CN113691380A - Multidimensional private data aggregation method in smart power grid - Google Patents
Multidimensional private data aggregation method in smart power grid Download PDFInfo
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H02—GENERATION; CONVERSION OR DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTRIC POWER
- H02J—CIRCUIT ARRANGEMENTS OR SYSTEMS FOR SUPPLYING OR DISTRIBUTING ELECTRIC POWER; SYSTEMS FOR STORING ELECTRIC ENERGY
- H02J13/00—Circuit arrangements for providing remote indication of network conditions, e.g. an instantaneous record of the open or closed condition of each circuitbreaker in the network; Circuit arrangements for providing remote control of switching means in a power distribution network, e.g. switching in and out of current consumers by using a pulse code signal carried by the network
- H02J13/00006—Circuit arrangements for providing remote indication of network conditions, e.g. an instantaneous record of the open or closed condition of each circuitbreaker in the network; Circuit arrangements for providing remote control of switching means in a power distribution network, e.g. switching in and out of current consumers by using a pulse code signal carried by the network characterised by information or instructions transport means between the monitoring, controlling or managing units and monitored, controlled or operated power network element or electrical equipment
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0435—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/10—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/008—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols involving homomorphic encryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/085—Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
- H04L9/3242—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02E—REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS [GHG] EMISSIONS, RELATED TO ENERGY GENERATION, TRANSMISSION OR DISTRIBUTION
- Y02E60/00—Enabling technologies; Technologies with a potential or indirect contribution to GHG emissions mitigation
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y04—INFORMATION OR COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES HAVING AN IMPACT ON OTHER TECHNOLOGY AREAS
- Y04S—SYSTEMS INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO POWER NETWORK OPERATION, COMMUNICATION OR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES FOR IMPROVING THE ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION, DISTRIBUTION, MANAGEMENT OR USAGE, i.e. SMART GRIDS
- Y04S40/00—Systems for electrical power generation, transmission, distribution or end-user application management characterised by the use of communication or information technologies, or communication or information technology specific aspects supporting them
- Y04S40/12—Systems for electrical power generation, transmission, distribution or end-user application management characterised by the use of communication or information technologies, or communication or information technology specific aspects supporting them characterised by data transport means between the monitoring, controlling or managing units and monitored, controlled or operated electrical equipment
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y04—INFORMATION OR COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES HAVING AN IMPACT ON OTHER TECHNOLOGY AREAS
- Y04S—SYSTEMS INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO POWER NETWORK OPERATION, COMMUNICATION OR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES FOR IMPROVING THE ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION, DISTRIBUTION, MANAGEMENT OR USAGE, i.e. SMART GRIDS
- Y04S40/00—Systems for electrical power generation, transmission, distribution or end-user application management characterised by the use of communication or information technologies, or communication or information technology specific aspects supporting them
- Y04S40/20—Information technology specific aspects, e.g. CAD, simulation, modelling, system security
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Abstract
The invention discloses a multidimensional private data aggregation method in a smart grid, which comprises the following steps: s1, a trusted center sets a security password component, a signature private key and a secret share parameter of each communication entity, and publishes a system public password parameter; s2, the intelligent electric meter performs binary preprocessing and encryption on the data of each dimension, generates a corresponding digital signature and uploads verifiable ciphertext data; s3, the fog node performs batch verification on verifiable ciphertext data, calculates an aggregation ciphertext to generate a first session key, calculates a second message authentication code, and uploads the verifiable fog level aggregation ciphertext to a power grid control center; and S4, the power grid control center generates a second session key, calculates a third message authentication code, checks the third message authentication code with the received second message authentication code, decrypts the verifiable fog-level aggregation ciphertext, and recovers the aggregated multiple dimension data values. The method can prevent an attacker from analyzing the user data and does not influence the statistical analysis of the power grid system.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the field of big data analysis and processing in a smart power grid, and particularly relates to a multidimensional privacy data aggregation method in the smart power grid.
Background
With the increasingly wide application of electric energy, the production mode and the management mode of the traditional power grid cannot meet the basic requirements of people. The appearance of the smart grid provides a more convenient, more reasonable and more economical mode for people. The smart meter is widely installed in each household and is responsible for collecting power data of the user and uploading the data to a corresponding edge computing server, such as a fog node server. And after collecting the data reported by the intelligent electric meters in the jurisdiction areas of the intelligent electric meters, the fog nodes carry out aggregation processing and then send the data to the power grid control center. The power grid control center analyzes the power consumption data, makes decisions such as power supply according to needs and the like, and saves power resources in three stages of power production, transmission and use.
However, since the power data generally reflects private information such as living habits of the user, it is necessary to encrypt the sensitive power data to ensure privacy of the user. However, the smart meter is usually a small-sized computing unit, cannot perform complicated encryption operations, and the transmitted data may depend on a home network or a private small-sized network. Too long ciphertext length of communication may also cause transmission congestion. In addition, in order to solve the data island problem, the homomorphic encryption technology can enable the fog nodes to carry out linear aggregation on ciphertext data transmitted by the plurality of terminal electric meters, and data analysis convenience of privacy protection is provided for a power grid control center. The existing encryption and polymerization technology is mostly based on classical Paillier and BGN homomorphic encryption algorithms which both need to use modular exponentiation calculation, so that the calculation cost of the terminal intelligent electric meter is extremely high, and the terminal intelligent electric meter is not suitable for small metering equipment.
During the transmission process, the grid users may try to tamper with the power data in the smart meter to avoid the subsequent electricity charging. Meanwhile, an internal adversary may exist in the power grid system, a private key of the smart meter or the control center is stolen, and the data confidentiality and the user privacy security are destroyed by decrypting a single ciphertext. Besides, the failure damage of the smart meter cannot be avoided in practice, so the encryption system should be provided with a fault tolerance mechanism. Therefore, designing a lightweight encryption and aggregation technology supporting transmission fault tolerance and verification functions is an important guarantee for realizing safe and wide deployment of the smart grid.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to overcome one or more defects in the prior art and provides a multidimensional private data aggregation method in a smart grid.
The purpose of the invention is realized by the following technical scheme: a multidimensional private data aggregation method in a smart grid is applied to a smart grid system, the smart grid comprises a grid control center, a fog node, a smart meter and a trusted center, the grid control center is in communication connection with the fog node, the fog node is in communication connection with the smart meter, the grid control center, the fog node and the smart meter are all in communication connection with the trusted center, and the multidimensional private data aggregation method in the smart grid comprises the following steps:
s1, a trusted center sets a security password component, a signature private key of each communication entity and a secret share parameter of a threshold secret sharing technology, wherein the security password component comprises a symmetric homomorphic encryption algorithm, a symmetric key of the symmetric homomorphic encryption algorithm, bilinear pairwise mapping, a security hash function and a first message authentication code, and the communication entities comprise a power grid control center, an intelligent ammeter and a fog node; the trusted center publishes system public password parameters, generates secret parameters of each communication entity according to the symmetric key, the signature private key and the secret share parameters, and sends the secret parameters to each communication entity through a secure channel;
s2, the intelligent electric meter performs binary preprocessing on data of each dimension of a user, encrypts the binary preprocessed data by adopting a homomorphic symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain ciphertext data, and generates a digital signature corresponding to the ciphertext data by using a signature private key; the intelligent electric meter uploads verifiable ciphertext data to a corresponding fog node in a time period, wherein the verifiable ciphertext data comprise the ciphertext data, a digital signature, the time period and the identity of the intelligent electric meter;
s3, judging whether the number of normally working intelligent electric meters which upload verifiable ciphertext data in a responsible area of each fog node in a time period is larger than a preset threshold value or not, and if so, verifying the verifiable ciphertext data in batches by the fog nodes; after the verification is passed, the fog node calculates an aggregation ciphertext, generates a first session key temporarily negotiated with a power grid control center, calculates a second message authentication code, and uploads a verifiable fog-level aggregation ciphertext to the power grid control center, wherein the verifiable fog-level aggregation ciphertext comprises the aggregation ciphertext, the second message authentication code, a time period and the identity of the fog node;
and S4, after receiving the verifiable fog-level aggregation ciphertext of the fog node, the power grid control center generates a second session key temporarily negotiated with the fog node, calculates a third message authentication code, and checks the third session key with the received second message authentication code, if the third session key passes the checking, the power grid control center decrypts the verifiable fog-level aggregation ciphertext and recovers a plurality of dimension data values after aggregation.
Preferably, the S1 includes the following steps:
s101, the trusted center generates a symmetric key of a symmetric homomorphic encryption algorithmWhere u and v are both large prime numbers, and the bit length of u is greater than or equal to 2 times the bit length of v, and s is a u-order finite fieldD is the number of times of the ciphertext, and the trusted center is represented by TTP;
s102, the credible center sets a bilinear mappingWherein, in the step (A),is a p-order addition cycle group,is a P-factorial cyclic group, P is an additive cyclic groupA generator of (2);
s103, the credible center sets the number of the fog nodes asAnd setting the maximum intelligent electric meter number of a fog node responsible area to be N, wherein the fog node is usedTo said smart meterRepresents;
s104, the credible center sets a fixed positive integerWhereinRepresenting upward integer taking, D represents the supremum of each dimension data;
s105, the credible center sets an anti-collision Hash functionWherein, in the step (A),representing a bit string with any length, and setting a first message authentication code HMAC;
s106, the credible center is in a limited domain of order pMist node signature private key selected for mist nodesAnd calculates its public key of the fog nodeThe identity of the fog node is;
S107, the trusted center slave finite fieldElectric meter signature private key selection method for intelligent electric meterAnd calculate the public key of the electric meterThe identity of the intelligent electric meter is;
S108, the trusted center slave finite fieldSelecting a control center signature private key x for a power grid control center, and calculating a control center public key of the control center signature private key xThe grid control center is denoted by CC;
s111, the credible center selects a positive integerAnd calculating a secret share parameter oneSecret share parameter twoSecret share parameter threeSecret share parameter fourAnd secret share parameter fiveWherein is a positive integerThe bit length of (f) is less than or equal to 20 bits, and (f) (j) represents the value of a t-1 degree polynomial corresponding to the jth intelligent electric meter;
S113, the trusted center controls the secret parameters of the centerSending the parameters to a power grid control center to obtain the secret parameters of the electric meterSending the parameters to each intelligent ammeter, and carrying out secret parameter of the fog nodeTo each of the fog nodes.
Preferably, the S2 includes the following steps:
s201, enabling the intelligent electric meter to obtain data of each dimension of a userEncoding into binary bit stringsWherein the encoded data of each dimension is,representing dataIn the form of a binary code of (a),is expressed as length ofPadding all-zero bit strings of (1);
S203, selecting one positive value by the intelligent electric meterRandom numberAnd is andwherein, the symbolsWhich represents the length of the bit string and,has a bit length of;
S204, using the electric meter secret parameter by the intelligent electric meterThe electricity data are compared in the following wayAnd (3) encryption:
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,is power consumption dataThe ciphertext of (a) may be encrypted,is a random number;
s206. the intelligent electric meter verifies the ciphertext dataAnd sending the information to the corresponding fog node.
Preferably, the S3 includes the following steps:
s301, judging the number of intelligent electric meters which are in charge of normal work of regional uploading verifiable ciphertext data by the fog nodes in the time period TIf the threshold value is larger than the preset threshold value t, if yes, S302 is executed, wherein,a subscript set of the smart meter which works normally is represented;
s302, carrying out batch verification on the fog nodes according to the following equation:
if the equation is established, the verification is passed;
s303, calculating Lagrange coefficient in polymerization process by using fog nodeWherein, in the step (A),is managed by user in fog nodeThe sequence of values is then set to the value,indicated as the location of one user,representing a pointer in the traversal process, and calculating all user subscripts received by the fog nodes;
s305, the fog node calculates a first session key temporarily negotiated with a power grid control center;
S306, the fog node calculates a second message authentication codeWhereinRepresenting points on an elliptic curveThe ordinate of (a);
s307, the fog node sends a verifiable fog level aggregation ciphertext to a power grid control center。
Preferably, the S4 includes the following steps:
s401, the power grid control center receives verifiable fog-level aggregation ciphertext from a fog nodeThen, a second session key temporarily negotiated with the fog node is calculated;
S402, the power grid control center calculates a third message authentication codeWhereinRepresenting points on an elliptic curveOn the ordinate, ifThen, S403 is executed;
s403, the power grid control center utilizes secret parameters of the control centerDecrypting the verifiable fog level aggregation ciphertext of the fog node:
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,the decrypted aggregated data of the intelligent electric meter are represented;
s404, the power grid control center recovers the aggregated data of each dimension, wherein the aggregated data of the s-th dimensionAs a bit stringTo middle The data in the bit positions of the data,。
the invention has the beneficial effects that:
(1) the method can prevent an attacker from analyzing the user data and does not influence the statistical analysis of the power grid system;
(2) the method reduces the calculation complexity and the calculation requirement of the intelligent ammeter while not affecting the safety, and can effectively improve the system efficiency, reduce the time delay and the like;
(3) the method has the fault-tolerant function of the intelligent electric meter, and even if the damaged intelligent electric meter exists or part of data of the intelligent electric meter is not received due to network blockage, the control center can still analyze correct results from most of data of the intelligent electric meter;
(4) the method has the function of resisting the key leakage, and the control center or the intelligent electric meter can perform timely remediation after the symmetric key is lost, so that a large amount of loss is avoided.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a smart grid system;
FIG. 2 is a flowchart of a method for aggregating multidimensional private data in a smart grid;
fig. 3 is a schematic diagram of an aggregated plaintext data form.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions of the present invention will be described clearly and completely with reference to the following embodiments, and it should be understood that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be obtained by a person skilled in the art without inventive effort based on the embodiments of the present invention, are within the scope of the present invention.
Referring to fig. 1 to fig. 3, the embodiment provides a multidimensional private data aggregation method in a smart grid:
as shown in fig. 1, a multidimensional private data aggregation method in a smart grid is applied to a smart grid system, the smart grid comprises a grid control center, a fog node, a smart meter and a trusted center, the grid control center is in communication connection with the fog node, the fog node is in communication connection with the smart meter, and the grid control center, the fog node and the smart meter are in communication connection with the trusted center.
As shown in fig. 2, a method for aggregating multidimensional private data in a smart grid includes the following steps:
s1, a trusted center sets a security password component, a signature private key of each communication entity and a secret share parameter of a threshold secret sharing technology, wherein the security password component comprises a symmetric homomorphic encryption algorithm, a symmetric key of the symmetric homomorphic encryption algorithm, bilinear pairwise mapping, a security hash function and a first message authentication code, and the communication entities comprise a power grid control center, an intelligent ammeter and a fog node; the trusted center publishes the system public password parameters, generates the secret parameters of each communication entity according to the symmetric key, the signature private key and the secret share parameters, and sends the secret parameters to each communication entity through a secure channel.
Specifically, the S1 includes the following steps:
s101, the trusted center generates a symmetric key of a symmetric homomorphic encryption algorithmWhere u and v are both large prime numbers, and the bit length of u is greater than or equal to 2 times the bit length of v, and s is a u-order finite fieldD is the number of times of the ciphertext, and the trusted center is represented by TTP.
S102, the credible center sets a bilinear mappingWherein, in the step (A),is a p-order addition cycle group,is a P-factorial cyclic group, P is an additive cyclic groupThe generator of (1).
S103, the credible center sets the number of the fog nodes asAnd setting the maximum intelligent electric meter number of a fog node responsible area to be N, wherein the fog node is usedTo said smart meterAnd (4) showing.
S104, the credible center sets a fixed positive integerWhereinRepresents taking an integer upward, and D represents the supremum of each dimension data.
S105, the credible center sets an anti-collision Hash functionWherein, in the step (A),representing a bit string of arbitrary length and setting a first message authentication code HMAC.
S106, the credible center is in order pFinite fieldMist node signature private key selected for mist nodesAnd calculates its public key of the fog nodeThe identity of the fog node is。
S107, the trusted center slave finite fieldElectric meter signature private key selection method for intelligent electric meterAnd calculate the public key of the electric meterThe identity of the intelligent electric meter is。
S108, the trusted center slave finite fieldSelecting a control center signature private key x for a power grid control center, and calculating a control center public key of the control center signature private key xThe grid control center is denoted CC.
S111, the credible center selects a positive integerAnd calculating a secret share parameter oneSecret share parameter twoSecret share parameter threeSecret share parameter fourAnd secret share parameter fiveWherein is a positive integerThe bit length of (f) is less than or equal to 20 bits, and (f) and (j) represent the value of the t-1 degree polynomial corresponding to the jth intelligent electric meter.
S113, the trusted center controls the secret parameters of the centerSending the parameters to a power grid control center to obtain the secret parameters of the electric meterSending the parameters to each intelligent ammeter, and carrying out secret parameter of the fog nodeTo each of the fog nodes.
S2, the intelligent electric meter performs binary preprocessing on data of each dimension of a user, encrypts the binary preprocessed data by adopting a homomorphic symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain ciphertext data, and generates a digital signature corresponding to the ciphertext data by using a signature private key; the intelligent electric meter uploads verifiable ciphertext data to the corresponding fog node in a time period, wherein the verifiable ciphertext data comprise the ciphertext data, the digital signature, the time period and the identity of the intelligent electric meter.
Generally, a time period defaults to 15 minutes, and can be changed according to network conditions, calculation conditions of each device and statistical requirements of a control center.
Specifically, the S2 includes the following steps:
s201, enabling the intelligent electric meter to obtain data of each dimension of a userEncoding into binary bit stringsWherein the encoded data of each dimension is,representing dataIn the form of a binary code of (a),is expressed as length ofIs filled with all-zero bit strings.
S203, the intelligent electric meter selects a positive random numberAnd is andwherein, the symbolsWhich represents the length of the bit string and,has a bit length of。
S204, using the electric meter secret parameter by the intelligent electric meterThe electricity data are compared in the following wayAnd (3) encryption:
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,is power consumption dataThe ciphertext of (a) may be encrypted,is a random number, and the main function of the random number is to ensure the randomness of the ciphertext to prevent differential attack.
S206. the intelligent electric meter verifies the ciphertext dataAnd sending the information to the corresponding fog node.
S3, judging whether the number of normally working intelligent electric meters which upload verifiable ciphertext data in a responsible area of each fog node in a time period is larger than a preset threshold value or not, and if so, verifying the verifiable ciphertext data in batches by the fog nodes; and after the verification is passed, the fog node calculates an aggregation ciphertext, simultaneously generates a first session key temporarily negotiated with the power grid control center, calculates a second message authentication code, and uploads a verifiable fog-level aggregation ciphertext to the power grid control center, wherein the verifiable fog-level aggregation ciphertext comprises the aggregation ciphertext, the second message authentication code, a time period and the identity of the fog node.
Specifically, the S3 includes the following steps:
s301, judging a fog node in a time period TNumber of intelligent electric meters in charge of normal work of regional uploading verifiable ciphertext dataIf the threshold value is larger than the preset threshold value t, if yes, S302 is executed, wherein,and indicating a subscript set of the smart meter which normally works.
S302, carrying out batch verification on the fog nodes according to the following equation:
if the equation is true, the verification passes. If all data sources are legal users, the verification can be successfully passed, and the derivation process is in a correctness formula (2).
S303, calculating Lagrange coefficient in polymerization process by using fog nodeWherein, in the step (A),is a sequence value managed by the user at the fog node,indicated as the location of one user,and (4) representing a pointer of the traversal process, and calculating all the user subscripts received by the fog nodes.
S306, the fog node calculates a second message authentication codeWhereinRepresenting points on an elliptic curveThe ordinate of (c).
S307, the fog node sends a verifiable fog level aggregation ciphertext to a power grid control center。
And S4, after receiving the verifiable fog-level aggregation ciphertext of the fog node, the power grid control center generates a second session key temporarily negotiated with the fog node, calculates a third message authentication code, and checks the third session key with the received second message authentication code, if the third session key passes the checking, the power grid control center decrypts the verifiable fog-level aggregation ciphertext and recovers a plurality of dimension data values after aggregation.
Specifically, the S4 includes the following steps:
s401, the power grid control center receives verifiable fog-level aggregation ciphertext from a fog nodeThen, a second session key temporarily negotiated with the fog node is calculated。
S402, the power grid control center calculates a third message authentication codeWhereinRepresenting points on an elliptic curveOn the ordinate, ifThen S403 is executed.
S403, the power grid control center utilizes secret parameters of the control centerDecrypting the verifiable fog level aggregation ciphertext of the fog node:
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,and the decrypted aggregate data of the intelligent electric meter is represented.
S404, the power grid control center recovers the aggregated data of each dimension, wherein the aggregated data of the s-th dimensionAs a bit stringTo middle The data in the bit positions of the data,。
since it is known that data of each dimension after aggregation should be less than or equal to ND in the initial stage of the system, the data bit length of each dimension should be less than or equal to ND. Therefore, for eachAggregated data in the s-th dimensionShould be a bit stringTo middle Data in bits. The power grid control center can quickly recover the aggregated data of each dimension according to the rule.
The correctness of the method of the invention proves as follows:
(2) after receiving the user valid data, the fog node verifies the information in batches, and the integrity is correctly deduced as follows:
(3) if the fog node receives a plurality of pieces of user valid data, and the user data volume is greater than or equal to the threshold value t, the fog node executes aggregation operation and generates a fog level aggregation ciphertext:
(4) due to the fact thatThe power grid control center can calculate the same temporary session key as the fog node=Thereby calculating the correct second message authentication code。
(5) After the power grid control center receives the verifiable fog level aggregation ciphertext of the fog nodes, the power grid control center distributes the ciphertext by using the credible center To decrypt the fog-level aggregate ciphertext:
(6) and after recovering the fog-level aggregation ciphertext, the power grid control center recovers the aggregation data of each dimension in a character string segmentation mode. Because we set the maximum value for each dimension during the system initialization phaseD, and the number of the intelligent electric meters to which each fog node belongs is N. Therefore, at the fog node, the aggregated binary length of each dimension data should be less than or equal toThe aggregated plaintext data form is shown in fig. 3. Therefore, the power grid control center can restore the aggregation data of the specified dimensionality only by intercepting the corresponding bit string.
The foregoing is illustrative of the preferred embodiments of this invention, and it is to be understood that the invention is not limited to the precise form disclosed herein and that various other combinations, modifications, and environments may be resorted to, falling within the scope of the concept as disclosed herein, either as described above or as apparent to those skilled in the relevant art. And that modifications and variations may be effected by those skilled in the art without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as defined by the appended claims.
Claims (5)
1. A multidimensional private data aggregation method in a smart grid is applied to a smart grid system, the smart grid comprises a grid control center, a fog node, a smart meter and a trusted center, the grid control center is in communication connection with the fog node, the fog node is in communication connection with the smart meter, and the grid control center, the fog node and the smart meter are all in communication connection with the trusted center, and is characterized in that the multidimensional private data aggregation method in the smart grid comprises the following steps:
s1, a trusted center sets a security password component, a signature private key of each communication entity and a secret share parameter of a threshold secret sharing technology, wherein the security password component comprises a symmetric homomorphic encryption algorithm, a symmetric key of the symmetric homomorphic encryption algorithm, bilinear pairwise mapping, a security hash function and a first message authentication code, and the communication entities comprise a power grid control center, an intelligent ammeter and a fog node; the trusted center publishes system public password parameters, generates secret parameters of each communication entity according to the symmetric key, the signature private key and the secret share parameters, and sends the secret parameters to each communication entity through a secure channel;
s2, the intelligent electric meter performs binary preprocessing on data of each dimension of a user, encrypts the binary preprocessed data by adopting a homomorphic symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain ciphertext data, and generates a digital signature corresponding to the ciphertext data by using a signature private key; the intelligent electric meter uploads verifiable ciphertext data to a corresponding fog node in a time period, wherein the verifiable ciphertext data comprise the ciphertext data, a digital signature, the time period and the identity of the intelligent electric meter;
s3, judging whether the number of normally working intelligent electric meters which upload verifiable ciphertext data in a responsible area of each fog node in a time period is larger than a preset threshold value or not, and if so, verifying the verifiable ciphertext data in batches by the fog nodes; after the verification is passed, the fog node calculates an aggregation ciphertext, generates a first session key temporarily negotiated with a power grid control center, calculates a second message authentication code, and uploads a verifiable fog-level aggregation ciphertext to the power grid control center, wherein the verifiable fog-level aggregation ciphertext comprises the aggregation ciphertext, the second message authentication code, a time period and the identity of the fog node;
and S4, after receiving the verifiable fog-level aggregation ciphertext of the fog node, the power grid control center generates a second session key temporarily negotiated with the fog node, calculates a third message authentication code, and checks the third session key with the received second message authentication code, if the third session key passes the checking, the power grid control center decrypts the verifiable fog-level aggregation ciphertext and recovers a plurality of dimension data values after aggregation.
2. The method for aggregating multidimensional private data in a smart grid according to claim 1, wherein the S1 comprises the following steps:
s101, the trusted center generates a symmetric key of a symmetric homomorphic encryption algorithmWhere u and v are both large prime numbers, and the bit length of u is greater than or equal to 2 times the bit length of v, and s is a u-order finite fieldD is the number of times of the ciphertext, and the trusted center is represented by TTP;
s102, the credible center sets a bilinear mappingWherein, in the step (A),is a p-order addition cycle group,is a P-factorial cyclic group, P is an additive cyclic groupA generator of (2);
s103, the credible center sets the number of the fog nodes asAnd setting the maximum intelligent electric meter number of a fog node responsible area to be N, wherein the fog node is usedTo said smart meterRepresents;
s104, the credible center sets a fixed positive integerWhereinRepresenting upward integer taking, D represents the supremum of each dimension data;
s105, the credible center sets an anti-collision hashFunction(s)Wherein, in the step (A),representing a bit string with any length, and setting a first message authentication code HMAC;
s106, the credible center is in a limited domain of order pMist node signature private key selected for mist nodesAnd calculates its public key of the fog nodeThe identity of the fog node is;
S107, the trusted center slave finite fieldElectric meter signature private key selection method for intelligent electric meterAnd calculate the public key of the electric meterThe identity of the intelligent electric meter is;
S108, the trusted center slave finite fieldMiddle is electricityThe network control center selects a control center signature private key x and calculates a control center public key thereofThe grid control center is denoted by CC;
s111, the credible center selects a positive integerAnd calculating a secret share parameter oneSecret share parameter twoSecret share parameter threeSecret share parameter fourAnd secret share parameter fiveWherein is a positive integerThe bit length of (f) is less than or equal to 20 bits, and (f) (j) represents the value of a t-1 degree polynomial corresponding to the jth intelligent electric meter;
S113, the trusted center controls the secret parameters of the centerSending the parameters to a power grid control center to obtain the secret parameters of the electric meterSending the parameters to each intelligent ammeter, and carrying out secret parameter of the fog nodeTo each of the fog nodes.
3. The method for aggregating multidimensional private data in a smart grid according to claim 2, wherein the S2 comprises the following steps:
s201, enabling the intelligent electric meter to obtain data of each dimension of a userEncoding into binary bit stringsWherein the encoded data of each dimension isRepresenting dataIn the form of a binary code of (a),is expressed as length ofPadding all-zero bit strings of (1);
S203, the intelligent electric meter selects a positive random numberAnd is andwherein, the symbolsWhich represents the length of the bit string and,has a bit length of;
S204, using the electric meter secret parameter by the intelligent electric meterThe electricity data are compared in the following wayAnd (3) encryption:
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,is power consumption dataThe ciphertext of (a) may be encrypted,is a random number;
4. The method for aggregating multidimensional private data in a smart grid according to claim 3, wherein the S3 comprises the following steps:
s301, judging the number of intelligent electric meters which are in charge of normal work of regional uploading verifiable ciphertext data by the fog nodes in the time period TIf the threshold value is larger than the preset threshold value t, if yes, S302 is executed, wherein,a subscript set of the smart meter which works normally is represented;
s302, carrying out batch verification on the fog nodes according to the following equation:
if the equation is established, the verification is passed;
s303, calculating Lagrange coefficient in polymerization process by using fog nodeWherein, in the step (A),is a sequence value managed by the user at the fog node,indicated as the location of one user,representing a pointer in the traversal process, and calculating all user subscripts received by the fog nodes;
s305, the fog node calculates a first session key temporarily negotiated with a power grid control center;
S306, the fog node calculates a second message authentication codeWhereinRepresenting points on an elliptic curveThe ordinate of (a);
5. The method for aggregating multidimensional private data in a smart grid according to claim 4, wherein the S4 comprises the following steps:
s401, the power grid control center receives verifiable fog-level aggregation ciphertext from a fog nodeThen, a second session key temporarily negotiated with the fog node is calculated;
S402, the power grid control center calculates a third message authentication codeWhereinRepresenting points on an elliptic curveOn the ordinate, ifThen, S403 is executed;
s403, the power grid control center utilizes secret parameters of the control centerDecrypting the verifiable fog level aggregation ciphertext of the fog node:
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,the decrypted aggregated data of the intelligent electric meter are represented;
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