KR20140052099A

KR20140052099A - Smart key system and method for defensing relay station attack using the system

Info

Publication number: KR20140052099A
Application number: KR1020120111454A
Authority: KR
Inventors: 신상수
Original assignee: 현대모비스 주식회사
Priority date: 2012-10-08
Filing date: 2012-10-08
Publication date: 2014-05-07

Abstract

The present invention relates to a smart key system and an RSA defense method using the same, including a step in which a smart key electronic control unit and a terminal intercommunicate wirelessly and the smart key electronic unit performs a first authentication process on the terminal; a step in which the smart key electronic control unit receives the GPS location data of the terminal from the terminal when the first authentication process is completed; and a step in which the smart key electronic control unit compares the GPS location data of the terminal and of a vehicle to decide whether the terminal is positioned within a predetermined distance from the vehicle and performs a second authentication process based on the comparison result.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD [0001] The present invention relates to a smart key system and an RSA defense method using the system.

The present invention relates to a smart key system and a method of protecting a relay station attack (RSA) using the system, and more particularly, to a smart key system for preventing a vehicle theft using RSA and an RSA defense method using the system.

1 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a conventional smart key system.

Referring to FIG. 1, the conventional smart key system 30 performs location and password authentication of the FOB including the SMK ECU 10 and the FOB 20.

The location confirmation process and the password authentication process of the POB 20 in the existing smart key system 30 are as follows.

First, the SMK ECU 10 transmits data, such as an ID, a challenge signal, and the like, necessary for authentication with the FOV 20, to the FOV 20 using LF (Low Frequency, usually 125 / 134.2 kHz).

Then, the POB 20 that has received the data required for the authentication transmits the self-encrypted data in response to the received data to the SMK ECU 10 through RF (Radio Frequency, usually using 315/43 Mhz).

Next, the SMK ECU 10 decrypts the encrypted data received from the Pov 20, and confirms the Pov authentication and the Pov position to determine whether it is a valid Pov 20.

However, the conventional smart key system 30 is very vulnerable to RSA (Relay Station Attack), and thus there is a high risk of vehicle theft. In general, the recognition distance of the PFB 20 using the LF communication is about 2 m. Basically, the PFB authentication does not have the risk of theft because the driver is located around the vehicle. However, by using the RSA method, In the case of an attack, even if the driver holding the vehicle is located at a remote location from the vehicle, there is a possibility of theft of the vehicle.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION Accordingly, it is an object of the present invention to provide a smart key system capable of preventing theft of the vehicle according to the RSA even when the driver is located at a remote location from the vehicle.

Another object of the present invention is to provide an RSA defense method using the system.

According to another aspect of the present invention, there is provided a smart key system including a terminal and a smart key electronic control unit installed in a vehicle for unlocking and starting a vehicle door, Receives GPS position data of the terminal from the terminal and compares GPS position data of the terminal with GPS position data of the vehicle when the first authentication process for the terminal is completed using the terminal, Determines whether the vehicle is located within a predetermined distance from the vehicle, and performs a second authentication process based on the determination result.

An RSA defense method using the system according to another aspect of the present invention is a smart key system including a terminal and a smart key electronic control unit installed in a vehicle for unlocking and starting a vehicle door, The smart key electronic control unit and the terminal perform bidirectional wireless communication in order to prevent theft of the vehicle according to the RSA (Relay Station Attack) generated in the smart key electronic control unit, and the smart key electronic control unit performs a first authentication process for the terminal Wherein the smart key electronic control unit receives the GPS position data of the terminal from the terminal when the first authentication process is completed, Compares the GPS position data of the vehicle with the GPS position data, Determining whether within a location, and based on the determination result and a step of performing a second verification process.

According to the present invention, the SMK ECU provided in the vehicle receives the GPS position information of the mobile phone, and permits authentication of the mobile phone only when the position of the mobile phone is recognized within a reference distance from the vehicle. Therefore, it is possible to prevent theft of the vehicle according to the RSA even when the driver is located at a distance from the vehicle.

1 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a conventional smart key system.
2 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration of a smart key system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 3 is a conceptual view illustrating a recognition range of a mobile phone according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention. Referring to FIG.

Hereinafter, embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings so that those skilled in the art can easily carry out the present invention. The present invention may, however, be embodied in many different forms and should not be construed as limited to the embodiments set forth herein. In order to clearly illustrate the present invention, parts not related to the description are omitted, and similar parts are denoted by like reference characters throughout the specification.

Throughout the specification, when an element is referred to as "comprising ", it means that it can include other elements as well, without excluding other elements unless specifically stated otherwise. Also, the terms " part, "" module," and " module ", etc. in the specification mean a unit for processing at least one function or operation and may be implemented by hardware or software or a combination of hardware and software have.

2 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration of a smart key system according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 2, a smart key system 300 according to an embodiment of the present invention includes a terminal 100 and a smart key electronic control unit 200 (SMK ECU).

The terminal 100 may be a FOB configured to perform bi-directional communication (RF communication and LF communication) with the smart key system 300 for unlocking and starting the vehicle door, FOB is not particularly limited as long as it is a device including a module capable of processing the function or operation of the FOB. For example, it may be a PDA, a mobile phone capable of LTE communication, a tablet, and the like.

Hereinafter, in order to facilitate understanding of the explanation, the term 'terminal' is replaced with the term 'forb.'

In order to transmit its own position data to the SMK ECU 200, the FOV 100 mounts a GPS module (not shown) therein. The fob 100 transmits its position data received via the GPS module in response to the position data request from the SMK ECU 200 via RF communication.

The SMK ECU 200 performs data communication with the Pov 100 using the bidirectional communication and performs first and second authentication processes for the Pov 100. The first authentication process is the same as the existing position and password authentication process. In the present invention, a second authentication process based on the position data of the mobile phone received from the mobile phone is added to the existing authentication process.

The SMK ECU 200 compares GPS position data of the Poble 100 received via RF communication from the Pob 100 with GPS position data of the vehicle to determine whether the Pob 100 is located within a predetermined distance from the vehicle And performs a second authentication process based on the determination result.

In order to compare the GPS position data of the FOV 100 with the GPS position data of the vehicle, the SMK ECU 200 receives and collects GPS position data of the vehicle from the GPS module mounted on the vehicle. In order to receive GPS position data of the vehicle from the GPS module, the SMK ECU 200 can receive GPS position data of the vehicle from the GPS module in a vehicle network communication such as LIN communication or CAN communication.

The SMK ECU 200 permits the authentication of the Pob only when the position of the Pob 100 is recognized to be within the reference distance through the second authentication process and controls unlocking and starting of the vehicle door only in this case . Here, the reference distance is a distance in consideration of the error of the GPS position data and the prevention of theft of the vehicle, and may be defined as a proximity such as the Pob recognition distance in the LF communication method.

In other words, since the recognition distance of the PFB using the LF communication is about 2 m, it is possible to recognize that the PFB 100 is located near the SMK ECU 200 in addition to the authentication information using the LF communication, Authorization is granted. If theft is attempted using the RSA, that is, if the vehicle 100 and the vehicle exist at a remote location, authentication of the vehicle 100 is not permitted.

Hereinafter, a process of the smart key system according to an embodiment of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the flowchart shown in the block configuration shown in FIG. 2 and FIG.

When the SMK ECU 200 generates an event for the forb authentication request (S212), the LF data for generating the PFV password is generated and transmitted to the Fob 100 through the LF communication (S214). At the same time, current position data of the vehicle is collected from the GPS module in the vehicle (S216).

Then, when the LF data is received from the SMK ECU 200 while maintaining the slip mode, the fob 100 switches from a slip mode to a wake up mode (S112 ).

Next, the mobile phone 100 switched to the wakeup mode generates encrypted RF data in response to the received LF data and transmits the encrypted RF data to the SMK ECU 200 through RF communication (S114).

Next, the SMK ECU 200 decrypts the encrypted RF data received from the Pov and performs a first authentication process for the Pov 100 (S218).

If the authentication of the Pov 100 is successful, the SMK ECU 200 completes the first authentication process and simultaneously requests the Pov 100 for location data of the Pov 100 at step S220.

In step S118, the Pov 100 acquires its own position data via the GPS module mounted in response to the request of the POS data of the SMK ECU 200, and transmits the collected position data to the SMK To the ECU (200).

Next, the SMK ECU 200 compares the position data of the vehicle received from the vehicle 100 with the current position data of the vehicle collected in the step S216 to determine a distance from the current vehicle to the vehicle 100 (S222).

As a result of the determination, if it is determined that the distance from the vehicle to the pav 100 is within the reference distance, the second authentication process for finalizing the pav authentication is completed (S24). That is, as shown in the lower portion of FIG. 3, when the fob 100 is located within the pob recognition area B defined by the reference distance from the vehicle A, the second authentication process is completed. Here, the pod recognition area B is set to the LF frequency transmission range, as described above, and may be set within 2 m, for example.

If it is determined that the mobile phone 100 is located outside the LF detection area D formed by the RSA antenna shown in the upper part of FIG. 3, i.e., the reference distance, the step S220 The first authentication process completed is canceled and the vehicle door is opened and closed and the start is interrupted.

The foregoing description is merely illustrative of the technical idea of the present invention, and various changes and modifications may be made by those skilled in the art without departing from the essential characteristics of the present invention. Therefore, the embodiments disclosed in the present invention are intended to illustrate rather than limit the scope of the present invention, and the scope of the technical idea of the present invention is not limited by these embodiments. The scope of protection of the present invention should be construed according to the following claims, and all technical ideas falling within the scope of the same shall be construed as falling within the scope of the present invention.

Claims

A smart key system comprising a terminal and a smart key electronic control unit installed in a vehicle for unlocking and starting a vehicle door, comprising: a smart key system for preventing a vehicle theft according to an RSA (Relay Station Attack) A method for protecting an RSA using a smart key system, the method comprising:
The smart key electronic control unit and the terminal perform two-way wireless communication, and the smart key electronic control unit performs a first authentication process for the terminal;
When the first authentication process is completed, the smart key electronic control unit receiving GPS position data of the terminal from the terminal;
Wherein the smart key electronic control unit compares GPS position data of the terminal with GPS position data of the vehicle to determine whether the terminal is located within a predetermined distance from the vehicle and performing a second authentication process based on the determination result
A method for protecting an RSA using a smart key system.

The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the step of receiving GPS position data of the terminal comprises:
Wherein the smart key electronic control unit receives GPS position data of the terminal in RF communication.

The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the step of receiving GPS position data of the terminal comprises:
Wherein the smart key electronic control unit comprises receiving GPS position data of the vehicle from a GPS module installed in the vehicle in a vehicle network communication.

4. The vehicle network communication system according to claim 3,
LIN communication or CAN communication.

The method of claim 1, wherein the performing the second authentication process comprises:
And completing the second authentication process when the terminal is located within a predetermined distance from the vehicle and canceling the first authentication process when the terminal is located outside the predetermined distance from the vehicle Using RSA defense method.

A smart key system comprising a terminal and a smart key electronic control unit installed in a vehicle for unlocking and starting a vehicle door,
Wherein the smart key electronic control unit comprises:
When receiving the GPS position data of the terminal from the terminal and comparing the GPS position data of the terminal with the GPS position data of the vehicle when the first authentication process for the terminal is completed using bidirectional communication, Is located within a predetermined distance from the vehicle, and performs a second authentication process based on the determination result.