JP2020058037A - Unauthorized communication establishment prevention system - Google Patents

Abstract

To provide an unauthorized communication establishment prevention system capable of precisely detecting unauthorized communication.SOLUTION: An unauthorized communication establishment prevention system transmits a reply radio wave Sb transmitted by an electronic key according to a predetermined transmission pattern when confirming the right or wrong of communication by checking delay time Tx of radio waves transmitted and received between a vehicle and the electronic key. Specifically, when a reply radio wave Sb is returned as a response to a transmission radio wave Sa from the electronic key, the system creates a pattern not to transmit the reply radio wave Sb. If a transmission pattern of a reply radio wave Sb obtained during a series of communication is the predetermined pattern, the system permits communication establishment, and on the other hand if the transmission pattern of the reply radio wave Sb is not the predetermined pattern, it does not permit communication.SELECTED DRAWING: Figure 3

Description

  The present invention relates to a communication unauthorized establishment prevention system that prevents unauthorized communication establishment.

  2. Description of the Related Art Conventionally, in a vehicle or the like, an electronic key system that wirelessly transmits an electronic key ID from an electronic key to a vehicle and performs ID collation is known. By the way, in this type of electronic key system, an illegal act using a repeater (an illegal act using a repeater: see Patent Document 1 or the like) is an illegal act that attempts to establish an ID match without depending on the user's will. is there. Repeater use misconduct is, for example, when the electronic key is located far from the vehicle, the electronic key is connected to the vehicle by a plurality of repeaters to relay radio waves, thereby establishing communication between the two parties. is there. Therefore, since ID collation is established where the user does not notice, there is a possibility that a third party may illegally unlock the door or start the engine.

JP 2006-161545 A

In taking measures against unauthorized communication using a repeater, there was a need to reliably detect this unauthorized communication.
An object of the present invention is to provide a communication fraud establishment prevention system that can accurately detect fraudulent communication.

  A communication fraud prevention system that solves the above-mentioned problem is to transmit a transmission radio wave and then receive the reply radio wave by causing a terminal to receive a transmission radio wave from a communication master and to return a reply radio wave from the terminal. In the configuration in which the delay time until the time is measured and whether the communication between the two parties is correct is determined from the delay time, a pattern setting unit that sets the transmission pattern of the return radio wave and the transmission pattern of the received return radio wave are confirmed. Thus, the communication device includes a right / wrong determining unit that determines whether the communication is right or wrong.

  According to this configuration, when confirming the correctness of the communication by checking the delay time of the radio wave transmitted and received between the communication master and the terminal, if the transmission pattern of the reply radio wave takes a specified pattern, the communication is permitted, If the transmission pattern of the reply radio wave does not take a prescribed pattern, communication is disabled. By the way, in the case of the unauthorized communication using the repeater, the return radio wave can be returned only in the same manner. Therefore, if the determination logic of this configuration is adopted, the communication using the repeater can be detected. Therefore, unauthorized communication can be detected with high accuracy.

  In the communication fraud prevention system, the process of transmitting and receiving radio waves between the communication master and the terminal to measure the delay time is performed a plurality of times, and the right / wrong determination unit determines whether the reply radio wave is transmitted a plurality of times. It is preferable to check the transmission pattern to determine whether communication is correct. According to this configuration, since the transmission pattern of the reply radio wave transmitted a plurality of times is confirmed to determine whether communication is correct or not, it is advantageous to accurately determine whether the communication is unauthorized.

  In the communication fraud prevention system, the communication master includes: an ID collation for confirming whether the ID registered in the terminal is correct; a delay time estimation for confirming whether the delay time falls within a specified time; It is preferable to perform pattern authentication for confirming whether or not the transmission pattern of the reply radio wave is correct, and to confirm that all these processes are established, to permit the establishment of communication. According to this configuration, the determination as to whether or not the communication is valid is made by various confirmations, which is more advantageous in accurately determining whether or not the communication between the communication master and the terminal is correct.

  In the communication improper establishment prevention system, ID verification performed at the time of communication is performed by each of the communication master and the terminal performing an operation for obtaining a response code by passing the challenge code through an encryption key, thereby comparing the response code. It is preferable that authentication is provided, and the pattern setting unit returns the return radio wave in a transmission pattern determined by the response code. According to this configuration, it is advantageous to generate the transmission pattern of the return radio wave in a safe manner that is difficult to copy.

  In the communication fraud prevention system, it is preferable that the pattern setting unit executes transmission of the return radio wave by sharing a part of the response code as the return radio wave. According to this configuration, it is possible to authenticate the transmission pattern of the return radio wave while performing the challenge response authentication, which is advantageous in shortening the time required for communication.

  In the communication improper establishment prevention system, it is preferable that the pattern setting unit sets a transmission pattern of the return radio wave based on timing information which is data indicating a transmission pattern of the return radio wave. According to this configuration, since the transmission pattern of the return radio wave is set based on the timing information, it is possible to set the optimum transmission pattern recognized by both the communication master and the terminal.

  In the communication fraud prevention system, it is preferable that the timing information is transmitted from the communication master to the terminal and notified to the terminal. According to this configuration, since the transmission pattern of the return radio wave is set based on the timing information notified from the communication terminal to the terminal, it is possible to reliably link the transmission pattern.

  In the communication fraud prevention system, it is preferable that the timing information is registered in advance in each of the communication master and the terminal. According to this configuration, since the communication master and the terminal have the timing information in advance, it is possible to eliminate the communication for notifying the timing information.

  In the communication fraud prevention system, it is preferable that the pattern setting unit sets the transmission pattern of the return radio wave by an operation of substituting a prescribed parameter into a calculation formula provided in advance for each of the communication master and the terminal. . According to this configuration, it is advantageous to generate the transmission pattern of the return radio wave in a safe manner that is difficult to copy.

  In the communication improper establishment prevention system, it is preferable that the pattern setting unit sets the transmission pattern of the return radio wave according to the presence or absence of the return radio wave. According to this configuration, it is possible to set a unique transmission pattern of the return radio wave in a manner in which the distinction of “transmitting” or “not transmitting” the return radio wave is clear.

  In the communication improper establishment prevention system, the pattern setting unit may set a transmission pattern of the return radio wave by changing a time from receiving the radio wave of the communication master to transmitting the return radio wave. preferable. According to this configuration, it is possible to set a unique transmission pattern of the return radio wave in a simple manner of changing the transmission timing of the return radio wave.

  According to the present invention, in a communication fraud prevention system, fraudulent communication can be accurately detected.

FIG. 1 is a configuration diagram of a communication fraud establishment prevention system according to a first embodiment. (A), (b) is explanatory drawing which shows the specific example of illegal communication. FIG. 4 is a communication sequence diagram of delay time estimation. FIG. 9 is a communication sequence diagram of delay time estimation according to the second embodiment. The block diagram of the communication fraud establishment prevention system of 3rd Embodiment. FIG. 4 is a communication sequence diagram of delay time estimation. FIG. 14 is a communication sequence diagram of delay time estimation according to the fourth embodiment.

(1st Embodiment)
Hereinafter, a first embodiment of a communication fraud prevention system will be described with reference to FIGS.
As shown in FIG. 1, the vehicle 1 includes an electronic key system 3 that performs wireless ID collation with the electronic key 2. The electronic key system 3 of this example is a key operation free system that executes ID collation with the electronic key 2 through short-range communication triggered by communication from the vehicle 1. Generally, ID collation performed in the key operation free system is called "smart collation", and the communication is called "smart communication".

The vehicle 1 includes a verification ECU (Electronic Control Unit) 4 that performs ID verification (smart verification), a body ECU 5 that manages a power supply of onboard electrical components, and an engine ECU 6 that controls the engine 7. These ECUs are connected through a communication line 8 in the vehicle. The communication line 8 is, for example, a CAN (Controller Area Network) or a LIN (Local Interconnect).
Network). In the verification ECU 4, an electronic key ID and an encryption key of the electronic key 2 registered in the vehicle 1 are written and stored in a memory (not shown). The encryption key is used in challenge response authentication performed in the process of ID verification.

The vehicle 1 includes an outdoor transmitter 11 for transmitting radio waves to the outside, an indoor transmitter 12 for transmitting radio waves to the room, and a radio receiver 13 for receiving radio waves in the vehicle 1. The outdoor transmitter 11 and the indoor transmitter 12 transmit, for example, radio waves in the LF (Low Frequency) band. The radio wave receiver 13 is, for example, a UHF (Ultra
High Frequency) radio waves are received. The electronic key system 3 authenticates the electronic key 2 by LF-UHF two-way communication. The body ECU 5 switches the locking and unlocking of the vehicle door by controlling the operation of the door lock mechanism 14 provided on the vehicle door.

  The electronic key 2 includes a key control unit 17 that controls the operation of the electronic key 2, a receiving unit 18 that receives radio waves from the electronic key 2, and a transmission unit 19 that transmits radio waves from the electronic key 2. In the key control unit 17, an electronic key ID as an ID unique to the key and an encryption key used in challenge-response authentication for ID collation are written and stored in a memory (not shown). The receiving unit 18 receives, for example, LF radio waves. The transmitting unit 19 transmits, for example, UHF radio waves.

  The verification ECU 4 periodically LF-transmits the wake signal Swk from the outdoor transmitter 11 or the indoor transmitter 12, and monitors the establishment of communication with the electronic key 2. Upon receiving the ack signal Sack from the electronic key 2 that has received the wake signal Swk, the verification ECU 4 executes specific verification communication. In the ID verification performed at the time of the verification communication, for example, an electronic key ID verification for confirming the validity of an electronic key ID registered in the electronic key 2 or a challenge code is calculated with an encryption key in both the vehicle 1 and the electronic key 2. It is preferable to include challenge response authentication for confirming the response code.

  The electronic key system 3 includes a communication unauthorized establishment prevention function (communication unauthorized establishment prevention system 22) for preventing unauthorized establishment of communication. The communication improper establishment prevention system 22 of this embodiment causes the terminal 24 (in this example, the electronic key 2) to receive the transmission radio wave Sa from the communication master 23 (in this example, the verification ECU 4) and return the reply radio wave Sb from the terminal 24. By measuring the delay time Tx from the transmission of the transmission radio wave Sa to the reception of the return radio wave Sb, the correctness of the communication is determined by the delay time estimation for determining the correctness of the communication between the two parties based on the delay time Tx. I do. As described above, the communication fraud prevention system 22 of the present example performs the delay time estimation by the half-duplex method in which the radio waves are alternately transmitted between the communication master 23 and the terminal 24. The delay time Tx corresponds to a propagation time from transmission of a radio wave from the vehicle 1 to reception of a response of the electronic key 2 to the radio wave. The communication improper establishment prevention system 22 determines whether the ID collation communication is correct or not by confirming whether or not the delay time Tx falls within a specified time. Note that the process of transmitting and receiving radio waves between the communication master 23 and the terminal 24 to measure the delay time Tx is preferably performed a plurality of times.

  The communication fraud establishment prevention system 22 includes a pattern setting unit 27 that varies the transmission pattern of the return radio wave Sb used for delay time estimation. The pattern setting section 27 is provided in the key control section 17. The pattern setting section 27 does not always make the transmission pattern of the return radio wave Sb the same, but changes the transmission pattern of the return radio wave Sb by creating an irregular state in the transmission pattern. In particular, the pattern setting unit 27 of this example sets the transmission pattern of the return radio wave Sb according to the presence or absence of the return radio wave Sb.

  The communication fraud prevention system 22 includes a right / wrong determination unit 28 that determines whether communication between the communication master 23 and the terminal 24 is right or wrong. The correctness determination unit 28 is provided in the verification ECU 4. The correctness determination unit 28 of the present example performs communication by performing delay time estimation for confirming whether the delay time Tx falls within a specified time and pattern authentication for confirming the return pattern of the return radio wave Sb received from the electronic key 2. Is determined. The communication master 23 performs ID collation for confirming the validity of the ID (electronic key ID) registered in the terminal 24 (electronic key 2), delay time estimation, and pattern authentication. Is confirmed, communication establishment is permitted.

Next, the operation of the communication fraud establishment prevention system 22 will be described with reference to FIGS.
As shown in the flow from FIG. 2A to FIG. 2B, as an example in which the third party illegally establishes the communication of the ID verification, for example, the third party possesses the repeater 29 and There is an act of illegally establishing communication with the electronic key 2 possessed by the user. In this case, for example, after the radio wave from the vehicle 1 is relayed to the electronic key 2 through the repeater 29 and the verification communication between the vehicle 1 and the electronic key 2 is established, even if the authorized user leaves the vehicle 1, the When a third party sends a radio wave back through the repeater 29 at the time of estimating the time Tx, there is a case where smart matching is illegally established. This example is a countermeasure for preventing this unauthorized communication.

  As shown in FIG. 3, the communication fraud establishment prevention system 22 of the present embodiment employs a method of estimating a delay time in the process of challenge-response authentication. That is, the pattern setting unit 27 returns the return radio wave Sb in a transmission pattern determined by the response code of the challenge response authentication. In the case of this example, the pattern setting unit 27 sets the transmission pattern of the return radio wave Sb by sharing a part of the response code with the return radio wave Sb. That is, when the electronic key 2 transmits a response code to the vehicle 1, delay time estimation is performed using a response pattern of the response code in a part of the response code.

  In performing the smart communication, the verification ECU 4 periodically transmits a wake signal Swk. When the electronic key 2 is activated upon receiving the wake signal Swk, the electronic key 2 transmits an ack signal Sack by UHF. When the verification ECU 4 receives the ack signal Sack within a specified time after transmitting the wake signal Swk, the verification ECU 4 starts verification communication for confirming whether or not the electronic key 2 is correct.

  The verification ECU 4 first performs challenge response authentication as verification communication. At this time, the verification ECU 4 transmits to the electronic key 2 a challenge signal Sch including a challenge code (random number) whose value changes each time it is transmitted. Upon receiving the challenge signal Sch, the electronic key 2 calculates the response code by passing the challenge code through its own encryption key. When transmitting the challenge signal Sch to the electronic key 2, the verification ECU 4 itself calculates a response code in the same manner. Thereby, when the verification ECU 4 receives the response code from the electronic key 2, it can confirm whether the response code is correct.

  Further, the verification ECU 4 executes the delay time estimation together with the challenge response authentication. At this time, after transmitting the challenge signal Sch, the verification ECU 4 transmits the transmission radio wave Sa for estimating the delay time from the outdoor transmitter 11 to the electronic key 2 by LF. The transmission radio wave Sa may be a radio wave including any information as long as it can instruct the electronic key 2 to transmit the return radio wave Sb. When receiving the transmission radio wave Sa, the electronic key 2 transmits the return radio wave Sb from the transmission unit 19 to the vehicle 1 in UHF as a response to the transmission radio wave Sa. At this time, the pattern setting unit 27 transmits the return radio wave Sb at a timing determined by the value of the response code. In the case of this example, if the bit string from the head of the response code is, for example, "1, 0, 1, ...", the transmission of the reply radio wave Sb is executed in response to the head bit being "1". Note that the return radio wave Sb may be a signal containing any information as long as it is a response to the transmission radio wave Sa.

  Upon receiving the return radio wave Sb from the electronic key 2, the verification ECU 4 measures a delay time Tx required from transmission of the transmission radio wave Sa to reception of the return radio wave Sb. The verification ECU 4 may measure the delay time Tx using, for example, its own counter or the like.

  Subsequently, the verification ECU 4 transmits the transmission radio wave Sa for estimating the delay time again. The electronic key 2 performs an operation of returning a response of the return radio wave Sb when receiving the transmission radio wave Sa. In this example, when the bit string from the head of the response code is, for example, “1, 0, 1. The transmission of the return radio wave Sb is not executed in response to the fact that the second bit from is zero. That is, the electronic key 2 does not execute the operation of returning the return radio wave Sb when receiving the second transmission radio wave Sa.

  At this time, since the verification ECU 4 cannot receive the return radio wave Sb for the transmission radio wave Sa, it does not measure the delay time Tx. However, since the verification ECU 4 knows from the response code calculated by itself that the return radio wave Sb does not come, there is no problem even if the verification ECU 4 cannot receive the return radio wave Sb.

  The electronic key 2 and the verification ECU 4 repeat the transmission and reception of the above-mentioned radio waves to estimate the delay time. Then, when the delay time Tx falls within the specified time in all the received return radio waves Sb, the verification ECU 4 establishes the delay time estimation. When the verification ECU 4 confirms that the reception pattern of the return radio wave Sb takes a specified pattern, the pattern authentication is also established. As described above, if both the delay time estimation and the pattern authentication are established, the challenge response authentication is continued.

  On the other hand, if at least one of the delay time estimation and the pattern authentication is not established, the communication of the electronic key system 3 is processed as not established. As a result, the challenge response authentication is forcibly terminated. That is, the smart communication is forcibly terminated on the way, and even if a third party tries to illegally establish communication using the repeater 29, for example, this is disabled.

  After processing the delay time estimation, the electronic key 2 transmits to the vehicle 1 a response signal Sre including the remaining response code and the electronic key ID. The verification ECU 4 authenticates the response code based on a part of the response code received at the time of estimating the delay time and the remaining response codes included in the response signal Sre. When the verification ECU 4 confirms that the authentication of the response code has been established and that the verification of the electronic key ID has been established, the verification ECU 4 processes the smart verification as being established. Thereby, the verification ECU 4 permits the operation of the vehicle 1. That is, the locking / unlocking operation of the vehicle door is permitted or executed, and the transition operation of the vehicle power supply (engine start operation) is permitted.

According to the configuration of the present embodiment, the following effects can be obtained.
(1) When confirming the validity of communication by confirming the delay time Tx of the radio wave transmitted and received between the vehicle 1 and the electronic key 2, the transmission pattern of the return radio wave Sb transmitted from the electronic key 2 can take a prescribed pattern. For example, the establishment of communication is permitted, and if the transmission pattern of the return radio wave Sb does not take a specified pattern, the communication is disabled. By the way, in the case of the unauthorized communication using the repeater 29, the return radio wave Sb can be returned only in the same manner, so that the communication using the repeater 29 can be detected by employing the determination logic of this example. Becomes Therefore, unauthorized communication can be detected with high accuracy.

  (2) The process of transmitting and receiving radio waves between the vehicle 1 and the electronic key 2 to measure the delay time Tx is executed a plurality of times. The correctness determination unit 28 checks the transmission pattern of the return radio wave Sb transmitted a plurality of times to determine whether communication is correct. Therefore, since the transmission pattern of the reply radio wave Sb transmitted a plurality of times is confirmed to determine whether communication is correct or not, it is advantageous to accurately determine whether or not the communication is unauthorized.

  (3) The verification ECU 4 (vehicle 1) verifies the electronic key ID registered in the electronic key 2 to determine whether the electronic key ID is correct, and estimates the delay time Tx to determine whether the delay time Tx falls within a specified time. Then, pattern authentication for confirming whether or not the transmission pattern of the reply radio wave Sb is correct is performed. When it is confirmed that all of these processes are established, the establishment of communication is permitted. Therefore, since the determination as to whether the communication is valid is made by various confirmations, it is more advantageous to accurately determine whether the communication is correct.

  (4) The pattern setting unit 27 returns the return radio wave Sb in a transmission pattern determined by the response code. Therefore, it is advantageous to generate the transmission pattern of the reply radio wave Sb in a safe manner that is difficult to copy.

  (5) The pattern setting unit 27 transmits the return radio wave by sharing a part of the response code as the return radio wave Sb. Therefore, it is possible to authenticate the transmission pattern of the reply radio wave Sb while performing the challenge response authentication, which is advantageous for shortening the time required for communication.

  (6) The pattern setting unit 27 sets the transmission pattern of the return radio wave Sb according to the presence or absence of the return radio wave Sb. Therefore, a unique transmission pattern of the return radio wave Sb can be set in a manner in which the distinction of “transmit” or “not transmit” the return radio wave Sb is clear.

(2nd Embodiment)
Next, a second embodiment will be described with reference to FIG. This embodiment is an embodiment in which the method of estimating delay time is different, and other basic configurations are the same. Therefore, the same portions as those of the first embodiment are denoted by the same reference numerals, and detailed description thereof is omitted.

  As shown in FIG. 4, in the case of this example, challenge-response authentication is performed first, and delay time estimation is performed after completion of the challenge-response authentication. That is, if the response signal Sre including the response code and the electronic key ID is received and challenge-response authentication can be completed based on the received response signal Sre, then the return radio wave is transmitted at a timing determined by the bit sequence of the response code (a part of the response code). By repeating “reply” or “do not reply” for Sb, the return radio wave Sb is returned to the vehicle 1 in a specific transmission pattern.

According to the configuration of the present embodiment, the following effects can be obtained in addition to (1) to (6) described in the first embodiment.
(7) Since the challenge-response authentication and the delay time estimation are individually performed, the processing is clear and simple.

(Third embodiment)
Next, a third embodiment will be described with reference to FIGS. Note that also in this example, only portions different from the first and second embodiments will be described.

  As shown in FIG. 5, in the case of the present example, the transmission pattern of the return radio wave Sb is set based on the timing information St which is data indicating the transmission pattern of the return radio wave Sb. In particular, this example is a method in which the timing information St is transmitted from the communication master 23 to the terminal 24 in advance to the other party, and the transmission pattern of the return radio wave Sb is determined. In this case, the communication master 23 is provided with an information notifying unit 32 that notifies the terminal 24 of the timing information St. The timing information St may be any information that can notify the other party of the reply pattern.

  Now, as shown in FIG. 6, when the vehicle 1 receives the ack signal Sack from the electronic key 2 after transmitting the wake signal Swk, the information notification unit 32 transmits the timing information St regarding the transmission pattern of the return radio wave Sb to the outdoor transmitter 11. LF transmission. When the electronic key 2 receives the timing information St, the pattern setting unit 27 sets the transmission pattern of the return radio wave Sb based on the timing information St received from the vehicle 1. Thus, it is possible to set the transmission pattern of the return radio wave Sb based on the timing information St notified from the verification ECU 4 to the electronic key 2.

According to the configuration of the present embodiment, the following effects can be obtained in addition to (1) to (3), (6), and (7) described in the first and second embodiments.
(8) The pattern setting unit 27 sets the transmission pattern of the return radio wave Sb based on the timing information which is data on which transmission pattern the return radio wave Sb is transmitted. Therefore, it is possible to set an optimal transmission pattern based on the timing information St.

  (9) The timing information St is transmitted from the vehicle 1 (the verification ECU 4) to the electronic key 2 to be notified. Therefore, since the transmission pattern of the return radio wave Sb is set based on the timing information St notified from the vehicle 1 (the verification ECU 4) to the electronic key 2, the transmission pattern can be reliably linked.

(Fourth embodiment)
Next, a fourth embodiment will be described with reference to FIG. Note that, in this example, only portions different from the first to third embodiments will be described.

  As shown in FIG. 7, the pattern setting unit 27 of the present example changes the time td from the reception of the transmission radio wave Sa of the communication master 23 to the transmission of the reply radio wave Sb, thereby changing the transmission pattern of the reply radio wave Sb. Set. That is, after the transmission radio wave Sa is received by the electronic key 2, the transmission timing of the reply radio wave Sb is changed to set a unique transmission pattern of the reply radio wave Sb.

  Now, when the electronic key 2 transmits the return radio wave Sb to the vehicle 1, the pattern setting unit 27 transmits the return radio wave Sb at a timing determined by the value of the response code. In the case of this example, if the bit string from the beginning of the response code is, for example, “1, 0, 1...”, The response radio wave Sb is set to a longer time td1 in response to the first bit being “1”. And send it.

  Upon receiving the return radio wave Sb from the electronic key 2, the verification ECU 4 measures a delay time Tx required from transmission of the transmission radio wave Sa to reception of the return radio wave Sb. At this time, since the verification ECU 4 itself recognizes that the return radio wave Sb is transmitted with the longer time td1 by calculating the response code, the verification ECU 4 performs the delay time estimation taking this into consideration. .

  Subsequently, the verification ECU 4 transmits the transmission radio wave Sa for estimating the delay time again. The electronic key 2 performs an operation of returning a response of the return radio wave Sb when receiving the transmission radio wave Sa. In this example, when the bit string from the head of the response code is, for example, “1, 0, 1. In response to the second bit from “0” being “0”, the return radio wave Sb is transmitted after a shorter time td2. That is, the first reply radio wave Sb is returned with a short time, while the second reply radio wave Sb is returned to the vehicle 1 at short time intervals.

  Upon receiving the return radio wave Sb from the electronic key 2, the verification ECU 4 measures a delay time Tx required from transmission of the transmission radio wave Sa to reception of the return radio wave Sb. At this time, since the verification ECU 4 recognizes that the return radio wave Sb is returned in the shorter time td2 by calculating the response code itself, the verification ECU 4 performs the delay time estimation taking this into consideration. .

  The transmission and reception of the above radio waves are repeated to estimate the delay time. When the verification ECU 4 confirms that the delay time Tx falls within the specified time in all of the received return radio waves Sb, the verification ECU 4 determines that the delay time estimation is established. That is, when the return radio wave Sb is returned at the longer time td1 interval, the delay time Tx falls within the specified time corresponding to the longer time td1, and the return radio wave Sb is returned at the shorter time td2 interval. At this time, if it is confirmed that the delay time Tx falls within the specified time corresponding to the shorter time td2, the delay time estimation is established.

According to the configuration of the present embodiment, the following effects can be obtained in addition to (1) to (9) described in the first to third embodiments.
(10) By a simple mode of changing the transmission timing of the return radio wave Sb, a unique transmission pattern of the return radio wave Sb can be set.

The embodiment is not limited to the configuration described above, and may be changed to the following modes.
In each embodiment, the timing information St may be registered in the communication master 23 and the terminal 24 in advance. In this case, communication for notifying the timing information St can be eliminated.

  In each embodiment, in the case where the timing information St is registered in advance in each of the communication master 23 and the terminal 24, a plurality of timing patterns are stored in a database in advance, and a specific one is selectively used. You may make it. Which timing pattern to use may be changed as appropriate according to, for example, the number of times of delay time estimation.

-In each embodiment, timing information St may be transmitted to the other party through encryption communication.
In each embodiment, the pattern setting unit 27 may set the transmission pattern of the return radio wave Sb by performing an operation of substituting a prescribed parameter into a calculation formula provided in each of the communication master 23 and the terminal 24. Various values such as the above-described response code, the number of times of delay time estimation, and a rolling counter whose value is incremented each time transmission is performed can be adopted as the specified parameters. In this case, it is advantageous to generate the transmission pattern of the reply radio wave Sb in a safe manner that is difficult to copy.

  In each embodiment, the delay time estimation is not limited to checking whether or not all the delay times Tx fall within a specified time. For example, the average value of the delay times Tx may be taken, and the determination may be made based on whether or not this value falls within a predetermined value.

In each embodiment, when the response code is shared with the return radio wave Sb, where the return radio wave Sb is incorporated in the response code can be changed as appropriate.
In each embodiment, the delay time estimation and the pattern authentication may be performed on the electronic key 2 side by transmitting the transmission radio wave Sa from the electronic key 2 side and returning the return radio wave Sb to the verification ECU 4.

In each embodiment, the pattern setting unit 27 and the correctness determination unit 28 may be provided in either the communication master 23 or the terminal 24.
In each embodiment, the electronic key system 3 is not limited to a system that performs smart communication, and may be a system that uses another communication format or frequency.

  In each embodiment, the transmission pattern is not limited to a method of setting the presence or absence of the return radio wave Sb or a method of changing the transmission timing, but can be changed to another method such as changing the time width of the return radio wave Sb. is there.

-In each embodiment, it is possible to make an example in which unique ideas are appropriately combined.
-In each embodiment, the communication master 23 is not limited to the verification ECU 4, but can be changed to another device or device.

-In each embodiment, the terminal 24 is not limited to the electronic key 2, and various terminals can be adopted.
In each embodiment, the communication fraud prevention system 22 is not limited to being applied to the vehicle 1 and may be employed in other devices or devices.

  In each embodiment, the communication improper establishment prevention system 22 may perform communication by not only the half-duplex system but also the full-duplex system.

  DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 1 ... Vehicle, 2 ... Electronic key which is an example of a terminal, 22 ... Communication fraud establishment prevention system, 23 ... Communication master, 24 ... Terminal, 27 ... Pattern setting part, 28 ... Correctness judgment part, Sa ... Transmission radio wave, Sb ... Return radio wave, Tx: delay time, St: timing information.

Claims (11)

By causing the terminal to receive the transmission radio wave from the communication master and returning the reply radio wave from the terminal, the delay time from the transmission of the transmission radio wave to the reception of the reply radio wave is measured. In a communication fraud prevention system that determines whether communication between parties is correct,
A pattern setting unit that sets a transmission pattern of the reply radio wave,
A communication fraud prevention system, comprising: a right / wrong determining unit that determines whether the communication is correct by checking a transmission pattern of the received return radio wave. The process of transmitting and receiving radio waves between the communication master and the terminal to measure the delay time is executed a plurality of times,
The communication improper establishment prevention system according to claim 1, wherein the right / wrong determining unit checks a transmission pattern of the return radio wave transmitted a plurality of times to determine right or wrong of the communication. The communication master checks an ID registered in the terminal to determine whether or not the ID is correct, estimates a delay time to determine whether the delay time falls within a specified time, and checks whether a transmission pattern of the reply radio wave is correct. 3. The communication improper establishment prevention system according to claim 1, wherein pattern authentication for confirming whether or not the communication is successful is performed, and if it is confirmed that all of these processes are established, communication establishment is permitted. ID verification performed at the time of communication includes challenge-response authentication for comparing the response code by performing an operation for obtaining a response code by passing the challenge code through the encryption key in each of the communication master and the terminal.
The communication fraud prevention system according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the pattern setting unit causes the return radio wave to be returned in a transmission pattern determined by the response code.   The communication fraud prevention system according to claim 4, wherein the pattern setting unit executes transmission of the reply radio wave by sharing a part of the response code as the reply radio wave. The communication according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the pattern setting unit sets a transmission pattern of the return radio wave based on timing information that is data indicating a transmission pattern of the return radio wave. Fraud prevention system. 7. The communication fraud prevention system according to claim 6, wherein the timing information is transmitted from the communication master to the terminal and notified to the terminal. 7. The communication fraud prevention system according to claim 6, wherein the timing information is registered in advance in each of the communication master and the terminal. The said pattern setting part sets the transmission pattern of the said reply radio wave by the operation which substitutes a prescribed parameter in the calculation formula provided beforehand in each of the said communication master and a terminal. Communication fraud formation prevention system according to 4. The communication fraud prevention system according to any one of claims 1 to 9, wherein the pattern setting unit sets a transmission pattern of the return radio wave according to the presence or absence of the return radio wave. 10. The pattern setting unit according to claim 1, wherein the pattern setting unit sets the transmission pattern of the return radio wave by changing a time from when the radio wave of the communication master is received to when the return radio wave is transmitted. Communication unauthorized establishment prevention system according to the paragraph.

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