JP2007215104A - Terminal equipment - Google Patents

Abstract

<P>PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To perform time certification to a value measured by a number of measuring instruments at low costs. <P>SOLUTION: The instrument 7 is connected to a network 10 and communicates with a slave 9 by radio. The slave 9 is a measuring instrument, such as a thermometer, and transmits measured values to the instrument 7. The instrument 7 incorporates a time stamp issuing function, and issues a time stamp to a measured value for transmitting to a client server 4 when the measured value is received from the instrument 7. The instrument 7 and the slave 9 share a common key. The common key is used to encrypt the communication between the instrument 7 and the slave 9. The slave 9 can also be connected to the instrument 7 via other slaves 9. The instrument 7 has also a measuring section, and issues a time stamp to the measured value measured by itself for transmitting to the client server 4. The client server 4 receives the measured value measured by the instrument 7 and that measured by the slave 9 from the instrument 7 to confirm the time stamp for storing into a measured value database. <P>COPYRIGHT: (C)2007,JPO&INPIT

Description

  The present invention relates to a terminal device, for example, a device that receives a measurement value from a slave terminal.

With the rapid progress of network technology in recent years, various kinds of computerized information are distributed through the network.
Attempts have also been made to connect measuring devices installed at remote locations to the network using such network technology.
As a result, what has conventionally been collected manually by the meter reader around each measuring device (for example, a gas meter) can be collected by the server via the network.

As described above, when collecting measurement values at a remote place by the server, it is important to prove the position of the measured value or the location where the measurement is performed and the time proof of the time when the measurement value is measured.
For example, in the case of a device fixed at a fixed position such as a gas meter, the measurement position is constant, but the measurement time is different each time, so the measured value is transmitted from the device to the time stamp server, and the time stamp server I had it issued.
The time stamp is obtained by adding the received time information to the measurement value received from the device and performing a digital signature with the secret key of the time stamp server.
By confirming the digital signature with the public key corresponding to the secret key, it is possible to prove that the time stamp server has received the measurement value at the time.

As a technology for constructing such a time stamp system, there are a system and a method for providing the following trusted third-party clock and trusted local clock.
Special table 2003-519417 gazette

  This technology provides an audit server that audits the clock of the time stamp server, and prevents time tampering at the time stamp server.

  For example, there is a demand for collecting data by installing a large amount of measuring devices such as measuring the temperature distribution in a greenhouse. However, there is a problem that the cost increases when a large number of measuring devices are each provided with a time certification function.

  Accordingly, an object of the present invention is to realize a function of performing time certification on measured values measured by a large number of measuring devices at a low cost.

In order to achieve the above object, the present invention provides information configured using a slave terminal, a terminal device that can communicate with the slave terminal, and an information processing server that receives measurement values from the terminal device. A terminal device used in a processing system, wherein a measurement value acquisition unit that acquires a measurement value measured by the child device terminal from the child device terminal and a measurement value received by the measurement value reception unit There is provided a terminal device comprising: a clock device that measures time; and time proof information generating means that generates time proof information based on the acquired time for the received measurement value. Configuration).
In the first configuration, a public key and a private key paired as an asymmetric encryption key are provided, and a secret key storage unit that stores the secret key is provided, and the time certification information generation unit uses the stored secret key Thus, the time certification information may be generated by encrypting the correspondence information in which the measurement value is associated with the time by a predetermined encryption method (second configuration).
In the first configuration or the second configuration, it may be configured to include a transmission unit that transmits the generated time certification information to a predetermined transmission destination (third configuration).
In the first configuration, the second configuration, or the third configuration, the timepiece device uses the reference time information receiving means for receiving the reference time transmitted by the reference time transmitting device and the received reference time. And a time correction unit that corrects a time in a unit smaller than a predetermined unit among the times to be performed (fourth configuration).
In the fourth configuration, when the reference time receiving means for receiving a reference time from a predetermined audit server, and when the measured time coincides with the received reference time at the time equal to or greater than the predetermined unit, the time certification information generation An audit result executing means for operating the means and stopping the time certification information generating means if they do not match can be configured (fifth structure).
In any one of the first to fifth configurations, a measurement unit that measures a measurement target is provided, and the measurement value acquisition unit acquires a measurement value from the measurement unit It is also possible (sixth configuration).

  According to the present invention, time certification can be performed at low cost on the measurement values measured by a large number of measurement devices by giving the time certification by the terminal device to the measurement value at the slave terminal.

(1) Outline of Embodiment The device 7 (FIG. 16) is connected to the network 10 and wirelessly communicates with the slave units 9, 9,.
The subunit | mobile_unit 9 is measuring instruments, such as a thermometer, for example, and transmits a measured value to the apparatus 7. FIG. The device 7 has a built-in time stamp issuing function. When a measured value is received from the device 7, the device 7 issues a time stamp to the measured value and transmits it to the customer server 4. The device 7 and the child device 9 share a common key, and communication between the device 7 and the child device 9 is encrypted by this common key. In addition, the subunit | mobile_unit 9 can also be connected to the apparatus 7 via the other subunit | mobile_unit 9. FIG.
The device 7 also has a measuring unit, issues a time stamp to the measured value measured by itself, and transmits it to the customer server 4.
The customer server 4 receives the measurement value measured by the device 7 from the device 7 and the measurement value measured by the slave unit 9 and confirms the time stamp, and then stores it in the measurement value database.

(2) Details of Embodiment In the present embodiment, installation of a measurement device on a network and use of the measurement device after installation will be described.

[Installation of equipment]
FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing an example of a network configuration of the information processing system according to the present embodiment.
The information processing system 1 is arranged such that the CAs 3 and 3, the verification server 5, the customer servers 4 and 4, the device registration server 6, the devices 7, 7, 7,. The parent CA2 is provided above the CA3 and CA3.
Hereinafter, regarding a plurality of items such as CA 3, 3, customer server 4, 4, device 7, 7,..., They are simply referred to as CA 3, customer server 4, device 7 unless otherwise distinguished.

Each of the parent CA2 and CA3 is an authentication server of a certificate authority that creates a public key certificate, and forms a certificate trust chain that proves the legitimacy of the CA public key of CA3 by a root certificate issued by the parent CA2. ing.
The reason why a plurality of CAs 3 are provided in the information processing system 1 is that the devices 7 are distributed in large quantities, and can be assigned to the CAs 3 by dividing them into, for example, each production lot or each customer who uses the devices 7. It is for doing so.
As described above, the certificate trust chain is used for business convenience, and all the devices 7 may be handled by a single CA.

The legitimacy of the CA public key certificate that certifies the public key of CA3 is confirmed by the root certificate issued by the parent CA2.
More specifically, the CA public key of CA3 is digitally signed by the parent CA private key of the parent CA2, and the authenticity of the CA public key is confirmed by verifying the authenticity of the digital signature with the parent CA public key. can do.
The CA public key certificate and the root certificate are provided to the customer server 4, the verification server 5, the device 7 and the like in advance by a secure method.

The customer server 4 is an information processing server operated by a customer who performs measurement using the device 7. Note that the user of the device 7 is a customer of the seller when viewed from the seller side of the device 7, and the user is called a customer.
The customer server 4 is operated by customers, such as those operated by Company A and those operated by Company B, respectively.
The device 7 is a measuring device such as a gas meter, for example, and the customer server 4 collects measurement values from these devices 7 via the network 10. Gas charges etc. are calculated from the collected measurements.

The device 7 is a measuring device or the like installed so as to be connectable to the network 10 and may be a mobile device in addition to a fixed device such as a gas meter.
For example, the device 7 is connected to the customer server 4 of the company A, and the device 7 of the company B is connected to the customer server 4 of the company B. Connect to transmit information such as measurement values to the customer server 4.
The device 7 can be connected to the network 10 by wire as well as wirelessly. In this case, the device 7 is connected to the network 10 via the base station 8.

The verification server 5 is a server for verifying the legitimacy of the device 7 and preventing unauthorized use of the device 7 such as impersonation when the device 7 is installed in the network 10 and connected to the customer server 4.
After the verification server 5 verifies that the device 7 is a legitimate product, the customer server 4 connects to the device 7.

The device registration server 6 is a server that mediates between the device 7 and the CA 3 when the device 7 issues a device public key certificate or the like to the CA 3 and registers the device 7 in the verification server 5.
The device registration server 6 stores a device registration server secret key, and the verification server 5 stores a device registration server public key corresponding to the secret key.
Then, the device registration server 6 encrypts the registration request information for registering the device 7 with the verification server public key and transmits it to the verification server 5, and the verification server 5 decrypts it with the verification server private key. It is like that.
The verification server 5 can confirm that this information is surely transmitted from the device registration server 6 by digitally signing the registration request information with the registration server private key.

In the information processing system 1 configured as described above, the parent CA 2, CA 3, the verification server 5, and the device registration server 6 are operated by a sales side business operator such as a manufacturer or sales business of the device 7. The customer server 4 is operated by the customer who purchased the device 7.
Since the sales company has information on the serial number of the device 7 and the customer to whom the device 7 is delivered, the device verification service is provided to the customer by operating the parent CA2, CA3, the verification server 5, and the device registration server 6. Is in a good position to provide.

  The communication path formed by the device 7, the verification server 5, the device registration server 6, the customer server 4 and the like via the network 10 is encrypted using a technology such as SSL (Secure Sockets Layer), and the information processing system 1 security is enhanced.

Next, the hardware configuration of the device 7 will be described with reference to FIG.
The device 7 is roughly divided into a tamper resistant portion 20 and a measuring portion 35 connected by a bus line.
The tamper resistant unit 20 is a functional unit that performs information processing related to security such as device authentication. For example, the tamper resistant unit 20 is a tamper resistant module configured by an IC chip containing a tamper resistant integrated circuit.

The tamper-resistant specification means that the internal structure is automatically destroyed when trying to analyze the internal structure, such as falsification, duplication, and deciphering of the internal logical structure, etc. It is a specification.
Therefore, the tamper resistant unit 20 is a kind of black box that is extremely difficult to analyze from the outside, and can securely hold secret information such as a device secret key.
Note that tamper means that the device is tampered with, or that information is illegally changed, and tamper resistance means that resistance to these operations is maintained. To do.

  The tamper resistant unit 20 includes a CPU (Central Processing Unit) 21, an internal clock 22, a ROM (Read Only Memory) 23, a RAM (Random Access Memory) 24, and an EEPROM (Electrically Erasable and Programmable ROM) 25. Connected and configured.

The CPU 21 is a central processing unit that performs various types of information processing according to programs stored in the EEPROM 25, the ROM 23, the RAM 24, and the like.
In the present embodiment, a pair of a device public key and a device private key is generated, device authentication of the device 7 is performed by communicating with the verification server 5, and information is encrypted / decrypted when communicating with the customer server 4. Or do.

The internal clock 22 generates a clock for driving the tamper resistant part 20 and, for example, for the type of device 7 in which the tamper resistant part 20 gives time information to the measurement value of the measuring part 35, the time information It can be used as a watch for imparting. The internal clock 22 is synchronized with the external clock 28 of the measuring unit 35, and the CPU 21 and the CPU 29 can operate in cooperation with the timing synchronized.
The ROM 23 is a read-only storage device (memory), and stores basic programs and parameters for driving the tamper resistant unit 20.
The RAM 24 is a readable / writable storage device and provides a working area when the CPU 21 performs various types of information processing.

The EEPROM 25 is a readable / writable nonvolatile storage device, and stores programs, data, and the like.
In this embodiment, as an example, an asymmetric encryption key generation program, a device private key, a device public key certificate, a verification server public key certificate, a verification server connection information, a verification request program, a CA public key certificate, or not shown A communication program, an OS (Operating System), and the like are stored.

The asymmetric encryption key generation program is a program executed by an administrator of the device 7 (usually a manufacturer of the device 7) before the device 7 is delivered to the customer. An asymmetric encryption key pair (pair) of the device private key and the device public key is generated inside 20.
The device 7 stores the generated device secret key in the EEPROM 25 so that the device secret key cannot be known from the outside.

The device public key certificate is a public key certificate in which the generated device public key is transmitted from the device 7 to the CA 3 via the device registration server 6 and digitally signed by the CA 3 with the CA private key.
A device that has received the device public key certificate can verify that the device public key described in the device public key certificate is authentic by verifying the digital signature with the CA public key.

The verification server public key certificate is a public key certificate in which the verification server public key that is the public key of the verification server 5 is digitally signed by the CA 3 with the CA private key.
As will be described later, the device 7 encrypts information using the verification server public key recorded in the verification server public key, and transmits the information to the verification server 5. Since this encrypted information can be decrypted only with the verification server private key possessed by the verification server 5, it cannot be decrypted even if the encrypted information is received by anyone other than the verification server 5, thereby improving security. Can do.
The legitimacy of the verification server public key can be confirmed by verifying the digital signature of the verification server public key certificate with the CA public key.

The CA public key certificate is a public key certificate obtained by digitally signing the CA public key, which is the public key of CA3, with the parent CA2 using the parent CA private key. The device 7 uses the CA public key described in the CA public key certificate to verify the verification server public key certificate of the verification server 5 and the customer server public key certificate of the customer server 4 (both are CA public keys of CA3). Can be verified.
Although not shown, the device 7 stores the root certificate issued by the parent CA 2 in the EEPROM 25 and confirms the legitimacy of the CA public key certificate with the parent CA public key described in the root certificate. can do.

The verification server connection information is address information for connecting to the verification server 5 when the device 7 is connected to the network 10, and includes, for example, a URL (Uniform Resource Locators) of the verification server 5.
When the device 7 is installed in the network 10, it connects to the verification server 5 using the verification server connection information and receives device verification.
As described above, in this embodiment, since the verification server connection information is embedded in the device 7 in advance, the verification server 5 can be accessed from the device 7 regardless of the network environment. it can.

The verification request program is a program for requesting the verification server 5 to verify the device.
After the device 7 is connected to the network 10 (for example, immediately after the power is turned on), when the CPU 21 executes the verification request program, the CPU 21 generates verification information described later. Then, the CPU 21 connects the device 7 to the verification server 5 using the verification server connection information, and transmits the verification information to the verification server 5.
Although not shown, the EEPROM 25 stores a program for performing information processing related to security, such as encrypting the measurement value measured by the measurement unit 35.
As described above, each component of the tamper resistant part 20 has been described. In addition, a communication control part for controlling communication between the tamper resistant part 20 and the measuring part 35 is also configured.

The measurement unit 35 is a functional unit that performs measurement, and includes a CPU 29, a ROM 27, a RAM 30, an external clock 28, a display unit 31, an input unit 32, a storage unit 33, a measurement device unit 34, and the like.
The measurement device unit 34 is a device that performs measurement, and outputs a measurement value to the CPU 29 as digital information when requested by the CPU 29.
For example, in addition to measuring the amount of gas, water, and electricity used, the measuring device unit 34 performs temperature measurement, humidity measurement, water quality measurement, and air pollution measurement, and is installed in a vending machine for inventory and sales. Various things, such as what measures a situation etc., are employable.

The CPU 29 is a central processing unit that performs various types of information processing according to programs stored in the storage unit 33, the ROM 27, the RAM 30, and the like.
The CPU 29 operates in cooperation with the CPU 21. For example, when the device 7 is installed, the CPU 29 transmits the verification information output from the tamper resistant unit 20 to the verification server 5, or after installation, from the measuring device unit 34. The measured value is acquired, and this is digitally signed by the tamper resistant unit 20 and transmitted to the customer server 4.

  The external clock 28 generates a clock for driving the measuring unit 35. In general, since the external clock 28 has higher accuracy than the internal clock 22, the external clock 28 is corrected by an external radio wave or the like, and the internal clock 22 is corrected using the corrected external clock 28. .

The ROM 27 is a read-only storage device, and stores basic programs and parameters for driving the CPU 29.
The RAM 30 is a readable / writable storage device and provides a working area when the CPU 29 performs various types of information processing.

The storage unit 33 is corrected by, for example, an EEPROM, and stores various programs and data.
The CPU 29 executes a program stored in the storage unit 33 to obtain a measurement value from the measurement device unit 34, a function to communicate with the tamper resistant unit 20 and perform information processing, and a communication unit 26 And a function of communicating with the verification server 5 and the customer server 4 can be realized.
The storage unit 33 can also be used to temporarily store the measurement values measured by the measurement device unit 34.

The display unit 31 includes, for example, a display device such as a liquid crystal display panel, and displays various information such as operation instructions when the person in charge of installation installs the device 7 on the network 10 and measurement values of the measurement device unit 34. Can be displayed.
The input unit 32 includes operation buttons and the like, and is used, for example, when the person in charge of installation installs the device 7 on the network 10 to operate the device 7.

  The communication unit 26 constitutes an interface for connecting the device 7 to the network 10, and the CPU 21 and the CPU 29 can communicate with the device registration server 6, the verification server 5, the customer server 4, and the like via the communication unit 26. it can. When the device 7 connects to the network 10 wirelessly, the communication unit 26 includes an RF circuit and the like.

Next, the hardware configuration of the verification server 5 will be described with reference to FIG.
The verification server 5 includes a CPU 41, a ROM 42, a RAM 43, a storage unit 46, a communication unit 45, and the like.
The CPU 41 operates in accordance with programs stored in the ROM 42, RAM 43, storage unit 46, and the like, and performs various types of information processing for verifying the device 7.

The ROM 42 is a read-only storage device, and stores basic programs and parameters for driving the CPU 41.
The RAM 43 is a readable / writable storage device and provides a working area when the CPU 41 performs various types of information processing.
The communication unit 45 is an interface that connects the verification server 5 to the network 10.

The storage unit 46 is configured using, for example, a large-capacity storage medium such as a hard disk, and stores various programs and data as illustrated.
The verification program is a program for verifying the device 7, and the CPU 41 executes the device verification program to verify the verification information transmitted from the device 7 and transmit the verification result to the customer server 4. Can do.

The CA public key certificate is a public key certificate of the CA public key of CA3. Although not shown, the root certificate of the parent CA2 is also stored. These certificates are provided by a secure method such as handing them between the persons in charge.
The verification server private key is a private key corresponding to the verification server public key, and is used for information encryption, digital signature, and the like.

The customer server connection information is information for connecting to the customer server 4 via the network 10 and is configured by, for example, the URL or IP address of the customer server 4.
The customer server connection information is stored in the storage unit 46 in advance by the customer.
When the verification server 5 transmits the verification result to the customer server 4, the verification server 5 connects to the customer server 4 using the customer server connection information and transmits it.

Next, the device registration database will be described.
The device registration database is a database in which devices 7 requiring verification are registered in advance, and an example of a logical configuration thereof is shown in FIG.
As shown in the figure, the device registration database includes items such as “customer ID”, “customer server connection information”, “device ID”, “device public key”,.

“Customer ID” is ID information for identifying each customer who operates the customer servers 4, 4. As described above, the customer is registered in advance in the verification server 5 and given ID information.
“Customer server connection information” is connection information for connecting to the customer server 4 and is stored in association with the customer ID.
In the figure, one customer server connection information is described for each customer. However, when a customer uses a plurality of customer servers 4, the plurality of customer server connection information is associated with a customer ID.

“Device ID” is ID information assigned to each of the devices 7, 7,..., And for example, a manufacturing serial number can be used.
The “device public key” is a device public key corresponding to the device private key stored for each device 7. The device public key is obtained from the device public key certificate transmitted by the CA 3 to the verification server 5.

  Which customer server connection information the device 7 is registered to correspond to is specified by the customer server 4 to which the device 7 is connected from the customer when the device 7 is sold, and the administrator of the verification server 5 handles this. It has been made.

Although the hardware configuration of the verification server 5 has been described above, the hardware configurations of the customer server 4, the device registration server 6, and the CA 3 are the same as those of the verification server 5.
The CA3 and the parent CA2 exhibit a function of performing various information processing such as creating a public key certificate by the CPU executing a predetermined program stored in advance.
Further, in the case of CA3, a revocation list storing revocation information of the device 7 that has issued the device public key certificate is stored in the storage unit 46.
The revocation list is a data list in which whether or not the device 7 to which the CA 3 has issued the device public key certificate is currently revoked is stored in association with the presence or absence of the device ID. No information about the device is registered. The revocation is set by registering the device ID in the revocation list by a declaration from the customer.
The verification server 5 verifies the validity by referring to the revocation list of the CA 3 when there is an inquiry about the validity from the customer server 4 or the like.
That is, when verifying the legitimacy of the device 7, the verification server 5 verifies the validity of the device 7 using the revocation status storage means (revocation list of CA3) that stores whether or not the device is in a revocation status. The effectiveness verification means to provide is provided.

In the case of the customer server 4, the device master and the measurement value database are stored in the storage unit 46.
The device master is master information of the device 7 to which the customer server 4 is connected. For example, basic information such as the device ID of the device 7, device connection information for connecting to the device 7, and the device public key, It consists of additional information such as installation location and installation date. The customer server 4 manages each device 7 by the device master.

For example, basic items are received and stored from the verification server 5 at the time of device verification, and incidental items are input by the administrator of the customer server 4.
When the device 7 is revoked, the administrator of the customer server 4 inputs the revocation of the device 7 to the customer server 4 and deletes it from the device master. At this time, the customer server 4 transmits a revocation request to CA3 and is revoked when CA3 is registered in the revocation list.

The measurement value database is a database that stores and accumulates measurement values transmitted from the device 7 via the network 10.
In the measurement value database, each measurement value is associated with the device ID of the device 7 that measured it, and the measurement date and time are also stored.

  The device registration server 6 generates a function for mediating between the device 7 and the CA 3 when the device 7 acquires the device public key certificate, and generates registration request information and transmits it to the verification server 5. A program for causing the CPU to perform the function of registering 7 and the like is stored in the storage unit 46, and these functions are exhibited by executing this program. The device registration server 6 also stores verification server connection information for input to the device 7.

Next, the entire configuration of the procedure from pre-shipment processing to installation of the device 7 will be described with reference to FIG. In the figure, the order of the procedures is shown in parentheses, and the description will be made in accordance with this order.
The procedure (1) to the procedure (4) are operations performed before the installation of the device 7 (preferably before shipping to the customer).
(1) (Generation of asymmetric encryption key pair of device private key and device public key)
When the hardware of the device 7 is completed, the operator operates the device 7 to execute the asymmetric encryption key generation program, and causes the CPU 21 to generate a device private key / device public key pair within the tamper resistant unit 20 (asymmetric Encryption key generation means).
The device 7 stores the generated device secret key in a predetermined area of the EEPROM 25 (secret key storage means).

(2) (Send device public key)
The device 7 is connected to the device registration server 6 in charge of the device 7 by a worker, and transmits the generated device public key, device unique information, and the like to the device registration server 6 (public key providing means).
Here, the device unique information includes information unique to the device 7 such as the device ID and the MAC address of the tamper resistant part.
The device registration server 6 receives these pieces of information from the device 7 (public key acquisition means). Then, the device registration server 6 transmits a device public key, device ID, and the like to the CA 3 and requests the CA 3 to issue a device public key certificate (public key certificate issue request means).

(3) (Write device certificate)
The CA 3 creates a device certificate from the device public key from the device registration server 6. The CA 3 adds the verification server public key certificate of the verification server 5 to the device certificate, creates a device certificate, and transmits the device certificate to the device registration server 6.
Upon receiving the device certificate from the CA 3, the device registration server 6 adds verification server connection information to the device certificate and transmits it to the device 7.
The device 7 receives the device certificate from the device registration server 6 and stores it in the tamper resistant unit 20.
As described above, the device certificate includes a device public key certificate, verification server connection information, a verification server public key certificate, and the like.

More specifically, the device public key certificate is a public key certificate obtained by digitally signing the device public key of the device 7 with the CA private key (certification server private key) of CA3 (public key certificate creating means). Thus, CA3 is provided with a secret key storage means.
More specifically, the device public key certificate includes, for example, a message having a content such as “Public key [ab12... 01] is a device public key of device ID [12. Is composed of a digital signature obtained by encrypting a digest (for example, using a message hash value) with a CA private key of CA3.
When the device public key certificate is received, the digital signature is decrypted using the CA public key (certification server public key) of CA3, and a message digest is created to confirm the match between the two. It can be confirmed that has not been reorganized.

  The verification server connection information is information for connecting to the verification server 5 on the network 10, and is composed of, for example, the URL (Uniform Resource Locators) or IP address of the verification server 5 (verification server connection information storage means) .

The verification server public key certificate is a public key certificate obtained by digitally signing the verification server public key with the CA3 private key.
Since the verification server public key certificate includes the verification server public key, the device 7 acquires the verification server public key.
The device 7 can verify the legitimacy of the device public key certificate and the verification server public key certificate using a CA public key incorporated in advance.
The device registration server 6 according to the present embodiment includes the verification server public key certificate included in the device certificate received from the CA 3 and transmits the device certificate to the device 7. However, the present invention is not limited to this, and the device certificate received from the CA 3 The verification server connection information can be separately transmitted to the device 7.

(4) (Registration request for device 7)
The device registration server 6 can obtain a device public key certificate when the CA 3 issues a device certificate to the device 7.
Then, the device registration server 6 creates registration request information including the device public key certificate obtained in this way, device specific information (device ID), and the like, and transmits the registration request information to the verification server 5. Request registration of the device 7 (public key certificate transmission means).
The verification server 5 receives the registration request information from the device registration server 6 and updates the device registration database using this information.

Further, after receiving the designation of the customer server 4 to which the device 7 is connected from the customer to whom the device 7 is sold, the sales operator of the device 7 causes the customer server connection information of the customer server 4 to correspond to the device 7. Are input to the verification server 5.
In other words, the verification server 5 stores the device public key included in the registration request information in the device registration database in association with the device 7 (public key storage means), and further associates the device 7 with the customer server 4 in the device registration database. (Information processing server device corresponding storage means).

(5) (Shipment)
The device 7 is shipped to the customer after being registered in the verification server 5. The device 7 is under customer control after being shipped.

(6) (Verification request)
After the device 7 is shipped, it is connected to the network 10 by the person in charge of installation, and the verification request program is executed.
When the verification request program is executed, the device 7 generates verification request information. And the apparatus 7 connects to the verification server 5 using the verification server connection information memorize | stored in EEPROM25 (verification server connection means), and transmits verification request information.

The verification request information is obtained by digitally signing the device ID, device connection information for connecting from the customer server 4 to the device 7, environment information (information on the network connection environment) with the device private key, and encrypting it with the verification server public key. It has become.
As described above, when the device 7 is connected to the network 10, it acquires its own device connection information (connection information acquisition means) and transmits it to the verification server 5 (connection information transmission means). On the other hand, the verification server 5 includes connection information receiving means for receiving this.
The verification request information includes a digital signature obtained by encrypting a digest (predetermined information) with a device secret key, and functions as signature information. Thus, the device 7 has a signature information transmission unit.

(7) (Refer to revocation list)
When the verification server 5 receives the verification information from the device 7 (signature information receiving means), it decrypts it with the verification server private key. Then, the verification server 5 acquires the device public key of the device 7 from the device registration database (public key acquisition means), and uses this to confirm the authenticity of the digital signature, so that the device 7 is an authentic product. Whether or not (verification means).
Further, although not shown, the verification server 5 inquires to the CA 3 to check whether or not the device 7 has expired (validity verification means).
(8) (Notification of verification result)
When the device 7 is valid, the verification server 5 transmits the verification result to the customer server 4 using the customer server connection information associated with the device 7 in the device registration database (verification result transmitting unit). .
The verification result is obtained by, for example, encrypting the device public key certificate of the device 7, the device connection information to the device 7, the verification result, and the like with the verification server private key. As described above, the verification server 5 includes connection information transmitting means for transmitting connection information to the device 7 to the customer server 4.

The customer server 4 can confirm the legitimacy of the verification result by decrypting the verification result with the verification server public key stored in advance. Alternatively, legitimacy may be guaranteed by digitally signing the verification result with the verification server private key of the verification server 5.
If the device 7 has expired, an error message is transmitted to the device 7 and the verification result is not notified to the customer server 4. Or you may comprise so that the notification to the effect that the verification request | requirement from the apparatus 7 in which the verification server 5 became invalid may be performed to the customer server 4. FIG.

(9) (Notification of customer server information)
The customer server 4 receives the verification result from the verification server 5 (verification result receiving means), confirms that the device 7 is verified as a legitimate product, and then connects to the device 7 (connection means). Customer server information is transmitted to the customer server 4.
The customer server information includes customer server public key certificate, customer server connection information for the device 7 to connect to the customer server 4 via the network 10, and the like.

The customer server 4 and the device 7 may be connected from the customer server 4 to the device 7 or from the device 7 to the customer server 4.
In the former case, the customer server 4 connects to the device 7 using the connection information of the device 7, and in the latter case, the device 7 receives the customer server connection information from the verification server 5 at the time of the verification request, This is used to connect to the customer server 4.

(10) (communication between device 7 and customer server 4)
The device 7 may verify the authenticity of the customer server 4 by verifying the customer server public key certificate (digitally signed with the CA private key) transmitted from the customer server 4 with a pre-stored CA public key. it can.
Thereafter, the device 7 and the customer server 4 become communicable, and the device 7 encrypts the measurement data with the customer server public key and transmits it to the customer server 4.
Since the measurement data can be decrypted only by the customer server 4 having the customer server private key, it is possible to prevent leakage of the measurement data during transmission.

(11) (Revocation request)
For example, when the device 7 is no longer used by replacing the device 7 with a new device or the like, the customer invalidates the device 7 with the device master and requests the CA 3 to invalidate the device 7.
By revoking the device 7 from the revocation list of CA3, it is possible to prevent the device 7 from being newly installed in another place or being illegally used.

The overall procedure up to the installation of the device 7 has been described above. Next, these procedures will be described in detail using a flowchart.
FIG. 6 is a flowchart for explaining a procedure until the device 7 is shipped to a customer.
After the device 7 is assembled on the assembly line, it is sent to the device registration department. In the device registration department, the customer who purchases the device 7, the customer server 4 to which the device 7 is connected, the CA 3 to which the device 7 is assigned, and the like are previously known.

The worker in charge connects the device 7 to the CA 3 and operates the input unit 32 to cause the CPU 21 to execute the asymmetric encryption key generation program.
Then, CPU21 produces | generates the apparatus private key and apparatus public key which are asymmetrical encryption key pairs intrinsic | native to the apparatus 7, for example using a random number (step 5).
The connection to CA3 may be after the device private key and the device public key are generated.

The CPU 21 stores the generated device secret key in a predetermined area in the EEPROM 25. Then, the CPU 21 reads out device unique information unique to the device 7 such as the device ID and the MAC address of the tamper resistant unit 20 stored in advance in the EEPROM 25, and transmits these to the device registration server 6 together with the device public key (step). 10).
The verification server 5 receives a device public key, device unique information, and the like from the device 7 and transmits them to the CA 3 (step 13).

The CA 3 receives the device public key and device specific information of the device 7 from the device registration server 6 (step 15).
Then, CA3 extracts the device ID from the device unique information. For example, “Device public key XXX is the device public key of device ID XXX. The prover is CA3”, A message including a device ID, a prover, and other certification date and time is generated.
Furthermore, CA3 generates a digest from the message and digitally signs it by encrypting it with a CA private key.

The CA 3 creates a device public key certificate from the message and the digital signature (step 20), and then generates a device certificate using the device public key certificate and the verification server public key certificate (step 25).
Then, the CA 3 transmits the generated device certificate to the device registration server 6 (step 30).
The device registration server 6 receives the device certificate from the CA 3 and sends it to the device 7 with verification server connection information attached thereto (step 33). The verification server connection information may be transmitted separately from the device certificate.

The device 7 receives the device certificate and stores it in the EEPROM 25 in the tamper resistant unit 20 (step 35).
In the EEPROM 25, the CA public key certificate of CA3 and the root certificate of the parent CA2 are stored in advance, and the device 7 can confirm the legitimacy of the device certificate using these.

On the other hand, after transmitting the device certificate to the device 7, the device registration server 6 transmits registration request information including a device ID, a device public key certificate, and the like to the verification server 5 to the device registration database of the device 7. Registration request is made (step 40).
At this time, the device registration server 6 digitally signs the registration request information with the device registration server private key and transmits it to the verification server 5 so that the verification server 5 can confirm the legitimacy of the verification request information with the device registration server public key. To.

In the verification server 5, the device registration server 6 digitally signs the registration request information, and the verification server 5 confirms this to confirm the legitimacy of the registration request information.
The verification server 5 confirms the legitimacy of the device public key certificate using the device registration server public key, and stores the correspondence between the customer server connection information, the device ID, and the device public key included in the registration request information in the device registration database. Register (step 45).

As described above, the pre-shipment processing of the device 7 is completed, and the device 7 in which the device secret key and the verification server connection information are embedded in the tamper resistant unit 20 is shipped to the customer.
On the other hand, the verification server 5 stores information about the device 7 in preparation for the verification of the device 7.
Although not shown in the flowchart, the customer server connection information of the customer server 4 to which the device 7 is to be connected is separately input to the device registration database of the verification server 5.

Next, with reference to the flowchart of FIG. 7, a procedure until the device 7 is installed at the installation site and connected to the customer server 4 via the network 10 will be described.
When the device 7 is shipped to the customer, it is transported to the installation location based on the customer's business plan.
The person in charge of installation goes to the site, connects the device 7 to the network 10 and starts the verification request program.
Then, the device 7 collects device connection information such as its own IP address on the network 10 and environmental information such as being connected via a router (step 50).

Next, the device 7 reads its own device ID from the EEPROM 25, and creates a verification request information by digitally signing the device ID together with the device connection information and environment information collected earlier with the device private key.
Then, the device 7 creates the encrypted verification request information by encrypting the verification request information with the verification server public key.
Next, the device 7 connects to the verification server 5 using the verification server connection information, transmits the encrypted verification request information to the verification server 5, and requests the verification server 5 for its own verification (step 55).

The verification server 5 receives the verification information encrypted from the device 7 and decrypts it with the verification server private key stored in advance.
Since the verification server private key has only the verification server 5, the encrypted verification information cannot be decrypted even if the verification information is passed on to others.
Next, the verification server 5 searches the device registration database for the device ID included in the verification request information, and acquires the device public key associated with the device ID.

Next, the verification server 5 confirms the digital signature using the device public key, and confirms the authenticity of the verification information (step 60).
More specifically, the verification server 5 generates a digest from the verification request information, decrypts the digital signature with the device public key, restores the digest, and confirms that the verification request information is authentic when the two match.
If they do not match, the verification server 5 transmits an error message to the device 7 because the device 7 is not legitimate.

After verifying the legitimacy of the device 7, the verification server 5 transmits the device ID of the device 7 to the CA 3 (not shown) and inquires whether the device 7 has expired.
And the verification server 5 receives the presence or absence of the expiration of the apparatus 7 from CA3, and confirms the effectiveness of the apparatus 7 by this (step 65).
If the device 7 is valid, the verification server 5 digitally signs the device ID of the device 7, the connection information, the verification result of authenticity, the connection environment, etc. with the verification server private key, and creates the verification result ( Step 70).

Next, the verification server 5 searches the device registration database for the device ID of the device 7 and acquires the customer server connection information of the customer server 4 associated with the device 7.
And the verification server 5 connects to the customer server 4 using this, and transmits a verification result (step 75).
On the other hand, if the device 7 has expired in the device registration database, the verification server 5 transmits an error message to the device 7 and does not transmit the verification result to the customer server 4. In addition, it can also comprise so that the notification that it was not verified may be transmitted to the customer server 4. FIG.

The customer server 4 receives the verification result from the verification server 5, and verifies the legitimacy of the verification server 5 by decrypting it with the verification server public key stored in advance (step 85).
That is, since only the verification server 5 can digitally sign the verification result with the verification server private key, the legitimacy of the verification server 5 can be verified by decrypting the verification result with the verification server public key.
The verification result may be configured to be digitally signed with the server private key and verified by the customer server 4.

After confirming the legitimacy of the verification server 5, the customer server 4 stores the device ID, device public key, device connection information, etc. included in the verification result in the device master, and stores the device 7 in the legitimate measuring device of the customer server 4. Register as
On the other hand, the customer server 4 transmits an error message to the verification server 5 when the legitimacy cannot be confirmed.

Next, the customer server 4 connects to the device 7 using the device connection information registered in the device master, and transmits the customer server information (step 90).
The customer server information includes public key certificate (customer server public key certificate digitally signed with a CA public key) and connection information to the customer server 4 including a URL and an IP address.

Upon receiving the customer server information from the customer server 4, the device 7 verifies the digital signature of the customer server public key certificate using the CA public key, and confirms the legitimacy of the customer server 4.
The device 7 stores customer server connection information in the EEPROM 25 and uses it when connecting to the customer server 4.
Thereafter, the customer server 4 and the device 7 can communicate (step 95), and the device 7 can transmit the measurement value to the customer server 4. At this time, the device 7 prevents the leakage of the measured value by encrypting the measured value with the customer server public key and transmitting it to the customer server 4.

In the above example, the customer server 4 is connected to the device 7, but the device 7 may be connected to the customer server 4.
In this case, the verification server 5 transmits a verification result to the customer server 4 (step 75), and then receives a notification that the device 7 has been registered from the customer server 4.
After verifying that the device 7 has been registered in this manner, the verification server 5 transmits customer server connection information to the device 7 (step 80).
The device 7 receives the customer server connection information from the verification server 5 and uses this to connect to the customer server 4.
Thereafter, the customer server 4 and the device 7 can communicate (step 95).

In the information processing system 1 described above, the validity of the device 7 is managed by the revocation list of the CA 3, but a copy of the revocation list can be managed by the verification server 5.
In this case, for example, the device registration database of the verification server 5 is synchronized with the revocation list of CA3 by batch processing about once a day.
When the device 7 is invalidated in the device registration database of the verification server 5 when the device 7 is verified, the verification server 5 sends an inquiry to the CA 3 (since the invalidated item is not valid). Even if it does not carry out, it can confirm that the said apparatus 7 is invalid.
Therefore, the verification server 5 may inquire of the CA 3 about whether or not it has expired when the device 7 is valid in its own device registration database. In this case, after the previous batch processing, the device 7 that has become invalid is notified from the CA 3 to the verification server 5 as invalid.
Thus, by using a copy of the revocation list, the number of inquiries to CA3 can be reduced, and the load on CA3 can be reduced.

In the present embodiment, the CA 3, the device registration server 6, and the verification server 5 are configured as separate servers. However, a single server can be configured to exhibit both functions.
For example, the server and CA3 having the functions of the verification server 5 and the device registration server 6, the server and the verification server 5 having the functions of the device registration server 6 and CA3, and the server and the device registration having the functions of the verification server 5 and CA3. A server 6 or a server having the functions of CA3, verification server 5, and device registration server 6 can also be configured. In these cases, server maintenance work and the like can be reduced.

The following effects can be obtained by the present embodiment described above.
(1) By generating a pair of asymmetric keys (device secret key, device public key) in the tamper resistant unit 20, the device secret key can be stored secretly in the device 7 from the outside.
(2) It is possible to verify that the device 7 is a legitimate device by confirming that the device 7 stores the device secret key using the device public key.
(3) When connecting the device 7 and the customer server 4, it is possible to guarantee that the device 7 is a legitimate device by verifying the legitimacy of the device 7 with the verification server 5. it can.
(4) By storing the verification server connection information in the device 7 in advance, the device 7 can be connected to the verification server 5 regardless of the connection environment of the device 7.
(5) By managing the expired device 7 using the revocation list, connection between the expired device 7 and the customer server 4 can be prevented.
(6) Since the device 7 is automatically verified via the network 10, it is not necessary to dispatch a highly skilled engineer to the installation site of the device 7.

[Device operation]
Next, an operation after the device 7 is installed in the information processing system 1 will be described.
FIG. 8 is a block diagram showing the information processing system 1 related to the operation of the device 7. The verification server 5, CA3, and parent CA2 shown in FIG. 1 are not shown in FIG. 8 because their functions are finished when the installation of the device 7 is completed.
Further, since the audit server and the standard radio wave transmission device are related when the operation of the device 7 is started, FIG. 8 shows the audit server 12 and the standard radio wave transmission device 11.

The device 7 has a time stamp function for issuing a time stamp to the measured value according to the time measured by the internal clock 22.
In addition, the device 7 includes a device for receiving the standard radio wave transmitted by the standard radio wave transmitter 11. As will be described later, the external clock 28 (FIG. 2) is corrected with the standard radio wave, and the external clock 28 is further corrected. Is used to correct the internal clock 22.
In this embodiment, the internal clock 22 is corrected by the standard radio wave. However, the present invention is not limited to this. For example, a time distributed by GPS or a time included in a wireless communication protocol can be used. Alternatively, the distribution time of the time distribution server can be supplied to the device 7 by wire or wireless.

The audit server 12 is a server operated by the auditing authority, and audits the internal clock 22 of the device 7.
In general, the auditing bureau is operated by a business entity that is a third party with the customer who operates the device 7. For this reason, it becomes virtually impossible for the customer to conspire with the operator of the audit server 12 to perform the time stamp backdate, and an extremely high security level can be realized.

The audit server 12 includes an atomic clock and an audit secret key. The audit server 12 digitally signs the reference time based on the atomic clock with the audit secret key, creates a time certificate, and transmits the time certificate to the device 7.
The device 7 uses this time certificate to check whether or not the internal clock 22 is outputting the correct time. If the correct time is not output, the device 7 stops issuing the time stamp. . As described above, the audit server 12 can perform time audit by transmitting the reference time to the device 7.

The standard radio wave transmitter 11 is a transmitter that is operated by a standard radio station and transmits standard radio waves including time information to an unspecified number of receivers.
The device 7 receives the standard radio wave transmitted from the standard radio wave transmitter 11 and corrects the internal clock 22 using this standard radio wave (via the external clock 28).
The customer server 4 receives the measurement data with the time stamp from the device 7 and stores it in the measurement value database.

FIG. 9 is a diagram for explaining the relationship among the device 7, the audit server 12, and the customer server 4.
The audit server 12 includes an atomic clock for measuring the time described in the time certificate, and further stores an audit secret key.
The time certificate transmitted from the audit server 12 to the device 7 includes a reference time, a time limit, a serial number, unique information, a digital signature, and the like.
The reference time is a time configured using the time measured by the atomic clock, and the current time of the atomic clock may be used as it is, or when communication delay becomes a problem, the alive time is the delay time. You may use the value which performed some corrections, such as using the value which correct | amended.

The time limit is the expiration date of the reference time recorded in the time certificate. That is, the accuracy of the output time of the internal clock 22 audited at the reference time described in the time certificate is guaranteed by the auditing bureau during this time limit.
The device 7 can issue a time stamp within the time limit, and the time during which this time stamp can be issued is called an activation time.

The serial number is a time certificate number assigned by the audit server 12 in the order of issue. However, since serial numbers may be easily guessed from the outside, in this embodiment, the serial number is Consists of random numbers.
The unique information is information unique to the hardware of the device 7 such as ID information of the tamper resistant unit 20. If the unique information does not match, the tamper resistant unit 20 issues an error.

  In addition to these items, the expiration date of the time certificate and the common key for communication between the device 7 and the audit server 12 after the validity of the time certificate is confirmed are also included in the time certificate. Can do.

A digital signature is a message digest encrypted with a private key for audit.
Here, the message is information for preventing falsification such as the current time, the time limit, the serial number, and the unique information, and the digest is a hash value obtained by calculating the message by a hash function.
The recipient of the time certificate creates a digest from the message, and further decrypts the digital signature with the audit public key to restore the digest. Then, it is possible to confirm that the contents of the time certificate have not been tampered with by matching the two.

In addition to the device secret key and the internal clock 22 described above, the device 7 stores in the EEPROM 25 an audit public key that is paired with the audit secret key and has a mode switching unit 51. ing.
The mode switching unit 51 is configured by the CPU 21 executing a time stamp program stored in advance in the EEPROM 25 at the time of shipment.
The EEPROM 25 stores a previous certificate that is a time certificate received from the audit server 12 in the past past.
In FIG. 2, the communication unit 26 is illustrated as being included in the measurement unit 35, but here the communication unit 26 is illustrated outside the measurement unit 35 for easy understanding.

The audit public key is public key information for decrypting the digital signature attached to the time certificate transmitted from the audit server 12.
The tamper resistant part 20 can confirm the legitimacy of the time certificate using the audit public key, and confirms the validity of the reference time.

The device secret key is used to digitally sign the measurement data transmitted to the customer server 4.
Here, information used as a message is a measurement value, a device ID, a measurement time, and the like, and a time stamp is configured by digitally signing these digests with a device secret key.
The message may be digitally signed as it is without generating a digest.

The internal clock 22 gives the measurement time to the measurement value. That is, the time when the tamper resistant unit 20 acquires the measurement value from the measurement unit 35 is measured by the internal clock 22, and this time is set as the measurement time.
Since the internal clock 22 has a restriction that it is configured inside the tamper-resistant portion 20, it is difficult to configure it with a highly accurate timepiece device. On the other hand, the external clock 28 has high accuracy and is always corrected by the standard radio wave. Therefore, the tamper resistant unit 20 corrects the internal clock 22 with reference to the external clock 28 (FIG. 2) as appropriate.

Here, the correction of the internal clock 22 will be described in more detail with reference to FIG.
FIG. 10 shows an example of the time measured by the internal clock 22, and as an example, “March 30, 2005 15:30:20 seconds 2100 milliseconds”. Thus, the internal clock 22 measures the time in units of one hundred milliseconds.
The tamper resistant unit 20 manages the time of the internal clock 22 by dividing it into a portion of minutes or more (hereinafter referred to as a time label) and a second unit, and performs time auditing on the time label. Do this for seconds.

For this reason, in the time of the internal clock 22, a portion (time label) requiring security cannot be tampered with, and security can be improved. In addition, the portion providing quality (seconds) is corrected with high accuracy by the standard radio wave.
In general, the internal clock 22 can maintain accuracy within 1 minute for several months even if it is not corrected. Therefore, the customer installs the device 7 in the meantime and corrects the internal clock 22 in seconds. The internal clock 22 can be corrected.

In this embodiment, as an example, the time is divided into a part related to security and a part related to quality assurance with a second unit as a boundary, but the present invention is not limited to this. It is also possible to divide into large units or small units.
That is, for example, when an accurate time is required up to 1 second in the time stamp, the audit server 12 audits the portion of 1 second or longer and corrects the time of 999 milliseconds or shorter with the standard radio wave.

Returning to FIG. 9, the previous certificate is a time certificate sent from the audit server 12 and used in the previous time audit and stored in the EEPROM 25.
When the tamper resistant unit 20 confirms the reference time of the time certificate transmitted from the audit server 12, it confirms that this reference time is later than the reference time received from the audit server 12 last time.

In the time stamp, the most important thing to prevent is to issue the time stamp at the time when it is back dated (to output the past time) by falsification or the like.
Therefore, the tamper resistant unit 20 confirms that the reference time transmitted from the audit server 12 is later than the time when the previous audit was performed (the time described in the previous certificate).

  If the reference time transmitted from the audit server 12 is earlier than the time described in the previous certificate, it is stopped in an audit mode (described later) by issuing an error message and the time stamp is issued. Not performed.

By storing the previous reference time in this way and confirming that the reference time used for the audit is later, it is possible to prevent the time stamp from being issued at the back-dated time. be able to.
Note that a default previous certificate is stored in the EEPROM 25 at the time of factory shipment.

The mode switching unit 51 is a functional unit that sequentially switches operation modes related to the time stamp function of the tamper resistant unit 20.
The operation modes performed by the tamper resistant unit 20 include an audit mode, a synchronization mode, and a stamp mode.
Each of these operation modes is performed by an independent module so that no interference occurs between the modules.

The audit mode is an operation mode for auditing whether the time label of the internal clock 22 is correct using the reference time transmitted from the audit server 12.
The synchronization mode is an operation mode that synchronizes (that is, corrects) the second clock portion of the internal clock 22 with an accurate time using the time distributed from the standard radio wave transmitter 11 by the standard radio wave.
The stamp mode is an operation mode in which a time stamp is issued for the measurement value measured by the measurement unit 35.

As shown in FIG. 11, the mode switching unit 51 sequentially switches the operation mode of the tamper resistant unit 20 in a predetermined order such as audit mode → synchronous mode → stamp mode → audit mode →. To go.
Among these modes, the audit mode and stamp mode are operation modes that require high security because they handle time labels (security mode), while the synchronization mode deals with units of seconds and therefore does not necessarily require high security. Mode (general mode).

The mode switching unit 51 does not switch the tamper resistant unit 20 to the next operation mode until the currently operating mode is completed.
Therefore, in order to operate in the stamp mode, it is necessary that the audit mode and the synchronization mode are completed, and the tamper resistant unit 20 can issue a time stamp at the time of the audit and synchronization.
In addition, the tamper resistant unit 20 can stop issuing time stamps when an error occurs in at least one of the audit mode and the synchronization mode.

As described above, the tamper resistant unit 20 operates by switching between the security mode and the general mode, thereby preventing simultaneous processing that requires high security and processing that does not require high security.
In addition, since each operation mode operates by an independent module, the tamper resistant unit 20 can prevent the processing in the security mode and the process in the general mode from interfering with each other in the tamper resistant unit 20, such as cracking. High resistance against unauthorized access.

In the tamper resistant unit 20, the security mode is switched between the audit mode and the stamp mode. However, since these are both security modes, it may be configured to perform the audit and issue the stamp in the same mode. Good.
Furthermore, in the present embodiment, the mode is switched in the order of audit mode → synchronous mode → stamp mode → audit mode..., But the order of mode switching is not limited to this. The operation mode may be switched in another order such as → audit mode → stamp mode → synchronization mode →.

In this way, during the stamp mode, the device 7 (FIG. 9) acquires a measurement value from the measurement unit 35, issues a time stamp according to the time of the internal clock 22, and transmits it to the customer server 4 as measurement data.
Thus, since the device 7 has a built-in time stamp function and issues a time stamp together with the measurement, it can be assured that the measurement value is surely measured at the measurement time.
In the present embodiment, the time measured by the internal clock 22 is used as the measurement time. However, the measurement unit 35 outputs the measurement time together with the measurement value to the tamper resistant unit 20, and includes the measurement time. Can also be configured to issue a time stamp.

The customer server 4 (FIG. 9) includes a device master that registers the device 7 and a measurement value database that stores measurement data transmitted from the device 7.
FIG. 12A is a diagram illustrating an example of a logical configuration of the device master.
The device master includes items such as “device ID”, “connection information”, “device public key”, “model number”, “installation location”, “installation date”, and so on.
The device ID is used to identify the device 7, and the connection information is used to connect to the device 7. The device public key is used to confirm the time stamp (digital signature) of the measurement data.

FIG. 12B is a diagram illustrating an example of a logical configuration of the measurement value database.
The measurement value database includes items such as “device ID”, “reception time”, “measurement value”, “measurement time”,.
The device ID is the device ID of the device 7 that is the transmission source of the measurement data, and the reception time is the time when the customer server 4 receives the measurement data. The measurement value is a measurement value included in the measurement data.
The customer server 4 verifies the time stamp of the measurement data with the device public key of the device 7, confirms that the measurement data, the measurement time, etc. have not been tampered with, and registers them in the measurement value database.

Next, the procedure in which the customer server 4 collects measurement data from the device 7 will be described with reference to FIG.
Here, a description will be given from the time when the device 7 switches to the audit mode. The following operation of the device 7 is performed by the tamper resistant unit 20.
First, when the mode switching unit 51 switches the tamper resistant unit 20 to the audit mode, the device 7 connects to the audit server 12 and requests transmission of a time certificate (step 25).

Upon receiving a time certificate transmission request from the device 7, the audit server 12 creates a time certificate using the time output by the atomic clock and transmits it to the device 7 (step 30).
When the device 7 receives the time certificate from the audit server 12, after confirming the digital signature of the time certificate using the audit public key, the device 7 measures the reference time of the time certificate and the time measured by the internal clock 22 Are confirmed to coincide with each other (step 35).

When the time label does not match the reference time label, in the tamper resistant unit 20, the mode switching unit 51 stops the mode switching, and the device 7 transmits an error message to the customer server 4. Thereby, the customer server 4 can detect the abnormality of the device 7.
When the time label matches the reference time, the mode switching unit 51 switches the operation mode of the tamper resistant unit 20 to the synchronous mode.

When the tamper resistant unit 20 is set to the synchronous mode, the device 7 receives the standard radio wave (step 40) broadcasted by the base station 8, and uses the time sent by the standard radio wave to make the second of the internal clock 22 The unit is corrected (step 45).
When the correction of the internal clock 22 in units of seconds is completed, the mode switching unit 51 switches the operation mode of the tamper resistant unit 20 to the stamp mode.

When the tamper resistant unit 20 is switched to the stamp mode, the CPU 29 of the measuring unit 35 transmits the measurement value measured by the measuring device unit 34 to the tamper resistant unit 20. Then, the tamper resistant part 20 generates measurement data using this and transmits it to the customer server 4 (step 50).
The customer server 4 receives the measurement data from the device 7 and stores the measurement value and the like in the measurement value database (step 60).

The tamper resistant unit 20 monitors whether or not the activation time has elapsed since the time audit. If the activation time has not elapsed (step 55; N), the device 7 proceeds to step 50. Return and continue measurement.
On the other hand, when the activation time has elapsed (step 55; N), the device 7 determines whether or not to continue the infinite loop (step 65).

When continuing the infinite loop (step 65; Y), the mode switching unit 51 switches the operation mode of the tamper resistant unit 20 to the audit mode, and the device 7 returns to step 25. When the infinite loop is not continued (step 65; N), the device 7 ends the operation.
The device 7 normally operates continuously in an infinite loop, but automatically stops when the infinite loop is not continued, for example, when the usage period has been limited and the usage period has expired.

Next, the time audit of the device 7 will be described in more detail using the flowchart of FIG. Steps 110 to 140 in FIG. 14 correspond to step 35 in FIG.
The device 7 requests a time certificate (step 25), and the audit server 12 transmits the time certificate in response (step 30).
The device 7 receives the time certificate transmitted from the audit server 12 and inputs it to the tamper resistant unit 20.
Then, the device 7 compares the reference time described in the time certificate with the time measured by the internal clock 22 (step 110).

  This comparison is done in time labels, ie in minutes, not in seconds. For example, the time described in the time certificate is “March 20, 2005, 12: 30: 3, 2200 milliseconds”, and the time of the internal clock 22 is “March 20, 2005, 12:30 0”. If it is “5,500 milliseconds per second”, since both units have the same minute unit or more, the device 7 determines that they match.

When the time described in the time certificate does not match the time of the internal clock 22 (step 115; N), the device 7 returns to step 25 and requests the audit server 12 to transmit the time certificate again.
If both times match (step 115; Y), the device 7 checks the validity of the time certificate (step 120).

This validity is obtained by decrypting the digital signature attached to the time certificate with the audit public key and restoring the digest, and further obtaining the digest from the time certificate using the same function (for example, hash function) as the audit server 12. This is done by confirming a match between the two.
If the time certificate has an expiration date attached to the time certificate, it is confirmed that it is within the expiration date.

The reason for comparing the time certificate and the time of the internal clock 22 before confirming the validity of the time certificate is to compare the time as quickly as possible.
That is, if the time is compared after the validity is confirmed, the time of the internal clock 22 is advanced by the time required for the validity confirmation, and the difference from the time described in the time certificate becomes large. is there.

If the time certificate is not valid (step 125; N), the device 7 returns to step 25.
When the time certificate is valid (step 125; Y), the device 7 determines whether the reference time described in the previous certificate (FIG. 9) and the reference time described in the time certificate Are compared (step 130).

When the reference time described in the time certificate is a time before the reference time described in the previous certificate (step 135; N), the device 7 returns to step 25.
On the other hand, when the reference time described in the time certificate is later than the reference time described in the previous certificate (step 135; Y), the time certificate that received the previous certificate this time Replace by overwriting with.

An audit error may occur depending on the state of the communication line. In this case, the device 7 returns to step 25 each time and requests the audit server 12 to issue a time certificate.
Then, when the audit re-execution reaches a predetermined number of times, the audit server 12 transmits a command for stopping the device 7 to the device 7.
Thus, when it is considered that some abnormality has occurred in the device 7, the audit server 12 can stop the device 7.

Next, the measurement process of the device 7 will be described in more detail using the flowchart of FIG. Steps 200 to 220 in FIG. 15 correspond to step 50 in FIG. 13, and steps 225 and 230 in FIG. 15 correspond to step 60 in FIG. 13.
The measurement unit 35 (FIG. 2) of the device 7 monitors the external clock 28. When the measurement time set in advance is reached, the measurement unit 35 is instructed to perform measurement, thereby executing measurement (step 200). ).
Note that the timing at which the measurement unit 35 acquires the measurement value from the measurement device unit 34 can be set in various ways depending on the type and application of the device 7.

And the apparatus 7 provides the measured value acquired by the measurement part 35 to the tamper-proof part 20 via a bus line (step 205).
The tamper resistant unit 20 acquires the time when the measurement value is provided from the internal clock 22, and sets this time as the measurement time of the measurement value (step 210).

Next, the device 7 creates a digest of a message such as a device ID, a measurement value, and a measurement time in the tamper resistant unit 20, encrypts this with a device secret key, and generates and issues a time stamp (step 215). ).
And the apparatus 7 produces measurement data from apparatus ID, a measured value, measurement time, a time stamp, etc., and transmits to the customer server 4 (step 220).

When the customer server 4 receives the measurement data from the device 7, the customer server 4 searches the device master for the device ID described in the measurement data and acquires the device public key of the device 7.
Then, the customer server 4 confirms the time stamp using the device public key (step 225).
When the confirmation of the time stamp is finished, the customer server 4 stores the measurement value and the measurement time described in the measurement data in the measurement value database and updates it (step 230).

As described above, the measurement unit 35 of the device 7 functions as a measurement unit that measures a measurement target, and the internal clock 22 functions as a clock device that measures time.
Then, in the stamp mode, the tamper resistant part 20 acquires the time when the measurement is performed by the measurement part 35 from the internal clock 22, and provides time certification information (time stamp) based on the acquired time for the measurement value. It functions as time proof information generating means for generating.

The EEPROM 25 functions as a secret key storage unit that stores a device secret key among a device public key and a device secret key paired as an asymmetric encryption key, and the tamper resistant unit 20 uses the device secret key, Time certification information is generated by encrypting correspondence information (message or digest) in which the measurement value and time are associated with each other by a predetermined encryption method.
The communication unit 26 functions as a transmission unit that transmits the generated time certification information to a predetermined transmission destination.

In addition, the device 7 uses the reference time information receiving means for receiving the reference time (standard radio wave etc.) transmitted by the reference time transmitting device (standard radio wave transmitter 11 etc.) and the internal clock 22 using the reference time. Time correction means for correcting a time in units smaller than a predetermined unit (time in seconds) among the time to be performed.
Furthermore, the device 7 includes a reference time receiving unit that receives a reference time from a predetermined audit server, and the mode switching unit 51 includes the time measured by the internal clock 22 at the time (time label) equal to or more than the predetermined unit. It functions as an audit result execution unit that operates the time certification information generation unit when the received reference times match, and stops the time certification information generation unit when they do not match.

The following effects can be obtained by the present embodiment described above.
(1) Since the device 7 has a built-in time stamp function, it can be assured that the device 7 has been measured at the time certified by the time stamp from the measured value.
(2) Since the measurement time at the device 7 cannot be falsified, a reliable time series of measurement values can be obtained.
(3) Since the standard radio wave is used for the correction of the internal clock 22, no facility for distributing the time for correction is required.
(4) Since the time can be corrected only for the second or less, the time label can be prevented from being falsified.
(5) Since the operation of the tamper resistant unit 20 is switched between the security mode (time audit, time stamp issuance) and the general mode (synchronization), security can be enhanced.

In this embodiment, the time measured by the internal clock 22 is divided into a time label and a second unit, the time audit is performed for the time label, and the time correction is performed for the second unit using the standard radio wave. However, as in the prior art, a time distribution server may be provided so that time distribution is performed thereby, and the time of the internal clock 22 corrected thereby may be audited.
In addition to the meters such as water and gas meters, the device 7 can be used for a thermometer for house cultivation, a radioactive leak measurement device at a nuclear power plant, a seismometer, and the like.

The device 7 has a function as a time certification server as follows.
That is, a clock device that outputs time, first time acquisition means that acquires a time (time label) of a predetermined unit or more among the times output from the clock device, and a reference time distribution server that distributes a reference time Confirm that the reference time receiving means for receiving the reference time from the (audit server 12) and the time acquired by the first time acquisition means at the time equal to or greater than the predetermined unit match the received reference time. By doing so, verification means for verifying that the timepiece device is operating within a predetermined range of accuracy, and receiving proof object information for receiving proof object information as a time proof object from the client device (measurement unit 35) Time proof information generation for generating time proof information (time stamp) of the received proof object information using means and time output by the timepiece device that has verified the accuracy Providing a stage, a time certification information transmission means for transmitting the generated time certification information to a predetermined destination, the time certification server, characterized by comprising a (first configuration).
In the first configuration, when the reference time used for the verification is confirmed to be a time later than the reference time used in the previous verification, the timepiece device has an accuracy within a predetermined range. It can also be configured to verify that it is operating at (second configuration).
In the first configuration or the second configuration, the timepiece device measures using the correction time acquisition means for acquiring the correction time from the correction time generator (standard radio wave transmitter 11) and the acquired correction time. Time correction means for correcting a time in units (seconds) smaller than the predetermined unit of the time, and the time certification information generation means uses the configured time to generate the time certification information. It can also be configured to generate (third configuration).
In the first configuration, the second configuration, or the third configuration, a predetermined unit changing unit that changes the predetermined unit may be provided (fourth configuration).
In the third configuration, an operation mode switching unit that switches between a first operation mode in which the verification unit and the time certification information generation unit operate and a second operation mode in which the time correction unit operates, is provided. The operation mode switching means may be configured to switch the operation mode after the operation is completed in each operation mode (fifth configuration).
In the fifth configuration, the first operation mode includes: a verification mode in which the verification unit verifies the timepiece device; and a time certification information generation mode in which the time certification information generation unit generates the time certification information. The operation mode switching means can be configured to switch the operation mode to the mode switching destination after the operation of the mode switching source is completed in the switching between the verification mode and the time certification information generation mode (Sixth). Configuration).

[Installation of handset]
Next, the case where a subunit | mobile_unit is installed in the apparatus 7 installed as mentioned above is demonstrated.
FIG. 16 is a block diagram illustrating the information processing system 1 in which the slave unit 9 is connected with the device 7 serving as a master unit.
The device 7 can be directly connected to a plurality of child devices 9 and can be connected to more child devices 9 via the child devices 9.
In the present embodiment, the connection between the device 7 and the slave unit 9 and the connection between the slave unit 9 and the slave unit 9 are wireless, but they may be wired.

In the information processing system 1, the slave unit 9 transmits the measurement value to the device 7, and the device 7 adds a time stamp thereto and transmits it to the customer server 4.
In this way, the customer server 4 can collect the measurement values to which the time stamp is given from the device 7 or the slave unit 9.

FIG. 17 is a block diagram illustrating an example of a hardware configuration of the slave unit 9.
The structure of the subunit | mobile_unit 9 is substantially the same as the apparatus 7 shown in FIG. For this reason, the corresponding components are denoted by the same reference numerals as those of the device 7, and overlapping descriptions are simplified or omitted.

The EEPROM 25 stores an asymmetric encryption key generation program, a slave device private key, a slave device certificate, a connection request program, a common key, a CA public key certificate, and the like.
The asymmetric encryption key generation program is a program for generating a pair of the slave unit private key and the slave unit public key. When the CPU 21 executes this program, the pair of the slave unit private key and the slave unit public key is protected. It is generated in the tamper unit 20.
Then, after the child machine private key is generated, it is stored in the EEPROM 25. As described above, the EEPROM 25 constitutes a handset secret key storage means.

The slave unit certificate includes an encrypted slave unit public key certificate obtained by encrypting a slave unit public key certificate of the slave unit public key with a verification server public key, slave unit unique information including a slave unit ID, and the like. Is digitally signed with a CA private key. As described above, the EEPROM 25 constitutes an encrypted slave device public key storage means.
The connection request program is a program used when connecting the slave unit 9 to the device 7. The device 7 also stores a handset connection program that accepts a connection request from the handset 9, and the device 7 and the handset 9 are connected by functioning in cooperation with each other.

The common key is a common key transmitted from the device 7 when connecting to the device 7, and the slave unit 9 encrypts and transmits the measurement value to the device 7 with the common key. Also, the information sent from the device 7 (encrypted with the common key) is decrypted with the common key.
The CA public key certificate is a CA3 public key certificate. Although not shown, the root certificate is also stored in the EEPROM 25.

Next, the overall configuration of the procedure from the pre-shipment process to the installation of the slave unit 9 will be described with reference to FIG. In the figure, the order of the procedures is shown in parentheses, and the description will be made in accordance with this order. Note that the device 7 is already installed in the information processing system 1.
Further, the procedure (1) to the procedure (4) are operations performed before installation of the slave unit 9 (preferably before shipment to the customer).
(1) (Generation of asymmetric encryption key pair of handset private key and handset public key)
When the hardware of the slave unit 9 is completed, the person in charge of the operation operates the slave unit 9 to execute the asymmetric encryption key generation program, and sets the pair of the slave unit private key and the slave unit public key to the CPU 21 in the tamper resistant unit 20. Generate.
Then, the slave unit 9 stores the generated slave unit private key in a predetermined area of the EEPROM 25.

(2) (Send device public key transmission)
The child device 9 is connected to the CA 3 that is in charge of the child device 9 by the worker in charge, and transmits the generated child device public key and child device unique information (such as a child device ID) to the CA 3.
(3) (Writing handset certificate)
When CA3 receives the slave unit public key from slave unit 9, CA3 digitally signs it with the CA private key and creates a slave unit public key certificate.
Further, the CA 3 stores the verification server public key, and encrypts the slave unit public key certificate by using a predetermined encryption method to create an encrypted slave unit public key certificate.
The CA 3 then digitally signs the encrypted child device public key certificate and other information (such as child device specific information) to create a child device certificate, and transmits it to the child device 9.
The slave unit 9 receives the slave unit certificate from the CA 3 and stores it in the EEPROM 25.
(4) (Shipping)
The handset 9 stores the handset certificate, is shipped to the customer, and thereafter is under the customer's control.

(5) (Connection request)
After the child machine 9 is shipped, it is installed at an installation location by a person in charge of installation. Since the range in which the device 7 and the child device 9 can perform wireless communication is limited, the child device 9 is installed within the communication range with the device 7 serving as the parent device (for example, a radius of 100 meters from the device 7). .
In the subunit | mobile_unit 9, after installing in an installation location, a connection request program is started by the installation person in charge.

The subunit | mobile_unit 9 detects the apparatus 7 in the communication range, if a connection request program starts.
Then, the slave unit 9 sends a connection request to the detected device 7 and transmits a slave unit certificate to the device 7. As described above, the slave unit 9 includes an encrypted slave unit public key (included in the slave unit certificate) transmission unit.
When a plurality of devices 7 are detected, the slave unit 9 acquires, for example, the device ID of each device 7 and displays the device ID on the display device, and allows the installation person to select the device 7 to be connected.

(6) (Transmission of handset certificate to customer server 4)
The device 7 receives the handset certificate from the handset 9 (encrypted handset public key receiving means) and confirms the digital signature with the CA public key. Then, the device 7 connects to the customer server 4 and transmits the slave device certificate to the customer server 4.
As described above, the device 7 includes the encrypted slave unit public key transmission unit that transmits the encrypted slave unit public key to a predetermined transmission destination. In the present embodiment, the predetermined transmission destination is the customer server 4, but various modifications are possible, for example, direct transmission to the verification server 5.

The customer server 4 receives the slave certificate from the device 7. As described above, the device 7 includes an encrypted slave device public key receiving unit.
The customer server 4 can acquire the device ID from the device 7 and can acquire the child device ID from the child device certificate. The customer server 4 confirms the legitimacy by the digital signature when receiving the slave unit certificate.
And the customer server 4 confirms whether the combination of the apparatus 7 and the subunit | mobile_unit 9 is registered previously using the subunit | mobile_unit master.

  As shown in FIG. 19, the slave device master predefines the slave device 9 connected to the device 7 by a combination of the device ID and the slave device ID, and constitutes correspondence storage means. In addition, the validity of the slave unit 9 is also registered in the slave unit master, and those that can be used are set to be valid, and those that are not used are set to be invalid.

When the combination of the device ID and the slave device ID received from the device 7 matches the one specified by the slave device master and the validity of the slave device is valid, the customer server 4 performs subsequent processing. continue. On the other hand, if at least one of these conditions is not satisfied, an error message is transmitted to the device 7.
That is, the device 7 includes a correspondence confirmation unit that confirms whether or not the device 7 and the child device 9 are associated with each other by the child device master.
In this way, when the customer plans the child device 9 connected to the device 7 in advance and defines the child device master as the child device master, installation of the child device 9 due to impersonation or erroneous installation of the child device 9 can be prevented.

(7) (Transmission of handset certificate to verification server 5)
Returning to FIG. 18, the customer server 4 transmits the slave unit certificate to the verification server 5 after confirming by the slave unit master. As described above, the device 7 includes an encrypted slave device public key transmission unit.
(8) (Slave unit public key transmission to customer server 4)
When the verification server 5 receives the slave certificate from the customer server 4, the verification server 5 confirms the legitimacy by the digital signature.
Then, the verification server 5 decrypts the encrypted handset public key certificate included in the handset certificate with the verification server private key, and transmits it to the customer server 4.
If the encrypted handset public key certificate cannot be decrypted or the authenticity of the handset certificate or the like cannot be confirmed, the verification server 5 transmits an error message to the customer server 4.

(9) (Transmission of handset public key to device 7)
When the customer server 4 receives the slave unit public key from the verification server 5, it transfers this to the device 7.
(10) (Common key transmission)
The device 7 receives the slave device public key from the customer server 4 (slave device public key receiving means), and temporarily stores it in the RAM 24. Then, the device 7 generates a common key by generating a random number, etc., encrypts it with the child device public key temporarily stored, and transmits it to the child device 9.
The subunit | mobile_unit 9 receives this encryption common key from the apparatus 7, decrypts this with a subunit | mobile_unit private key, and decompress | restores a common key.
Thereafter, the device 7 and the slave unit 9 communicate with each other by encrypting information using the common key. That is, of the device 7 and the slave unit 9, the information transmitting side encrypts and transmits the information with the common key, and the information receiving side decrypts the information with the common key.

  In the above example, the device 7 transmits the encrypted child machine public key certificate to the verification server 5 via the customer server 4 and further receives the child machine public key via the customer server 4. For example, the device 7 is connected to the verification server 5, and the encrypted child device public key certificate is directly transmitted from the device 7 to the verification server 5. The reception of the child device public key is also received by the verification server 5. It can also be configured to perform directly from

  Further, the customer server 4 is configured to sequentially transmit the encrypted slave unit public key to the verification server 5 when it receives the encrypted slave unit public key from the device 7, but for a certain period, the customer server 4 receives the encrypted slave unit public key. It is also possible to store them and send them to the verification server 5 in batch processing.

Next, a procedure for connecting the slave unit 9 to the device 7 will be described using the flowchart of FIG. In the following, information processing performed by the slave unit 9 is mainly performed by the CPU 21 in the tamper-proof section 20 (FIG. 17).
The processing before shipping of the slave unit, such as generating a pair of the slave unit public key and the slave unit private key in the slave unit 9, is the same as that of the device 7, and the description thereof is omitted.
When the slave unit 9 is installed at the installation location, the person in charge of installation operates the input unit 32 (FIG. 17) to start the connection request program. Then, the subunit | mobile_unit 9 searches the apparatus 7 which exists in the periphery, and performs a connection request with respect to the searched apparatus 7. FIG.

On the other hand, when there is a connection request from the slave unit 9, the device 7 starts a slave unit connection program stored in advance in the tamper-resistant unit 20 (FIG. 2) and cooperates with the slave unit 9 to obtain the following series of information. Process.
First, when the handset connection program is activated in the device 7, the handset 9 reads the handset certificate from the EEPROM 25 and transmits it to the device 7 (step 305).

When the device 7 receives the handset certificate from the handset 9, the device 7 verifies the digital signature using the CA public key and confirms the legitimacy of the handset certificate.
When the legitimacy cannot be confirmed, the device 7 transmits an error message to the slave unit 9. When the legitimacy is confirmed, the customer server 4 is connected using the customer server connection information. At this time, the device ID of the device 7 is notified to the customer server 4. In addition, when the apparatus 7 and the customer server 4 are always connected, it is not necessary to newly connect.
After connecting to the customer server 4, the device 7 transmits the slave device certificate received from the slave device 9 to the customer server 4 (step 310).

When the customer server 4 receives the slave certificate from the device 7, the customer server 4 confirms the digital signature with the CA public key.
Next, a combination of the device ID of the device 7 and the child device ID described in the child device certificate of the child device 9 is searched in the child device master (FIG. 19), and is this combination defined in advance in the child device master? It is confirmed whether or not (step 315).
If the combination cannot be confirmed, the customer server 4 transmits an error message to the device 7, and this error message is further transmitted from the device 7 to the child device 9.
If the combination can be confirmed, the customer server 4 connects to the verification server 5 and transmits a handset certificate (step 320).

When the verification server 5 receives the slave certificate from the customer server 4, it verifies the digital signature with the CA public key.
Next, the encrypted handset public key certificate included in the handset certificate is decrypted with the verification server private key stored in advance, and the handset public key certificate is restored (step 325).
Next, the verification server 5 confirms the digital signature of the slave unit public key certificate using the CA public key, and confirms the legitimacy of the slave unit public key certificate.

If the handset certificate or handset public key certificate is not authentic, the verification server 5 sends an error message to the customer server 4, and this error message is further transmitted to the handset 9 via the device 7. Is done.
If the handset public key certificate is authentic, the verification server 5 transmits the handset public key to the customer server 4 (step 330).

The customer server 4 receives the child machine public key from the verification server 5 and transmits it to the device 7 (step 335).
Upon receiving the slave unit public key from the customer server 4, the device 7 generates a common key and encrypts it with the slave unit public key to generate an encrypted common key (step 340). And the apparatus 7 transmits an encryption common key to the subunit | mobile_unit 9 (step 345).

When receiving the encrypted common key from the device 7, the handset 9 decrypts it using the handset private key stored in the EEPROM 25 and restores the common key (step 350).
In this way, the device 7 and the child device 9 can share a common key, and thereafter, the device 7 and the child device 9 communicate by encrypting / decrypting information to be transmitted / received with the common key.
After confirming that the device 7 and the child device 9 share the common key in this way, the device 7 stores the child device specific information and address of the child device 9 in the EEPROM 25 (FIG. 2), and the child device. 9 is officially registered as its own handset. In this way, the device 7 and the slave unit 9 are connected (step 355).

Next, a modified example of the connection method between the slave unit 9 and the device 7 will be described using the flowchart of FIG.
In the embodiment described above, the combination of the device 7 and the child device 9 is defined in advance by the child device master. However, in this modification, an arbitrary child device 9 is connected to the device 7, The slave unit master is dynamically updated depending on the combination of the slave units 9.
Note that steps common to FIG. 20 are denoted by the same step numbers, and description thereof will be simplified or omitted.

Steps 305 and 310 are the same as those in FIG.
Next, when the customer server 4 receives the child device certificate from the device 7, the customer server 4 associates the device ID of the device 7 with the child device ID of the child device 9 and temporarily registers it in the child device master (step 360). ).
In the slave device master of this modification, the device ID and the slave device ID are not associated with each other at first, and the correspondence between the device ID and the slave device ID is stored by the process of step 360.

Thereafter, steps 320 to 355 are the same as those in FIG.
When the device 7 establishes the connection with the child device 9, the device 7 transmits a connection notification indicating that the child device 9 is connected to the customer server 4 (step 365).
When the customer server 4 receives the connection notification from the device 7, the customer server 4 determines the combination of the device ID of the device 7 and the child device ID of the child device 9 that are provisionally registered in the child device master, and formally sets the combination to the child device master. Register (step 370).

  In this modification, since the combination of the device 7 and the child device 9 is not defined in advance by the device master, the combination of the device 7 and the child device 9 cannot be confirmed, but an arbitrary child device 9 is connected to the device 7. Therefore, the flexibility of the operation of the slave unit 9 is increased.

The following effects can be obtained by the slave unit setting method described above.
(1) Since the customer installs and manages the child device, the supplier of the device 7 and the child device 9 may manage information about the device 7 (device public key, etc.).
(2) By registering the combination of the device 7 and the child device 9 in advance by the child device master, it is possible to suppress impersonation of the child device 9 or erroneous installation of the child device 9.
(3) The device 7 can perform handset authentication by requesting the verification server 5 to verify the handset certificate.
(4) A plurality of slave units 9 can be installed in the device 7, and the flexibility of installation of the measuring device by the device 7 or the slave unit 9 can be enhanced.

[Operation of slave unit]
Next, the operation of the slave unit 9 installed as described above will be described with reference to the flowchart of FIG.
Note that steps that perform the same processing as in FIG. 15 are denoted by the same step numbers as in FIG.

First, the subunit | mobile_unit 9 performs measurement of a measuring object by the measuring device part 34 (FIG. 17) (step 300). This measurement is performed at a predetermined time interval or a preset time, for example.
The subunit | mobile_unit 9 will acquire this measured value in the measuring device part 34, will send this to the tamper resistant part 20, and will encrypt with a common key within the tamper resistant part 20 (step 305). And the subunit | mobile_unit 9 transmits the encryption measured value which encrypted the measured value in this way to the apparatus 7 (step 310).

When the device 7 receives the encrypted measurement value from the child device 9 (step 315), the device 7 decrypts it with the common key in the tamper resistant unit 20 (step 320). As described above, the device 7 includes a measurement value acquisition unit that acquires a measurement value from the slave unit 9.
And the apparatus 7 acquires the measurement time of a measurement value by measuring the time at the time of receiving an encryption measurement value with the internal clock 22 (step 210).

Next, the device 7 generates measurement data including a measurement value, a measurement time, a child device ID of the child device 9 and the like in the tamper resistant unit 20 and issues a time stamp by digitally signing the measurement data. (Step 215).
The device 7 transmits the measurement data issued with the time stamp in this way to the customer server 4 (step 220).

When the customer server 4 receives the measurement data from the device 7, it confirms the time stamp by decrypting the digital signature with the device public key of the device 7 (step 225). This confirms the legitimacy of the measurement data.
When the time stamp is confirmed, the customer server 4 stores the data included in the measurement data in the measurement value database and updates it (step 230).

The measurement value database stores data measured by the slave unit 9 in addition to data measured by the device 7.
The items to be stored are the same as those of the device 7, and the item of “device ID” in FIG. 12B is set to “child device ID”.
As the “measurement value”, the measurement value measured by the slave unit 9 is stored, and as the measurement value, the time when the device 7 receives the measurement value from the slave unit 9 is stored.

The following effects can be obtained by the operation of the slave unit 9 described above.
(1) The time stamp can be issued by the device 7 for the measurement value of the slave unit 9.
(2) Since the time stamp is issued by the device 7, it is not necessary to install the time stamp issuing function in the slave unit 9.
(3) Since the time stamp is made by the device secret key of the device 7, the customer server 4 does not need to store the child device secret key of the child device 9.
(4) Since a plurality of slave units 9 can be connected to the device 7, a large number of slave units 9 can be installed.

It is the block diagram which showed an example of the network structure of the information processing system which concerns on this Embodiment. It is the block diagram which showed an example of the hardware structure of an apparatus. It is the block diagram which showed an example of the hardware constitutions of a verification server. It is the figure which showed an example of the logical structure of an apparatus registration database. It is a figure for demonstrating the whole procedure after installing an apparatus and connecting with a customer server. It is a flowchart for demonstrating the procedure of the process performed before shipping an apparatus. It is a flowchart for demonstrating the procedure until it installs in an installation site and connects with a customer server. It is the block diagram which showed the part regarding operation of an information processing system. It is the block diagram which showed the relationship between an apparatus, an audit server, and a customer server. It is a figure for demonstrating the correction of an internal clock. It is a figure for demonstrating the mode switching operation | movement of a mode switching part. It is the figure which showed the logical structure of the apparatus master and the measured value database. 4 is a flowchart for explaining a procedure by which a customer server 4 collects measurement data from a device 7. It is a flowchart for demonstrating a time audit procedure. It is a flowchart for demonstrating a measurement process procedure. It is the figure which showed the place which connected the apparatus and the subunit | mobile_unit in the information processing system. It is the block diagram which showed an example of the hardware constitutions of a subunit | mobile_unit. It is a figure for demonstrating the procedure until installing a subunit | mobile_unit. It is the figure which showed an example of the logical structure of a subunit | mobile_unit master. It is a flowchart for demonstrating the procedure which connects a subunit | mobile_unit to an apparatus. It is a flowchart for demonstrating the modification of the procedure which connects a subunit | mobile_unit to an apparatus. It is a flowchart for demonstrating operation | movement of a subunit | mobile_unit.

Explanation of symbols

1 Information processing system 2 Parent CA
3 CA
4 customer server 5 verification server 6 device registration server 7 device 8 base station 9 slave unit 10 network 12 audit server 51 mode switching unit

Claims (6)

A terminal device used in an information processing system configured using a child device terminal, a terminal device capable of communicating with the child device terminal, and an information processing server that receives measurement values from the terminal device,
A measurement value acquisition means for acquiring a measurement value obtained by measuring the measurement target by the slave terminal from the slave terminal;
A clock device that measures the time when the measurement value is received by the measurement value receiving means;
Time proof information generating means for generating time proof information according to the acquired time for the received measurement value;
A terminal device comprising: Of a public key and a private key paired as an asymmetric encryption key, the private key storage means for storing the secret key,
The time proof information generation means generates time proof information by encrypting correspondence information in which the measured value and the time are associated with each other using a predetermined encryption method, using the stored secret key. The terminal device according to claim 1.   The terminal device according to claim 1, further comprising a transmission unit configured to transmit the generated time certification information to a predetermined transmission destination. Reference time information receiving means for receiving the reference time transmitted by the reference time transmitting device;
Using the received reference time, time correction means for correcting a time in a unit smaller than a predetermined unit among the times measured by the timepiece device;
The terminal device according to claim 1, 2, or 3. A reference time receiving means for receiving a reference time from a predetermined audit server;
An audit result execution unit that operates the time certification information generation unit when the measured time and the received reference time match at the predetermined unit time or more, and stops the time certification information generation unit when they do not match When,
The terminal device according to claim 4, comprising: Comprising a measuring means for measuring a measurement object;
The terminal device according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein the measurement value acquisition unit acquires a measurement value from the measurement unit.

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