DE19920744A1 - Process for ensuring the authenticity of products - Google Patents

Abstract

The invention relates to a concept for ensuring that the product authenticity of brand-name products is clearly recognisable. Said concept comprises a method for personalising a memory chip for a trademark protection system, a testing device for testing memory chips and for verifying product data for a trademark protection system and a method for checking product data. According to the inventive concept, a product chip with a signature that is clearly identifiable throughout a system is allocated to each brand-name item. Brand-name items and therefore imitations can then be reliably identified using a testing device.

Description

The present invention relates to a concept for unequivocal recognition of the authenticity of a branded product. This implies the discovery of counterfeits.

The subject of the registration concerns a procedure for persona lization of a memory chip for a brand protection system, a test device for testing memory chips for a brand protection system and a method for checking product data.

To ensure the authenticity of products, Merk male attached to the product by the original creator should testify. These include e.g. B. holograms, companies logos, the z. B. sewn into the product, u. The last In the end, however, all of these features are counterfeit and are also imitated by the counterfeiters.

From DE 43 41 880 A1 it is known to use semiconductor chips Protection of branded products.

A test device is from the Spanish patent application Loureiro Benimeli, Fermin Jaime "LOUCARD - Universal data communication cation system for data carrier boards such as credit cards or Similar "known.

The invention is based on the problem, method and to specify orders using product chip and Test device an optimized recognition of branded articles and This also ensures reliable detection of counterfeits len.

The problem is solved according to the present invention by the Claims 1, 2 or 4 solved.  

The present invention provides methods described below Use of product chip and test device a safe detection of branded articles and thus also of counterfeits create.

The invention provides a special combination and application of cryptographic methods in the recognition of marks products ready. The combination of symmetrical and asym metric authentication when testing the product chip including the system-wide unique chip number bie highest level of security. Authentication with belonging to the symmetrical key SP-Key guarantees chip of the brand protection system, the signed product information guarantees the originality of the product Inclusion of the chip number in the cryptographic function guarantees that the product information has not been copied de. Each product chip contains a unique Si gnatur only for this product and only for this product chip fits.

In the present method, the label that is attached to the product can no longer be falsified because its production requires knowledge of secret cryptographic keys. However, these keys are only in the hands of the authorized entities:

• - the system operator SPB ("System Provider Brand") and
• - the brand name BNM ("Brand Name manufacturer").

The invention is described below as an embodiment in a scope necessary for understanding based on Figu ren explained in more detail. Show:

Fig. 1 components of the trademark protection system and

Fig. 2 shows the hierarchy of the keys in the trademark protection system.

In the figures, the same designations denote the same elements ment.  

The present inventive concept for unequivocally recognizing the authenticity of a branded product comprises

• - The creation or personalization path of the product chip
• - Personalization of test devices and key cards
• - the process of product testing
• - the test of test devices
• - the key hierarchy of the system (certification here archie)
• - The distribution of the individual keys on the components
• - the key update processes.

So far in connection with the present invention of If fire is spoken, it will have a certain system to protect branded products from unauthorized imitation Roger that.

1.1 The product chip

The BPC product chip (for: Brand Product Chip) features:

• - an intelligent, contactless memory chip, the Le se and write access through cryptographic challenge Response and encryption procedures are protected. The chip contains one
• - symmetric cryptographic algorithm SYM-Alg
• - and at least one secret chip-specific key SP-key 'to this algorithm.
• - a unique identification number USN (for: unique se rial number). The chip-specific key is the pro duct chip with this identification number clearly assigned arranges and according to the usual method of generating derived keys from a master key and egg ner unique identification number derived.
• - The product chip also contains information about the product, e.g. B. Brand name, product name, location and time the production.

This product information also includes a digital Si gnatur by the brand manufacturer with an asymmetrical cryptographic algorithm ASYM-Alg using the private key B-P-PrK of the brand manufacturer has been. The signature closes next to the product information also the unique chip number to try to copy the make signed product data useless. Every product chip thus contains a system-wide unique signature, the only fits this product and only this product chip. A product chip BPC therefore has one for its chip number issued certificate.

1.1.2 The test device

The test device contains:

• - A display device DY (for: display)
• - an input device KB (for: keyboard)
• - a unit CLCU (for: Contactless Communication Unit) for contactless communication with the product chip,
• - a chip card contact unit SCCU (for: Smart Card Con tacting unit) for the contact or contactless Communication with key cards (for loading new ones Keys) and
• - a smart card processor chip PI-SCC (for: plug-in Smart Card Chip) with cryptographic coprocessor. in the Smart card chip of the test device run the symmetrical Al gorithmus SYM-Alg and the asymmetrical algorithm ASYM-Alg e.g. B. RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman).
• - The test device's smart card chip contains
• - A system-wide unique serial number USN (for: unique serial number),
• - the global SYM Alg key SP-KEY of the system operator
• - an individual asymmetrical key pair (TD-PrK, TD-PuK) with public key certificate,
• - a public key certificate of the key (SP-P-PrK, SP-P-PuK), this is the public key of the key pair  (TD-PrK, TD-PuK) as to this unique serial number properly certified,
• - the public key certificates of the brand manufacturers (brand Pers-Puk-Cert), certified by the system operator with the root key.
• - the public key certificate of the public root key of the system operator (SP-Root-PuK-Cert) with which the Pu blic keys of the brand manufacturers and the personalization certificates SP-P-PuK-Cert are verifiable (inclusive Previous generation).

In a special embodiment, the root key is dropped of the system operator SP-Root-PA in addition to the public key Certificate (SP-Root-PuK-Cert) of the public root System operator's key and the key pair from public public and private key SP-P-PA together with the persona system operator's SP-P-PuK-Cert together.

The test device therefore has an individual for its serial number mer created certificate.

1.1.3 The personalization machine

The personalization machine enables the brand manufacturer to write his signed product information on the chip. This machine is integrated into the production process. It contains

• - The key of the system operator SP-KEY, with whose help Fe the chips to be processed as real brand chips can be thentized (optional),
• - the key pair (Brand-Pers-PrK, Brand-Pers-PuK), with whose help signs the product data for the product chip become.

1.1.4 The key card

The key card KC (for: Key Card) is designed as a processor chip card with a cryptographic coprocessor for asymmetrical cryptography. It is contact-based or non-contact and interacts with the chip card contact unit SCCU or with the unit for contactless communication CLCU of the test device. It contains like the test device

• - A system-wide unique serial number USN as well
• - an individual asymmetrical key pair (KC-PrK, KC-PuK) with public key certificate,
• - a public key certificate of the key (SP-P-PrK, SP-P-PuK), this is the public key of the key pair (KC-PrK, KC-PuK) as to this unique serial number properly certified.
• - the public key certificate of the public root key of the system operator (SP-Root-PuK-Cert) with which the Per personalization certificates SP-P-PuK-Cert are verified can (including previous generation).

The key card is the transport medium for distribution the public key certificates of the brand manufacturers and the Brand root certificate in all test devices as well as for the up date of the secret symmetric key SP-Key in the Test equipment.

1.2 The instances and their responsibilities

The following instances are involved in the system:

1.2.1 The system operator SPB

The system operator has the following tasks:

• - It provides the other instances with all the hardware and software components required:
  • - - the brand chips
  • - - the personalization machine
  • - - the test devices
  • - - the key cards
• - it creates, manages and distributes the secret symmetri system key SP-KEY,
• - He hires the brand chip personalizer, the testge advises personalizers and the key card personalizer with the personalization of the respective components Delivery with the corresponding cryptographic Keys,
• - he maintains a trust center in which the public Brand personalization key pairs and keys the public key of the brand manufacturers certifi be decorated.

1.2.2 The Brand Chip Personalizer

He receives the from the system operator (or his trust center) secret system key SP-KEY and thus personalizes the Brand chips (see also chapter 1.3.1 Personalization of the brand chip). He is for them Responsibility for keeping the SP-KEY key confidential.

1.2.3 The fire tester personalizer

He receives the from the system operator (or his trust center) secret system key SP-KEY and thus personalizes the Smart card chips of the test devices (see also chapter 1.3.3 Personalization of the test device smart card chip). To do this, he also needs a pair of personalization keys testify, whose public key is from the Trust Center of the System operator is certified. With the private key He signs the public for this key pair Key of the test equipment that he personalized. He is for the confidentiality of the SP-KEY key and its private key Personalization key responsible.

1.2.4 The Brand Key Card Personalizer

It creates a pair of personalization keys, whose public key from the system operator's trust center is certified. With the private key of this key  He signs the public keys of the keys cards that he personalized. (see chapter 1.3.4 Personalization of the key cards).

He is responsible for keeping his private information confidential key.

1.2.5 The brand manufacturer

The brand manufacturer is responsible for keeping the SP-KEY secret from the system operator. The brand manufacturer

• - generates its asymmetrical key pair, leaves the public certify the public key from the system operator and is for the secure storage of his private key responsible.
• - distributes its public key certificate to all retailers, wholesale dealers and investigators.
• - receives the personalization with SP-KEY 'from the system operator ten chips.
• - attach the chip to its branded product,
• - reads the chip serial number,
• - Checks whether it is a real brand chip (through an authen tization with SK-KEY) and
• - signs his product information for this chip (under Inclusion of the chip number) with his private key and writes this signed product information in the Chip.

1.2.6 The dealer / wholesaler

• - he must have the branded products delivered to him with his Check the test device (see chapter 1.3.5 Process of the product test)
• - Optionally, the sales transaction can be ver in the product chip be noticed. This invalidates the product chip and reuse on another (fake) pro made impossible.  
• - Update of the symmetrical key SP-KEY and all be required public key certificates in his test device and in the test devices of its customers through key stores from the special key card.

1.2.7 The investigator

• - he checks goods at
  Distributor / wholesaler,
  at customs.
  . . .
  with his test device. (see Chapter
• - 1.3.5 Process of the product test)
• - He checks test devices whether they are real fire test devices and not "chronic Jasager" or otherwise manipulated Test devices that counterfeit as genuine branded products give.

1.2.8 The end user

The end user has the option of a test device acquire. He can get the public key certificates of the brands Have the manufacturer load it into their test device at the dealer and then check the products.

1.3 procedures 1.3.1 Personalization of the brand chip

This process takes place at the brand chip personalizer in a secure environment before the chips are delivered to the brand manufacturer. The individual steps are as follows:

• - Authentication of the product chip with the transport Key manufacturer's key
• - Read the serial number USN of the product chip
• - Generate an individual key SP-KEY 'that from is derived from the global key SP-KEY  
• - Registration of the derived key SP-KEY 'in the Product chip.

1.3.2 Personalization of the product chip

This process takes place at the brand manufacturer before delivery Delivery of branded goods to dealers / wholesalers. The sure one The server of the brand manufacturer has the global key System operator's SP-KEY saved and generated or stores the private key B-P-PrK as well as the public one Chen key B-P-PuK from the brand manufacturer.

The following steps are given:

• - Attaching the product chip to the product
• - Read the serial number USN of the product chip
• - Authentication of the product chip as a brand chip by An use of the global key SP-KEY
• - Generate a product certificate for this product chip by using the brand's private key B-P-PrK manufacturer
• - Registration of the product certificate in the product chip.

1.3.3 Personalization of the test device smart Card chips

This process takes place at the test device personalizer Delivery of the test equipment in an environment that is high is secured instead.

The following steps are given:

• - The personalization machine generates with the asymmetri ASYM-Alg algorithm, such as. B. the RSA algorithm (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman) algorithm, a new key selpaar
• - The personalization machine reads the unique ID tification number ID of the test device, which is actually the unique identification number ID of the smart card chip and creates a certificate that is public Key PuK of the new key pair to the unique Identification number ID of the smart card chip confirmed.  She signs the certificate through her current SP-P-PrK and writes the certified key pair in the Smart card chip
• - The personalization machine writes its current SP-P-PuK Certificate in the smart card chip
• - The personalization machine writes the current and the previous version of the global key SP-KEY into the smart card chip
• - The personalization machine writes the current and the previous version of the SP Root PuK Certificate in the smart card chip.

1.3.4 Personalization of the key cards

This process takes place at the key card personalizer before delivery of the key card in an environment that is in is secured to a high degree instead.

The following steps are given:

• - The personalization machine generates with the asymmetri ASYM-Alg algorithm, such as. B. the RSA algorithm (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman) algorithm, a new key selpaar
• - The personalization machine reads the unique ID identification number ID of the key card and generates a Certificate representing the public key PuK of the new Key pair for the unique identification number Key card ID confirmed. You signed that Certificate and writes the certified key pair in the key card
• - The personalization machine writes the current public public key certificate of the system operator (SP-P-PuK-Cert) into the key card
• - The personalization machine writes the current and the previous version of the SP Root PuK Certificate in the key card.

1.3.5 Process of product testing

This process can take place anywhere: at the dealership, wholesale dealer, end user, etc. He can be who is in possession of a test device (dealer, Wholesalers, end users, investigators, etc.)

• - Read identification number
• - Authenticate chip as a real brand chip using challen ge-response procedure with key SP-KEY '
• - Read signed product data from the chip
• - Signature including the chip number with the public verify the key of the brand manufacturer.

In a special embodiment, the location and the Date of sales transactions entered into the BPC memory chip wrote, with which a cancellation information is given.

1.3.6 Key loading functions

The update (update) of the global key SP-KEY in the test device proceeds in the following steps:

• 1. Mutual (mutual) authentication between test device and key card using their individual key pairs formed by an asymmetrical algorithm ASYM-Alg
  • - Reading the partner's PuK certificates (individual PuK and personalization PuK) and their verification using the corresponding SP root PuK
  • - Generate and send a random number to the partner
  • - Encrypt the received random number with your own private key and send back the result
  • - Verify the result obtained from the partner with its public key.
• 2. Load the new SP-KEY master key from the key card into the test device
  • - The new SP-KEY master key, which is stored encrypted in the key card with the previous SP-KEY master key, is also encrypted in the key card with the public key of the TD-PuK test device,
  • - The new SP-KEY master key is sent to the test device
  • - The test device decrypts the received SP-KEY with its private key and with the previous SP-KEY master key and stores it in the EEPROM (Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory) of the smart card chip.

All cryptographic functions in the test device run in the smart card chip. Secret keys never appear in plain text in the firmware of the test device outside the Smart card chips. The smart card chip is a security Controller that physically and logically against attacks protects.

The update (update) of the brand public key certificate BP-PuK-Cert in the test device takes place in the following steps:

• - Mutual authentication between test device and key card using their through one asymmetric algorithm ASYM-Alg formed individually len key pairs
• - Load the new B-P-PuK-Cert into the test device in plain text
• - Verification of the brand signature of the B-P-PuK-Cert in the Test device.

The test device must have the previous Brand Public Key Certifi keep kat as long as it is valid or even longer at recognize running product certificates.

The update (update) of the SP-Root-PuK-Cert in the test device takes place in the following steps:

• - Mutual authentication between test device and key card using their through one asymmetric algorithm ASYM-Alg formed individually len key pairs  
• - Load the new SP-Root-PuK-Cert into the test device in the Klar text
• - Verification of the brand signature of the new SP-Root-PuK-Cert with the previous SP root PuK in the test device
• - Generation of a fingerprint (checksum) of the new SP-Root-PuK-Cert through the test device and display to the user for verification purposes.

The test device must keep the previous SP Root PuK Cert as long as it is valid.

The key card must be the previous SP Root PuK Cert content to authenticate older test devices.

1.3.7 Test the test device with a special Test card

Is the test device an authentic brand device?

• - Read and display test data from the test card. The This data can only be saved after a successful ASYM Alg Authentication with the individual key pair will be.

Does the test device contain the correct SP-KEY generations?

• - Read and display test data from the test card. The This data can only be Authentication can be read with the SP-KEY.

Does the test device contain the correct SP root PuKs?

• - Show the SP root PuKs including their fingers press;
• - Try to load a non-authentic SP-Root-PuK-Cert and testing the answer
• - Try to load an authentic SP Root PuK Cert and Test the answer.

Does the test device contain the correct BP-PuKs?

• - Display the B-P-PuKs including their fingerprints;
• - Verification of an authentic product chip and testing The answer  
• - Verification of a non-authentic product chip and test the answer.

In the present concept, the product data in the product chips BPC, the keys in the test devices TD and in the key cards KC - as illustrated in FIG. 2 - are hierarchically or indirectly signed or certified hierarchically.

Reference list

SPB system operator branding procedure (for: System Provider Brand)
BNM brand manufacturer (for: Brand Name Manu facturer)
BPC contactless product chip (for: Brand Product Chip)
SYM-Alg Symmetric cryptographic algorithm
ASYM-Alg Asymmetric cryptographic algorithm
RSA asymmetric algorithm from Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
RSA-PA RSA algorithm key pair (for: RSA-KeyPair)
SP-KEY global secret SYM-Alg key of the system operator (for: System Provider Key)
SP-KEY 'individual, chip-specific key, which is derived from the global key SP-KEY
BP-PuK public key of the brand manufacturer (for: Brand-Personalization- Public Key)
BP-PrK private key of the brand manufacturer (for: Brand-Personalization-Private Key)
BP-Pa key pair from public and private key of the brand manufacturer (for: Brand-Personalization-Pair)
BP-PuK-Cert public key certificates from brand manufacturers (for: Brand-Personalization-Public Key-Certificate)
TD-PuK public key of the test device (for: Test Device-Public Key)
TD-PrK private key of the test device (for: Test Device-Private Key),
TD-Pa Individual, asymmetrical key pair for test device (for: test device pair)
SP-P-PuK (for: System Provider-Personalization- Public Key)
SP-P-PrK (for: System Provider-Personalization- Private Key)
SP-P-Pa key pair from public and private key of the system operator (for: System Provider-Personalization-Pair)
SP-P-PuK-Cert personalization certificate of the system operator (for: System Provider- Personalization-Public Key-Certificate)
SP-Root-Pa root key of the system operator (for: System Provider-Root-Pair)
SP-Root-PrK private root key of the system operator
SP-Root-PuK-Cert Certificate of the system operator's public root key (for: System provider-Root-Public Key-Certificate)
KC-PuK public key of the key card (for: Key Card-Public Key)
KC-PrK private key of the key card (for: Key Card-Private Key)
KC-Pa Individual, asymmetrical key card pair from KC-PrK, KC-PuK (for: Key Card-Pair)
BTC headquarters of the branding process (for: Brand Trust Center)
BTD test device (for: Brand Test Device)
USN system-wide unique serial number (for: unique serial number)
DY display device (for: display)
KB input device (for: keyboard)
CLCU device for contactless communication with the product chip (for: Contactless Communication Unit)
SCCU chip card contacting unit for communication with key cards (for: Smart Card Contacting Unit)
PI-SCC smart card processor chip with cryptographic coprocessor (for: plug-in smart card chip)
KC contact key card with cryptographic coprocessor for asymmetric cryptography (for: Key Card)
CCCC contactless chip card chip (for: Contactless Chip Card Chip)
MS product data including signature (for: manufacturer's signature)
II Cancellation information (for: Invalidation Information)
BA Authentication as part of the trademark protection process (for: Brand Authentication)
BV verification of branding (for: brand verification)
PE personalizer

Claims (4)

1. Method for personalizing a memory chip for a brand protection system, consequently for personalization at the system provider

• the unique identification number (USN) of the memory chip is read,
• an individual key (SP-KEY ') is derived from a global, secret key (SP-KEY) and the identification number,
• the individual key (SP-KEY ') is written into the memory chip,

for personalization at the brand manufacturer

• the unique identification number (USN) of the memory chip is read,
• - a signature about the identification number and product information is formed with the private key of the brand manufacturer (BP-PrK),
• - The product information and the signature are written in the memory chip.

2. Test device (TD) for a brand protection system comprising a unit (CLCU) for contactless communication with a chip, comprising
a smart card processor chip PI-SCC that

• a symmetric cryptographic algorithm SYM-Alg,
• - the global SYM Alg key SP-KEY from the brand protection system operator,
• an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm ASYM-Alg,
• - the public key certificates (BP-PuK-Cert) of the brand manufacturers,

having. 3. Test device (TD) for a brand protection system according to claim 2, characterized in that the smart card processor chip PI-SCC

• - a unique serial number,
• an individual asymmetric key pair (TD-PrK, TD-PuK) with a public key certificate TD-PuK-Cert signed by a higher-level private key of the system operator,
• - Has the public key certificate of the public key of the system operator, which is used to verify the public key certificates of the brand manufacturers.

4. Procedure for checking product data in an arrangement in which

• - A test device (TD) with a product chip (BPC) is in active connection,
• - the test device
  • - a symmetric algorithm (SYM-Alg),
  • - an asymmetric algorithm (ASYM-Alg),
  • - a global symmetric key (SP-KEY)
  • - the public key certificates (BP-PuK-Cert) of the brand manufacturers,
  having
• the product chip has a symmetrical algorithm (SYM-Alg), a unique identification number (USN) and an individual key (SP-KEY ') derived from the global key (SP-KEY) and the identification number (USN),

consequently authentication of the chip and verification of the product data are given such that

• the test device reads the identification number (USN) from the product chip,
• - The chip-specific key SP-KEY 'is derived from this identification number and the global key SP-KEY
• - With the key SP-KEY 'the product chip is authenticated by a chal lenge response process
• - After successful authentication of the product chip, the test device reads the product information and the signature from the product chip, the signature generated with the private key of the brand manufacturer (BP-PrK) being formed via the identification number and the product information
• - The test device verifies this signature with the public key of the brand manufacturer (BP-PuK) and thus verifies the authenticity of the product information and its affiliation with this chip.