EP2603905A1 - Method and device for detecting and verifying attempts to manipulate a self-service terminal - Google Patents
Method and device for detecting and verifying attempts to manipulate a self-service terminalInfo
- Publication number
- EP2603905A1 EP2603905A1 EP11741562.0A EP11741562A EP2603905A1 EP 2603905 A1 EP2603905 A1 EP 2603905A1 EP 11741562 A EP11741562 A EP 11741562A EP 2603905 A1 EP2603905 A1 EP 2603905A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- classifier
- image data
- self
- service terminal
- manipulation
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 27
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 18
- 230000001960 triggered effect Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 4
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 claims description 14
- 230000008859 change Effects 0.000 claims description 6
- 238000003708 edge detection Methods 0.000 claims description 6
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 claims description 4
- 230000000007 visual effect Effects 0.000 claims description 4
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims description 2
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 3
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 3
- 239000011159 matrix material Substances 0.000 description 3
- 230000002159 abnormal effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000010276 construction Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000001419 dependent effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000010191 image analysis Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012423 maintenance Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000009467 reduction Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000000926 separation method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000013179 statistical model Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012360 testing method Methods 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G08—SIGNALLING
- G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
- G08B13/00—Burglar, theft or intruder alarms
- G08B13/18—Actuation by interference with heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength; Actuation by intruding sources of heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength
- G08B13/189—Actuation by interference with heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength; Actuation by intruding sources of heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength using passive radiation detection systems
- G08B13/194—Actuation by interference with heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength; Actuation by intruding sources of heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength using passive radiation detection systems using image scanning and comparing systems
- G08B13/196—Actuation by interference with heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength; Actuation by intruding sources of heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength using passive radiation detection systems using image scanning and comparing systems using television cameras
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F19/00—Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
- G07F19/20—Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F19/00—Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
- G07F19/20—Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
- G07F19/207—Surveillance aspects at ATMs
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method for detecting and verifying manipulation attempts on a self-service terminal according to the preamble of claim 1. Furthermore, the invention relates to a device operating according to the method, in particular a yersund control unit, and a self-service terminal equipped therewith, in particular designed as an ATM self-service terminal.
- self-service terminals hereinafter also referred to as self-service terminals, especially at ATMs
- criminal acts are often carried out in the form of manipulation, which pursue the goal, sensitive data, in particular PINs (Personal Identification Numbers) and / or card numbers of users of the SB Spy on the terminals.
- manipulation attempts are known in which so-called skimming devices, such as keyboard superstructures and the like, are installed illegally in the operating area or control panel.
- Such keyboard superstructures often have their own power supply, as well as a processor, a memory and an operating program, so that an unsuspecting user is spied on entering his PIN or inserting his bank card.
- the spied out data is then over transmit a transmitter integrated into the keyboard superstructure to a remote receiver or are stored in a data memory located in the keyboard superstructure.
- Many of today's skimming devices are very difficult to distinguish with the human eye from original controls (keyboard, card reader, etc.).
- monitoring systems which have one or more cameras which are mounted in the area of the location of the self-service terminal and detect the entire control panel and often also the area of residence of the user.
- Such a solution is described for example in DE 201 02 477 ül.
- a sensor is provided in order to distinguish whether a person is in the occupied area.
- US 2009/0057395 A1 discloses a method and a device for detecting and verifying manipulation attempts at an ATM.
- various sensors are used (see text section [0063]), such as cameras or proximity sensors (“proximity sensor”), the signals or data to a microprocessor-controlled unit (“microprocessor 32") deliver.
- microprocessor 32 microprocessor-controlled unit
- data processing is then performed on the basis of a statistical model having a classifier (see paragraphs [0081] - [0085]) to infer a normal operating condition or an abnormal operating condition of the ATM, the latter could show a manipulation attempt proposed to detect a manipulation attempt on the basis of a classifier, which is fed with data from different sensors.
- the reliability of this principle requires the use of several different sensors and the effort to tune the classifier to the various sensors.
- devices and methods for detecting tampering attempts on a self-service terminal are known, wherein a camera is based on at least one operating element, such as e.g. Keyboard, cash dispenser, etc., is aligned and wherein the image data generated by the camera are evaluated by means of a classifier to detect a tampering attempt.
- the known solutions require a high amount of hardware and software to achieve the safest and error-free manipulation detection.
- the image data generated by the camera be supplied to a first classifier, by means of which the image data is used to check whether a manipulation attempt is recognizable on the operating element, and that the image data are also fed to a second classifier in parallel with the first classifier, by means of which it is checked on the basis of the image data whether the detection of a manipulation attempt is plausible.
- the invention is based on the recognition that the conventional devices not infrequently operate faulty and even then skimming show, if no attempt at
- Manipulation of the self-service terminal is present. Applicant has observed that users on the control panel b2w. the control panel of self-service terminals, such as ATMs, personal belongings, especially purses, wallets, notes, etc., and this can then lead to a false skimming alarm.
- the second classifier by using a further classifier working in parallel, which checks for plausibility of the image data, it is ensured that an alarm is generated only when, based on the situation detected by the camera, a genuine manipulation attempt has to be reasonably assumed.
- the first classifier may recognize an abnormal situation and want to display a manipulation attempt in the case of a purse left on the keyboard
- the second classifier would be the purse, in particular its contour and / or position rather than untypical of a keyboard superstructure (manipulation or skimming -Over) and thus prevent the triggering of a false alarm.
- the image data in the classifiers are processed independently of each other.
- the classifiers thus come independently of each other's results, with the first result (output value of the first classifier) being verified by the second result (output value of the second classifier) or not.
- meaningful events that are not meaningful can be reliably separated.
- a parallel-operating structure of two or more classifiers is proposed for this purpose.
- the first classifier evaluates the image data on the basis of first features in order to obtain a first output value which determines the probability of the presence of a change in the visual appearance of the image Indicates control.
- first features relate, for example, to the edge lengths of a keyboard whose photo is subjected to edge image detection.
- the second classifier evaluates the image data based on second features to obtain a second output value indicative of the likelihood of a manipulation-typical change in the visual appearance of the control.
- These second features relate for example to the relative position or position of the edges to each other.
- a keyboard as well as in a skimming superstructure, most of the edges are aligned parallel or perpendicular to each other, with an object left lying, e.g. Purses, edges also occur that are neither parallel nor perpendicular to the other edges (the keyboard). Therefore, a plausibility test leads to the result that most likely no manipulation attempt is present. Also the feature "ambient lighting" leads to very reliable results.
- the output values of the classifiers are preferably between 0 and 1.
- the first output value is compared with a first threshold value or the second output value with a second threshold value, whereby a first or second binary value can be obtained, which in turn can be logically processed.
- the binary values can be supplied to an AND link, for example, in order to obtain a reliable statement as to whether manipulation has been carried out at the SB terminal or not. If a tampering attempt is detected, in addition to or as an alternative to triggering an alert, self-service terminal and / or trigger an additional camera (portrait camera) to take photos of suspicious persons who may have done the manipulation. It may also be provided to deactivate the tamper detection or the camera (s) during the maintenance of the self-service terminal to avoid false alarms.
- an alarm is triggered only if, by means of the first classifier, a manipulation attempt.
- the control element is detected and if the recognition of the manipulation attempt is assessed as plausible by means of the second classifier.
- a display, in particular notification, for an operator and / or users of the self-service terminal is generated, and then if by means of the first classifier a manipulation attempt is detected on the control element and if by means of the second classifier, the detection of the manipulation attempt as not is valued plausibly.
- the notification is preferably sent to the operator and / or user of the self-service terminal via a communication service, in particular email or SMS.
- a device for detecting and verifying manipulation attempts on a self-service terminal which has at least one operating element for users, to which at least one camera is aligned, the device being connected to the at least one camera and generated by the camera Receiving image data, and wherein the device comprises a data processing unit with a first classifier, which checks on the image data, if a manipulation attempt is to be recognized on the operating element, wherein the data processing unit of the device has a second classifier, which processes the image data parallel to the first classifier and checks whether the detection of a manipulation attempt is plausible.
- a self-service terminal that has such a device.
- the device may preferably be provided by means of a computer b2w present in the self-service terminal. PC be realized.
- the self-service terminal is designed as an ATM.
- the at least one operating element is a manipulation-suitable element, in particular a keyboard or a PIN pad, a cash dispenser and / or a card input funnel.
- the at least one control element detected by the camera should have optically clearly recognizable features, in particular have edges delimiting homogeneous surfaces.
- the image data generated by the camera (s) can be processed by means of edge detection, for example by creating at least one edge image and comparing its characteristic data with the pattern data of a reference edge image.
- edge detection not only causes a significant data reduction, but also increases the speed and reliability of the image analysis.
- the camera detects the elements that are particularly suitable for manipulation and / or the elements arranged in particularly manipulation-suitable areas of the control panel, such as cash dispenser, keyboard, card slot and / or screen.
- the elements are therefore preferably control elements in the strict sense, but may also be other elements, such as shelf space in the control area or the like.
- the lying of objects is reliably detected.
- an automatic notification service can be realized, which in particular indicates to users or customers that personal items have been left at the self-service terminal.
- Flg. 1 shows in the form of a block diagram the construction of a self-service terminal according to the invention, referred to as
- Fig. 2 shows a schematic flow diagram for a
- 3 is a decision matrix for illustrating the
- the ATM terminal illustrated in FIG. 1 is embodied as an ATM ATM and has a control panel with a plurality of elements or operating elements, of which a keyboard KBD, a cash dispensing shaft SHT and a card input hopper CSL are shown by way of example in the form of individual functional blocks.
- Each control element is monitored by a camera CAM, CAM 'or CAM ", which in turn is connected to a control device CTR, which processes and evaluates the image signals or data generated by the camera.
- the control device CTR forms a device for detecting and verifying manipulation attempts on the said operating elements KBD, SHT or CSL and is realized by means of a computer-aided hardware, here for example by means of the hardware of a PC integrated in the ATM.
- the image data coming from the cameras are processed in an image processing unit IPRC, for example by being subjected to edge detection.
- IPRC image processing unit
- the amount of data can be significantly reduced without significant information about the properties of the lose the photographed object or operating element.
- the edge images or edge image data obtained from the edge detection thus represent essential properties on the basis of which a change or manipulation of the object (eg keyboard KDB) can be detected.
- the device CTR has for each picture element a manipulation recognition module M100, M100 'or M100 ", which essentially contains a data processing instance which performs a parallel structured two-fold classification of the corresponding image data - Detection module M100, M100 'or ⁇ 100 "two parallel classifiers are used (see 110 and 120 in Fig. 2).
- the first manipulation detection module M100 is used, the function of which will be described in more detail below with reference to FIGS. 2 and 3.
- the device CTR also includes an alarm unit ALRT, which triggers an alarm when a tampering attempt is reliably detected.
- FIG. 1 An example of a method for detecting and verifying manipulation attempts will now be described with reference to FIGS. 2 and 3.
- FIG. 1 An example of a method for detecting and verifying manipulation attempts will now be described with reference to FIGS. 2 and 3.
- FIG. 2 shows a schematic sequence diagram for the method 100, which relates to the mode of operation of the manipulation detection module M100 and essentially comprises the steps 101 to 130 described below.
- a first step 101 the data generated by the camera CAM and preprocessed in the image processing unit IPRC (see Fig. 1) to edge image data are provided as input data IN for the subsequent classifications.
- Features or properties A, B, C, D are extracted from the input data or processed image data, also referred to below as image data IN, which represent characteristic recognition features for the monitored object (here: control element KDB). These include, for example, the following features: edge length (top, bottom, left, right), distance of the edges of reference points or reference lines, angles of edges to each other, angles of edges compared to reference lines, histogram, lighting conditions, and the like.
- a first subset of the features (eg features A and B) is supplied to a first classifier CF in a step 110 and one, preferably another, second subset (eg features C and D) is fed in a parallel step 120 to a second classifier SC.
- the first classifier CF takes the function of a.
- Main classifier or a tamper evidence collector which checks whether tampering is likely or not. This is done, for example, by checking the features A (edge lengths at different positions) and B (distances between different edges) by comparing them with corresponding reference values.
- the output value OUT1 is the number or frequency with which characteristics (one or more of them) do not match the reference values.
- the output value is between 0 and 1.
- An output value of 0.7 and more indicates that (very) many deviations have been detected, so that (very) probably there is a manipulation of the object (in this case keyboard KBD or PIN pad). Whether the detected manipulation is a real manipulation, eg a keyboard superstructure, can not be predicted with certainty.
- the second (parallel) classifier SC therefore assumes the function of a subclassifier or a verifier and checks whether the image data IN reproduces a typical situation for a manipulation at all. This check is done, for example, by checking the characteristics C (angle of edges among each other) and D ⁇ ambient light conditions).
- the output value OUT2 is the number or frequency with which the detected characteristics (one or more of them) do not deviate from the typical reference values. An output value of 0.3 and less indicates that the plausibility of a manipulation is low.
- the output values OUT1 and OÜT2 are weighted and / or compared with threshold values TH1 and TH2, respectively, so that logically connectable values OUT1 * and OUT2 *, respectively, result show either a YES or a NO. If the value OUT1 * corresponds to the logical value "1", this means that the classification CF has detected tampering, which is symbolized here by a "Y” (for English "Yes"), otherwise an "N” results. If the value OUT2 * also corresponds to a "Y”, this means that the manipulation is plausible.
- the thresholds TH1 and TH2 are set in the middle value range, e.g. is set at about 0.5, so that output values greater than 0.5 mean a clear "Y * (statement” Yes "or” Yes ").
- step 130 By a logical AND operation carried out in step 130, which is also illustrated by means of FIG. 3, the final result is obtained.
- a manipulation attempt is only clearly recognized and verified if both classifiers each yield a positive result "Y", ie if the first classifier recognizes CF for manipulation and the second independently recognizes a plausible manipulation situation.
- the second classifier SC ensures a reasonable decision and could therefore also be called a "sanity checker.”
- the strict separation of the two classifiers or their tasks makes the manipulation detection proposed here very robust against wrong decisions ,
- the camera signals are first subjected to image processing (edge detection) (see block IPRC in Fig. 1). From this, features are extracted (A to D in Fig. 2), e.g. the edge lengths, distances, angles, ambient lighting conditions, etc. concern. These features are then classified.
- the first classifier CF e.g. classifies the features "edge length” and "angle” to detect tampering; in the second classifier CF, the other characteristics "angle" and / or “ambient light” are classified in order to check the plausibility (sanity check).
- the invention can also be carried out in such a way that quantities are classified, for example with the first classifier, and qualities with the second classifier.
- the plausibility check makes it possible to deduce the presence of a foreign object, which is not a skimming device, but merely a personal object of a user in the event of a detected change to the monitored object.
- the system can initiate an automatic notification of the user or customer, for example via email or SMS.
- Possibility offers a new customer service.
- the operator of the self-service terminal will in this case also be notified immediately in order to keep the forgotten item for the customer for later collection. So if objects are left on the SS terminal, an automatic
- the present invention has been described using the example of an ATM, but is not limited thereto, but can be applied to any type of self-service terminals.
- ATM self-service terminal designed as an ATM, with the following controls:
- CTR device here control device for ATM with:
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- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
- Finance (AREA)
- User Interface Of Digital Computer (AREA)
- Image Analysis (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE102010036961A DE102010036961A1 (en) | 2010-08-12 | 2010-08-12 | Method and device for detecting and verifying manipulation attempts on a self-service terminal |
PCT/EP2011/063510 WO2012019968A1 (en) | 2010-08-12 | 2011-08-05 | Method and device for detecting and verifying attempts to manipulate a self-service terminal |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP2603905A1 true EP2603905A1 (en) | 2013-06-19 |
EP2603905B1 EP2603905B1 (en) | 2021-09-29 |
Family
ID=44509812
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP11741562.0A Active EP2603905B1 (en) | 2010-08-12 | 2011-08-05 | Method and device for detecting and verifying attempts to manipulate a self-service terminal |
Country Status (3)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP2603905B1 (en) |
DE (1) | DE102010036961A1 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2012019968A1 (en) |
Families Citing this family (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
EP2736026B1 (en) | 2012-11-26 | 2020-03-25 | Wincor Nixdorf International GmbH | Device for reading out a magnetic strip and/or chip card with a camera for detecting inserted skimming modules |
EP2897112B1 (en) | 2014-01-17 | 2019-03-06 | Wincor Nixdorf International GmbH | Method and apparatus for the prevention of false alarms in monitoring systems |
EP2897108B1 (en) | 2014-01-17 | 2020-04-22 | Wincor Nixdorf International GmbH | Test unit for detecting skimming modules |
US11657681B1 (en) | 2022-02-25 | 2023-05-23 | Kyndryl, Inc. | System to prevent full ATM enclosure skimming attacks |
Family Cites Families (7)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
GB2351585B (en) * | 1999-06-29 | 2003-09-03 | Ncr Int Inc | Self service terminal |
DE20102477U1 (en) | 2000-02-22 | 2001-05-03 | Wincor Nixdorf Gmbh & Co Kg | Device for protecting self-service machines against manipulation |
WO2005109315A2 (en) * | 2004-04-30 | 2005-11-17 | Utc Fire & Safety Corp. | Atm security system |
US20060169764A1 (en) * | 2005-01-28 | 2006-08-03 | Ncr Corporation | Self-service terminal |
US20090201372A1 (en) * | 2006-02-13 | 2009-08-13 | Fraudhalt, Ltd. | Method and apparatus for integrated atm surveillance |
JP4961158B2 (en) * | 2006-04-12 | 2012-06-27 | 日立オムロンターミナルソリューションズ株式会社 | Automatic transaction device and suspicious object detection system |
US7942315B2 (en) | 2007-09-05 | 2011-05-17 | Ncr Corporation | Self-service terminal |
-
2010
- 2010-08-12 DE DE102010036961A patent/DE102010036961A1/en not_active Withdrawn
-
2011
- 2011-08-05 EP EP11741562.0A patent/EP2603905B1/en active Active
- 2011-08-05 WO PCT/EP2011/063510 patent/WO2012019968A1/en active Application Filing
Non-Patent Citations (2)
Title |
---|
None * |
See also references of WO2012019968A1 * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
EP2603905B1 (en) | 2021-09-29 |
WO2012019968A1 (en) | 2012-02-16 |
DE102010036961A1 (en) | 2012-02-16 |
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