EP3357212A1

EP3357212A1 - Improved method and device for authentication

Info

Publication number: EP3357212A1
Application number: EP16784231.9A
Authority: EP
Inventors: Antoine BOULANGER; Sylvain PATUREAU MIRAND
Original assignee: PSA Automobiles SA
Current assignee: PSA Automobiles SA
Priority date: 2015-09-29
Filing date: 2016-09-23
Publication date: 2018-08-08
Also published as: FR3041798B1; WO2017055716A1; FR3041798A1; CN108141444B; CN108141444A

Abstract

The invention relates to a method for creating a token authorising a terminal (103) of a user (102) to access a resource comprising a memory in which a private key is stored, comprising the steps of: - creating a first data field comprising at least one identifier associated with an item of encryption information, - creating a second data field comprising an access token, said access token comprising data describing the rights accorded to the terminal (103) of the user (102) on the resource; - encrypting the data describing the access rights, using a public key associated with the private key stored in the memory of the resource, - encrypting the access token using an encryption key based on at least one portion of the encryption information associated with the identifier contained in the first data field of the preservation token.

Description

IMPROVED AUTHENTICATION METHOD AND DEVICE

The invention relates to authentication and rights management in the context of exchanges of data between different computer systems such as an electronic box in a vehicle, mobile devices (smartphones, tablets, laptops, etc.) and landed systems (also called cloud in English).

It is known from the state of the art to access a computer resource after having previously authenticated. It is also known to use a token (physical or digital) to authenticate with the resource.

For example, document US2004230831 discloses an authentication system based on security tokens. This system makes it possible to allow a terminal belonging to a first organization to access a service provider server belonging to a second organization. The first and second organizations form a federation. The user of the terminal belonging to the first organization identifies himself only once and is allowed to access resources of the second organization. Authorizations are carried by tokens issued by a trusted authority and then exchanged by the two organizations.

In general, for security reasons, the authentication tokens are limited in time by a period of validity. After the token has expired, it must be renewed with the trusted authority (also known as the authentication server). The renewal request requires a connection (for example of the Internet or 3G type) to communicate with the authentication server.

However, there are situations where a user wants to access a service provider server without having a connection to the Internet and therefore without being able to communicate with the authentication server.

Such a problem does not arise when the service provider is a computer server only accessible via an Internet connection. In this case, a user wishing to access the resource necessarily has access to the Internet and can therefore recover a security token through this Internet access.

The problem to be solved by the present invention relates to the case: (i) where the service provider is a connected object (for example a telematic box of a motor vehicle) accessible via a wireless link (for example Bluetooth type or NFC) or a wired link, and (ii) where the user is able to access the object (for example a user with a smartphone located outside the vehicle) but without access to an Internet connection (in other words without any means of communicating with the trusted authority issuing the security tokens). For example, it is assumed that the user wishes to control, with the aid of his Smartphone, the unlocking of an opening to gain access to the passenger compartment of the vehicle, while he is at a place without a cover of a network of communication.

Nothing is planned to securely access the resource in this case.

The invention therefore aims to remedy the aforementioned problems by providing an improved method and an authentication device allowing secure access to a computer resource without requiring permanent communication with an authentication server.

More specifically, it proposes a method for authorizing a terminal (103) of a user (102) to access a resource (104) having a memory in which a private key is stored, comprising steps of:

generating (206) a storage token by an authentication device (101),

- issuing (207) a storage token to the terminal (103), characterized in that said step (206) comprises steps of:

- creating (206.1) a first data field having at least one identifier associated with an encryption information, at least a portion of which is intended to be used as an encryption key;

creation (206.2) of a second data field comprising a token access, said access token comprising data describing rights granted to the user's terminal (103) (102) on the resource (104);

encrypting (206.3) data describing access rights, with a public key associated with the private key stored in the memory of the resource (104),

- encrypting (206.4) the access token with an encryption key based on at least a portion of the encryption information associated with the identifier contained in the first data field of the conservation token.

To remedy the problem of access to the authentication server, the invention proposes the creation of a secure storage system of an access token. The access token is kept in a so-called conservation token. The access token is encrypted using encryption data.

Token encryption allows for a longer validity period (for example, more than one day) without compromising the security of the system. Thus, in the case where the user wishes to access the resource, even though he has no means of communication with an authentication server, it decrypts the access token contained in the conservation token .

The access token is then ready to use for use with the resource.

The security of the system is maintained insofar as only the user is able to provide the data necessary to decrypt the access token.

Advantageously, the access token having a validity date indicating an expiry date of the rights granted to the user, the step of generating the conservation token furthermore includes adding an expiry date to said token the expiration date of the retention token being the same as the expiration date of the access token.

Advantageously, the step of encrypting the access token implements a symmetric cryptography method.

Advantageously, the encryption information comprises at least Less: an answer to a question, a fingerprint or a voice print.

Advantageously, the step of encrypting the access token implements an asymmetric cryptographic method.

Advantageously, the encryption information comprises at least one public key of a cryptographic key pair whose private key is stored in a memory of an object held by the user.

Advantageously, the method of creating a token according to the invention further comprises a step of signing the access token and the storage token with a private key of the authentication device.

The invention also relates to an authorization token for a terminal of a user to access a resource comprising a memory in which a private key is stored, characterized in that it comprises:

a first data field comprising at least one identifier associated with an encryption information, at least part of which is intended to be used as an encryption key;

a second data field comprising an access token, said access token comprising data describing rights granted to the user's terminal on the resource, data describing access rights being with a public key associated with the private key stored in the resource's memory,

and in that the access token is encrypted with an encryption key based on at least a portion of the encryption information associated with the identifier contained in the first data field of the preservation token.

The invention also relates to a device for authorizing a terminal of a user to access a resource comprising a memory in which a private key is stored, comprising means for generating a preservation token and means for transmitting said token. storage device for the terminal, characterized in that the means for generating the conservation token comprise:

means for creating a first data field comprising at least one identifier associated with encryption information, including at least one part is intended to be used as an encryption key;

means for creating a second data field comprising an access token, said access token comprising data describing rights granted to the user's terminal on the resource;

means for encrypting the data describing access rights, with a public key associated with the private key stored in the memory of the resource,

means for encrypting the access token with an encryption key based on at least part of the encryption information associated with the identifier contained in the first data field of the preservation token.

Other features and advantages of the invention will appear on examining the detailed description below, and the attached drawings, in which:

FIG. 1 illustrates a schematic view of a system comprising an authentication device according to the invention;

FIG. 2 illustrates a diagram representing steps of the method according to the invention,

FIG. 3 illustrates a diagram representing substeps of the method according to the invention;

FIG. 4 shows an example of a token structure according to the prior art;

FIG. 5 shows an example of a token structure according to the invention.

The attached drawings may not only serve to complete the invention, but also contribute to its definition, if any.

With reference to FIG. 1, an authentication system according to the invention comprises at least one terminal 103, a service provider 104 and an authentication authority 101. The access by the terminal 103 to data or services of the service provider 104 requires authentication and authorizations issued by the authentication authority 101.

In the following, we consider as a non-limiting example that the terminal 103 is a smart mobile phone (also called smartphone in English). But the invention is not limited to this example. Indeed, the terminal 103 may be a laptop, a touch pad or any other connected object (ie capable of exchanging data via a wireless connection). This mobile equipment belongs, for example, to the driver of a vehicle or to one of the passengers of the vehicle.

The service provider 104 (or SP for "Service Provider" in English) is an IT resource. SP 104 controls access to data or commands to perform an activity. SP 104 protects access to data and applications. It refuses any access without prior authentication. Advantageously, it redirects the unauthenticated user to an identity provider. Access to the service is therefore restricted. Users must be identified before they can access data or start the execution of an order. In the rest of the document, the SP 104 is also called resource 104 or box 104.

Authentications and authorizations are communicated by means of authorization tokens also called token or "identity credentials" in English.

The tokens used to transmit the permissions are encrypted (or encrypted) according to an asymmetric cryptography mechanism (also called public key cryptography). In such a system, a pair of keys is used: a public key for encryption and a private key for decryption. When a resource sends a token to another computing resource, it simply encrypts the token to be sent using the recipient's public key. The latter will be able to decipher the message using his private key (which he is alone to know).

The tokens incorporate the authorizations that allow access to functions or data on the services hosted on the SP 104.

Authorizations are checked by the SP by either querying a reference directory or a manifest to make permissions that may be common in the token but not providing the same services on different systems. The SP 104 includes a secure storage space capable of storing a private key used to decrypt the authorization tokens. The secure storage space is for example a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip, which is a hardware cryptographic component for storing secrets (such as encryption keys) securely.

In what follows, it is considered by way of non-limiting example that the SP 104 is an electronic box of a motor vehicle. The electronic box is an on-board vehicle that is the boundary of the vehicle data to the outside through various means: cable, wireless protocols (wifi, bluetooth, 3G, etc.).

But the invention is not limited to this example. Indeed, the SP can be a management information system or a system that controls a numerically controlled machine or more generally any connected object (ie capable of exchanging data via a wired or wireless connection) and including a secure storage space capable of storing a private key.

The authentication authority 101 (Identity Provider or Identity Provider) is used to authenticate the user as well as to retrieve additional information associated with his identity. The Idp 101 allows users 102 to authenticate and receive tokens on their terminal 103 (personal computer or smartphone) allowing them to be recognized with the SP 104.

Thus, Idp 101 makes it possible to allow a terminal 103 of a user 102 to access a resource 104.

To do this Idp 101 includes means for generating a conservation token and means for issuing said conservation token to the terminal 103.

In particular, the means for generating the conservation token comprise:

means for creating a first data field comprising at least one identifier associated with encryption information, at least part of which is intended to be used as an encryption key; means for creating a second data field comprising an access token, said access token comprising data describing rights granted to the terminal 103 of the user 102 on the resource 104;

means for encrypting the data describing access rights, with a public key associated with the private key stored in the memory of the resource 104,

Advantageously, Idp 101 further includes means for electronically signing authorization tokens. The electronic signature makes it possible to guarantee the integrity of a token and to authenticate the author. The electronic signature system uses a pair of keys. A private key used to sign a token and a public key to read the signed token.

Such a system generally comprises a public key infrastructure (PKI), in other words an IT resource for generating, distributing and publishing certificates to the various necessary components (SP, IdP, etc.). IdP 101 and SP 104 each have a certificate of their own.

Recall that a certificate (or electronic certificate) is a set of data containing at least one public key, at least one identification information (for example: a name, usually stored in a data field called CN for "Common Name" And at least one private key to sign.

The system also includes an Internet interface 106 through which a user can authenticate with Idp 101.

In the system of Figure 1, the chips are generated and used as follows. A token is generated by the Idp 101, in response to a request from a user (previously authenticated to the authentication authority 101). The token is transported by the user's terminal 103 to be finally checked and consumed by the embedded box 104 to allow the user and an application executed on the terminal 103 to access certain functions of the housing 104 (for example unlocking a door of the vehicle).

With reference to FIG. 4, an authorization token is structured, for example, in the following manner (JSON type structure).

The authorization token includes:

a first datum (access_token) containing the rights of the user, encrypted with the public key of the embedded box 104 (for example with an asymmetric encryption algorithm, for example of the RSA type). Thus, only the recipient box 104 can decrypt the contents of the token.

- a second data (token_type) whose value is set to "bearer" to indicate that it is a standard access token (as opposed to a storage token).

a third datum (expires_in) corresponding to a date of end of validity of the token.

A fourth datum (refresh_token) corresponding to a random string generated by the authentication authority 101 making it possible to subsequently request a new token without any new authentication on the part of the user,

A fifth data token_signature corresponding to a signature of HMAC type (it is a condensate (or "hash") of the token, generated by means of a hashing algorithm (for example SHA-1) and encrypted with the private key the authentication authority 101 (for example an asymmetric RSA encryption algorithm) The signature ensures the authenticity of the sender and the integrity (non-alteration) of the message.

The invention also relates to a storage token, which can be stored securely (encrypted) on a terminal. In this way, the validity period of such a token can be lengthened while maintaining a high level of security.

In addition to the encryption of the permissions (access_token) with the public key of the box 104, data of the conservation token are encrypted using a key from one or more data of the user. previously informed.

With reference to FIG. 5, a conservation token is for example structured in the following manner (JSON type structure). The conservation token includes:

a first datum (token_type) indicating a type of token (here "long" or "conservation"), as well as at least one identifier associated with an encryption information (for example question identifiers whose personal answers form the key used to decipher the token contained in the third data (access_token) of the conservation token),

a second datum (expires_in) corresponding to a date of end of validity of the conservation token,

a third datum (access_token) containing the data structure of an authorization token, for example as defined above, but encrypted by means of a key issuing from the encryption information corresponding to the identifiers indicated in the first datum. Only this part is sent, once deciphered by the terminal 103, to the housing 104.

The invention also relates to a method for authorizing the terminal 103 of the user 102 to access the resource 104.

With reference to FIG. 2, the method comprises steps of:

- Input 201, by the user 102, connection information (eg an identifier and a password or any other authentication method) in the terminal 103;

- Request 202 connection of the terminal 103 to the Idp 101;

- Verification 203, by Idp 101, connection information, if the connection information is correct then move to the next step 204, if not connection refusal;

Establishing a connection session with the terminal 103;

- Request 205, through the terminal 103, a conservation token from Idp 101;

- Generation 206 of the storage token by Idp 101; - Sending 207 of the conservation token of Idp 101 to the terminal 103.

This method may be initiated by the user 102 when he wishes to have a storage token on his terminal 103, either as a precaution or in anticipation of a situation where he will have to access the resource 104 without being able to communicate with the user. 'Idp 101.

The creation step 206 of the conservation token, by Idp 101, comprises the following substeps:

- Creation 206.1 of a first data field having at least one identifier associated with an encryption information, at least a portion of which is intended to be used as an encryption key. This is for example an identifier of a question.

creation 206.2 of a second data field comprising an access token, said access token comprising data describing rights granted to the terminal 103 of the user 102 on the resource 104.

- Encryption 206.3 data describing access rights, with a public key associated with the private key stored in the memory of the resource 104. In this way the encrypted data can only be read by the resource 104.

- 206.4 encryption of the access token with an encryption key based on at least a portion of the encryption information associated with the identifier contained in the first data field of the conservation token. The encrypted access token is intended to be decrypted by the user's terminal 102.

According to one characteristic of the invention, the access token and the storage token each include a validity date. Advantageously, their validity dates are identical. This then makes it possible to know the date of validity of the access token without having to decipher it (i.e. only by consulting the date of validity of the conservation token).

According to a first embodiment, the encryption step 206.4 of the access token implements a symmetric cryptographic method. In other words, the key used to encrypt the data is identical to the key used to decrypt the data. In this case the information of encryption includes at least: an answer to a question, a fingerprint or a voice print.

Advantageously, the encryption information comprises several answers to questions to which the user has previously responded.

According to a second embodiment, the step of encryption 206.4 of the access token implements an asymmetric cryptographic method. In this case, the encryption information comprises at least one public key of a cryptographic key pair whose private key is stored in a memory of an object held by the user, for example a secure usb key.

The use of an encryption for the access token makes it possible to consider storing this token on the terminal 103 for a duration greater than one day without compromising the security of the resource. Indeed, even if the terminal 103 is stolen by an attacker, it will be unable to use the access token to access the resource, as long as this access token remains encrypted in the storage token.

To be used and sent to the box, the token must be decrypted using the key that was used for encryption. This key is restored by obtaining from the user, the encryption data (for example, its answers to questions) chosen to encrypt the token.

If the encryption data is correctly filled, the terminal 103 decrypts the token, then transmits it to the housing 104.

Upon receipt of the token, the box 104 first verifies the signature of Idp 101. For that it calculates the condensate of the token using the same hashing algorithm that used by Idp 101 (for example SHA-1). It also decrypts the signature, using the public key of Idp 101 and using the same algorithm (for example RSA) and obtains the condensate calculated by Idp 101. If the two condensates are identical, the signature is validated. Otherwise, the token is rejected.

The data (access_token), containing the rights of the user, of the access token are then decrypted using the private key of the box 104. The enclosure is then ready to allow access in accordance with the rights specified in the access token.

Claims

1. A method of creating a token authorizing a user's terminal (103) (102) to access a resource (104) having a memory in which a private key is stored, comprising steps of:

generating (206) a storage token by an authentication device (101),

transmission (207) of the generated storage token to the terminal

(103),

characterized in that said step (206) of generating the conservation token comprises steps of:

- creating (206.2) a second data field having an access token, said access token comprising data describing rights granted to the user's terminal (103) (102) on the resource (104);

encryption (206.3) of the data describing access rights, with a public key associated with the private key stored in the memory of the resource

(104),

A method of creating a token according to claim 1, characterized in that the access token has a validity date indicating an expiration date of the rights granted to the user, the generation step (206). the retention token further includes adding an expiration date to said retention token, the expiration date of the retention token being the same as the expiration date of the access token.

3. Method of creating a token according to one of the preceding claims characterized in that the step of encryption (206.4) of the access token implements a symmetric cryptographic method.

4. Method of creating a token according to the preceding claim, characterized in that the encryption information comprises at least: an answer to a question, a fingerprint or a voice print.

5. Method for creating a token according to one of claims 1 or 2, characterized in that, the step of encryption (206.4) of the access token implements an asymmetric cryptographic method.

6. A method of creating a token according to the preceding claim, characterized in that the encryption information comprises at least one public key of a cryptographic key pair whose private key is stored in a memory of an object held by the user.

7. A method of creating a token according to one of the preceding claims characterized in that it further comprises a step of signing the access token and the storage token with a private key of the authentication device (101). ).

8. Authorization token for a terminal (103) of a user (102) to access a resource (104) having a memory in which a private key is stored, characterized in that it comprises:

a second data field comprising an access token, said access token comprising data describing rights granted to the user's terminal (103) on the resource (104), the data describing access rights being with a public key associated with the private key stored in the resource's memory (104),

9. Device (101) for creating a token authorizing a terminal (103) of a user (102) to access a resource (104) having a memory in which is stored a private key, comprising means for generating a a storage token and means for transmitting said conservation token to the terminal (103), characterized in that the storage token generation means comprise:

means for creating a first data field comprising at least one identifier associated with encryption information, at least part of which is intended to be used as an encryption key;

means for creating a second data field comprising an access token, said access token comprising data describing rights granted to the user's terminal (103) on the resource (104);

means for encrypting the data describing access rights, with a public key associated with the private key stored in the memory of the resource (104),