JPH10327145A - Authentication system - Google Patents
Authentication systemInfo
- Publication number
- JPH10327145A JPH10327145A JP9134723A JP13472397A JPH10327145A JP H10327145 A JPH10327145 A JP H10327145A JP 9134723 A JP9134723 A JP 9134723A JP 13472397 A JP13472397 A JP 13472397A JP H10327145 A JPH10327145 A JP H10327145A
- Authority
- JP
- Japan
- Prior art keywords
- verifier
- prover
- digital signature
- information
- data
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Pending
Links
Abstract
Description
【０００１】[0001]
【発明の属する技術分野】本発明は通信ネットワークを
用いて２者間でサービス提供を行うシステムに関し、特
に通信相手の認証方式に関する。[0001] 1. Field of the Invention [0002] The present invention relates to a system for providing a service between two parties using a communication network, and more particularly to an authentication method for a communication partner.
【０００２】[0002]
【従来の技術】従来の通信ネットワークを用いた認証シ
ステムでは、認証局と呼ばれる第３者機関を利用してい
た。認証局を利用したシステムの構成を図６に示す。登
録段階において、証明者Ａは公開情報Ｉと秘密情報Ｊの
ペアを生成し、公開情報Ｉを認証局Ｃに送信する。認証
局Ｃでは、保証者Ａの身元を確認し、公開情報Ｉに認証
局Ｃのデジタル署名を付加した認証書Ｎを作成し、証明
者Ａに送信する。利用段階では、証明者Ａは検証者Ｂに
認証書Ｎを送信し、検証者Ｂは認証書Ｎに付加された認
証局Ｃのデジタル署名を確認し、その認証書Ｎに含まれ
ている公開情報Ｉをもとに証明者Ａの認証を行う。ま
た、複数回の利用段階に対して登録段階は一回であるこ
とが一般的である。このような利用形態としては例えば
（ＭasterＣard and ＶＩＳＡ，Ｓecure Ｅlectronic
Ｔransaction（ＳＥＴ）Ｓpecification Ｂook３，Ａu
g.１９９６）があり、認証書の形態としては（ＩＴＵ
Ｒec．Ｘ．５０９（１９９３），ＩＳＯ／ＩＥＣ９５９
４−８：１９９５）がある。2. Description of the Related Art In a conventional authentication system using a communication network, a third party called a certificate authority is used. FIG. 6 shows the configuration of a system using a certificate authority. In the registration stage, the prover A generates a pair of the public information I and the secret information J, and transmits the public information I to the certificate authority C. The certificate authority C confirms the identity of the guarantor A, creates a certificate N in which the digital signature of the certificate authority C is added to the public information I, and transmits the certificate N to the prover A. In the use stage, the prover A sends the certificate N to the verifier B, and the verifier B confirms the digital signature of the certificate authority C attached to the certificate N, and the public key included in the certificate N The certifier A is authenticated based on the information I. Further, it is general that the registration stage is once for a plurality of use stages. Examples of such a use form include (MasterCard and VISA, Secure Electronic)
Transaction (SET) Specification Book3, Au
g. 1996), and the form of the certificate is (ITU
Rec. X. 509 (1993), ISO / IEC959
4-8: 1995).
【０００３】[0003]
【発明が解決しようとする課題】しかしながら、従来の
認証局を用いた認証方式では取引に関して第三者機関で
ある認証局Ｃが必要になり、そのデータベース管理も大
変である。また、異なる取引に同じ認証書Ｎを用いるた
めに、登録の回数は少なくてすむが、異なる取引間でユ
ーザーの同一性が認証者に判明してしまう。さらに、認
証局Ｃは取引について何ら保証を与えず、認証書Ｎは証
明者Ａの身元を保証する機能しか有しない。However, in the conventional authentication method using a certificate authority, a certificate authority C, which is a third party, is required for transactions, and its database management is also difficult. In addition, since the same certificate N is used for different transactions, the number of registrations can be reduced, but the identity of the user between different transactions becomes apparent to the authenticator. Further, the certificate authority C does not provide any guarantee for the transaction, and the certificate N has only the function of assuring the identity of the prover A.
【０００４】本発明の目的は、証明者の匿名性を守りな
がら証明者を認証し、データベースが不要な認証方式を
提供する事にある。また、本発明の他の目的は、取引内
容をも保証するような認証方式を提供することにある。An object of the present invention is to provide an authentication method in which a prover is authenticated while protecting the anonymity of the prover and a database is not required. Another object of the present invention is to provide an authentication system that guarantees the contents of a transaction.
【０００５】[0005]
【課題を解決するための手段】この発明の検証方式に関
わる第１の発明は、登録段階において、証明者Ａが乱数
発生器によって公開情報Ｉと秘密情報Ｊのペアを作成
し、その公開情報Ｉを検証者Ｂに送信し、検証者Ｂはそ
の公開情報Ｉにデジタル署名を付加したデータＳを証明
者Ａに送信する。利用段階においては、証明者Ａが上記
デジタル署名付き公開情報Ｓを検証者Ｂに送信し、検証
者ＢはＳに付加されたデジタル署名を確認した後にその
公開情報Ｉを用いて認証を行う事により認証局に個人情
報を登録することなく証明者Ａの検証を行う事が可能に
なる。また、検証者Ｂのデジタル署名を用いることによ
り、検証者Ｂは登録段階においてデータベースに証明者
Ａの公開情報Ｉを登録する必要がないので記憶装置を準
備する必要がない。According to a first aspect of the present invention, in a registration step, a prover A creates a pair of public information I and secret information J by a random number generator, I is transmitted to the verifier B, and the verifier B transmits data S obtained by adding a digital signature to the public information I to the prover A. In the use stage, the prover A transmits the public information S with the digital signature to the verifier B, and the verifier B verifies the digital signature added to the S, and then performs authentication using the public information I. Thereby, it becomes possible to verify the prover A without registering personal information in the certificate authority. In addition, by using the digital signature of the verifier B, the verifier B does not need to register the public information I of the prover A in the database at the registration stage, and thus does not need to prepare a storage device.
【０００６】また、第２の発明は、登録段階において、
証明者Ａが乱数発生器によって公開情報Ｉと秘密情報Ｊ
のペアを作成し、その公開情報Ｉを検証者Ｂに送信し、
検証者Ｂはその公開情報Ｉに許可内容Ｍを付加し、さら
にデジタル署名を付加したデータＳを証明者Ａに送信す
る。利用段階においては、証明者Ａが上記デジタル署名
付き公開情報Ｓを検証者Ｂに送信し、検証者ＢはＳに付
加されたデジタル署名を確認した後にその公開情報Ｉを
用いて認証を行い、さらにＳに含まれている許可内容Ｍ
にしたがってサービスを行う。これにより認証局に個人
情報を登録することなく証明者Ａの検証を行う事が可能
になる。また、検証者Ｂのデジタル署名を用いることに
より、検証者Ｂは登録段階においてデータベースに証明
者Ａの公開情報Ｉを登録する必要がないので記憶装置を
準備する必要がなく、さらにサービス内容の識別も可能
である。[0006] In the second invention, at the registration stage,
The prover A uses the random number generator to make public information I and secret information J
And sends the public information I to the verifier B,
The verifier B adds the permission contents M to the public information I, and transmits the data S to which the digital signature is added to the prover A. In the use stage, the prover A transmits the above-mentioned public information S with the digital signature to the verifier B, and the verifier B verifies the digital signature added to S and performs authentication using the public information I, Further, the permission contents M included in S
Service is performed according to. As a result, it becomes possible to verify the prover A without registering personal information in the certificate authority. Also, by using the digital signature of the verifier B, the verifier B does not need to register the public information I of the prover A in the database at the registration stage, so that there is no need to prepare a storage device, and furthermore, identification of service contents. Is also possible.
【０００７】また、第３の発明は公開情報Ｉと秘密情報
Ｊを取引毎に生成することにより、異なる取引間に同一
の証明者が関与していることを検証者に知らせることな
く認証ができる。In the third invention, authentication can be performed without informing the verifier that the same prover is involved in different transactions by generating the public information I and the secret information J for each transaction. .
【０００８】さらに、第４の発明では公開情報Ｉと秘密
情報Ｊとして例えばＲＳＡ(Ｒ.Ｌ.Ｒivest，Ａ．Ｓhami
r，and Ｌ．Ｍ．Ａdleman，“ＡＭethod for Ｏbtainin
gＤigital Ｓignatures and Ｐublic-Ｋey Ｃryptosyst
ems”，Ｃommunicationsof the ＡＣＭ，Ｖol．２１
（２），pp．１２０−１２６，Ｆebruary １９７８．）
の公開鍵と秘密鍵を利用することにより、後日第三者で
ある調停者に通信の記録を提示することで証明者が取引
を否認することを防止している。Furthermore, in the fourth invention, the public information I and the secret information J are, for example, RSA (RL Rivest, A. Shami).
r, and L. M. Adleman, “AMethod for Obtainin
gDigital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosyst
ems ", Communications of the ACM, Vol.
(2), pp. 120-126, February 1978. )
Utilizing the public key and private key of the third party prevents the certifier from denying the transaction by presenting the communication record to a third party arbitrator at a later date.
【０００９】[0009]
【発明の実施の形態】第１の実施例を以下に述べる。図
１はこの発明の原理をあらわす構成図である。証明者Ａ
が用いる情報処理装置１は乱数発生器１１、演算処理器
１２、メモリ１３を備え、検証者Ｂが用いる情報処理装
置２は、乱数発生器２１、演算処理器２２、メモリ２３
を備えていて、上記情報処理装置１、２の間は通信ネッ
トワーク３を通じて接続されている。DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS A first embodiment will be described below. FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing the principle of the present invention. Prover A
The information processing device 1 used by the verifier B includes a random number generator 11, an arithmetic processor 12, and a memory 13. The information processor 2 used by the verifier B includes a random number generator 21, an arithmetic processor 22, and a memory 23.
The information processing apparatuses 1 and 2 are connected via a communication network 3.
【００１０】本実施例では認証に用いる公開情報として
Ｆｉａｔ−Ｓｈａｍｉｒ法（ＵＳＰ第４，７４８，６６
８号）を用いる。以下の数式では底となる、二つの素数
の積Ｎによる剰余計算（ｍｏｄ Ｎ）が省略されてい
る。本実施例における登録手順を図２に示す。証明者Ａ
は上記乱数発生器１によって公開情報としてＩ＝Ｊ×Ｊ
を作成し、秘密情報Ｊをメモリ１３に記憶し、公開情報
Ｉを検証者Ｂへ送信する。検証者Ｂは上記公開情報Ｉと
許可内容である「１割引」をあらわすデータにデジタル
署名をつけて証明者Ａに送信する。証明者Ａはこのデジ
タル署名付きデータをメモリ１３に記憶させる。In this embodiment, Fiat-Shamir method (USP 4,748,66) is used as public information used for authentication.
No. 8) is used. In the following equation, the remainder calculation (mod N) based on the product N of two prime numbers is omitted. FIG. 2 shows a registration procedure in this embodiment. Prover A
Is I = J × J as public information by the random number generator 1
Is created, the secret information J is stored in the memory 13, and the public information I is transmitted to the verifier B. The verifier B attaches a digital signature to the public information I and data representing "1 discount", which is the permitted content, and transmits the data to the prover A. The prover A stores the data with the digital signature in the memory 13.
【００１１】後日、商品を注文する際の利用手順を図３
に示す。証明者Ａは乱数発生器１１により乱数Ｔを生成
し、上記メモリ１３に格納してあるデジタル署名付きデ
ータと、Ｒ＝Ｔ×Ｔを検証者Ｂに送信する。検証者Ｂは
前記データのデジタル署名を確認した後に、乱数発生器
２１によって乱数Ｘを｛０，１｝のどちらから選択し 認証の精度を上げることができる。この実施例において
は、Ｆｉａｔ−Ｓｈａｍｉｒ法が否認・偽造防止機能が
ないために検証者が取引内容を偽造することが可能であ
る。FIG. 3 shows a use procedure for ordering a product at a later date.
Shown in The prover A generates a random number T by the random number generator 11 and transmits the data with the digital signature stored in the memory 13 and R = T × T to the verifier B. After verifying the digital signature of the data, the verifier B selects the random number X from {0, 1} using the random number generator 21. The accuracy of authentication can be improved. In this embodiment, since the Fiat-Shamir method has no repudiation / forgery prevention function, it is possible for a verifier to forge transaction contents.
【００１２】つぎに本発明の他の実施例を以下に述べ
る。第１の実施例と同様に図１はこの発明の原理をあら
わす構成図である。証明者Ａが用いる情報処理装置１は
乱数発生器１１、演算処理器１２、メモリ１３を備え、
検証者Ｂが用いる情報処理装置２は、乱数発生器２１、
演算処理器２２、メモリ２３を備えていて、上記情報処
理装置１、２の間は通信ネットワーク３を通じて接続さ
れている。Next, another embodiment of the present invention will be described below. FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing the principle of the present invention, similarly to the first embodiment. The information processing device 1 used by the prover A includes a random number generator 11, an arithmetic processor 12, and a memory 13,
The information processing device 2 used by the verifier B includes a random number generator 21,
The information processing apparatus includes an arithmetic processor 22 and a memory 23, and the information processing apparatuses 1 and 2 are connected to each other through a communication network 3.
【００１３】本実施例における登録手順を図４に示す。
証明者Ａは上記乱数発生器１によって公開情報として例
えば上記ＲＳＡにおける公開鍵ＫPAと秘密鍵ＫSAを作成
し、秘密鍵ＫSAをメモリ１３に記憶し、公開鍵ＫPAを＄
１００に相当する電子マネーとともに検証者Ｂへ送信す
る。検証者Ｂは＄１００の電子マネーを受け取った後
に、上記公開鍵ＫPAと＄１００をあらわすデータにデジ
タル署名をつけたデータＳを作成し証明者Ａに送信す
る。証明者Ａはこのデジタル署名付きデータＳをメモリ
１３に記憶させる。FIG. 4 shows a registration procedure in this embodiment.
Prover A creates a public key K PA and the secret key K SA, for example in the RSA as public information by the random number generator 1, and stores the secret key K SA in the memory 13, the public key K PA $
It is transmitted to the verifier B together with the electronic money corresponding to 100. After receiving the electronic money of $ 100, the verifier B creates data S in which a digital signature is attached to the data representing the public key KPA and the $ 100, and transmits the data S to the prover A. The prover A stores the data S with the digital signature in the memory 13.
【００１４】後日、商品の欠陥などで払い戻しを行う場
合の利用手順を図５に示す。証明者Ａは上記メモリ１３
に格納してあるデジタル署名付きデータＳを検証者Ｂに
送信し、検証者Ｂは前記データのデジタル署名を確認し
た後に、乱数発生器２１によって乱数Ｒを生成し、証明
者Ａに送信する。証明者Ａは乱数Ｒに上記秘密鍵ＫSAを
用いてデジタル署名を行い、これを検証者Ｂに送信す
る。検証者Ｂは送られてきたデータのデジタル署名を確
認して証明者Ａが登録段階で＄１００送ったおくり主で
あることを認証し、＄１００相当の電子マネーを返金す
る。この方式では、ＲＳＡの非対象暗号を用いることに
より証明者Ａが払い戻しの事実を否認することを防止す
ることが可能になる。本実施例ではデジタル署名方式が
否認・偽造防止能力を有しているので検証者が認証記録
を偽造することを防ぐことができる。FIG. 5 shows a use procedure in the case where a refund is made at a later date due to a defective product or the like. Prover A uses the memory 13
Is transmitted to the verifier B. After the verifier B confirms the digital signature of the data, the verifier B generates a random number R by the random number generator 21 and transmits it to the prover A. The prover A digitally signs the random number R using the secret key K SA , and transmits the digital signature to the verifier B. The verifier B confirms the digital signature of the transmitted data, authenticates that the prover A has sent $ 100 at the registration stage, and refunds the electronic money corresponding to $ 100. In this method, it is possible to prevent the prover A from denying the fact of the refund by using the asymmetric encryption of the RSA. In this embodiment, since the digital signature method has the denial / forgery prevention capability, it is possible to prevent the verifier from falsifying the authentication record.
【００１５】以上の実施例では公開情報としてＲＳＡの
公開鍵やＦｉａｔ−Ｓｈａｍｉｒ法の公開情報等を用い
たが、その外の公開情報を用いた認証方式でも同様のこ
とを行うことが可能である。In the above embodiment, the public key of the RSA, the public information of the Fiat-Shamir method, and the like are used as the public information. However, the same can be performed by an authentication method using other public information. .
【００１６】[0016]
【発明の効果】本発明によれば、取引毎に公開情報を作
成し、その公開情報に検証者のデジタル署名を付加した
ものを後日認証に用いる事により、証明者のプライバシ
ーを守り、また事前にデータベースに登録する作業も必
要なく、認証を行う事が可能になる。According to the present invention, public information is created for each transaction, and the public information added with a digital signature of a verifier is used for authentication at a later date, so that the privacy of the prover can be protected. It is possible to perform authentication without the need to register the data in the database.
【図１】本発明のシステム構成図である。FIG. 1 is a system configuration diagram of the present invention.
【図２】第１の実施例における登録段階の処理手順をあ
らわす図である。FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating a processing procedure at a registration stage in the first embodiment.
【図３】第１の実施例における利用段階の処理手順をあ
らわす図である。FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating a processing procedure in a use stage according to the first embodiment.
【図４】第２の実施例における登録段階の処理手順をあ
らわす図である。FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating a processing procedure at a registration stage in a second embodiment.
【図５】第２の実施例における利用段階の処理手順をあ
らわす図である。FIG. 5 is a diagram illustrating a processing procedure in a use stage according to a second embodiment.
【図６】従来技術のシステム構成図である。FIG. 6 is a system configuration diagram of a conventional technique.
【図７】従来技術の処理フローである。FIG. 7 is a processing flow of a conventional technique.
１…証明者側情報処理装置、 ２…検証者側情報
処理装置、２…検証者側情報処理装置、 １１、２
１…乱数発生器、１２、２２…演算器、
１３、２３…メモリ、３…通信ネットワーク。DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 1 ... Prover side information processing apparatus, 2 ... Verifier side information processing apparatus, 2 ... Verifier side information processing apparatus, 11, 2
1: random number generator, 12, 22: arithmetic unit,
13, 23 ... memory, 3 ... communication network.
Claims (4)
テムで、通信相手の身元を確認する利用者の認証方式に
おいて、 証明者Ａが公開情報ＩとＩと対になる秘密情報Ｊを作成
し、前記公開情報Ｉを検証者Ｂに送信し、検証者Ｂは前
記公開情報Ｉに検証者Ｂのデジタル署名を付加したデー
タＳを作成し、Ｓを証明者Ａに送信する利用登録段階
と、 証明者Ａが上記デジタル署名を付加したデータＳを検証
者Ｂに送信し、検証者ＢがＳに付加されている検証者Ｂ
のデジタル署名を確認後、Ｓに含まれている公開情報Ｉ
を用いて証明者Ａの認証を行う利用者認証段階、 とを有することを特徴とする認証方式。In a system comprising a prover A and a verifier B, in a user authentication method for confirming the identity of a communication partner, secret information J in which the prover A is paired with public information I and I is provided. And transmits the public information I to the verifier B. The verifier B creates data S in which the digital signature of the verifier B is added to the public information I, and transmits the S to the prover A. Step, the prover A sends the data S to which the digital signature has been added to the verifier B, and the verifier B
After confirming the digital signature of the public information I included in S
A user authentication step of performing authentication of the prover A by using the authentication method.
テムで、通信相手の身元を確認する利用者の認証方式に
おいて、 証明者Ａが公開情報ＩとＩと対になる秘密情報Ｊを作成
し、前記公開情報Ｉを検証者Ｂに送信し、検証者Ｂは前
記公開情報Ｉと許可内容Ｍとに検証者Ｂのデジタル署名
を付加したデータＳを作成し、Ｓを証明者Ａに送信する
利用登録段階と、 証明者Ａが上記デジタル署名を付加したデータＳを検証
者Ｂに送信し、検証者ＢがＳに付加されている検証者Ｂ
のデジタル署名を確認後、Ｓに含まれている公開情報Ｉ
を用いて証明者Ａの認証を行い、認証が成功した場合に
限りＳに含まれている許可内容Ｍにしたがってサービス
を提供する利用者認証段階、 とを有することを特徴とする認証方式。2. A system comprising a prover A and a verifier B. In a user authentication method for confirming the identity of a communication partner, secret information J in which the prover A is paired with public information I and I The public information I is transmitted to the verifier B, and the verifier B creates the data S in which the digital signature of the verifier B is added to the public information I and the permission contents M, and transmits the S to the prover A. And the prover A sends the data S with the digital signature added thereto to the verifier B, and the verifier B adds the digital signature to the verifier B.
After confirming the digital signature of the public information I included in S
A user authentication step of performing authentication of the prover A using the authentication method and providing a service in accordance with the permission contents M included in S only when the authentication is successful.
て、 認証を行うごとに上記公開情報Ｉと上記秘密情報Ｊを作
成し直す事を特徴とする認証方式。3. The authentication method according to claim 1, wherein said public information I and said secret information J are re-created each time authentication is performed.
て、 上記公開情報Ｉと上記秘密情報Ｊの組として、デジタル
署名の公開鍵と秘密鍵を用い、 検証者Ｂは認証の際に用いたデータを調停者Ｃに送信
し、前記調停者Ｃが認証の際に用いたデータに証明者Ａ
のデジタル署名が付加されている事を確認する事によ
り、証明者Ａが検証者Ｂによって認証された事実を前記
調停者Ｃが確認することを可能にすることを特徴とする
認証方式。4. The authentication method according to claim 1, wherein a public key and a secret key of a digital signature are used as a set of the public information I and the secret information J, and the verifier B uses the public key and the private key for authentication. The data transmitted to the arbitrator C is transmitted to the arbitrator C.
An authentication method wherein the arbitrator C can confirm the fact that the prover A has been authenticated by the verifier B by confirming that the digital signature has been added.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| JP9134723A JPH10327145A (en) | 1997-05-26 | 1997-05-26 | Authentication system |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| JP9134723A JPH10327145A (en) | 1997-05-26 | 1997-05-26 | Authentication system |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| JPH10327145A true JPH10327145A (en) | 1998-12-08 |
Family
ID=15135104
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| JP9134723A Pending JPH10327145A (en) | 1997-05-26 | 1997-05-26 | Authentication system |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| JP (1) | JPH10327145A (en) |
Cited By (7)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JP2007135062A (en) * | 2005-11-11 | 2007-05-31 | Nippon Hoso Kyokai <Nhk> | Personal information protection system, its signature key update method and personal information collection method, key management device and key generation program, signature key generator and signature key generation program, personal information management device and personal information collection program, and content decoder and personal information management program |
| US9864989B2 (en) | 1999-06-18 | 2018-01-09 | Cria Inc. | Method and apparatus for ordering goods, services, and content over an internetwork using a virtual payment account |
| US11093623B2 (en) | 2011-12-09 | 2021-08-17 | Sertainty Corporation | System and methods for using cipher objects to protect data |
| CN114638622A (en) * | 2022-03-18 | 2022-06-17 | 贵州省电子证书有限公司 | Wine anti-counterfeiting tracing method |
| US11386409B2 (en) | 2016-03-04 | 2022-07-12 | Sertintyone Corporation | Systems and methods for media codecs and containers |
| US11423400B1 (en) | 1999-06-18 | 2022-08-23 | Stripe, Inc. | Method and apparatus for ordering goods, services and content over an internetwork using a virtual payment account |
| US12072989B2 (en) | 2011-12-09 | 2024-08-27 | Sertainty Corporation | System and methods for using cipher objects to protect data |
-
1997
- 1997-05-26 JP JP9134723A patent/JPH10327145A/en active Pending
Cited By (10)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US9864989B2 (en) | 1999-06-18 | 2018-01-09 | Cria Inc. | Method and apparatus for ordering goods, services, and content over an internetwork using a virtual payment account |
| US9864990B2 (en) | 1999-06-18 | 2018-01-09 | Cria Inc. | Method and apparatus for ordering goods, services and content over an internetwork using a virtual payment account |
| US9928509B2 (en) | 1999-06-18 | 2018-03-27 | Cria Inc. | Method and apparatus for ordering goods, services and content over an internetwork using a virtual payment account |
| US11423400B1 (en) | 1999-06-18 | 2022-08-23 | Stripe, Inc. | Method and apparatus for ordering goods, services and content over an internetwork using a virtual payment account |
| US11551211B1 (en) | 1999-06-18 | 2023-01-10 | Stripe, Inc. | Method and apparatus for ordering goods, services and content over an internetwork using a virtual payment account |
| JP2007135062A (en) * | 2005-11-11 | 2007-05-31 | Nippon Hoso Kyokai <Nhk> | Personal information protection system, its signature key update method and personal information collection method, key management device and key generation program, signature key generator and signature key generation program, personal information management device and personal information collection program, and content decoder and personal information management program |
| US11093623B2 (en) | 2011-12-09 | 2021-08-17 | Sertainty Corporation | System and methods for using cipher objects to protect data |
| US12072989B2 (en) | 2011-12-09 | 2024-08-27 | Sertainty Corporation | System and methods for using cipher objects to protect data |
| US11386409B2 (en) | 2016-03-04 | 2022-07-12 | Sertintyone Corporation | Systems and methods for media codecs and containers |
| CN114638622A (en) * | 2022-03-18 | 2022-06-17 | 贵州省电子证书有限公司 | Wine anti-counterfeiting tracing method |
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