EP0813723B1 - Chip card with protected operating system - Google Patents
Chip card with protected operating system Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- EP0813723B1 EP0813723B1 EP96905687A EP96905687A EP0813723B1 EP 0813723 B1 EP0813723 B1 EP 0813723B1 EP 96905687 A EP96905687 A EP 96905687A EP 96905687 A EP96905687 A EP 96905687A EP 0813723 B1 EP0813723 B1 EP 0813723B1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- chip card
- operating system
- adr
- command
- processor
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Revoked
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Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/355—Personalisation of cards for use
- G06Q20/3552—Downloading or loading of personalisation data
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/355—Personalisation of cards for use
- G06Q20/3558—Preliminary personalisation for transfer to user
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/357—Cards having a plurality of specified features
- G06Q20/3576—Multiple memory zones on card
Definitions
- Smart cards are found in a wide variety of different ways Areas of daily life application. Accordingly there are very large quantities of them in circulation. Usually a variety of measures are envisaged to after issuing the chip card, i.e. during normal Use, financial loss especially for the respective Avoid cardholders. For example, after losing a card at least unauthorized use of the card any third party can be prevented.
- JP 62-221 089 describes a blocking of a chip card canceled during initialization by reading a data code and with a corresponding one stored on the chip card Data code is compared. Only if there is a match of the code stored on the chip card with the code to be entered by the user becomes the card for initialization Approved. A comparison is therefore made. Of the The data code used for comparison is already on the card contain.
- the chip card In the chip card present in JP 61-235 994 user-specific by a user during initialization Data entered.
- the chip card contains two different ones Command sentences.
- the first instruction set enables the Execution of the initialization. After successful graduation initialization is done by setting a so-called "end flags "instead of the first instruction set the second one is activated.
- a chip card according to the preamble of claim 1 can be found in EP-A-540 095.
- the invention has for its object protection for to specify a chip card that is already in the intermediate phase between their manufacture and their transfer to the normal Use is effective. It should therefore be excluded in particular be that e.g. in the on the smart card during manufacture applied program code itself, especially in the Operating system code, inspected or unauthorized or can be changed unprofessionally.
- the object is achieved with that specified in claim 1 Smart card.
- the internal processor and one for recording an operating system for operating the processor and this in turn, if necessary, further functional elements the chip card, e.g. Power supply, data interface to exchange data between the chip card and external Writing and reading stations and the like, serving non-volatile Program memory coordinated so that the chip card only execute a command instruction after its manufacture can, if it is for the first time with a read / write station in data connection is brought.
- This instruction causes the reloading of an operating system-specific Command table in the non-volatile memory of the processor.
- the design of a chip card according to the invention offers the Advantage that the chip card before authorization by Reloading the command table usually immediately before delivery almost in the domain of the new owner every type of unauthorized use is protected without being expensive Measures in the hardware or software area of the chip card should be provided, which the production of the chip card make it more expensive and possibly limit its usability would.
- the chip card for executing the load command alone it is easily possible the chip card for executing the load command alone to upgrade for the command table.
- the chip card prepares reloading the command table in terms of data technology for an authorized in possession of the code of the command table Facility, such as a bank, no problems. In this process, you can also use any of these at the same time further, the respective chip card e.g. regarding the individualized data are transmitted to new users.
- a transfer the command table in cryptologically encrypted Create form When loading, the sequences of the transmitted code instructions in the command table are intercepted will. Nevertheless, the command table arrives not in plain text in the hands of possibly unauthorized persons.
- Cryptographic encryption is advantageous protected by a so-called checksum.
- the invention is based on that shown in the figure Embodiment explained in more detail.
- FIG. 1 On the right side of the figure is exemplary in descriptive A section of the sequence of successive tables Instructions of the operating system code BSC shown.
- the table is mentally both after to continue above as well as below.
- the section shows an example of a preceding entry address adr k-1 and a subsequent entry address adr k.
- the one of these Line of operating system command code assigned to entry addresses and the one to the next entry address the following lines of the operating system command code form a Group that executes a specific user command causes.
- the chip card becomes a current user command AWB x preferably from an external read / write station fed.
- This requires a command table KTB, which almost an access to the functional subunits of the Operating system BSC enables key.
- Exemplary consists of each line of the command table KTB a first code part bic k, which for interpretation, i.e. to recognize the type, the current user command AWB x serves, and from a second code part adr k, which the Start address of the associated operating system command sequence contains.
- the command table KTB thus consists of a first part table BIT, which is used for command interpretation serving codes bic 1, bic 2, bic 3 ... bic k ...
- a with AWB x designated user command supplied to the chip card This is done by coding bic k as a permissible command recognized what is shown in the figure by a dashed line the left side of the command table KTB is shown. Now the associated entry address adr k is activated and hereby the code of the operating system BSC from the beginning at Entry address adr k on executed. In the figure is the Call of the operating system sequence belonging to the user command AWB x by one of the corresponding cell in the command table KTB up to the entry address adr k Arrow SBS shown.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
- Strategic Management (AREA)
- Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
- General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
- Credit Cards Or The Like (AREA)
- Developing Agents For Electrophotography (AREA)
- Coupling Device And Connection With Printed Circuit (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Chipkarten finden in stark steigendem Maße in unterschiedlichsten Bereichen des täglichen Lebens Anwendung. Dementsprechend sind sehr große Mengen derselben im Umlauf. Üblicherweise sind eine Vielzahl von Maßnahmen vorgesehen, um nach der Ausgabe der Chipkarte, d.h. während der normalen Benutzung, Vermögensschäden insbesondere für den jeweiligen Kartenbesitzer zu vermeiden. So muß z.B. nach einem Kartenverlust zumindest eine unbefugte Benutzung der Karte durch beliebige Dritte verhindert werden.Smart cards are found in a wide variety of different ways Areas of daily life application. Accordingly there are very large quantities of them in circulation. Usually a variety of measures are envisaged to after issuing the chip card, i.e. during normal Use, financial loss especially for the respective Avoid cardholders. For example, after losing a card at least unauthorized use of the card any third party can be prevented.
Aufgrund der steigenden mengenmäßigen Verbreitung müssen aber auch Maßnahmen vorgesehen werden, um insbesondere größere Kartenmengen bereits vor deren einzelner Ausgabe an die Endkunden zu schützen. So werden Karten z.B. in u.U. sehr großen Mengen von einem Kartenhersteller an einen Verteiler von Karten, z.B. an ein Geldinstitut geschickt. Dieser Weg ist vergleichbar mit dem Transport von größeren Geldmengen zwischen Banken, und somit entsprechend gefährdet.Due to the increasing volume distribution, however measures are also envisaged, especially for larger ones Card quantities before they are issued to end customers to protect. So cards are e.g. in some circumstances very big Quantities from a card manufacturer to a distributor of cards, e.g. sent to a financial institution. This way is comparable with the transportation of larger amounts of money between Banks, and thus at risk accordingly.
In der JP 62-221 089 wird eine Blockierung einer Chipkarte bei der Initialisierung aufgehoben, indem ein Datencode eingelesen und mit einem auf der Chipkarte gespeicherten, entsprechenden Datencode verglichen wird. Nur bei einer Übereinstimmung des auf der Chipkarte gespeicherten Codes mit dem vom Benutzer einzugebenden Code wird die Karte zur Initialisierung freigegeben. Es findet somit ein Vergleich statt. Der zum Vergleich herangezogene Datencode ist schon auf der Karte enthalten.JP 62-221 089 describes a blocking of a chip card canceled during initialization by reading a data code and with a corresponding one stored on the chip card Data code is compared. Only if there is a match of the code stored on the chip card with the code to be entered by the user becomes the card for initialization Approved. A comparison is therefore made. Of the The data code used for comparison is already on the card contain.
Bei der in der JP 61-235 994 vorliegenden Chipkarte werden von einem Benutzer bei einer Initialisierung benutzerspezifische Daten eingegeben. Die Chipkarte enthält zwei verschiedene Befehlssatze. Der erste Befehlssatz ermöglicht die Durchführung der Initialisierung. Nach erfolgreichem Abschluß der Initialisierung wird durch Setzen eines sogenannten "end flags" anstelle des ersten Befehlssatzes der zweite aktiviert.In the chip card present in JP 61-235 994 user-specific by a user during initialization Data entered. The chip card contains two different ones Command sentences. The first instruction set enables the Execution of the initialization. After successful graduation initialization is done by setting a so-called "end flags "instead of the first instruction set the second one is activated.
Hierdurch wird die Chipkarte für den weiteren Gebrauch durch den Benutzer freigegeben.This makes the chip card for further use released by the user.
Eine Chipkarte entsprechend dem Oberbegriff von Anspruch 1 ist der EP-A-540 095 entnehmbar.A chip card according to the preamble of
Der Erfindung liegt die Aufgabe zugrunde einen Schutz für eine Chipkarte anzugeben, der bereits in der Zwischenphase zwischen deren Herstellung und deren Übergabe in den normalen Gebrauch wirksam ist. Es soll somit insbesondere ausgeschlossen sein, daß z.B. in den bei der Herstellung auf die Chipkarte aufgebrachten Programmcode selbst, insbesondere in den Code des Betriebssystems, Einsicht genommen bzw. dieser unbefugt oder unprofessionell verändert werden kann.The invention has for its object protection for to specify a chip card that is already in the intermediate phase between their manufacture and their transfer to the normal Use is effective. It should therefore be excluded in particular be that e.g. in the on the smart card during manufacture applied program code itself, especially in the Operating system code, inspected or unauthorized or can be changed unprofessionally.
Die Aufgabe wird gelöst mit der im Anspruch 1 angegebenen
Chipkarte. Dabei sind der interne Prozessor und ein zur Aufnahme
eines Betriebssystems zum Betrieb des Prozessors und
hierüber wiederum gegebenenfalls weiterer Funktionselemente
der Chipkarte, wie z.B. Energieversorgung, Datenschnittstelle
zum Austausch von Daten zwischen der Chipkarte und externen
Schreib- und Lesestationen u.dgl., dienender nichtflüchtigter
Programmspeicher so aufeinander abgestimmt, daß die Chipkarte
nach ihrer Herstellung nur eine Befehlsanweisung ausführen
kann, wenn sie erstmalig mit einer Schreib-Lesestation in
datentechnische Verbindung gebracht wird. Diese Befehlsanweisung
bewirkt das Nachladen einer betriebssystemspezifischen
Kommandotabelle in den nichtflüchtigen Speicher des Prozessors.
Erst nach erfolgreicher Beendigung dieser Ladeoperation
ist eine Zuordnung von weiteren, insbesondere über externe
Schreib-Lesestationen der Chipkarte zugeführten Anwenderbefehlsanweisungen
zu den für deren Ausführung vorgesehenen,
jeweiligen Betriebssystemteilen möglich. Die Ausführung der
für eine ordnungsgemäße Funktionsfähigkeit der Chipkarte
gehörigen Befehlsanweisungen in Bezug auf alle während der
Normalnutzung maximal möglichen Operationen ist somit erst
nach Einbindung der Kommandotabelle möglich. The object is achieved with that specified in
Diese Ausführung bietet den Vorteil, daß u.U. auch sehr große Mengen frisch hergestellter Chipkarten nahezu vollkommen unbrauchbar sind. Die Ermöglichung der Gebrauchsfertigkeit erfolgt vielmehr separat für jede einzelne Chipkarte meist erst unmittelbar vor deren Übergabe an den berechtigten Endbenutzer. Neu hergestellte Chipkarten, in deren nichtflüchtigem Speicher bzw. anderen Speicherbereichen zwar die Codierung der aufeinanderfolgenden Betriebssystembefehlsanweisungen geladen ist, sind deswegen nicht funktionsfähig, weil aufgrund der fehlenden Kommandotabelle eingehende Anwenderbefehlsanweisungen nicht identifiziert und der bzw. die zu deren Ausführung benötigten Betriebssystemteile wegen der nicht vorhandenen, dazugehörigen Verzweigadressen nicht aktiviert werden können. Praktisch ist es mit vernünftigem Zeit- und Mittelaufwand nahezu nicht möglich, in der Art eines Reverse-Engineering die funktionelle Struktur des Betriebssystems so zu rekonstruieren, daß die zur Ausführung einzelner Anwenderbefehlsanweisung gehörigen Teile und deren mögliche Wechselwirkungen in Form von Einsprungadressen zugänglich werden.This version has the advantage that under certain circumstances also very large Quantities of freshly produced chip cards are almost completely unusable are. The readiness for use is enabled rather, usually separately for each individual chip card immediately before they are handed over to the authorized end user. Newly manufactured chip cards, in their non-volatile Memory or other memory areas, the coding the successive operating system command instructions are not functional because of the missing command table incoming user command instructions not identified and the to operating system parts required because of the nonexistent, associated branch addresses not activated can be. It is practical with reasonable Time and resources almost impossible, in the manner of reverse engineering the functional structure of the operating system to be reconstructed in such a way that the execution parts belonging to individual user instructions and their possible interactions accessible in the form of entry addresses will.
Die Gestaltung einer Chipkarte gemäß der Erfindung bietet den Vorteil, daß die Chipkarte vor deren Autorisierung durch Nachladen der Kommandotabelle meist unmittelbar vor Übergabe in den Herrschaftsbereich des neuen Besitzers nahezu gegen jede Art von unbefugtem Gebrauch geschützt ist, ohne daß aufwendige Maßnahmen im Hard- oder Softwarebereich der Chipkarte vorgesehen werden müßten, welche die Herstellung der Chipkarte verteuern und deren Gebrauchs fähigkeit möglicherweise einschränken würden. Einerseits ist auf einfache Weise möglich, die Chipkarte zur alleinigen Ausführbarkeit des Ladebefehls für die Kommandotabelle zu ertüchtigen. Andererseits bereitet das Nachladen der Kommandotabelle datentechnisch für eine befugterweise im Besitz des Codes der Kommandotabelle befindliche Einrichtung, wie z.B. eine Bank, keinerlei Probleme. Bei diesem Vorgang können bei Bedarf gleichzeitig auch beliebige weitere, die jeweilige Chipkarte z.B. bezüglich des neuen Benutzers individualisierende Daten übertragen werden.The design of a chip card according to the invention offers the Advantage that the chip card before authorization by Reloading the command table usually immediately before delivery almost in the domain of the new owner every type of unauthorized use is protected without being expensive Measures in the hardware or software area of the chip card should be provided, which the production of the chip card make it more expensive and possibly limit its usability would. On the one hand, it is easily possible the chip card for executing the load command alone to upgrade for the command table. On the other hand prepares reloading the command table in terms of data technology for an authorized in possession of the code of the command table Facility, such as a bank, no problems. In this process, you can also use any of these at the same time further, the respective chip card e.g. regarding the individualized data are transmitted to new users.
Neben der Verhinderung unbefugter Benutzung von Chipkarten vor deren Übergabe in den normalen Gebrauch wird durch die Erfindung auch unterbunden, daß in dieser Zwischenphase in den bei der Herstellung auf die Chipkarte aufgebrachten Programmcode selbst, insbesondere der Code des Betriebssystems, in unbefugter Weise Einsicht genommen bzw. dieser unbefugt oder unprofessionell verändert wird.In addition to preventing unauthorized use of chip cards before they are put into normal use by the Invention also prevented that in this intermediate phase in the program code applied to the chip card during manufacture itself, especially the operating system code, inspected in an unauthorized manner or unauthorized or is changed unprofessionally.
Gemäß einer vorteilhaften weiteren Ausgestaltung der Erfindung können zusätzlich Mittel vorhanden sein, eine Übertragung der Kommandotabelle in kryptologisch verschlüsselter Form bewirken. Beim Ladevorgang können dann die Sequenzen der übertragenen Codeanweisungen der Kommandotabelle zwar abgehört werden. Dennoch gelangt hierdurch die Kommandotabelle nicht im Klartext in die Hände möglicherweise unbefugter Personen. Vorteilhaft wird die krypotologische Verschlüsselung mittels eine sogenannten Prüfsumme geschützt.According to an advantageous further embodiment of the invention there may be additional means, a transfer the command table in cryptologically encrypted Create form. When loading, the sequences of the transmitted code instructions in the command table are intercepted will. Nevertheless, the command table arrives not in plain text in the hands of possibly unauthorized persons. Cryptographic encryption is advantageous protected by a so-called checksum.
Die Erfindung wird nachfolgend an dem in der Figur dargestellten Ausführungsbeispiel näher erläutert.The invention is based on that shown in the figure Embodiment explained in more detail.
Auf der rechten Seite der Figur ist beispielhaft in anschaulicher Tabellenform ein Ausschnitt aus der Sequenz der aufeinanderfolgenden Anweisungen des Betriebssystemcodes BSC dargestellt. Dabei ist gedanklich die Tabelle sowohl nach oben als auch nach unter fortzusetzen. Der Ausschnitt zeigt beispielhaft eine vorangehende Einsprungadresse adr k-1 und eine darauf folgende Einsprungadresse adr k. Die einer dieser Einsprungsadressen zugeordnete Zeile des Betriebssystembefehlscodes und die bis zur nächsten Einsprungadresse darauf folgenden Zeilen des Betriebssystembefehlscodes bilden eine Gruppe, welche die Ausführung eines bestimmten Anwenderkommandos bewirkt. On the right side of the figure is exemplary in descriptive A section of the sequence of successive tables Instructions of the operating system code BSC shown. The table is mentally both after to continue above as well as below. The section shows an example of a preceding entry address adr k-1 and a subsequent entry address adr k. The one of these Line of operating system command code assigned to entry addresses and the one to the next entry address the following lines of the operating system command code form a Group that executes a specific user command causes.
Im Beispiel der Figur wird der Chipkarte ein aktuelles Anwenderkommando
AWB x bevorzugt von einer externen Schreib-Lesestation
zugeführt. Dieses soll vom Betriebssystem ausgeführt
werden. Hierzu wird eine Kommandotabelle KTB benötigt, welche
quasi einen den Zugang zu den funktionellen Teileinheiten des
Betriebssystems BSC ermöglichenden Schlüssel darstellt. Beispielhaft
besteht jede Zeile der Kommandotabelle KTB aus
einem ersten Codeteil bic k, welcher zur Interpretation, d.h.
zur Erkennung des Typs, des aktuellen Anwenderkommandos AWB x
dient, und aus einem zweiten Codeteil adr k, welcher die
Startadresse der dazugehörigen Betriebssystembefehlssequenz
enthält. Die Kommandotabelle KTB besteht somit aus einer
ersten Teiltabelle BIT, welche die zur Befehlsinterpretation
dienenden Codes bic 1, bic 2, bic 3 ... bic k ... bic n-1,
bic n enthält, und aus einer zweiten Teiltabelle BSC, welche
die dazugehörigen Einsprungsadressen adr 1, adr 2, adr 3 ...
adr k ... adr n-1, adr n der entsprechenden Betriebssystemsequenzen
enthält.In the example of the figure, the chip card becomes a current user command
AWB x preferably from an external read / write station
fed. This should be done by the operating system
will. This requires a command table KTB, which
almost an access to the functional subunits of the
Operating system BSC enables key. Exemplary
consists of each line of the command table KTB
a first code part bic k, which for interpretation, i.e.
to recognize the type, the current user command AWB x
serves, and from a second code part adr k, which the
Start address of the associated operating system command sequence
contains. The command table KTB thus consists of a
first part table BIT, which is used for command interpretation
serving
Bei dem in der Figur dargestellten Beispiel wird ein mit AWB x bezeichnetes Anwenderkommando der Chipkarte zugeführt. Dieses wird durch die Codierung bic k als zulässiger Befehl erkannt, was in der Figur durch eine strichlierte Linie auf der linken Seite der Kommandotabelle KTB dargestellt ist. Nun wird die dazugehörige Einsprungadresse adr k aktiviert und hierdurch der Code des Betriebssystems BSC von Beginn bei der Einsprungadresse adr k an ausgeführt. In der Figur ist der Aufruf der zum Anwenderkommando AWB x gehörenden Betriebssystemsequenz durch einen von der entsprechenden Zelle der Kommandotabelle KTB bis zur Einsprungadresse adr k verlaufenden Pfeil SBS dargestellt.In the example shown in the figure, a with AWB x designated user command supplied to the chip card. This is done by coding bic k as a permissible command recognized what is shown in the figure by a dashed line the left side of the command table KTB is shown. Now the associated entry address adr k is activated and hereby the code of the operating system BSC from the beginning at Entry address adr k on executed. In the figure is the Call of the operating system sequence belonging to the user command AWB x by one of the corresponding cell in the command table KTB up to the entry address adr k Arrow SBS shown.
Aus dem Beispiel der Figur ist zu erkennen, daß ohne die Brückenfunktion einer Kommandotabelle KTB kein Anwenderkommando AWB x ausführbar ist, da keine Zuordnung desselben zu dem dazugehörigen Teil des Betriebssystems möglich ist. Die erfindungsgemäße Ausgestaltung der Chipkarte stellt somit einen außerordentlich wirksamen Schutz gegen unbefugte Benutzung frisch hergestellter Chipkarten dar.From the example of the figure it can be seen that without the Bridge function of a command table KTB no user command AWB x is executable, since no assignment of the same to the associated part of the operating system. The configuration of the chip card according to the invention thus represents extremely effective protection against unauthorized use freshly produced chip cards.
Claims (3)
- Chip card, having at least one internal processor and one non-volatile program memory for an operating system (BSC) of the processor, characterized in that, after its manufacture and a first data-handling connection to a read-write station, the chip card can execute only the at least one command instruction which effects the reloading of a command table (KTB) specific to the operating system into the non-volatile program memory of the processor, whereby the assignment (adr1 ... adr k ... adr n) of user command instructions (AWBx) to the parts of the operating system (BSC) respectively executing them is established.
- Chip card according to Claim 1, there being means which effect a transfer of the command table-(KTB) in a cryptologically encoded form.
- Chip card according to Claim 2, the cryptological encoding being effected by means of a check sum.
Applications Claiming Priority (3)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| DE19508724 | 1995-03-10 | ||
| DE19508724A DE19508724C1 (en) | 1995-03-10 | 1995-03-10 | Smart card with protected operating system |
| PCT/DE1996/000399 WO1996028795A1 (en) | 1995-03-10 | 1996-03-06 | Chip card with protected operating system |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| EP0813723A1 EP0813723A1 (en) | 1997-12-29 |
| EP0813723B1 true EP0813723B1 (en) | 1998-09-02 |
Family
ID=7756356
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| EP96905687A Revoked EP0813723B1 (en) | 1995-03-10 | 1996-03-06 | Chip card with protected operating system |
Country Status (8)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| EP (1) | EP0813723B1 (en) |
| CN (1) | CN1176701A (en) |
| AT (1) | ATE170647T1 (en) |
| DE (2) | DE19508724C1 (en) |
| DK (1) | DK0813723T3 (en) |
| ES (1) | ES2120809T3 (en) |
| NO (1) | NO974055L (en) |
| WO (1) | WO1996028795A1 (en) |
Families Citing this family (14)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DE19705615A1 (en) * | 1997-02-14 | 1998-06-04 | Dirk Prof Dr Ing Jansen | Chip-card for measuring and displaying temperature e.g. for monitoring foodstuffs cooling chain during transportation |
| US6317832B1 (en) | 1997-02-21 | 2001-11-13 | Mondex International Limited | Secure multiple application card system and process |
| US6230267B1 (en) | 1997-05-15 | 2001-05-08 | Mondex International Limited | IC card transportation key set |
| US6357665B1 (en) | 1998-01-22 | 2002-03-19 | Mondex International Limited | Configuration of IC card |
| DE69932412T2 (en) * | 1998-02-06 | 2007-02-22 | Mondex International Ltd. | SMART CARD CONFIGURATION |
| DE19822220B4 (en) * | 1998-05-18 | 2018-01-25 | Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security Gmbh | Access-protected disk |
| DE19841676A1 (en) * | 1998-09-11 | 2000-03-16 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | Access protected data carrier with semiconductor chip, has operation which is modified prior to its execution, and is supplied with modified input data |
| DE19845582A1 (en) * | 1998-10-02 | 2000-04-06 | Ibm | Simplified use of a chip card |
| DE19950118C2 (en) * | 1999-10-18 | 2002-03-07 | Texas Instruments Deutschland | Method for preventing unauthorized access to a memory |
| FR2840428B1 (en) * | 2002-05-30 | 2004-08-20 | Gemplus Card Int | SECURE METHOD FOR DEPLOYING A COMPUTER PROGRAM ON SEPARATE INFORMATION MEDIA |
| JP4828809B2 (en) * | 2003-12-10 | 2011-11-30 | 株式会社東芝 | IC card and processing method in IC card |
| CN1315095C (en) * | 2004-03-09 | 2007-05-09 | 上海华虹集成电路有限责任公司 | Method for configuring smart cards |
| DE102006042723A1 (en) * | 2006-09-12 | 2008-03-27 | Vodafone Holding Gmbh | Chip card and method for software-based modification of a chip card |
| DE102008036873A1 (en) * | 2008-08-07 | 2010-02-11 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | Memory management in a portable volume |
Family Cites Families (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DE3833241A1 (en) * | 1988-09-30 | 1990-04-05 | Deutsche Bundespost | METHOD FOR PROGRAMMING CHIP CARDS |
| FR2683357A1 (en) * | 1991-10-30 | 1993-05-07 | Philips Composants | MICROCIRCUIT FOR PROTECTED PROGRAMMABLE MEMORY CHIP CARD. |
-
1995
- 1995-03-10 DE DE19508724A patent/DE19508724C1/en not_active Revoked
-
1996
- 1996-03-06 DE DE59600517T patent/DE59600517D1/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 1996-03-06 WO PCT/DE1996/000399 patent/WO1996028795A1/en not_active Application Discontinuation
- 1996-03-06 DK DK96905687T patent/DK0813723T3/en active
- 1996-03-06 CN CN96192241A patent/CN1176701A/en active Pending
- 1996-03-06 EP EP96905687A patent/EP0813723B1/en not_active Revoked
- 1996-03-06 ES ES96905687T patent/ES2120809T3/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1996-03-06 AT AT96905687T patent/ATE170647T1/en not_active IP Right Cessation
-
1997
- 1997-09-03 NO NO974055A patent/NO974055L/en unknown
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN1176701A (en) | 1998-03-18 |
| NO974055D0 (en) | 1997-09-03 |
| ES2120809T3 (en) | 1998-11-01 |
| WO1996028795A1 (en) | 1996-09-19 |
| NO974055L (en) | 1997-11-10 |
| ATE170647T1 (en) | 1998-09-15 |
| DE59600517D1 (en) | 1998-10-08 |
| DE19508724C1 (en) | 1996-10-31 |
| EP0813723A1 (en) | 1997-12-29 |
| DK0813723T3 (en) | 1999-06-07 |
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