists and other criminal elements, that is, meets the criteria of patentability.

Information sources

1. Directory of boats, boats and motors. "Shipbuilding", L., 1979, p. 84.

2. Yu.S. Nazarov, N.F. Sokolova. Travel on "Boats and Yachts". "Shipbuilding", L., 1978, p. 54-87, 98.

3. The weapons of Russia. Federal electronic directory of weapons and military equipment (information as of 2009).

4. Issues of defense technology. NTJ. Series 16. Technical means of countering terrorism. Issue 3-4. STC "Informtekhnika", M., 2004, S. 81, 82.

5. Jane's Weapon Systems, 1986-87, pp. 356-379.

6. Maritime Encyclopedic Reference, in two volumes. "Shipbuilding", L., 1986. Volume 1, p.203,333.

Claims (10)

1. A method of protecting a marine transport vessel from attack and capture by pirates, using a non-lethal means of destruction based on an irritant, for example CS, characterized in that a set of weapons with unmanned aerial vehicles - reconnaissance and strike non-lethal striking effects on an area of at least 10000 m ² . 2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that in the open sea, reconnaissance of a dangerous area is carried out in a line of sight with a width of up to ± 15 miles relative to the ship’s route along preliminary laying, directing the reconnaissance apparatus directly to the object detected by the ship’s radar station. 3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that when the vessel moves in a narrow, exploration of the water area is carried out on both sides from the axis of the fairway to the coastline or in the line of sight, holding the device at a height that allows you to detect the object in actual weather conditions. 4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, depending on the observed and predicted state of the detected object, the following tactics are performed: a demonstrative warning flight around the reconnaissance apparatus of an object classified by the operators of the complex, together with the skippers, as safe at the time of detection, demonstrative preventive attack by the percussion apparatus of an object classified as potentially dangerous, with the aerosol cloud being placed at a distance from the object R = 0.5D ± d, where D is the known the transverse size of the expanding cloud, after which the inhalant concentration of the irritant becomes tolerable for the person, and the value of d is the in situ component of the wind drift of the cloud in the direction of the object, going in the opposite, secretive, at the minimum possible height, attack by the percussion apparatus of a moving object, classified as dangerous, with a cloud of curtains being placed in front of him, preventing the ship from being captured by suspicious persons by their preventive neutralization. 5. The method according to claim 1 or 4, in which the direct hit of the fuselage of the percussion apparatus at the target during a covert attack of a dangerous object with the setting of a cloud-curtain is eliminated by setting the minimum height H _{t of the} final section of the apparatus’s trajectory as the sum of the values
H _t = H ₀ + h _t + h _w ,
where H ₀ - the greatest height of the silhouette of the target (excluding mast) relative to the sea surface in the absence of unrest;
h _t - the minimum technically feasible excess of the apparatus trajectory over the upper boundary of the target silhouette;
h _w is the correction for the largest increase in the height of the silhouette of the target relative to the zero level when sprouting to the top of the wave, equal to 0 in the absence of excitement. 6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that the complex used is not structurally and functionally associated with the platform vessel, immersing it on the vessel only on a voyage through dangerous areas of navigation and disposing of its elements as adjacent packages or as a single enlarged unit cargo space, with the possibility of releasing devices into free space. 7. The method according to claim 1 or 6, in which the initial version of the installation of the complex as a single enlarged or separate cargo package is received and added to the preliminary cargo plan taking into account the possibility of the complex functioning after moving its elements by ship or port cargo devices during subsequent cargo handling of the vessel according to the mission. 8. The method according to claim 1 or 6, in which the options for placing and moving the complex on the vessel are preliminarily worked out on the ships of a cool or slop fleet, including on a vessel of a certain subclass, and in the absence thereof, on a model of its surface part, using mock-ups typical packages and elements of the complex, observing a scale of not more than 1: 100. 9. The method according to claim 1 or 6, in which the complex is loaded onto a ship in the port closest to the dangerous navigation area, followed by its transfer to the ship designated to exit the corresponding port in the opposite direction, while technical ports are equipped in these ports for keeping the used complexes in good and operational condition, with the possibility of delivering them with the available transport to the operating area, directly to certain sections of the cargo berthing front, without hauling or re-mooring the assigned su on. 10. The method according to claim 1 or 6, in which the transfer of the complex from a vessel extending beyond the boundaries of a hazardous area to an oncoming vessel is carried out like transshipment of cargo directly — directly from vessel to vessel.

Images