DE102021203535A1 - Method for wireless communication between at least one infrastructure component and at least one vehicle - Google Patents

Abstract

A method for wireless communication between an infrastructure component as the first communication partner and a vehicle as the second communication partner is proposed, comprising the steps of establishing an infrastructure communication readiness for communication between the infrastructure component and the vehicle via a first radio communication channel by a first triggering action the infrastructure component, establishing a vehicle communication readiness for communication between the vehicle and the infrastructure component via the first radio communication channel by a second triggering action on the vehicle, mutual finding and identification of the communication partners via a second communication channel, which differs from the first radio communication channel distinguishes, coupling of the two communication partners via an IT-secure connection via the first radio communication channel with the help of information, received by at least one of the communication partners via the second communication channel, and establishment of a functionally secure connection between the communication partners via the IT-secure connection.

Description

The present invention relates to a method for wireless communication between at least one infrastructure component and at least one vehicle, a system for wireless communication, and a refueling or charging system.

State of the art

For modern refueling systems for refueling a vehicle with fuel, such as a hydrocarbon-based fuel or hydrogen, or for charging systems for charging with electrical energy, it can be useful to establish a temporary data connection between the refueling or charging system and the vehicle. In this way, the refueling or charging process could be controlled and identity and/or payment information could be transmitted.

When communication is established between an infrastructure component, e.g. a fuel pump, a charging station or a tank robot, and a vehicle, such as a land vehicle, aircraft or ship via a radio communication link, the infrastructure component and the vehicle can only be clearly assigned via the radio link itself if there is only a single infrastructure component and a single vehicle within range of the radio communication link. In the case of ambiguities that can be traced back to several infrastructure components and/or several vehicles within the radio range, the communication partners must be assigned in a different way. This could be done manually, for example, by the user of the vehicle or another person present confirming or selecting the communication partner.

US10800281B2 shows a method for hydrogen refueling that uses near field (radio) communication (NFC) to transmit information prior to a refueling operation. Here, N FC antennas are placed close to a tank nozzle and transmit a vehicle ID and information about vehicle tanks. The NFC communication is used to initiate a main communication via V2X (“vehicle-to-x”), which is then used to transmit refueling readings for monitoring, for example, pressure and temperature during the refueling process. However, NFC communication is neither used for functional security functions nor for IT security functions. In US20200346554A1 this method is applied to the charging of battery electric vehicles.

US20130139897A1 shows the use of a tank expansion sensor, the values of which are transmitted by radio to a fuel pump in order to interrupt a refueling process when the tank expands critically, but not to continuously influence the refueling process in the normal state.

US20180213376A1 uses radio communication from a vehicle to any participant to set communication parameters, but not to set parameters of a refueling process.

US20150031335A1 describes a general service layer for protecting information, e.g. position or other device-specific data, in loT scenarios. The communication must be handled via a cloud infrastructure that is wireless or wired.

Infrared-based data connections at hydrogen filling stations are already well known. However, scratches on the transmission/reception optics and ice formation on the tank nozzle or filler neck can impair data transmission and are therefore affected by failures in practice, so that accelerated refueling can be restricted. Furthermore, unidirectional connections do not allow a return channel from the fuel pump to the vehicle, so that it is not possible to compare existing fueling processes and to agree on the optimal process for the actual fuel pump/vehicle pair. Metallic contacts of a wired communication, especially in the vicinity of the tank coupling, should be avoided, since hydrogen gases could be explosively ignited by sparks on contact. Furthermore, every radio communication poses further challenges to the application due to the broadcasting properties of the radio medium air.

Disclosure of Invention

It is therefore the object of the invention to provide an alternative solution for establishing communication between two communication partners in the form of an infrastructure component and a vehicle, in which functionally secure and IT-secure contactless communication is sufficiently guaranteed, third parties cannot interfere with the communication and the disadvantages described above do not occur.

This is achieved by a method having the features of independent claim 1. Advantageous embodiments and developments can be found in the dependent claims and the following description.

A method for wireless communication between an infrastructure component as the first communication partner and a vehicle as the second communication partner is proposed, comprising the steps of establishing an infrastructure communication readiness for communication between the infrastructure component and the vehicle via a first communication channel by a first triggering action on the infrastructure component , Establishing a vehicle communication readiness for communication between the vehicle and the infrastructure component via the first communication channel by a second triggering action on the vehicle, mutual finding and identification of the communication partner via a second communication channel, which differs from the first communication channel, coupling of the two communication partners via an IT-secure connection via the first communication channel with the help of information obtained via the second n communication channel was received by at least one of the communication partners, and establishment of a functionally secure connection between the communication partners via the IT-secure connection.

Further below, the infrastructure component is referred to as the first communication partner. The infrastructure component could, for example, be a fuel or charging station that is used to refuel or charge a vehicle. The vehicle is further referred to below as the second communication partner. As explained above, an IT-secure and functionally secure connection between the two communication partners is desired during the refueling or charging process in order to optimize the refueling or charging process. The actual execution of the first communication channel is initially irrelevant for the core idea of the invention. It is conceivable that common, wireless data communication protocols can be used, with the initiation of an IT-secure and functionally secure connection being the priority according to the invention.

Both communication partners are ready to communicate. This is done by performing an action on the infrastructure component and the vehicle as a preparatory phase. On the infrastructure component, this can be the detected removal of a fuel nozzle from a holder, the removal of a charging plug from a holder, the vehicle driving over a contact or the triggering of a light barrier. This can be implemented on the vehicle in the form of entering a command on the vehicle, for example, opening a loading or tank cap.

The mutual finding and identification of the communication partners can take place in two different ways. In a first variant, at least one of the communication partners sends out a general radio signal. In the case of the vehicle, this can be implemented as a beacon signal that the vehicle emits. However, the infrastructure component can send out an advertisement signal. Each of the signals may include an identifying identification (ID) number. The ID could include different parameters that refer to a driver, a vehicle, a fuel pump, a gas station operator or a service that is offered by one of the above. The other communication partner can listen to such beacon signals or advertisement signals and respond to them with a data packet that can include at least one ID, for example for the driver, a vehicle, a fuel pump, a charging station or the services offered. It is particularly expedient here for the ID to be globally unambiguous or unique. Each communication partner could preferably generate a list of possible communication partners from the data received. The communication partners are identified via the second communication channel. This describes a communication method that differs from the radio communication used in the first communication channel and is referred to as "out-of-band communication" (OOBK). High data transmission rates are not necessary via the second communication channel.

It is preferred that the two communication partners communicate their respective IDs via the second communication channel. This communication can also be initiated through the first communication channel, in which, for example, the vehicle or the infrastructure component is encouraged to behave in a certain way. Based on the transmitted ID, the appropriate communication partner can be selected from the list, to which the communication via the first communication channel is subsequently addressed.

In the second variant, the two partners could first communicate their ID to each other via the second communication channel and then start direct communication via the first communication channel, with one communication partner opening it and the other communication partner responding to it. The rest of the process is identical to the first variant.

This allows the two communication partners to be coupled via an IT-secure connection via the first communication channel with the aid of information about the second communication channel were received by at least one of the communication partners. Establishing a functionally secure connection between the communication partners via the IT-secure connection requires mutual authentication and identification. This can be done wirelessly, for example using certificates, for example in accordance with the ITU standard X.509 (cf. also IEEE 802.1x), but also by simple transmission via the second communication channel. Based on this, a cryptographic session key could be exchanged, for example by means of a Diffie-Hellman key exchange over the air or by an optionally unprotected transmission over the second communication channel. From this point in time, any further radio communication can be encrypted using the session key, expediently using authenticated encryption methods (authenticated encryption with associated data, AEAD). This is thus protected against manipulation and eavesdropping by third parties. With the IT-secure connection, IT security can be monitored. If abnormal behavior, such as an attack, is detected, this can lead to an appropriate response. After the key exchange, an authorization check for data access and the usable services can be carried out. The authorization check can continue to take place after authentication. A resulting authorization restriction can then subsequently be implemented. Optionally, the coding of a packet-oriented forward erasure correction (packet erasure forward correction code) could also be initiated at the IT security level.

In order to set up a functionally secure connection via the IT-secure connection, it could first be determined, for example using digital certificates, whether the communication partner in question is security-certified. This could be done via the first communication channel and/or the second communication channel. If this is the case, then the data exchange can take place in accordance with a specified security transmission protocol. At the same time, the connection could be monitored for compliance with the black channel principle. If abnormal behavior is detected, a specified recipient, for example a control center, is informed and can take appropriate measures. Next, security-relevant parameters are exchanged via this protocol, e.g. a maximum tolerable downtime of the data connection. Here, too, the coding of a packet-oriented forward erasure correction code (packet erasure forward correction code) could optionally be initiated at the security level.

A particular advantage of the method is that it can be carried out independently of the radio technology actually used, a refueling or charging infrastructure and the hardware used. It can be used for refueling any gaseous or liquid fuel, as well as charging electric vehicles. The method allows data to be transmitted during a refueling or charging process, with which parameters of the tank container, e.g. temperature and pressure of the fuel in a tank container, are transmitted. This enables a significantly accelerated refueling process, especially when refueling a vehicle with hydrogen, since the refueling process does not have to take into account a worst-case assumption formed over a large number of vehicle/tank models, but only the individual safety limits and capabilities of one of the tank container system involved. Radio data transmission is not affected by the formation of ice, which can occur when refueling with gaseous, pressurized and pre-cooled fuels. Wireless data transmission is not affected by any mechanical stress, such as scratches on the optics of infrared data transmission. Additional services for the vehicle can be offered via radio data transmission. The procedure also meets the requirements for the functional safety of the overall system as well as IT security requirements, so that the billing of a refueling can be automated and, for example, based on authentication.

The method is applicable to all types of fuels i.e. gaseous, liquid, cryogenic etc. as well as to the charging of electric vehicles. The method for a refueling scenario at a gas station where, for example, a fuel cell vehicle is to be refueled with gaseous hydrogen can be considered as an example. It is irrelevant whether the scenario relates to a classic manual refueling process with or without automated billing, an automated or autonomous refueling process of a classic vehicle driven by a driver, or a (partially) automated or autonomous vehicle. In addition, the method can be suitable for a scenario in which a refueling vehicle drives to the recipient vehicle and refuels it.

The method could further include the transmission of services offered by the infrastructure to the vehicle, and the transmission of at least one selected service by the vehicle to the infrastructure component. The transfer of the services offered, ie the refueling or loading services, could also be carried out by querying a database gen. This database could either be local in the respective communication partner or at another location via further communication connections, for example via mobile radio, Ethernet or the like. Agreement on refueling or loading services could be reached at any time and should be finalized before mutual agreement on refueling or loading protocols begins. It is conceivable that after a key exchange to establish an IT-secure connection, an authorization check for data access and which of the services may be used takes place. The authorization check could already take place after an authentication. The corresponding authorization restriction can then be implemented.

The method can also include mutual transmission of offered refueling or charging protocols between the vehicle and the infrastructure component, and mutual agreement on a refueling or charging protocol to be used. This can include the type of structure of the refueling or loading protocol. For example, it can be determined where which parameters are located in a data packet or a transmitted data set. The log can also include information about a thermodynamic fueling process used, which can be assigned to a specific standard. It is conceivable that the reconciliation involves an exchange of refueling parameters, in which, for example, tank container types are compared and checked for compatibility. An exchange of refueling parameters can take place at any time after an IT-secure connection has been established and should be completed before planning a refueling process (see below). If the parameters turn out to be incompatible, the refueling process should be interrupted or prevented.

The infrastructure component can be a refueling facility, in which case the method then further comprises checking the infrastructure component for a leak and checking the vehicle for a leak, and a warning is issued if a leak is detected in the infrastructure component or the vehicle. The leakage check could be carried out in particular for the respective triggering event, but this is not absolutely necessary immediately afterwards.

Furthermore, the method may further include activating an immobilizer before a refueling or charging process is started. The activation of an immobilizer could be done explicitly or implicitly, e.g. by using a removed vehicle key or similar to release the infrastructure at any time and should expediently start with the insertion of a fuel nozzle into a tank nozzle or a charging plug into a charging socket, but at the latest before the start completion of the refueling or charging. The activation of the immobilizer could be followed by a release of a tank valve.

The method can also further include determining a refueling or charging plan and mutual information about the refueling or charging plan. The refueling or charging can be planned in such a way that the fastest possible refueling or charging can be achieved using the permissible parameters, i.e. refueling pressure, volume flow, current intensity or the like.

It can also be advantageous if the method includes the initiation of a refueling or charging process and the transmission of refueling or charging parameters during the refueling or charging process. This achieves a closed loop control to maximize refueling or loading speed. For this purpose, sensor readings, such as the pressure and temperature of a gas in one or more tanks, are also transmitted from the vehicle to the infrastructure component as aggregated values, for example as the worst value in the sense of a resulting limitation of the refueling speed across all tanks in the vehicle. The infrastructure can thus regulate a mass flow during refueling.

Refueling or charging parameters can be transmitted via the first communication channel in accordance with a layered model. For this, parameters can be packed in a protocol frame. This is packaged in a functional safety package, which is used for functional safety using the black channel principle mentioned. This is in turn packaged in an IT security package that meets the IT security requirements. This IT security package is then transmitted wirelessly to the infrastructure component and received by it. The IT security data is checked there and the data is forwarded to the functional security block. There, functional safety is ensured according to the black channel principle, for example. The package unpacked in the process is forwarded to a refueling log block, where the measured values are extracted again. These are then fed to a controller which, for example, regulates the flow of mass from the fueling device via a fuel hose, Tank nozzle and tank nozzle into the vehicle regulates.

• - Protokoll-Identifizierung,
• - Quell-/Absender-Adresse sowie Zieladresse,
• - Zeitstempel und/oder den Wert eines Paketnummernzählers, welcher bei jedem gesendeten Paket inkrementiert wird,
• - Nutzdaten des funktionalen-Sicherheitsprotokolls, und
• - Codierte Daten eines Message-Authentication-Codes (z.B. auf Basis von Hash-Funktionen) und/oder eine Signatur des Pakets (z.B. zertifikatbasiert), jeweils gebildet über Teile der Paketinformation, mindestens jedoch über die Nutzdaten und den Zeitstempel und/oder den Wert des Paketnummernzählers.

An IT security package can contain a selection of the following fields, i.e. one or more of the following fields:

• - protocol identification,
• - source/sender address and destination address,
• - Time stamp and/or the value of a packet number counter, which is incremented with each packet sent,
• - functional safety protocol payload, and
• - Coded data of a message authentication code (e.g. based on hash functions) and/or a signature of the packet (e.g. based on a certificate), each formed using parts of the packet information, but at least using the user data and the time stamp and/or the value the packet number counter.

Parts of the package information, but in any case the specified user data, are encrypted. It is particularly useful to use all fields.

• - Protokoll-Identifizierung,
• - Quell-/Absender-Adresse sowie Zieladresse,
• - Zeitstempel und/oder den Wert eines Paketnummernzählers, welcher bei jedem gesendeten Paket inkrementiert wird,
• - Nutzdaten des Betankungs- oder Ladeverfahrens,
• - Prüfsumme über mindestens die Nutzdaten,
• - Codierte Daten eines Message-Authentication-Codes (z.B. auf Basis von Hash-Funktionen) und/oder eine Signatur des Pakets (z.B. zertifikatbasiert, auch unterschiedlich zu dem der IT-Sicherheit), jeweils gebildet über Teile der Paketinformation, mindestens jedoch über die Nutzdaten und den Zeitstempel und/oder den Wert des Paketnummernzählers, und
• - eine Prüfsumme (z.B. eine zyklische Redundanz-Prüfung, cyclic redundancy check, CRC) über zumindest einen Teil der Felder.

However, a functional safety package can contain a selection of the following fields:

• - protocol identification,
• - source/sender address and destination address,
• - Time stamp and/or the value of a packet number counter, which is incremented with each packet sent,
• - user data of the refueling or charging process,
• - checksum over at least the user data,
• - Coded data of a message authentication code (e.g. based on hash functions) and/or a signature of the package (e.g. based on a certificate, also different from that of IT security), each formed over parts of the package information, but at least over the user data and the time stamp and/or the value of the packet number counter, and
• - a checksum (eg a cyclic redundancy check, CRC) over at least part of the fields.

Again, it may be useful to use all fields.

Each step of the procedure could be checked for successful execution by self-tests and plausibility checks. If the check is successful, the method continues. If an error occurs, a driver can be made aware of the error by a display in the vehicle or on the infrastructure component. Personnel at the infrastructure component can be informed of the error by monitor display in order to rectify it.

As explained above, the infrastructure component could adapt the refueling or charging of the vehicle to the refueling or charging plan and for this purpose continuously or repeatedly take into account refueling or charging parameters transmitted from the vehicle to the infrastructure component.

Analogously, the invention relates to a system for wireless communication between at least one infrastructure component and at least one vehicle, each having a first connection unit for a first communication channel and a second connection unit for a second communication channel, as well as at least one coupled to the first connection unit and the second connection unit Control unit, wherein the control unit is designed to detect a first or second triggering action, wherein the control unit is designed in each case to cause the first connection unit, after detecting the triggering action, to set up an infrastructure communication readiness or vehicle communication readiness, the control unit being designed in each case to find and identify the respective other communication partner via the second connection unit, the control unit being designed in each case to i st to couple the two communication partners via an IT-secure connection via the first communication channel with the aid of information received from at least one of the communication partners via the second communication channel, and wherein the control unit is respectively designed to establish a functionally secure connection between the communication partners via the IT-secure connection. The system is designed to carry out individual steps or all of the steps of the method presented above.

Furthermore, the invention relates to a refueling or charging system with at least one infrastructure component and a system according to the previous embodiment, the infrastructure component being a refueling or charging device which is designed to refuel or charge at least one vehicle.

Further, the invention-improving measures are below together with the Description of the preferred embodiments of the invention shown in more detail with reference to figures.

exemplary embodiments

• 1 eine schematische Darstellung eines Verfahrens zur drahtlosen Kommunikation.
• 2 eine schematische Darstellung eines Betankungs- oder Ladesystems.

It shows:

• 1 a schematic representation of a method for wireless communication.
• 2 a schematic representation of a refueling or charging system.

1 shows a method for wireless communication between an infrastructure component as the first communication partner and a vehicle as the second communication partner. The method has the steps of establishing 2 an infrastructure communication readiness for communication of the infrastructure component with the vehicle via a first communication channel by a first triggering action on the infrastructure component, of establishing 4 a vehicle communication readiness for communication of the vehicle with the infrastructure component via the first communication channel by a second triggering action on the vehicle, the mutual finding 6 and identification 8 of the communication partners via a second communication channel that differs from the first communication channel, the coupling 10 of the two communication partners via an IT-secure connection via the first communication channel with the help of Information that was received via the second communication channel from at least one of the communication partners, and the structure 12 of a functionally secure connection between the communication part via the IT-secure connection.

Services offered by the infrastructure can be transmitted to the vehicle 14. Thereupon at least one selected service can be sent by the vehicle to the infrastructure component 16. The vehicle and the infrastructure component transmit 18 mutually offered refueling or charging protocols and then mutually agree 20 to be used refueling or loading protocol. The infrastructure component is, for example, a refueling facility. The method then also includes, for example, checking 22 the infrastructure component for a leak, checking 24 the vehicle for a leak, and outputting 26 a warning if a leak is detected in the infrastructure component or the vehicle.

For safety, when refueling or loading, an immobilizer can be activated 28 before the refueling or loading process is started. The refueling or charging can be preceded by the determination 30 of a refueling or charging plan and mutual information 32 about the refueling or charging plan. The refueling or charging process is finally initiated 34 and refueling or charging parameters during the refueling or charging process are transmitted 36. The infrastructure component can adapt the refueling or charging of the vehicle to the refueling or charging plan 38 and for this purpose transmitted from the vehicle to the infrastructure component Consider refueling or loading parameters continuously or repeatedly 40.

2 discloses a refueling or charging system 42. An infrastructure component 44 is shown here as a refueling device that is designed to refuel a tank 46 in a vehicle 48. The vehicle 48 is an example of a bus in which hydrogen is used to generate electricity via a fuel cell (not shown). The infrastructure component 44 includes a refueling nozzle 50 coupleable to the vehicle 48 to be in fluid communication with a tank 46 inside the vehicle 48 . The infrastructure component 44 has a first control unit 52 which is connected to a first connection unit 54 and a second connection unit 56, both of which are designed as wireless connection units for implementing different communication channels, ie as a first communication channel and as a second communication channel. Likewise, the vehicle 48 has a second control unit 58 which is also connected to a first connection unit 54 and a second connection unit 56 which are arranged in the vehicle 48 and designed to be compatible with the connection units 54 and 56 in the infrastructure component 44 .

The control units 52 and 58 are designed to detect a first or second triggering action, for example the removal of a tank nozzle 60 from the infrastructure component 44 and the insertion of the tank nozzle 60 into a tank opening 62. The control units 52 and 58 are also designed to after detecting the triggering actions, cause the first connection units 54 to set up an infrastructure communication readiness or vehicle communication readiness, with the control units 52 and 58 being designed to find and identify the respective other communication partner via the second connection units 56, the Control units 52 and 58 are each designed to couple the two communication partners 44 and 48 via an IT-secure connection via the first communication channel with the aid of information NEN perform, which were received via the second communication channel from at least one of the communication partners 44 and 48. The control units 52 and 58 are also designed to set up a functionally secure connection between the communication partners 44 and 48 via the IT-secure connection. The system 42 is designed to carry out individual or all steps of the method presented above 1 to execute.

QUOTES INCLUDED IN DESCRIPTION

This list of documents cited by the applicant was generated automatically and is included solely for the better information of the reader. The list is not part of the German patent or utility model application. The DPMA assumes no liability for any errors or omissions.

Patent Literature Cited

• US10800281B2 [0004]
• US20200346554A1 [0004]
• US20130139897A1 [0005]
• US 20180213376 A1 [0006]
• US20150031335A1 [0007]

Claims (10)

Method for wireless communication between an infrastructure component (44) as the first communication partner and a vehicle (48) as the second communication partner, having the steps: - Build (2) an infrastructure communication readiness for communication of the infrastructure component (44) with the vehicle (48) via a first communication channel by a first triggering action on the infrastructure component (44), - Build (4) a vehicle communication readiness for communication of the vehicle (48) with the infrastructure component (44) via the first communication channel by a second triggering action on the vehicle (48), - Mutual finding (6) and identification (8) of the communication partners via a second communication channel, which differs from the first communication channel, - Coupling (10) of the two communication partners via an IT-secure connection via the first communication channel with the aid of information received from at least one of the communication partners via the second communication channel, and - Establishment (12) of a functionally secure connection between the communication partners via the IT-secure connection. procedure after claim 1 , further comprising - transmission (14) of services offered by the infrastructure to the vehicle (48), and - transmission (16) of at least one selected service by the vehicle (48) to the infrastructure component (44). procedure after claim 1 or 2 , further comprising - Mutual transmission (18) of offered refueling or charging protocols between the vehicle (48) and the infrastructure component (44), and - Mutual agreement (20) on a refueling or charging protocol to be used. Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the infrastructure component (44) is a refueling facility, the method further comprising: - checking (22) the infrastructure component (44) for a leak, - checking (24) the vehicle (48) for a leak, and - Outputting (26) a warning when a leak in the infrastructure component (44) or the vehicle (48) is detected. A method according to any one of the preceding claims, further comprising: - Activating (28) an immobilizer before starting a refueling or charging process. A method according to any one of the preceding claims, further comprising: - Determining (30) a refueling or loading plan and mutual information (32) about the refueling or loading plan. A method according to any one of the preceding claims, further comprising: - Initiating (34) a refueling or charging process, and - Transmission (36) of refueling or charging parameters during the refueling or charging process. procedure after claim 6 and 7 , wherein the infrastructure component (44) refueling or charging of the vehicle (48) to the refueling or charging plan adapts (38) and for this purpose from the vehicle (48) to the infrastructure component (44) transmitted refueling or charging parameters continuously or repeatedly considered ( 40). System for wireless communication between at least one infrastructure component (44) and at least one vehicle (48), each having a first connection unit (54) for a first communication channel and a second connection unit (56) for a second communication channel, and at least one connected to the first Connection unit (54) and the second connection unit (56) coupled control unit (52, 58), wherein the control unit (52, 58) is designed to detect a first or second triggering action, wherein the control unit (52, 58) respectively is designed to cause the first connection unit (54) to set up infrastructure communication readiness or vehicle communication readiness after the triggering action has been detected, with the control unit (52, 58) being designed in each case to notify the respective other communication partner via the second Find and identify connection unit (56), the Ste The external unit (52, 58) is each designed to couple the two communication partners via an IT-secure connection via the first communication channel with the aid of information received from at least one of the communication partners via the second communication channel, and wherein the control unit ( 52, 58) each designed to, is a functionally safe connection between between the communication partners via the IT-secure connection. Refueling or charging system (42) with at least one infrastructure component (44) and a system claim 9 , wherein the infrastructure component (44) is a refueling or charging device which is designed to refuel or charge at least one vehicle (48).

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