JP2004254020A - Authentication station system - Google Patents

Abstract

<P>PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To obtain an authentication station system for preventing an unauthorized access by performing access authentication to a tamper resistant device in which secrecy and strictness are required a plurality of times. <P>SOLUTION: This authentication station system is provided with a management tool 3 for performing access authentication by storing a PIN in the tamper resistant device 4 in advance in order to perform access authentication to the temper resistant device 4 for storing secret keys, restoring one PIN from a PIN2 which a plurality of operators have divided and inputted and collating the PIN stored in the tamper resistant device 4 with the restored PIN, and performs authentication based on the input of the PIN2 made by the plurality of operators so as to prevent an unauthorized access. <P>COPYRIGHT: (C)2004,JPO&NCIPI

Description

[0001]
TECHNICAL FIELD OF THE INVENTION
The present invention relates to a certificate authority system having a tamper-resistant device for storing and storing confidential information such as a secret key that requires confidentiality and strictness, and more particularly to access authentication to the tamper-resistant device.
[0002]
[Prior art]
In the conventional method of operating a tamper-resistant device in a certificate authority system that requires confidentiality and strictness, a plurality of physical key locking points are implemented by a hardware interface, and a plurality of persons possessing the key are provided. The use of the tamper-resistant device is enabled by opening the lock under the agreement of the administrator.
[0003]
Further, in the “digital data collection system with an agreement signature function” of Patent Literature 1, information collected using a divided signature key (private key) recorded in a portable storage device possessed by a plurality of operators is used. Sign.
[0004]
[Patent Document 1]
JP-A-2002-182561 (pages 4 to 5, FIG. 3)
[0005]
[Problems to be solved by the invention]
The conventional method of operating a tamper-resistant device in a certificate authority system that requires confidentiality and strictness depends on whether the hardware interface can be implemented and the function of the device that implements the physical key locking location using the hardware interface. Therefore, it can be used only for a limited purpose.
In an agreement signed by a plurality of persons using a divided signature key (private key), an operation on an apparatus recording the divided signature key (private key) itself is performed by an agreement operation by a plurality of valid operators of the apparatus. Therefore, the operation at the time of generating the divided signature key (private key) has been performed only by an authorized operator of the device.
[0006]
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION The present invention has been made to solve the above-described problems, and a certificate authority that performs a plurality of access authentications to a tamper-resistant device requiring confidentiality and strictness to prevent unauthorized access. The aim is to get the system.
[0007]
[Means for Solving the Problems]
In the certificate authority system according to the present invention, a tamper-resistant device that stores a secret key and stores in advance an authentication operation key used for access authentication to itself, and a plurality of divided operation keys are separately input, A management tool that restores the operation key divided into a plurality of operation keys into one operation key and authenticates access to the tamper-resistant device by comparing the restored operation key with the operation key for authentication stored in the tamper-resistant device It is provided with.
[0008]
BEST MODE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION
Embodiment 1 FIG.
Hereinafter, a first embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings.
FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a certificate authority system according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
PIN1 (operation key), which is unique information to be authenticated, is divided into a plurality of PIN2s (operation keys), managed by a plurality of persons, and is authenticated by the certificate authority 5. The certificate authority 5 includes a tamper-resistant device 4 for storing and storing confidential information requiring confidentiality and strictness (in this case, a secret key generated by the certificate authority 5), and an external input. It has a management tool 3 that provides a software interface.
[0009]
Next, the operation will be described.
When operating the certificate authority 5, the operator of the certificate authority 5 activates the management tool 3 for inputting the PIN1, which is the unique information necessary for accessing the tamper-resistant device 4. The PIN 1 is divided and managed by n operators (n> 1) of the certificate authority 5. The management tool 3 restores the original PIN 1 when the n operators have individually entered the PIN 2 that is individually managed by the n operators of the certificate authority 5 and authenticates the access to the tamper-resistant device 4. carry out. Regarding the access authentication method, if the PIN1 (authentication operation key) is stored in the tamper-resistant device 4 in advance and compared with the PIN1 input by n operators of the certification authority 5, the PIN1 Has been authenticated.
[0010]
FIG. 2 is a flowchart showing an operation of authenticating access to the tamper-resistant device of the certificate authority system according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
Step 210: Start the process.
Step 220: Activate the management tool 3 of the certificate authority 5.
Step 230: n (n> 1) operators of the certificate authority 5 input the PIN2.
Step 240: PIN1 authentication is performed. If the PIN authentication is NG, the process proceeds to step 245. If the authentication is OK, proceed to step 250.
Step 245: Proceed to step 230 to request input of a correct PIN.
Step 250: It is determined that the access to the tamper-resistant device 4 is valid.
Step 260: end the process.
[0011]
According to the first embodiment, the method of accessing the tamper-resistant device 4 that stores and keeps confidential information such as a secret key that requires confidentiality and strictness depends on a legitimate operator of the device alone. Since there is no confidential information, the environment is more secure when storing and storing the confidential information from the time of generation than when the operator is alone.
[0012]
Embodiment 2 FIG.
FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a certificate authority system according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
In the first embodiment, a case has been described in which PIN2 obtained by dividing PIN1 by n is input by each of n operators of the certificate authority 5, but in the second embodiment, as shown in FIG. Instead of the method in which n persons input PIN2, each fingerprint information 6 (biological identification information) of n operators of the certification authority 5 is collated by the fingerprint collation apparatus 7 (biometric identification information collation apparatus). Using the comparison result, the management tool 3 performs access authentication to the tamper-resistant device 4.
[0013]
Regarding the access authentication method, the fingerprint information (biometric identification information for authentication) of the operator of the authentication station 5 for n persons is stored in the tamper-resistant device 4 in advance. The read fingerprint information 6 is compared with the fingerprint information stored in the tamper-resistant device 4, and if they match, the management tool 3 authenticates the validity of the operator. Only after all the n operators have been authenticated in this operation can the tamper-resistant device 4 be accessed.
As a result, fingerprint information 6 depending on the operator of the certificate authority 5 is required, so that it is difficult for the operator to impersonate.
[0014]
FIG. 4 is a flowchart showing an operation of authenticating access to a tamper-resistant device of a certificate authority system according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
Step 410: Start the process.
Step 420: Activate the management tool 3 of the certificate authority 5.
Step 430: The fingerprint verification device 7 requests authentication of the fingerprint information 6 of the operator of the certificate authority 5.
Step 440: Start authentication of fingerprint information 6.
Step 450: Authenticate the fingerprint information 6. If the authentication is NG, the process proceeds to step 455. If the authentication is OK, the process proceeds to step 460. This operation is repeated by n (n> 1) operators.
Step 455: Proceed to Step 430 to request input of correct fingerprint information.
Step 460: It is determined that the access to the tamper-resistant device 4 is valid.
Step 470: End the process.
In the above description, fingerprint information has been described as information for identifying a living body, but other information may be used as long as it is information for identifying a living body.
[0015]
According to the second embodiment, since access to the tamper-resistant device is authenticated using a plurality of pieces of biometric identification information, it becomes difficult for an operator to impersonate.
[0016]
Embodiment 3 FIG.
FIG. 5 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a certificate authority system according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention.
In the first embodiment, a case has been described in which PIN2 obtained by dividing PIN1 by n is input by each of n operators of the certificate authority 5, but in the third embodiment, as shown in FIG. The n persons carry out the access authentication to the tamper-resistant device 4 by carrying the IC card 8 respectively. When the IC card 8 is inserted into the IC card reader / writer 9, the PIN 10 (authentication operation key) stored in the IC card 8 is read and compared with the input PIN (operation key).
[0017]
As for the access authentication method, a PIN 10 which is information unique to the operator is stored in the IC card 8 carried by the operator of the certificate authority 5. When the operator of the certification authority 5 connects the IC card 8 to the IC card reader / writer 9, the input of the PIN 10 stored in the IC card 8 is requested. If the PIN 10 input by the operator of the certification authority 5 is compared with the PIN 10 stored in the IC card 8, it means that the validity of the operator has been authenticated. Only after all the n operators have been authenticated in this operation can the tamper-resistant device 4 be accessed.
This eliminates the need to store the PIN 10 on the system side, and prevents the PIN 10 from being eavesdropped on by a malicious person, for example.
[0018]
FIG. 6 is a flowchart showing an operation of authenticating access to a tamper-resistant device of a certificate authority system according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention.
Step 610: Start the process.
Step 620: Activate the management tool 3 of the certificate authority 5.
Step 630: The insertion of the IC card 8 into the IC card reader / writer 9 is prompted.
Step 640: When the IC card 8 is inserted, the input of the PIN stored in the IC card 8 is requested.
Step 650: Perform PIN authentication for the input PIN using the PIN stored in the IC card 8. If the authentication is NG, the process proceeds to step 655. If the authentication is OK, proceed to step 660. This operation is repeated by n (n> 1) operators.
Step 655: Proceed to Step 640 to request the input of a correct PIN.
Step 660: It is determined that the access to the tamper-resistant device 4 is valid.
Step 670: End the process.
[0019]
According to the third embodiment, there is no need to store the PIN on the system side, so that the PIN is not eavesdropped by a malicious person, for example.
[0020]
Embodiment 4 FIG.
FIG. 7 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a certificate authority system according to Embodiment 4 of the present invention.
In the third embodiment, the case where the IC card 8 is connected to the IC card reader / writer 9 and the access authentication is performed by inputting the PIN 10 stored in the IC card 8 has been described. As shown in FIG. 7, instead of inputting the PIN, the fingerprint information PIN11 of the operator is collated by the fingerprint collation device 7 (biometric identification information collation device), thereby performing access authentication to the tamper-resistant device 4. I do.
[0021]
As for the access authentication method, the fingerprint information PIN11 (biometric identification information for authentication) of the operator is stored in the IC card 8 owned by the operator of the authentication station 5 in advance. When the operator connects the IC card 8 to the IC card reader / writer 9, verification of the fingerprint information PIN11 stored in the IC card 8 is required. The operator compares the fingerprint information PIN11 (biological identification information) read by the fingerprint collation device 7 with the fingerprint information PIN11, and if they match, the operator is authenticated. Only after all the n operators have been authenticated in this operation can the tamper-resistant device 4 be accessed.
As a result, the fingerprint information PIN11 is not stored in the system side, and the operator does not need to input the PIN11, so that it is difficult to impersonate a legitimate operator, and the operator himself forgets the PIN11. Operational difficulties are eliminated.
[0022]
FIG. 8 is a flowchart showing an operation of authenticating access to a tamper-resistant device of a certificate authority system according to Embodiment 4 of the present invention.
Step 810: Start the process.
Step 820: Activate the management tool 3 of the certificate authority 5.
Step 830: Insertion of the IC card 8 into the IC card reader / writer 9 is prompted.
Step 840: When the IC card 8 is inserted, authentication of the fingerprint information of the operator stored in the IC card 8 is requested.
Step 850: Authenticate the fingerprint information. If the authentication is NG, the process proceeds to step 855. If the authentication is OK, proceed to step 860. This operation is repeated by n (n> 1) operators.
Step 855: Proceed to Step 840 to request input of correct fingerprint information.
Step 860: It is determined that the access to the tamper-resistant device 4 is valid.
Step 870: End the process.
In the above description, fingerprint information has been described as information for identifying a living body, but other information may be used as long as it is information for identifying a living body.
[0023]
According to the fourth embodiment, since the fingerprint information PIN is not stored in the system side and the operator does not need to input the PIN, it is difficult to impersonate a legitimate operator, and the operator himself / herself is required to input the PIN. Operational difficulties due to forgetting are eliminated.
[0024]
Embodiment 5 FIG.
FIG. 9 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a certificate authority system according to Embodiment 5 of the present invention.
In the fourth embodiment, the case where the fingerprint information PIN11 of the operator stored in the IC card 8 is in plain text has been described. However, in the fifth embodiment, as shown in FIG. The access authentication to the tamper-resistant device 4 when the fingerprint information PIN11 of the operator is encrypted is performed.
[0025]
Regarding the access authentication method, the fingerprint information PIN11 of the operator is encrypted in advance in the IC card 8 possessed by the operator using a secret key stored in the IC card 8 to obtain the fingerprint information PIN12. Store in card 8. When the operator connects the IC card 8 to the IC card reader / writer 9, verification of the fingerprint information PIN 12 stored in the IC card 8 is required. The encrypted fingerprint information PIN12 stored in the IC card 8 is decrypted and compared with the fingerprint information read by the fingerprint collation device 7 by the operator. You are certified. Only after all the n operators have been authenticated in this operation can the tamper-resistant device 4 be accessed.
This makes it difficult for the fingerprint information PIN 12 to be eavesdropped or leaked and impersonated by a legitimate operator, and also eliminates the difficulty of operation caused by the operator himself forgetting the PIN 12.
[0026]
FIG. 10 is a flowchart showing an operation of authenticating access to a tamper-resistant device of a certificate authority system according to Embodiment 5 of the present invention.
Step 1010: Start the process.
Step 1020: Activate the management tool 3 of the certificate authority 5.
Step 1030: Insertion of the IC card 8 into the IC card reader / writer 9 is prompted.
Step 1040: When the IC card 8 is inserted, authentication of the fingerprint information of the operator stored in the IC card 8 is requested.
Step 1050: Decoding of the operator's fingerprint information stored in the IC card 8 is started.
Step 1060: Authenticate the fingerprint information. If the authentication is NG, the process proceeds to step 1065. If the authentication is OK, the process proceeds to step 1070. This operation is repeated by n (n> 1) operators.
Step 1065: Proceed to step 1040 to request input of correct fingerprint information.
Step 1070: It is determined that the access to the tamper-resistant device 4 is valid.
Step 1080: end the process.
[0027]
According to the fifth embodiment, the fingerprint information PIN is encrypted, which makes it more difficult to eavesdrop or leak the fingerprint information PIN and impersonate a legitimate operator, and to reduce the difficulty of operation due to the operator forgetting the PIN by himself / herself. Will be resolved.
[0028]
【The invention's effect】
As described above, according to the present invention, a tamper-resistant device that stores a secret key and previously stores an authentication operation key used for access authentication to itself, and a plurality of divided operation keys are separately input, A management tool that restores the operation key divided into a plurality of operation keys into one operation key and authenticates access to the tamper-resistant device by comparing the restored operation key with the operation key for authentication stored in the tamper-resistant device , It is possible to perform access authentication to the tamper-resistant device by using a plurality of operation keys, thereby preventing unauthorized access.
[Brief description of the drawings]
FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a certificate authority system according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
FIG. 2 is a flowchart showing an operation of authenticating access to a tamper-resistant device of the certificate authority system according to the first embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a certificate authority system according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating an operation of authenticating access to a tamper-resistant device of a certificate authority system according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention;
FIG. 5 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a certificate authority system according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention.
FIG. 6 is a flowchart illustrating an operation of authenticating access to a tamper-resistant device of a certificate authority system according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention.
FIG. 7 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a certificate authority system according to Embodiment 4 of the present invention.
FIG. 8 is a flowchart showing an operation of authenticating access to a tamper-resistant device of a certificate authority system according to Embodiment 4 of the present invention.
FIG. 9 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a certificate authority system according to Embodiment 5 of the present invention.
FIG. 10 is a flowchart showing an operation of authenticating access to a tamper-resistant device of a certificate authority system according to Embodiment 5 of the present invention.
[Explanation of symbols]
1 PIN, 2 divided PINs, 3 management tools,
4 Tamper-resistant device, 5 certificate authority, 6 fingerprint information, 7 fingerprint collation device,
8 IC card, 9 IC card reader / writer, 10 PIN,
11 Fingerprint information PIN, 12 Encrypted fingerprint information PIN.

Claims (6)

A tamper-resistant device that stores a secret key and previously stores an operation key for authentication used for access authentication to itself, and a plurality of operation keys that are separately input. A management tool that restores one operation key and authenticates access to the tamper-resistant device by comparing the restored operation key with an authentication operation key stored in the tamper-resistant device. And a certificate authority system. A tamper-resistant device that stores a secret key and pre-stores biometric identification information for authentication used for access authentication to itself, a plurality of biometric identification information is input, and is stored in the input biometric identification information and the tamper-resistant device. And a management tool for performing access authentication to the tamper-resistant device by using the result of comparison by the biometric identification information matching device. And a certificate authority system. A tamper-resistant device that stores a secret key, a plurality of IC cards each storing in advance an authentication operation key used for access authentication to the tamper-resistant device, an IC card reader / writer that reads the authentication operation key of the IC card, and Operation keys respectively corresponding to the authentication operation keys stored in the plurality of IC cards are individually input, and the plurality of input operation keys and the plurality of IC cards read through the IC card reader / writer are read. A certification authority system comprising: a management tool for performing access authentication to the tamper-resistant device by checking the operation key for authentication stored in the tamper-resistant device. A tamper-resistant device that stores a secret key, a plurality of IC cards each storing biometric identification information for authentication used for access authentication to the tamper-resistant device, and an IC card reader / writer that reads biometric identification information for authentication of the IC card The biometric identification information respectively corresponding to the biometric identification information for authentication stored in the plurality of IC cards is separately input, and the read plurality of biometric identification information and the read biometric identification information are read via the IC card reader / writer. A biometric identification information collating device for collating each with biometric identification information for authentication stored in a plurality of IC cards, and a management for performing access authentication to the tamper-resistant device using a result collated by the biometric identification information collating device A certificate authority system comprising tools. The biometric identification information for authentication stored in the IC card is encrypted, and the encrypted biometric identification information for authentication is decrypted and used for collation by the biometric identification information collation device. The certificate authority system according to claim 4, wherein The certificate authority system according to claim 2, wherein the biometric identification information is fingerprint information.

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