KR20140052099A - Smart key system and method for defensing relay station attack using the system - Google Patents
Smart key system and method for defensing relay station attack using the system Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- KR20140052099A KR20140052099A KR1020120111454A KR20120111454A KR20140052099A KR 20140052099 A KR20140052099 A KR 20140052099A KR 1020120111454 A KR1020120111454 A KR 1020120111454A KR 20120111454 A KR20120111454 A KR 20120111454A KR 20140052099 A KR20140052099 A KR 20140052099A
- Authority
- KR
- South Korea
- Prior art keywords
- terminal
- vehicle
- smart key
- position data
- control unit
- Prior art date
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Classifications
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
- B60R25/20—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off
- B60R25/24—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off using electronic identifiers containing a code not memorised by the user
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
- B60R25/30—Detection related to theft or to other events relevant to anti-theft systems
- B60R25/33—Detection related to theft or to other events relevant to anti-theft systems of global position, e.g. by providing GPS coordinates
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
- H04L2012/40208—Bus networks characterized by the use of a particular bus standard
- H04L2012/40215—Controller Area Network CAN
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
- H04L2012/40208—Bus networks characterized by the use of a particular bus standard
- H04L2012/40234—Local Interconnect Network LIN
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
- H04L2012/40267—Bus for use in transportation systems
- H04L2012/40273—Bus for use in transportation systems the transportation system being a vehicle
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
- Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
- Remote Sensing (AREA)
- Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
Abstract
Description
The present invention relates to a smart key system and a method of protecting a relay station attack (RSA) using the system, and more particularly, to a smart key system for preventing a vehicle theft using RSA and an RSA defense method using the system.
1 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a conventional smart key system.
Referring to FIG. 1, the conventional
The location confirmation process and the password authentication process of the
First, the SMK ECU 10 transmits data, such as an ID, a challenge signal, and the like, necessary for authentication with the
Then, the
Next, the SMK ECU 10 decrypts the encrypted data received from the
However, the conventional
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION Accordingly, it is an object of the present invention to provide a smart key system capable of preventing theft of the vehicle according to the RSA even when the driver is located at a remote location from the vehicle.
Another object of the present invention is to provide an RSA defense method using the system.
According to another aspect of the present invention, there is provided a smart key system including a terminal and a smart key electronic control unit installed in a vehicle for unlocking and starting a vehicle door, Receives GPS position data of the terminal from the terminal and compares GPS position data of the terminal with GPS position data of the vehicle when the first authentication process for the terminal is completed using the terminal, Determines whether the vehicle is located within a predetermined distance from the vehicle, and performs a second authentication process based on the determination result.
An RSA defense method using the system according to another aspect of the present invention is a smart key system including a terminal and a smart key electronic control unit installed in a vehicle for unlocking and starting a vehicle door, The smart key electronic control unit and the terminal perform bidirectional wireless communication in order to prevent theft of the vehicle according to the RSA (Relay Station Attack) generated in the smart key electronic control unit, and the smart key electronic control unit performs a first authentication process for the terminal Wherein the smart key electronic control unit receives the GPS position data of the terminal from the terminal when the first authentication process is completed, Compares the GPS position data of the vehicle with the GPS position data, Determining whether within a location, and based on the determination result and a step of performing a second verification process.
According to the present invention, the SMK ECU provided in the vehicle receives the GPS position information of the mobile phone, and permits authentication of the mobile phone only when the position of the mobile phone is recognized within a reference distance from the vehicle. Therefore, it is possible to prevent theft of the vehicle according to the RSA even when the driver is located at a distance from the vehicle.
1 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a conventional smart key system.
2 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration of a smart key system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 3 is a conceptual view illustrating a recognition range of a mobile phone according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention. Referring to FIG.
Hereinafter, embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings so that those skilled in the art can easily carry out the present invention. The present invention may, however, be embodied in many different forms and should not be construed as limited to the embodiments set forth herein. In order to clearly illustrate the present invention, parts not related to the description are omitted, and similar parts are denoted by like reference characters throughout the specification.
Throughout the specification, when an element is referred to as "comprising ", it means that it can include other elements as well, without excluding other elements unless specifically stated otherwise. Also, the terms " part, "" module," and " module ", etc. in the specification mean a unit for processing at least one function or operation and may be implemented by hardware or software or a combination of hardware and software have.
2 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration of a smart key system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Referring to FIG. 2, a
The
Hereinafter, in order to facilitate understanding of the explanation, the term 'terminal' is replaced with the term 'forb.'
In order to transmit its own position data to the SMK ECU 200, the
The SMK ECU 200 performs data communication with the
The SMK ECU 200 compares GPS position data of the Poble 100 received via RF communication from the Pob 100 with GPS position data of the vehicle to determine whether the Pob 100 is located within a predetermined distance from the vehicle And performs a second authentication process based on the determination result.
In order to compare the GPS position data of the
The SMK ECU 200 permits the authentication of the Pob only when the position of the
In other words, since the recognition distance of the PFB using the LF communication is about 2 m, it is possible to recognize that the
Hereinafter, a process of the smart key system according to an embodiment of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the flowchart shown in the block configuration shown in FIG. 2 and FIG.
When the SMK ECU 200 generates an event for the forb authentication request (S212), the LF data for generating the PFV password is generated and transmitted to the
Then, when the LF data is received from the SMK ECU 200 while maintaining the slip mode, the
Next, the
Next, the SMK ECU 200 decrypts the encrypted RF data received from the Pov and performs a first authentication process for the Pov 100 (S218).
If the authentication of the
In step S118, the Pov 100 acquires its own position data via the GPS module mounted in response to the request of the POS data of the SMK ECU 200, and transmits the collected position data to the SMK To the ECU (200).
Next, the SMK ECU 200 compares the position data of the vehicle received from the
As a result of the determination, if it is determined that the distance from the vehicle to the
If it is determined that the
The foregoing description is merely illustrative of the technical idea of the present invention, and various changes and modifications may be made by those skilled in the art without departing from the essential characteristics of the present invention. Therefore, the embodiments disclosed in the present invention are intended to illustrate rather than limit the scope of the present invention, and the scope of the technical idea of the present invention is not limited by these embodiments. The scope of protection of the present invention should be construed according to the following claims, and all technical ideas falling within the scope of the same shall be construed as falling within the scope of the present invention.
Claims (6)
The smart key electronic control unit and the terminal perform two-way wireless communication, and the smart key electronic control unit performs a first authentication process for the terminal;
When the first authentication process is completed, the smart key electronic control unit receiving GPS position data of the terminal from the terminal;
Wherein the smart key electronic control unit compares GPS position data of the terminal with GPS position data of the vehicle to determine whether the terminal is located within a predetermined distance from the vehicle and performing a second authentication process based on the determination result
A method for protecting an RSA using a smart key system.
Wherein the smart key electronic control unit receives GPS position data of the terminal in RF communication.
Wherein the smart key electronic control unit comprises receiving GPS position data of the vehicle from a GPS module installed in the vehicle in a vehicle network communication.
LIN communication or CAN communication.
And completing the second authentication process when the terminal is located within a predetermined distance from the vehicle and canceling the first authentication process when the terminal is located outside the predetermined distance from the vehicle Using RSA defense method.
Wherein the smart key electronic control unit comprises:
When receiving the GPS position data of the terminal from the terminal and comparing the GPS position data of the terminal with the GPS position data of the vehicle when the first authentication process for the terminal is completed using bidirectional communication, Is located within a predetermined distance from the vehicle, and performs a second authentication process based on the determination result.
Priority Applications (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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KR1020120111454A KR20140052099A (en) | 2012-10-08 | 2012-10-08 | Smart key system and method for defensing relay station attack using the system |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
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KR1020120111454A KR20140052099A (en) | 2012-10-08 | 2012-10-08 | Smart key system and method for defensing relay station attack using the system |
Publications (1)
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KR20140052099A true KR20140052099A (en) | 2014-05-07 |
Family
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KR1020120111454A KR20140052099A (en) | 2012-10-08 | 2012-10-08 | Smart key system and method for defensing relay station attack using the system |
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Cited By (9)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
KR101533428B1 (en) * | 2015-02-06 | 2015-07-02 | (주)플라토 | Method For Preventing Relay Station Attack By Using Moving Path of Smart Key |
CN105398420A (en) * | 2015-11-09 | 2016-03-16 | 莆田市云驰新能源汽车研究院有限公司 | Keyless entry system detecting method for automobile |
CN105730399A (en) * | 2014-12-31 | 2016-07-06 | 现代摩比斯株式会社 | Smart key system and operating method thereof |
WO2018148622A1 (en) * | 2017-02-10 | 2018-08-16 | Microchip Technology Incorporated | Systems and methods for managing access to a vehicle or other object using environmental data |
WO2019074135A1 (en) * | 2017-10-11 | 2019-04-18 | 조원기 | Method and device for smart control of vehicle while defending against rsa by using mobile device |
US10272875B2 (en) | 2016-02-01 | 2019-04-30 | Hyundai Motor Company | Vehicle and method of controlling the vehicle |
US10395454B2 (en) | 2017-08-31 | 2019-08-27 | Research Company Foundation of Yeungnam University | Vehicle remote key system and smart key authentication method for the same |
WO2021221225A1 (en) * | 2020-04-29 | 2021-11-04 | 주식회사 플랫폼베이스 | User authentication-based electronic key using external terminal apparatus, and operation method for same |
KR20210133828A (en) * | 2020-04-29 | 2021-11-08 | 주식회사 플랫폼베이스 | Electronic key based on user authentication using external device and operating method therof |
-
2012
- 2012-10-08 KR KR1020120111454A patent/KR20140052099A/en not_active Application Discontinuation
Cited By (13)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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CN105730399A (en) * | 2014-12-31 | 2016-07-06 | 现代摩比斯株式会社 | Smart key system and operating method thereof |
CN105730399B (en) * | 2014-12-31 | 2018-08-24 | 现代摩比斯株式会社 | The operating method of intelligent key system |
WO2016125969A1 (en) * | 2015-02-06 | 2016-08-11 | (주)플라토 | Method for preventing relay station attack by using movement path of smart key |
KR101533428B1 (en) * | 2015-02-06 | 2015-07-02 | (주)플라토 | Method For Preventing Relay Station Attack By Using Moving Path of Smart Key |
CN105398420B (en) * | 2015-11-09 | 2016-11-23 | 福建省汽车工业集团云度新能源汽车股份有限公司 | A kind of automotive keyless entering system detection method |
CN105398420A (en) * | 2015-11-09 | 2016-03-16 | 莆田市云驰新能源汽车研究院有限公司 | Keyless entry system detecting method for automobile |
US10272875B2 (en) | 2016-02-01 | 2019-04-30 | Hyundai Motor Company | Vehicle and method of controlling the vehicle |
WO2018148622A1 (en) * | 2017-02-10 | 2018-08-16 | Microchip Technology Incorporated | Systems and methods for managing access to a vehicle or other object using environmental data |
US10395454B2 (en) | 2017-08-31 | 2019-08-27 | Research Company Foundation of Yeungnam University | Vehicle remote key system and smart key authentication method for the same |
WO2019074135A1 (en) * | 2017-10-11 | 2019-04-18 | 조원기 | Method and device for smart control of vehicle while defending against rsa by using mobile device |
US11427158B2 (en) | 2017-10-11 | 2022-08-30 | Onekey Inc. | Method and device for smart control of vehicle while defending against RSA by using mobile device |
WO2021221225A1 (en) * | 2020-04-29 | 2021-11-04 | 주식회사 플랫폼베이스 | User authentication-based electronic key using external terminal apparatus, and operation method for same |
KR20210133828A (en) * | 2020-04-29 | 2021-11-08 | 주식회사 플랫폼베이스 | Electronic key based on user authentication using external device and operating method therof |
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