CN112346785B

CN112346785B - Data processing method, device, system, storage medium and computer equipment

Info

Publication number: CN112346785B
Application number: CN201910721546.9A
Authority: CN
Inventors: 付颖芳; 肖鹏
Original assignee: Alibaba Group Holding Ltd
Current assignee: Alibaba Group Holding Ltd
Priority date: 2019-08-06
Filing date: 2019-08-06
Publication date: 2024-05-14
Anticipated expiration: 2039-08-06
Also published as: TW202107311A; CN112346785A; WO2021023173A1

Abstract

The invention discloses a data processing method, a device, a system, a storage medium and computer equipment. The data processing method comprises the following steps: the trusted chip checks whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted or not; under the condition that the verification result is that the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are credible, the credible chip reports the BMC and the configuration strategy tool to a remote management and control center; the trusted chip obtains a trusted policy from the BMC, wherein the remote management and control center has issued the trusted policy to the BMC through a configuration policy tool.

Description

Data processing method, device, system, storage medium and computer equipment

Technical Field

The present invention relates to the field of computers, and in particular, to a data processing method, apparatus, system, storage medium, and computer device.

Background

With the popularization of computer application, hardware attack is increasingly rampant, and the integrity assurance of service platforms and systems is increasingly emphasized, and the measurement is a newer technical means for protecting the integrity of the platforms and the systems: at certain specific moments, the measured object is measured according to the measurement strategy to obtain certain information (such as hash value of the file) of the measured object, and the value of the information is compared with the standard value obtained according to the verification strategy, which is recorded in advance, so that whether the integrity of the target is destroyed is judged.

From the above, it can be seen how is the measurement policy and the verification policy guaranteed by how is the policy itself secure, when and how is it configured? These have great influence on timely finding out the abnormality of the measured object, timely controlling when finding out the abnormality, and ensuring the security of the policy configuration itself.

In the related art, the methods generally adopted are: before a basic input/output system (Basic Input Output System, abbreviated as BIOS) operates, the measurement strategy and the verification strategy are directly configured at a BIOS set up phase interface, written into the TPCM, and then in the system starting process (including BIOS), measurement verification is performed according to the configured strategy.

Another method is to configure the above measurement policy and verification policy after the device Operating System (OS) is started, and then restart the device to start measurement.

However, in the two methods, the policy is configured before the BIOS is operated, so that the security of the policy cannot be ensured; after the OS is started, the policy is configured, the device needs to be restarted, and continuity of the service cannot be guaranteed.

In view of the above problems, no effective solution has been proposed at present.

Disclosure of Invention

The embodiment of the invention provides a data processing method, a device, a system, a storage medium and computer equipment, which at least solve the technical problems that the safety of a trusted policy cannot be ensured and the service continuity cannot be ensured when the trusted policy is configured in the related technology.

According to an aspect of an embodiment of the present invention, there is provided a data processing method including: the trusted chip checks whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted or not; when the verification result is that the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are credible, the credible chip reports the BMC and the configuration strategy tool to a remote management and control center; the trusted chip obtains a trusted policy from the BMC, wherein the remote management and control center has issued the trusted policy to the BMC through a configuration policy tool.

According to another aspect of an embodiment of the present invention, there is provided a data processing method, including: the remote management and control center receives a report of the trusted chip, wherein the report is used for informing the BMC of the trust; the remote management and control center issues a configuration strategy request to the BMC; the remote management and control center issues the trusted policy to the BMC through a policy configuration tool, and the trusted chip is used for acquiring the trusted policy from the BMC.

According to still another aspect of the embodiment of the present invention, there is provided a data processing method, including: under the condition that the trusted chip determines that the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are trusted, the BMC receives a configuration strategy request issued by a remote management and control center; the BMC checks whether the remote control center and the configuration policy tool are trusted or not; under the condition that the checking result is that the remote control center and the configuration strategy tool are credible, the BMC receives a credible strategy issued by the remote control center through the configuration strategy tool; the BMC provides the received trusted policy to the trusted chip.

According to still another aspect of an embodiment of the present invention, there is provided a data processing method including: the trusted chip checks whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted or not; when the verification result is that the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are credible, the credible chip reports the BMC and the configuration strategy tool to a remote management and control center; the remote management and control center issues a configuration strategy request to the BMC; the BMC and the remote control center mutually check the validity of the other party, and the BMC checks whether the configuration strategy tool is credible or not; under the condition that the BMC and the remote management and control center are legal and the BMC verifies that the configuration strategy tool is credible, the remote management and control center issues a credible strategy to the BMC through the configuration strategy tool; the trusted chip obtains the trusted policy from the BMC.

According to still another aspect of an embodiment of the present invention, there is provided a data processing method including: the trusted chip checks whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted or not; if the verification result is that the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are reliable, the trusted chip reports the BMC and the configuration strategy tool to the edge computing server; the edge computing server sends a configuration strategy request to the BMC; the BMC and the edge computing server mutually check the legitimacy of the other party, and the BMC checks whether the configuration strategy tool is credible or not; under the condition that the BMC and the edge computing server are legal and the BMC verifies that the configuration strategy tool is credible, the edge computing server issues a credible strategy to the BMC through the configuration strategy tool; the trusted chip obtains a trusted policy from the BMC.

According to an aspect of an embodiment of the present invention, there is provided a data processing apparatus applied to a trusted chip, including: the first checking module is used for checking whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are credible or not; the reporting module is used for reporting the credibility of the BMC and the configuration strategy tool to a remote management and control center under the condition that the checking result is that the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are credible; the remote management and control center is used for sending the trusted policy to the BMC through the configuration policy tool.

According to another aspect of an embodiment of the present invention, there is provided a data processing apparatus, applied to a remote management and control center, including: the first receiving module is used for receiving a report of the trusted chip, wherein the report is used for informing the BMC of the trust; the first issuing module is used for issuing a configuration strategy request to the BMC; and the second issuing module is used for issuing the trusted policy to the BMC through a policy configuration tool and acquiring the trusted policy from the BMC by the trusted chip.

According to still another aspect of the embodiment of the present invention, there is provided a trusted policy configuration apparatus, applied to a BMC, including: the second receiving module is used for receiving a configuration strategy request issued by the remote management and control center under the condition that the trusted chip determines that the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are trusted; the second checking module is used for checking whether the remote control center and the configuration strategy tool are credible or not; the third receiving module is used for sending a trusted policy to the remote control center through the configuration policy tool under the condition that the test result is that the remote control center and the configuration policy tool are trusted; and the providing module is used for providing the received trusted strategy to the trusted chip.

According to a further aspect of an embodiment of the present invention, there is provided a data processing system comprising: the system comprises a trusted chip, a remote management and control center, a configuration strategy tool and a BMC, wherein the trusted chip is used for checking whether the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are trusted or not, and reporting the trusted BMC and the trusted configuration strategy tool to the remote management and control center when the checking result is that the BMC and the trusted configuration strategy tool are trusted; the remote management and control center is used for issuing a configuration strategy request to the BMC; the BMC is used for mutually checking the validity of the other party with the remote control center and checking whether the configuration strategy tool is credible or not; the remote management and control center is further configured to issue a trusted policy to the BMC through the configuration policy tool when both the BMC and the remote management and control center are legal and the BMC verifies that the configuration policy tool is trusted; the trusted chip is further configured to obtain the trusted policy from the BMC.

According to a further aspect of an embodiment of the present invention, there is provided a data processing system comprising: the system comprises a trusted chip, an edge computing server, a configuration strategy tool and a BMC, wherein the trusted chip is used for checking whether the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are trusted or not, and reporting the trusted BMC and the configuration strategy tool to the edge computing server under the condition that the checking result is that the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are trusted; the edge computing server is used for sending a configuration strategy request to the BMC; the BMC is used for mutually checking the legitimacy of the other party with the edge computing server and checking whether the configuration strategy tool is credible or not; the edge computing server is used for issuing a trusted policy to the BMC through the configuration policy tool under the conditions that the BMC and the edge computing server are legal and the BMC verifies that the configuration policy tool is trusted; the trusted chip is also used for acquiring a trusted policy from the BMC.

According to an aspect of an embodiment of the present invention, there is provided a storage medium storing a program, wherein the program, when executed by a processor, controls the processor to execute the data processing method of any one of the above.

According to another aspect of an embodiment of the present invention, there is provided a computer apparatus including: a memory and a processor, the memory storing a computer program; the processor is configured to execute a computer program stored in the memory, where the computer program when executed causes the processor to perform any one of the data processing methods described above.

In the embodiment of the invention, the remote control center is adopted to issue the trusted policy to the BMC through the configuration policy tool, so that the trusted chip can acquire the trusted policy from the BMC, the purpose of configuring the trusted policy to the trusted chip through the trusted remote control center before the equipment is started is achieved, and the security of configuring the trusted policy is realized; moreover, after the trusted policy is configured, the device can be started once, so that the technical effect of service continuity can be ensured, and the technical problems that the safety of the trusted policy cannot be ensured and the service continuity cannot be ensured when the trusted policy is configured in the related technology are solved.

Drawings

The accompanying drawings, which are included to provide a further understanding of the application and are incorporated in and constitute a part of this specification, illustrate embodiments of the application and together with the description serve to explain the application and do not constitute a limitation on the application. In the drawings:

FIG. 1 shows a block diagram of the hardware architecture of a computer terminal for implementing a data processing method;

FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a startup trust chain after a trusted policy is configured before BIOS operation, on which embodiments of the present invention are based;

FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a startup trust chain based on which embodiments of the present invention configure trusted policies after OS startup;

FIG. 4 is a flow chart of a first data processing method according to an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 5 is a flow chart of a second data processing method according to an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 6 is a flow chart of a third data processing method according to an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 7 is a flow chart of a fourth data processing method according to an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 8 is a flow chart of a fifth data processing method according to an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 9 is a flow chart of a data processing method provided in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 10 is a schematic diagram of a configuration trusted policy applied to a boot device according to an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 11 is a block diagram showing the structure of a first data processing apparatus according to embodiment 2 of the present invention;

fig. 12 is a block diagram of a structure of a second data processing apparatus according to embodiment 3 of the present invention;

fig. 13 is a block diagram of the structure of a third data processing apparatus according to embodiment 4 of the present invention;

FIG. 14 is a block diagram of a data processing system according to embodiment 5 of the present invention;

Fig. 15 is a schematic view of a security policy applied to control home appliances by a data processing system according to embodiment 8 of the present invention.

Detailed Description

In order that those skilled in the art will better understand the present invention, a technical solution in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings in which it is apparent that the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, not all embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be made by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of the present invention without making any inventive effort, shall fall within the scope of the present invention.

It should be noted that the terms "first," "second," and the like in the description and the claims of the present invention and the above figures are used for distinguishing between similar objects and not necessarily for describing a particular sequential or chronological order. It is to be understood that the data so used may be interchanged where appropriate such that the embodiments of the invention described herein may be implemented in sequences other than those illustrated or otherwise described herein. Furthermore, the terms "comprises," "comprising," and "having," and any variations thereof, are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, system, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of steps or elements is not necessarily limited to those steps or elements expressly listed but may include other steps or elements not expressly listed or inherent to such process, method, article, or apparatus.

First, partial terms or terminology appearing in the course of describing embodiments of the application are applicable to the following explanation:

Trusted computing (Trusted Computing) an international trusted computing group (Trusted Computing Group, abbreviated as TCG) development and promotion technique uses a trusted computing platform supported by a hardware-based security module in computing and communication systems to improve the security of the system as a whole. With trusted computing, a computer will always operate in the expected manner, which will be guaranteed by both the computer hardware and the program, by using hardware security modules that are inaccessible to the rest of the system.

Trusted platform modules (TPM, trusted Platform Model) the TPM is an international standard for secure crypto processors, written by TCG, and protects hardware by integrating encryption keys into the device through a specialized microcontroller. The TPM security chip is a security chip conforming to the TPM standard and is generally and physically bound to a computing platform, so that the TPM security chip can effectively protect a PC and prevent illegal users from accessing the TPM security chip.

The trusted platform control module (TPCM, trusted Platform Control Model) is characterized in that the TPCM is used as a trusted node which is autonomously controllable in China to be implanted with a trusted source root, and a trusted root control function is added on the basis of a TPM, so that the active control and measurement based on a password are realized; the TPCM starts before the CPU and verifies the BIOS, so that the traditional thought that the TPM is used as passive equipment is changed, and the active control of the TPCM on the whole platform is realized.

And a measurement strategy, which adopts a measurement algorithm to measure the measurement object, and is used for verifying the integrity of the measurement object, namely verifying whether the measurement object is tampered. Comprising the following steps: system integrity metrics policies (system integrity related algorithms/programs) and hardware platform integrity metrics policies (hardware firmware integrity metrics related metrics algorithms/metrics objects).

And checking a strategy, namely determining a reference value corresponding to the measurement strategy, measuring the measurement object to obtain a measurement result, and comparing the measurement result with the reference value for comparison, and determining that the measurement is passed when the measurement result and the reference value are consistent. Comprising the following steps: system integrity check policies (benchmark values for measuring the integrity of operating system kernels and management configuration files, program files) and hardware platform integrity check policies (benchmark values for checking the integrity of hardware platform firmware).

Example 1

In accordance with an embodiment of the present invention, there is also provided a method embodiment of a data processing method, it being noted that the steps shown in the flowchart of the figures may be performed in a computer system, such as a set of computer executable instructions, and that, although a logical order is shown in the flowchart, in some cases, the steps shown or described may be performed in an order other than that shown or described herein.

The method according to the first embodiment of the present application may be implemented in a mobile terminal, a computer terminal or a similar computing device. Fig. 1 shows a block diagram of a hardware architecture of a computer terminal (or mobile device) for implementing a data processing method. As shown in fig. 1, the computer terminal 10 (or mobile device 10) may include one or more (shown as 102a, 102b, … …,102 n) processors 102 (the processor 102 may include, but is not limited to, a microprocessor MCU, a programmable logic device FPGA, etc. processing means), a memory 104 for storing data. In addition, the method may further include: a transmission module, a display, an input/output interface (I/O interface), a Universal Serial Bus (USB) port (which may be included as one of the ports of the I/O interface), a network interface, a power supply, and/or a camera. It will be appreciated by those of ordinary skill in the art that the configuration shown in fig. 1 is merely illustrative and is not intended to limit the configuration of the electronic device described above. For example, the computer terminal 10 may also include more or fewer components than shown in FIG. 1, or have a different configuration than shown in FIG. 1.

It should be noted that the one or more processors 102 and/or other data processing circuits described above may be referred to generally herein as "data processing circuits. The data processing circuit may be embodied in whole or in part in software, hardware, firmware, or any other combination. Furthermore, the data processing circuitry may be a single stand-alone processing module, or incorporated, in whole or in part, into any of the other elements in the computer terminal 10 (or mobile device). As referred to in embodiments of the application, the data processing circuit acts as a processor control (e.g., selection of the path of the variable resistor termination connected to the interface).

The memory 104 may be used to store software programs and modules of application software, such as program instructions/data storage devices corresponding to the remote authentication method in the embodiment of the present invention, and the processor 102 executes the software programs and modules stored in the memory 104, thereby executing various functional applications and data processing, that is, implementing the data processing method of the application program. Memory 104 may include high-speed random access memory, and may also include non-volatile memory, such as one or more magnetic storage devices, flash memory, or other non-volatile solid-state memory. In some examples, the memory 104 may further include memory located remotely from the processor 102, which may be connected to the computer terminal 10 via a network. Examples of such networks include, but are not limited to, the internet, intranets, local area networks, mobile communication networks, and combinations thereof.

The transmission module is used for receiving or transmitting data through a network. The specific examples of the network described above may include a wireless network provided by a communication provider of the computer terminal 10. In one example, the transmission module includes a network adapter (Network Interface Controller, NIC) that can connect to other network devices through the base station to communicate with the internet. In one example, the transmission module may be a Radio Frequency (RF) module, which is used to communicate with the internet wirelessly.

The display may be, for example, a touch screen type Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) that may enable a user to interact with a user interface of the computer terminal 10 (or mobile device).

As described above, in the related art to which the embodiments of the present invention are directed, the method generally adopted is: before a basic input/output system (Basic Input Output System, abbreviated as BIOS) operates, the measurement strategy and the verification strategy are directly configured at a BIOS set up phase interface, written into the TPCM, and then in the system starting process (including BIOS), measurement verification is performed according to the configured strategy. FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a startup trust chain after a trusted policy is configured before BIOS run, on which an embodiment of the present invention is based.

Another method is to configure the above measurement policy and verification policy after the device Operating System (OS) is started, and then restart the device to start measurement. FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a startup trust chain based on which embodiments of the present invention configure trusted policies after OS startup.

However, the two schemes have the following disadvantages:

(1) In the two methods, when the equipment is started for the first time, the measurement before BIOS set up is protected by the strategy of the manufacturer, and the strategy of the user cannot be truly protected;

(2) In the first method, an operation and maintenance manager who is not in front of the device can not perform remote policy configuration operation, and in addition, when the BIOS setup configures a policy, the BIOS set up self-security is not protected and verified by integrity;

(3) After the policy configuration is performed by adopting the second method, the policy needs to be restarted to be effective, which cannot guarantee the continuity of the service, and thus the experience of the user is poor.

In order to overcome the above-mentioned shortcomings, in the embodiment of the present invention, a trusted policy configuration scheme is provided, in which the remote control function of the baseboard management controller (Baseboard Management Controller, abbreviated as BMC) of the server is utilized to configure the measurement policies of the BIOS, the OS Loader, and the OS kernel, so as to ensure that the measurement policies and the verification policies can be remotely configured in the first starting process, and the starting is not required, so that the continuity of the user service can be ensured, and the anomaly can be timely found. It should be noted that, the foregoing BMC may be integrated on a motherboard within a server device, where the BMC may be independently powered and provided with an independent I/O interface, and may be capable of performing remote control functions of the server, where the remote control functions include, but are not limited to, local and remote diagnostics, console support, configuration management, hardware management, and troubleshooting.

FIG. 4 is a flowchart of a first data processing method according to an embodiment of the present invention, as shown in FIG. 4, the flowchart includes:

step S402, the trusted chip checks whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted;

As an alternative embodiment, the data processing method provided by the embodiment of the present invention is described from the side of the trusted chip. The trusted chip may include various types, for example, may be a trusted platform module TPM, may also be a trusted platform control module TPCM, and the like, and is not limited herein. When the trusted policy of the trusted chip is configured, the related object for configuring the trusted policy can be checked first, namely whether the related object is trusted or not is checked, and when the related object is checked to be trusted, the configuration of the trusted policy is executed according to the trusted object. In addition, the data processing method provided by the embodiment of the invention can be described from the side of the non-trusted chip, that is, other chips besides the trusted chip, for example, the non-trusted chip. It should be further noted that, in the implementation process, whether the chip is a trusted chip or an untrusted chip, the application scenario should be determined, for example, the chip may be considered from aspects such as selectivity and compatibility.

As an alternative embodiment, the trusted chip and BMC may be combined together and deployed in a server or server array, where the trusted chip and BMC may be implemented in a deployment environment including, but not limited to, a virtual machine environment.

As an alternative embodiment, when detecting an object involved in configuring a trusted policy process, different objects may be tested using different policies, since the object involved may include multiple objects. For example, in an embodiment of the present invention, the objects involved in configuring the trusted policy process may include: trusted chips themselves, BMCs, configuration policy tools, and the like.

As an alternative embodiment, the trusted chip may employ a predetermined self-checking strategy when checking itself. For example, the trusted chip performs a self-test using a self-test policy, and in the event that the self-test passes, determines whether the checking BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted. It should be noted that, the self-checking policy may be set by default when the trusted chip leaves the factory, or may be a self-checking policy after the factory setting is modified later according to the needs of the user. The trusted chip performs self-checking on itself, and after the self-checking passes, other objects which interact with itself later are checked.

As an alternative embodiment, after the trusted chip verifies itself, it verifies the objects associated with the trusted policy configuration, e.g., the trusted chip verifies whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted. When the trusted chip verifies that the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted, various ways may be used. For example, the trusted chip checking whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted may include: the trusted chip verifies the legitimacy of the BMC and the configuration policy tool and measures the integrity of the BMC and the configuration policy tool; in the case of verifying the legitimacy pass of the BMC and the configuration policy tool, and measuring the integrity pass of the BMC and the configuration policy tool, the trusted chip determines that the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted. Thus, the trusted chip checks whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted, including not only checking whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are legitimate, but also checking whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are complete, and determining that the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted if the BMC and the configuration policy tool are both legitimate and complete.

As an alternative embodiment, the trusted chip may not be sequenced when it verifies that the BMC and the configuration policy tool are legitimate and when it verifies that the BMC and the configuration policy tool are complete. For example, it may be checked whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are legal before checking whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are complete. It is also possible to check whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are complete before checking whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are legal. Preferably, considering the importance of security, it may be checked first whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are legal, in case of legal, whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are complete.

Step S404, when the checking result is that the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are reliable, the trusted chip reports the BMC and the configuration strategy tool to the remote management and control center;

As an alternative embodiment, after checking whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted, if the checking result is that the BMC and the configuration policy tool are not trusted, the configuration flow of the trusted policy may be directly ended. And under the condition that the verification result is that the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are credible, reporting the BMC and the configuration strategy tool to a remote management and control center by the credible chip. The trusted chip informs the remote control center that the BMC and the configuration policy tool can be adopted to perform the configuration of the trusted policy. It should be noted that, the trusted chip may report the trust of the BMC and the configuration policy tool to the remote management and control center in various manners, for example, may directly send a report message, or may send an identifier, where the identifier is used to identify that the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted. The reporting mode can be flexibly selected according to the needs, and is not limited herein.

In step S406, the trusted chip obtains a trusted policy from the BMC, where the remote management and control center has issued the trusted policy to the BMC by configuring a policy tool.

As an optional embodiment, after the trusted chip reports the trust of the BMC and the configuration policy tool to the remote management and control center, the remote management and control center performs mutual authentication with the BMC, and in the case that the mutual authentication is passed, the remote management and control center issues the trust policy to the BMC through the configuration policy tool, and then the trusted chip obtains the trust policy from the BMC.

As an alternative embodiment, the above-described trusted policy comprises: the method comprises a measured object corresponding to the trusted policy, a measurement policy for measuring the measured object, and a verification policy (namely a reference value for judging whether the measurement passes) applied in the measurement process of the measured object. Wherein, the measured object referred to herein may be a measurement object that the trusted chip needs to measure during the boot process, for example, a measurement object included in a trust chain during the boot process as described above.

As an alternative embodiment, the trusted chip may obtain the trusted policy from the BMC in a variety of ways, e.g., the trusted chip may obtain the trusted policy directly from the BMC. However, a secure manner may exist in a manner of directly obtaining the trusted policy, and thus, in the embodiment of the present invention, a secure obtaining manner is provided. For example, the trusted chip may obtain a trusted policy from the BMC in the following manner: the trusted chip obtains a trusted policy package from the BMC, wherein the trusted policy package comprises: the method comprises the steps that a measured object in a trusted chip which signs by adopting a private key of a remote management and control center and a trusted policy of the measured object are adopted, wherein a trusted policy package is encrypted by adopting an EK public key of the trusted chip; after the trusted chip verifies the trusted policy package through the signature from the remote management and control center, the EK private key of the trusted chip is adopted to decrypt the trusted policy package, and the trusted policy is obtained.

As an alternative embodiment, the measured object in the trusted chip and the trusted policy corresponding to the measured object are signed with the private key of the remote control center, indicating that the trusted policy is secure from the trusted remote control center. The EK public key of the trusted chip is adopted to encrypt the trusted policy, so that in the process of transmitting the remote control center to the BMC, the transmission safety of the trusted policy can be ensured because the encrypted trusted policy packet is transmitted. It should be noted that, the private key of the remote control center is used for signing, and the EK public key encryption using the trusted chip is an alternative embodiment, which, of course, may also be used for signing or encrypting other identifiers to ensure the source reliability of the trusted policy and the security of the transmission, which is not illustrated here.

As an alternative embodiment, after the trusted chip obtains the trusted policy from the BMC, the method may further include: the trusted chip stores the trusted policy in the nonvolatile storage space; the trusted chip sequentially performs trusted measurement on the measured objects of the trusted trust chain according to the stored trusted policy, and starts the device under the condition that the measurement is passed. Therefore, after the trusted policy is obtained from the BMC, the trusted policy is stored in the nonvolatile storage space, and the nonvolatile storage space has the characteristics of safe and reliable storage, so that the safety of the trusted policy can be ensured, and the trusted policy is not lost. And then, the trusted chip sequentially performs trusted measurement on the measured objects of the trusted chain according to the stored trusted policy, and starts the equipment under the condition that the measurement is passed. By adopting the remote trusted policy configuration, the security of the trusted policy can be ensured, and only one start is needed.

Through the steps, the remote control center is adopted to issue the trusted policy to the BMC through the configuration policy tool, so that the trusted chip can acquire the trusted policy from the BMC, the purpose of configuring the trusted policy to the trusted chip through the trusted remote control center before the equipment is started is achieved, and the safety of configuring the trusted policy is ensured; moreover, after the trusted policy is configured, the device can be started once, so that the technical effect of service continuity can be ensured, and the technical problems that the safety of the trusted policy cannot be ensured and the service continuity cannot be ensured when the trusted policy is configured in the related technology are solved.

In an embodiment of the present invention, a data processing method is provided, and fig. 5 is a flowchart of a second data processing method according to an embodiment of the present invention, as shown in fig. 5, where the flowchart includes:

Step S502, a report of a trusted chip is received by a remote management and control center, wherein the report is used for informing the BMC of the trust;

As an alternative embodiment, the data processing method provided by the embodiment of the present invention is described from the side of the remote control center. When the trusted chip starts the configuration flow of the trusted policy, the trusted chip can check the objects involved in configuring the trusted policy to determine whether the involved objects are trusted. And the trusted chip can report the test result to a remote management and control center for issuing the trusted policy. After receiving the report of the trusted BMC sent by the trusted chip, the remote management and control center determines that the BMC for configuring the trusted policy is trusted, and can send the trusted policy to the BMC.

As an alternative embodiment, as above, the report that the remote management center receives the trusted chip may have a plurality of manners, which may be a manner of receiving the report message, or a manner of receiving a predetermined identifier for identifying that the BMC is trusted, which is not limited herein. Furthermore, in a specific implementation, the remote control center may be virtual, e.g. the remote control center is to be built up with one or more virtual terminal devices.

Step S504, the remote management and control center issues a configuration strategy request to the BMC;

As an optional embodiment, after the remote control center determines that the BMC for configuring the trusted policy is trusted, the remote control center may issue a request for configuring the trusted policy to the BMC, on the one hand, to notify the BMC that the BMC will issue the trusted policy to the BMC, and may remind the BMC that the BMC is ready to receive the trusted policy; on the other hand, the configuration policy request is issued from a trusted remote management center so that the BMC ensures the security and trustworthiness of the source of the trusted policy.

In step S506, the remote management and control center issues the trusted policy to the BMC through the policy configuration tool, for the trusted chip to obtain the trusted policy from the BMC.

As an optional embodiment, to ensure the security of the remote control center issuing the trusted policy, before the remote control center issues the trusted policy to the BMC through the policy configuration tool, the method may further include: the remote management and control center verifies the legitimacy and the integrity of the BMC and the configuration strategy tool; and the remote management and control center determines to issue the trusted strategy to the BMC through the strategy configuration tool under the condition that the validity and the integrity of the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are verified to pass. That is, the remote management and control center verifies the validity and integrity of the BMC and the configuration policy tool, and the remote management and control center can determine that the configuration policy tool used by the trusted policy is to be issued and that the issued object BMC is trusted, that is, the trusted policy is issued by the configuration policy tool and the issued object BMC is trusted and safe.

As an alternative embodiment, the remote management and control center may verify the validity and the integrity of the BMC and the configuration policy tool in a non-sequential manner, for example, may verify the validity and the integrity of the configuration policy tool after verifying the validity and the integrity of the BMC a priori, or may verify the validity and the integrity of the BMC after verifying the validity and the integrity of the configuration policy tool a priori. The remote management and control center can verify the legitimacy and the integrity of the BMC and the configuration policy tool in a non-sequential manner, for example, the legitimacy of the BMC and the configuration policy tool can be verified a priori, and then the integrity of the BMC and the configuration policy tool is verified; the integrity of the BMC and the configuration policy tool can also be verified a priori, and the legitimacy of the BMC and the configuration policy tool is verified afterwards. Of course, preferably, to ensure legitimacy and security, the legitimacy of the BMC and the configuration policy tool may be preferentially verified, and then the integrity of the BMC and the configuration policy tool may be verified.

As an alternative embodiment, the remote management center may issue the trusted policy to the BMC through the policy configuration tool in a variety of ways, for example, may be implemented in the following ways: the remote control center signs the measured object in the trusted chip and the trusted policy corresponding to the measured object by adopting a private key of the remote control center, encrypts the measured object and the trusted policy by adopting an EK public key of the trusted chip, and obtains a trusted policy package; the remote management and control center issues a trusted policy package to the BMC. The measured object in the trusted chip and the trusted policy corresponding to the measured object are signed by adopting the private key of the remote control center, so that the trusted policy can be confirmed to be from the trusted remote control center and is safe. In addition, the measured object and the trusted policy are encrypted by the EK public key of the trusted chip, and a trusted policy package is obtained, so that when the remote control center issues the trusted policy to the BMC, the trusted policy is not directly issued to the BMC, but issued after encryption, the safety of the transmission process of the remote control center issuing to the BMC is ensured, and the unsafe of the trusted policy caused by interception and tampering in the transmission process is avoided.

In an embodiment of the present invention, a data processing method is provided, and fig. 6 is a flowchart of a third data processing method according to an embodiment of the present invention, as shown in fig. 6, where the flowchart includes:

Step S602, when the trusted chip determines that the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted, the BMC receives a configuration policy request issued by a remote management and control center;

As an alternative embodiment, the data processing method provided by the embodiment of the present invention is described from the BMC side. BMC has built-in management functions on the motherboard, including: local and remote diagnostics, console support, configuration management, hardware management, and troubleshooting, among others.

Step S604, the BMC checks whether the remote control center and the configuration policy tool are trusted;

As an alternative embodiment, the BMC verifying whether the remote management center and the configuration policy tool are trusted includes: the BMC verifies whether the remote control center is legal or not and verifies the legitimacy and the integrity of the configuration strategy tool; and under the condition that the verification result is that the remote control center is legal and the validity and the integrity of the configuration strategy tool are passed, the BMC determines that the remote control center and the configuration strategy tool are credible. The BMC may determine whether the source of the trusted policy is secure, i.e., whether the trusted policy is trusted, by verifying whether the remote management center is trusted. The BMC can determine whether the way and approach by which the remote management and control center issues the trusted policy to the BMC is reliable by verifying whether the configuration policy tool is trusted.

Step S606, when the checking result is that the remote control center and the configuration strategy tool are credible, the BMC receives a credible strategy issued by the remote control center through the configuration strategy tool;

In step S608, the BMC provides the received trusted policy to the trusted chip.

As an alternative embodiment, the BMC may provide the received trusted policy to the trusted chip in a variety of manners, for example, the trusted chip may actively obtain the trusted policy from the BMC, for example, after the BMC receives the trusted policy issued by the remote management and control center, the BMC sends a notification message to the trusted chip to inform that the trusted policy of the trusted chip has been obtained, and then, the trusted chip actively sends a request for obtaining the trusted policy to request for obtaining the trusted policy; the trusted chip and the BMC can actively transmit the trusted policy to the trusted chip according to a predetermined mode, for example, the trusted chip and the BMC are predetermined in advance, and once the BMC acquires the trusted policy, the upper BMC transmits the trusted policy to the trusted chip.

In an embodiment of the present invention, a data processing method is provided, and fig. 7 is a flowchart of a fourth data processing method according to an embodiment of the present invention, as shown in fig. 7, where the flowchart includes:

Step S702, the trusted chip checks whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted;

Step S704, when the checking result is that the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are reliable, the trusted chip reports the BMC and the configuration strategy tool to the remote management and control center;

Step S706, the remote management and control center issues a configuration strategy request to the BMC;

step S708, the BMC and the remote control center mutually check the validity of the other party, and the BMC checks whether the configuration strategy tool is credible or not;

step S710, in the case that the BMC and the remote management and control center are legal and the BMC verifies that the configuration strategy tool is reliable, the remote management and control center issues a trusted strategy to the BMC through the configuration strategy tool;

in step S712, the trusted chip obtains a trusted policy from the BMC.

As an alternative embodiment, the remote management center may issue the trusted policy to the BMC by configuring the policy tool in the following manner: the remote control center signs the measured object in the trusted chip and the trusted policy corresponding to the measured object by adopting a private key of the remote control center, encrypts the measured object and the trusted policy by adopting an EK public key of the trusted chip, and obtains a trusted policy package; the remote management and control center issues a trusted policy package to the BMC.

In this embodiment, the operations or functions performed by the trusted policy configuration objects, such as the trusted chip, the remote management center, the BMC, and the configuration policy tool, may be described in the foregoing embodiments, and are not described in detail herein.

In an embodiment of the present invention, a data processing method is provided, and fig. 8 is a flowchart of a fifth data processing method according to an embodiment of the present invention, as shown in fig. 8, where the flowchart includes:

step S802, the trusted chip checks whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted;

Step S804, when the checking result is that the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are reliable, the trusted chip reports the BMC and the configuration strategy tool to the edge computing server;

Step S806, the edge computing server issues a configuration policy request to the BMC;

step S808, the BMC and the edge computing server mutually check the validity of the other party, and the BMC checks whether the configuration strategy tool is credible or not;

Step S810, when the BMC and the edge computing server are legal and the BMC verifies that the configuration policy tool is reliable, the edge computing server issues a trusted policy to the BMC through the configuration policy tool;

in step S812, the trusted chip obtains a trusted policy from the BMC.

As an alternative embodiment, when the above data processing method is applied in the edge computing scenario, the edge computing server may replace the remote control center in the above embodiment to perform the corresponding operation. For example, the issuing of trusted policies to the BMC by the edge computing server through the configuration policy tool may take the following forms: the edge computing server signs the measured object in the trusted chip and the trusted policy corresponding to the measured object by adopting the private key of the edge computing server, encrypts the measured object and the trusted policy by adopting the EK public key of the trusted chip, and obtains a trusted policy package; the edge computing server issues a trusted policy package to the BMC.

In this embodiment, the operations or functions performed by the trusted policy configuration objects, such as the trusted chip, the edge computing server, the BMC, and the configuration policy tool, may be described in the foregoing embodiments, and are not described in detail herein.

Through the steps, the edge computing server is adopted to issue the trusted policy to the BMC through the configuration policy tool, so that the trusted chip can acquire the trusted policy from the BMC, the purpose of configuring the trusted policy to the trusted chip through the trusted edge computing server before equipment is started is achieved, and the safety of configuring the trusted policy is ensured; moreover, after the trusted policy is configured, the device can be started once, so that the technical effect of service continuity can be ensured, and the technical problems that the safety of the trusted policy cannot be ensured and the service continuity cannot be ensured when the trusted policy is configured in the related technology are solved.

Based on the above examples and preferred embodiments, a preferred embodiment is provided.

It should be noted that, before executing the trusted configuration policy method, the trusted chip (for example, the TPM or the TPCM) may be factory initialized: comprising the following steps: when the equipment leaves the factory, the trusted chip is default to set a set of self-checking strategies, and measures and checks the BMC. The trusted chip has an EK public key and an EK private key, an EK certificate, and the BMC has a corresponding AIK public-private key pair and an AIK certificate.

Fig. 9 is a flowchart of a data processing method according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention, as shown in fig. 9, the flowchart including the steps of:

(1) The equipment stands by, TPCM self-tests, if the self-tests pass, step (2) is executed, otherwise step (11);

(2) Verifying the validity of the BMC, if the verification is passed, executing the step (3), otherwise, executing the step (11);

(3) Measuring the integrality of the BMC and the configuration strategy tool, if the integrality passes, executing the step (4), otherwise executing the step (11);

(4) TPCM reports BMC trusts to remote control center remotely;

(5) The remote management and control center issues a configuration strategy request to the BMC;

(6) The BMC verifies the legitimacy of the configuration strategy tool, and the BMC and the remote management and control center are mutually medical examination parts of legitimacy and the integrity of the configuration strategy tool through respective certificates, if the configuration strategy tool is legal and the configuration strategy tool is complete, the step (7) is executed, otherwise, the step (11) is executed;

(7) The remote control center packages and transmits the corresponding strategy to the BMC through a configuration strategy tool, and the package contains the measured object signed by the remote control center, the related measurement strategy and the verification strategy, which are signed by the private key of the remote control center, and encrypted by the EK public key in the TPCM;

(8) The TPCM actively acquires a corresponding strategy packet from the BMC, decrypts the strategy packet by using an EK private key, and verifies that the strategy packet is really from a remote management and control center, and if the strategy packet is not really from the remote management and control center, the TPCM executes the step (9), otherwise, the TPCM executes the step (11);

(9) The TPCM stores the corresponding policy package in NV space of the TPCM;

(10) The device is normally started, the starting process is carried out at one stage according to the same general trusted trust chain, fig. 10 is a schematic diagram applied to the starting device after the trusted policy is configured according to the embodiment of the present invention, as shown in fig. 10, the trusted policy is configured through step 0, and the subsequent steps normally start the device according to the configured trusted policy.

(11) And alarming, and prohibiting starting/limited starting/authorizing normal starting.

It should be noted that, the remote management and control center side may be an application program side or a role that sends a configuration request to the BMC through a policy tool.

Through the above preferred embodiment, by utilizing the BMC remote control function, a corresponding measurement strategy and a verification strategy are configured for the measured object started by the device through a strategy configuration tool; in addition, by remote configuration of the measurement strategy and the verification strategy, starting is not needed, so that continuity of user service can be ensured, and abnormality can be found in time.

It should be noted that, for simplicity of description, the foregoing method embodiments are all described as a series of acts, but it should be understood by those skilled in the art that the present invention is not limited by the order of acts described, as some steps may be performed in other orders or concurrently in accordance with the present invention. Further, those skilled in the art will also appreciate that the embodiments described in the specification are all preferred embodiments, and that the acts and modules referred to are not necessarily required for the present invention.

From the description of the above embodiments, it will be clear to a person skilled in the art that the method according to the above embodiments may be implemented by means of software plus the necessary general hardware platform, but of course also by means of hardware, but in many cases the former is a preferred embodiment. Based on such understanding, the technical solution of the present invention may be embodied essentially or in a part contributing to the prior art in the form of a software product stored in a storage medium (e.g. ROM/RAM, magnetic disk, optical disk) comprising several instructions for causing a terminal device (which may be a mobile phone, a computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to perform the method of the various embodiments of the present invention.

Example 2

In an embodiment of the present invention, there is further provided a data processing apparatus, and fig. 11 is a block diagram of a first data processing apparatus according to embodiment 2 of the present invention, as shown in fig. 11, where the first data processing apparatus is applied to a trusted chip, and includes: the first checking module 112, reporting module 114 and first obtaining module 116, the device is described below.

A first checking module 112 for checking whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted; the reporting module 114 is connected to the first checking module 112, and is configured to report the trust of the BMC and the configuration policy tool to the remote management and control center when the checking result is that the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted; the first obtaining module 116 is connected to the reporting module 114, and is configured to obtain the trusted policy from the BMC after the remote control center issues the trusted policy to the BMC through the configuration policy tool.

By the data processing device, the remote control center sends the trusted policy to the BMC through the configuration policy tool, so that the trusted chip can acquire the trusted policy from the BMC, the purpose of configuring the trusted policy to the trusted chip through the trusted remote control center before equipment is started is achieved, and the safety of configuring the trusted policy is guaranteed; moreover, after the trusted policy is configured, the device can be started once, so that the technical effect of service continuity can be ensured, and the technical problems that the safety of the trusted policy cannot be ensured and the service continuity cannot be ensured when the trusted policy is configured in the related technology are solved.

Here, the data processing apparatus corresponds to steps S402 to S406 included in fig. 4 in embodiment 1. The first data processing apparatus is the same as the example and application implemented by the corresponding steps, but is not limited to the disclosure of the above embodiment 1. It should be noted that the above-described module may be operated as a part of the apparatus in the computer terminal 10 provided in the first embodiment.

Example 3

In an embodiment of the present invention, there is further provided a data processing apparatus, and fig. 12 is a block diagram of a second data processing apparatus according to embodiment 3 of the present invention, as shown in fig. 12, where the second data processing apparatus is applied to a remote control center, and includes: the first receiving module 122, the first issuing module 124 and the second issuing module 126 are described below.

A first receiving module 122, configured to receive a report of the trusted chip, where the report is used to inform the BMC that the report is trusted; the first issuing module 124 is connected to the first receiving module 122, and is configured to issue a configuration policy request to the BMC; the second issuing module 126 is connected to the first issuing module 124, and is configured to issue the trusted policy to the BMC through the policy configuration tool, and is configured to obtain the trusted policy from the BMC by the trusted chip.

Here, the second data processing apparatus corresponds to steps S502 to S506 included in fig. 5 in embodiment 1. The second data processing apparatus is the same as the example and application implemented by the corresponding steps, but is not limited to the disclosure of the above embodiment 1. It should be noted that the above-described module may be operated as a part of the apparatus in the computer terminal 10 provided in the first embodiment.

Example 4

In an embodiment of the present invention, there is further provided a data processing apparatus, fig. 13 is a block diagram of a third data processing apparatus according to embodiment 4 of the present invention, and as shown in fig. 13, the third data processing apparatus is applied to a BMC, and includes: the second receiving module 132, the second checking module 134, the third receiving module 136 and the providing module 138 are explained below.

The second receiving module 132 is configured to receive a configuration policy request issued by the remote management and control center when the trusted chip determines that the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted; a second checking module 134, connected to the second receiving module 132, for checking whether the remote control center and the configuration policy tool are trusted; the third receiving module 136 is connected to the second checking module 134, and is configured to, if the checking result is that the remote control center and the configuration policy tool are trusted, issue a trusted policy by the remote control center through the configuration policy tool; a providing module 138, coupled to the third receiving module 136, is configured to provide the received trusted policy to the trusted chip.

Here, the third data processing apparatus corresponds to steps S602 to S608 included in fig. 6 in embodiment 1. The data processing apparatus three is the same as the example and application scenario realized by the corresponding steps, but is not limited to what is disclosed in the above embodiment 1. It should be noted that the above-described module may be operated as a part of the apparatus in the computer terminal 10 provided in the first embodiment.

Example 5

In an embodiment of the present invention, there is further provided a data processing system, and fig. 14 is a block diagram of a structure of a data processing system according to embodiment 5 of the present invention, and as shown in fig. 14, the data processing system may be applied to an interaction between a server array and a computer device, where the server array may include one or more virtual machines, the computer device is external to a server, a (remote) management center 144 is provided, and a trusted chip 142 and a BMC146 are provided in the server array. Further, the data processing system comprises: trusted chip 142, remote management center 144, configuration policy tool (not shown) and BMC146, the system is described below.

The trusted chip 142 is configured to check whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted, and report the trusted BMC and the trusted configuration policy tool to the remote management and control center if the check result is that the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted; a remote management and control center 144, connected to the trusted chip 142, for issuing a configuration policy request to the BMC; BMC146, connected to the remote control center 144 and the trusted chip 142, for mutually checking the validity of each other with the remote control center and checking whether the configuration policy tool is trusted; the remote management and control center 144 is further configured to issue a trusted policy to the BMC through the configuration policy tool when both the BMC and the remote management and control center are legal and the BMC verifies that the configuration policy tool is trusted; the trusted chip 142 is also used to obtain a trusted policy from the BMC.

It should be noted that, the data processing system corresponds to steps S702 to S712 included in fig. 7 in embodiment 1. The above data processing system is the same as the example and application scenario implemented by the corresponding steps, but is not limited to what is disclosed in the above embodiment 1. It should be noted that the above-described module may be operated as a part of the apparatus in the computer terminal 10 provided in the first embodiment.

In addition, it should be noted that when this embodiment is applied in an edge computing scenario, the functionality of the remote management center 144 may be replaced by an edge computing server, i.e., in a preferred embodiment, a data processing system is also provided, comprising: the trusted chip 142, edge computing server, configuration policy tool and BMC146, the system is described below.

The trusted chip 142 is configured to check whether the BMC 146 and the configuration policy tool are trusted, and report the trusted BMC 146 and the trusted configuration policy tool to the edge computing server if the check result is that the BMC 146 and the trusted configuration policy tool are trusted; the edge computing server is used for issuing a configuration policy request to the BMC 146; BMC 146, which is used to check the validity of the other party with the edge computing server, and BMC 146 checks whether the configuration policy tool is credible; the edge computing server is used for issuing a trusted policy to the BMC 146 through the configuration policy tool under the condition that the BMC 146 and the edge computing server are legal and the BMC 146 verifies that the configuration policy tool is trusted; the trusted chip 142 is also configured to obtain a trusted policy from the BMC 146.

It should be noted that, the data processing system corresponds to steps S802 to S812 included in fig. 8 in embodiment 1. The above data processing system is the same as the example and application scenario implemented by the corresponding steps, but is not limited to what is disclosed in the above embodiment 1. It should be noted that the above-described module may be operated as a part of the apparatus in the computer terminal 10 provided in the first embodiment.

Example 6

Embodiments of the present invention may provide a computer terminal (or computer device) that may be any one of a group of computer terminals. Alternatively, in the present embodiment, the above-described computer terminal may be replaced with a terminal device such as a mobile terminal.

Alternatively, in this embodiment, the above-mentioned computer terminal may be located in at least one network device among a plurality of network devices of the computer network.

Optionally, in this embodiment, the computer device may include: a memory and a processor, the memory storing a computer program; a processor for executing a computer program stored in the memory, the computer program when run causing the processor to perform the method of any one of the above.

The memory may be used to store software programs and modules, such as program instructions/modules corresponding to the data processing methods and apparatuses in the embodiments of the present invention, and the processor executes the software programs and modules stored in the memory, thereby executing various functional applications and data processing, that is, implementing the data processing methods described above. The memory may include high-speed random access memory, and may also include non-volatile memory, such as one or more magnetic storage devices, flash memory, or other non-volatile solid-state memory. In some examples, the memory may further include memory remotely located relative to the processor, which may be connected to the computer terminal via a network. Examples of such networks include, but are not limited to, the internet, intranets, local area networks, mobile communication networks, and combinations thereof.

The processor may call the information and the application program stored in the memory through the transmission device to perform the following steps: the trusted chip checks whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted or not; under the condition that the verification result is that the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are credible, the credible chip reports the BMC and the configuration strategy tool to a remote management and control center; the trusted chip obtains a trusted policy from the BMC, wherein the remote management and control center has issued the trusted policy to the BMC through a configuration policy tool.

Optionally, the above processor may further execute program code for: the trusted chip verifying whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted includes: the trusted chip verifies the legitimacy of the BMC and the configuration policy tool and measures the integrity of the BMC and the configuration policy tool; in the case of verifying the legitimacy pass of the BMC and the configuration policy tool, and measuring the integrity pass of the BMC and the configuration policy tool, the trusted chip determines that the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted.

Optionally, the above processor may further execute program code for: the trusted chip executes self-checking by adopting a self-checking strategy, and under the condition that the self-checking passes, whether the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are trusted or not is determined.

Optionally, the above processor may further execute program code for: the trusted chip obtaining the trusted policy from the BMC includes: the trusted chip obtains a trusted policy package from the BMC, wherein the trusted policy package comprises: the method comprises the steps that a measured object in a trusted chip which signs by adopting a private key of a remote management and control center and a trusted policy of the measured object are adopted, wherein a trusted policy package is encrypted by adopting an EK public key of the trusted chip; after the trusted chip verifies the trusted policy package through the signature from the remote management and control center, the EK private key of the trusted chip is adopted to decrypt the trusted policy package, and the trusted policy is obtained.

Optionally, the above processor may further execute program code for: after the trusted chip obtains the trusted policy from the BMC, further comprising: the trusted chip stores the trusted policy in the nonvolatile storage space; the trusted chip sequentially performs trusted measurement on the measured objects of the trusted trust chain according to the stored trusted policy, and starts the device under the condition that the measurement is passed.

The processor may call the information and the application program stored in the memory through the transmission device to perform the following steps: the remote management and control center receives a report of the trusted chip, wherein the report is used for informing the BMC of the trust; the remote management and control center issues a configuration strategy request to the BMC; the remote management and control center issues the trusted policy to the BMC through the policy configuration tool, and the remote management and control center is used for the trusted chip to acquire the trusted policy from the BMC.

Optionally, the above processor may further execute program code for: before the remote management and control center issues the trusted policy to the BMC through the policy configuration tool, the method further comprises: the remote management and control center verifies the legitimacy and the integrity of the BMC and the configuration strategy tool; and the remote management and control center determines to issue the trusted strategy to the BMC through the strategy configuration tool under the condition that the validity and the integrity of the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are verified to pass.

Optionally, the above processor may further execute program code for: the remote management and control center issuing the trusted policy to the BMC through the policy configuration tool comprises: the remote control center signs the measured object in the trusted chip and the trusted policy corresponding to the measured object by adopting a private key of the remote control center, encrypts the measured object and the trusted policy by adopting an EK public key of the trusted chip, and obtains a trusted policy package; the remote management and control center issues a trusted policy package to the BMC.

The processor may call the information and the application program stored in the memory through the transmission device to perform the following steps: under the condition that the trusted chip determines that the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are trusted, the BMC receives a configuration strategy request issued by a remote management and control center; the BMC checks whether the remote control center and the configuration strategy tool are credible or not; under the condition that the checking result is that the remote control center and the configuration strategy tool are credible, the BMC receives a credible strategy issued by the remote control center through the configuration strategy tool; the BMC provides the received trusted policy to the trusted chip.

Optionally, the above processor may further execute program code for: the BMC verifying whether the remote management center and the configuration policy tool are trusted includes: the BMC verifies whether the remote control center is legal or not and verifies the legitimacy and the integrity of the configuration strategy tool; and under the condition that the verification result is that the remote control center is legal and the validity and the integrity of the configuration strategy tool are passed, the BMC determines that the remote control center and the configuration strategy tool are credible.

The processor may call the information and the application program stored in the memory through the transmission device to perform the following steps: the trusted chip checks whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted or not; under the condition that the verification result is that the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are credible, the credible chip reports the BMC and the configuration strategy tool to a remote management and control center; the remote management and control center issues a configuration strategy request to the BMC; the BMC and the remote management and control center mutually check the validity of the other party, and the BMC checks whether the configuration strategy tool is credible or not; under the condition that the BMC and the remote management and control center are legal and the BMC verifies that the configuration strategy tool is credible, the remote management and control center issues a credible strategy to the BMC through the configuration strategy tool; the trusted chip obtains a trusted policy from the BMC.

Optionally, the above processor may further execute program code for: the remote management and control center issuing the trusted policy to the BMC through the configuration policy tool comprises: the remote control center signs the measured object in the trusted chip and the trusted policy corresponding to the measured object by adopting a private key of the remote control center, encrypts the measured object and the trusted policy by adopting an EK public key of the trusted chip, and obtains a trusted policy package; the remote management and control center issues a trusted policy package to the BMC.

The processor may call the information and the application program stored in the memory through the transmission device to perform the following steps: the trusted chip checks whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted or not; if the verification result is that the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are reliable, the trusted chip reports the BMC and the configuration strategy tool to the edge computing server; the edge computing server sends a configuration strategy request to the BMC; the BMC and the edge computing server mutually check the legitimacy of the other party, and the BMC checks whether the configuration strategy tool is credible or not; under the condition that the BMC and the edge computing server are legal and the BMC verifies that the configuration strategy tool is credible, the edge computing server issues a credible strategy to the BMC through the configuration strategy tool; the trusted chip obtains a trusted policy from the BMC.

Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the computer terminal may also be a smart phone (such as an Android phone, an iOS phone, etc.), a tablet computer, a palm computer, a Mobile internet device (Mobile INTERNET DEVICES, MID), a PAD, etc. The embodiment of the invention does not limit the structure of the electronic device. For example, the computer device may also include more or fewer components (e.g., network interfaces, display devices, etc.), or have different configurations.

Those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that all or part of the steps in the various methods of the above embodiments may be implemented by a program for instructing a terminal device to execute in association with hardware, the program may be stored in a computer readable storage medium, and the storage medium may include: flash disk, read-Only Memory (ROM), random-access Memory (Random Access Memory, RAM), magnetic disk or optical disk, etc.

Example 7

The embodiment of the invention also provides a storage medium. Alternatively, in this embodiment, the storage medium may be used to store the program code corresponding to any of the data processing methods provided in embodiment 1, and the processor may be controlled to execute any of the data processing methods when the program code is executed by the processor.

Alternatively, in this embodiment, the storage medium may be located in any one of the computer terminals in the computer terminal group in the computer network, or in any one of the mobile terminals in the mobile terminal group.

Alternatively, in the present embodiment, the storage medium is configured to store program code for performing the steps of: the trusted chip checks whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted or not; under the condition that the verification result is that the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are credible, the credible chip reports the BMC and the configuration strategy tool to a remote management and control center; the trusted chip obtains a trusted policy from the BMC, wherein the remote management and control center has issued the trusted policy to the BMC through a configuration policy tool.

Optionally, in the present embodiment, the storage medium is further configured to store program code for performing the steps of: the trusted chip verifying whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted includes: the trusted chip verifies the legitimacy of the BMC and the configuration policy tool and measures the integrity of the BMC and the configuration policy tool; in the case of verifying the legitimacy pass of the BMC and the configuration policy tool, and measuring the integrity pass of the BMC and the configuration policy tool, the trusted chip determines that the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted.

Optionally, in the present embodiment, the storage medium is further configured to store program code for performing the steps of: the trusted chip executes self-checking by adopting a self-checking strategy, and under the condition that the self-checking passes, whether the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are trusted or not is determined.

Optionally, in the present embodiment, the storage medium is further configured to store program code for performing the steps of: the trusted chip obtaining the trusted policy from the BMC includes: the trusted chip obtains a trusted policy package from the BMC, wherein the trusted policy package comprises: the method comprises the steps that a measured object in a trusted chip which signs by adopting a private key of a remote management and control center and a trusted policy of the measured object are adopted, wherein a trusted policy package is encrypted by adopting an EK public key of the trusted chip; after the trusted chip verifies the trusted policy package through the signature from the remote management and control center, the EK private key of the trusted chip is adopted to decrypt the trusted policy package, and the trusted policy is obtained.

Optionally, in the present embodiment, the storage medium is further configured to store program code for performing the steps of: after the trusted chip obtains the trusted policy from the BMC, further comprising: the trusted chip stores the trusted policy in the nonvolatile storage space; the trusted chip sequentially performs trusted measurement on the measured objects of the trusted trust chain according to the stored trusted policy, and starts the device under the condition that the measurement is passed.

Alternatively, in the present embodiment, the storage medium is configured to store program code for performing the steps of: the remote management and control center receives a report of the trusted chip, wherein the report is used for informing the BMC of the trust; the remote management and control center issues a configuration strategy request to the BMC; the remote management and control center issues the trusted policy to the BMC through the policy configuration tool, and the remote management and control center is used for the trusted chip to acquire the trusted policy from the BMC.

Optionally, in the present embodiment, the storage medium is further configured to store program code for performing the steps of: before the remote management and control center issues the trusted policy to the BMC through the policy configuration tool, the method further comprises: the remote management and control center verifies the legitimacy and the integrity of the BMC and the configuration strategy tool; and the remote management and control center determines to issue the trusted strategy to the BMC through the strategy configuration tool under the condition that the validity and the integrity of the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are verified to pass.

Optionally, in the present embodiment, the storage medium is further configured to store program code for performing the steps of: the remote management and control center issuing the trusted policy to the BMC through the policy configuration tool comprises: the remote control center signs the measured object in the trusted chip and the trusted policy corresponding to the measured object by adopting a private key of the remote control center, encrypts the measured object and the trusted policy by adopting an EK public key of the trusted chip, and obtains a trusted policy package; the remote management and control center issues a trusted policy package to the BMC.

Alternatively, in the present embodiment, the storage medium is configured to store program code for performing the steps of: under the condition that the trusted chip determines that the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are trusted, the BMC receives a configuration strategy request issued by a remote management and control center; the BMC checks whether the remote control center and the configuration strategy tool are credible or not; under the condition that the checking result is that the remote control center and the configuration strategy tool are credible, the BMC receives a credible strategy issued by the remote control center through the configuration strategy tool; the BMC provides the received trusted policy to the trusted chip.

Optionally, in the present embodiment, the storage medium is further configured to store program code for performing the steps of: the BMC verifying whether the remote management center and the configuration policy tool are trusted includes: the BMC verifies whether the remote control center is legal or not and verifies the legitimacy and the integrity of the configuration strategy tool; and under the condition that the verification result is that the remote control center is legal and the validity and the integrity of the configuration strategy tool are passed, the BMC determines that the remote control center and the configuration strategy tool are credible.

Alternatively, in the present embodiment, the storage medium is configured to store program code for performing the steps of: the trusted chip checks whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted or not; under the condition that the verification result is that the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are credible, the credible chip reports the BMC and the configuration strategy tool to a remote management and control center; the remote management and control center issues a configuration strategy request to the BMC; the BMC and the remote management and control center mutually check the validity of the other party, and the BMC checks whether the configuration strategy tool is credible or not; under the condition that the BMC and the remote management and control center are legal and the BMC verifies that the configuration strategy tool is credible, the remote management and control center issues a credible strategy to the BMC through the configuration strategy tool; the trusted chip obtains a trusted policy from the BMC.

Optionally, in the present embodiment, the storage medium is further configured to store program code for performing the steps of: the remote management and control center issuing the trusted policy to the BMC through the configuration policy tool comprises: the remote control center signs the measured object in the trusted chip and the trusted policy corresponding to the measured object by adopting a private key of the remote control center, encrypts the measured object and the trusted policy by adopting an EK public key of the trusted chip, and obtains a trusted policy package; the remote management and control center issues a trusted policy package to the BMC.

Optionally, in the present embodiment, the storage medium is further configured to store program code for performing the steps of: the trusted chip checks whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted or not; if the verification result is that the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are reliable, the trusted chip reports the BMC and the configuration strategy tool to the edge computing server; the edge computing server sends a configuration strategy request to the BMC; the BMC and the edge computing server mutually check the legitimacy of the other party, and the BMC checks whether the configuration strategy tool is credible or not; under the condition that the BMC and the edge computing server are legal and the BMC verifies that the configuration strategy tool is credible, the edge computing server issues a credible strategy to the BMC through the configuration strategy tool; the trusted chip obtains a trusted policy from the BMC.

Example 8

In an embodiment of the present invention, there is also provided a data processing system, including at least: a trusted chip, a BMC, and a remote management center, which may be used to implement, but is not limited to, the present disclosure. Fig. 15 is a schematic diagram of a security policy of a data processing system applied to control home appliances according to embodiment 8 of the present invention, as shown in fig. 15, in this application scenario, the security policy includes a mobile terminal and a home appliance, where a trusted chip and a BMC are disposed in the home appliance, the mobile terminal is set as a remote control center, and all home appliances can be controlled by the mobile terminal as the remote control center. The number of the home appliances and the number of the mobile terminals can be one or more, for example, the security policy of at least one home appliance is controlled by one mobile terminal, the security policy of one home appliance can be controlled by a plurality of mobile terminals, and other combinations are of course not described in detail herein. The interaction between the mobile terminal and the household appliance can be realized through the method, so that the safety of configuring the trusted policy is realized, and after the trusted policy is configured, the equipment is started once, so that the technical effect of service continuity can be ensured. It should be noted that, the home appliances may be air conditioners, refrigerators, televisions, etc., and the mobile terminals may be mobile devices such as smartphones, tablet computers, etc., and in the specific implementation process, the home appliances and the mobile terminals depend on application scenarios and are not limited to the above-listed examples. In addition, the mobile terminal can monitor the acquisition process of the trusted strategy before the household appliance is started, and the like. For example, the control execution process of the security policy of the household appliance can be displayed through the mobile terminal, and various information appearing in the process can be displayed, and the security policy of the household appliance can be configured correspondingly in a manual or automatic mode according to the display of the mobile terminal.

The foregoing embodiment numbers of the present invention are merely for the purpose of description, and do not represent the advantages or disadvantages of the embodiments.

In the foregoing embodiments of the present invention, the descriptions of the embodiments are emphasized, and for a portion of this disclosure that is not described in detail in this embodiment, reference is made to the related descriptions of other embodiments.

In the several embodiments provided in the present application, it should be understood that the disclosed technology may be implemented in other manners. The above-described embodiments of the apparatus are merely exemplary, and are merely a logical functional division, and there may be other manners of dividing the apparatus in actual implementation, for example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be omitted, or not performed. Alternatively, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed with each other may be through some interfaces, units or modules, or may be in electrical or other forms.

The units described as separate units may or may not be physically separate, and units shown as units may or may not be physical units, may be located in one place, or may be distributed on a plurality of network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment.

In addition, each functional unit in the embodiments of the present invention may be integrated in one processing unit, or each unit may exist alone physically, or two or more units may be integrated in one unit. The integrated units may be implemented in hardware or in software functional units.

The integrated units, if implemented in the form of software functional units and sold or used as stand-alone products, may be stored in a computer readable storage medium. Based on such understanding, the technical solution of the present invention may be embodied essentially or in part or all of the technical solution or in part in the form of a software product stored in a storage medium, including instructions for causing a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the method according to the embodiments of the present invention. And the aforementioned storage medium includes: a usb disk, a Read-Only Memory (ROM), a random access Memory (RAM, random Access Memory), a removable hard disk, a magnetic disk, or an optical disk, or other various media capable of storing program codes.

The foregoing is merely a preferred embodiment of the present invention and it should be noted that modifications and adaptations to those skilled in the art may be made without departing from the principles of the present invention, which are intended to be comprehended within the scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method of data processing, comprising:

the trusted chip checks whether the baseboard management controller BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted or not;

When the verification result is that the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are credible, the credible chip reports the BMC and the configuration strategy tool to a remote management and control center;

the trusted chip acquires a trusted policy from the BMC, wherein the remote management and control center issues the trusted policy to the BMC through a configuration policy tool;

Wherein the trusted chip obtaining the trusted policy from the BMC comprises: the trusted chip obtains a trusted policy package from the BMC, wherein the trusted policy package comprises: the method comprises the steps of adopting a private key of a remote management and control center to sign a measured object in a trusted chip and adopting a trusted policy of the measured object, wherein the trusted policy package is encrypted by adopting an EK public key of the trusted chip; and after the trusted chip verifies that the trusted policy package is from the remote management and control center through the signature, decrypting the trusted policy package by adopting an EK private key of the trusted chip to obtain the trusted policy.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the trusted chip verifying whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted comprises:

the trusted chip verifies the legitimacy of the BMC and the configuration policy tool and measures the integrity of the BMC and the configuration policy tool;

The trusted chip determines that the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted if the BMC and the configuration policy tool pass legitimacy and the integrity of the BMC and the configuration policy tool is measured.

3. The method as recited in claim 1, further comprising:

And the trusted chip executes self-checking by adopting a self-checking strategy, and under the condition that the self-checking passes, whether the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are trusted or not is determined.

4. A method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, further comprising, after the trusted chip obtains the trusted policy from the BMC:

the trusted chip stores the trusted policy in a nonvolatile storage space;

and the trusted chip sequentially performs trusted measurement on the measured objects of the trusted trust chain according to the stored trusted policy, and starts the equipment under the condition that the measurement is passed.

5. A method of data processing, comprising:

The remote management and control center receives a report of the trusted chip, wherein the report is used for informing the BMC of the trust;

the remote management and control center issues a configuration strategy request to the BMC;

The remote management and control center issues a trusted policy to the BMC through a policy configuration tool, and the trusted chip is used for acquiring the trusted policy from the BMC;

Wherein the remote management and control center issuing the trusted policy to the BMC through the policy configuration tool comprises: the remote control center adopts a private key of the remote control center to sign a measured object in a trusted chip and a trusted policy corresponding to the measured object, and adopts an EK public key of the trusted chip to encrypt the measured object and the trusted policy to obtain a trusted policy package; and the remote management and control center issues the trusted policy package to the BMC.

6. The method of claim 5, further comprising, prior to the remote management center issuing the trusted policy to the BMC via a policy configuration tool:

The remote management and control center verifies the legitimacy and integrity of the BMC and the configuration policy tool;

And the remote management and control center determines to issue a trusted policy to the BMC through a policy configuration tool under the condition that the validity and the integrity of the BMC and the configuration policy tool are verified to pass.

7. The method of claim 6, wherein the remote management center issuing a trusted policy to the BMC through a policy configuration tool comprises:

The remote control center adopts a private key of the remote control center to sign a measured object in a trusted chip and a trusted policy corresponding to the measured object, and adopts an EK public key of the trusted chip to encrypt the measured object and the trusted policy to obtain a trusted policy package;

and the remote management and control center issues the trusted policy package to the BMC.

8. A method of data processing, comprising:

Under the condition that the trusted chip determines that the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are trusted, the BMC receives a configuration strategy request issued by a remote management and control center;

The BMC checks whether the remote control center and the configuration policy tool are trusted or not;

under the condition that the checking result is that the remote control center and the configuration strategy tool are credible, the BMC receives a credible strategy issued by the remote control center through the configuration strategy tool;

The BMC provides the received trusted policy to the trusted chip;

The BMC sends a trusted policy package to the trusted chip, wherein the trusted policy package comprises: the method comprises the steps of adopting a private key of a remote management and control center to sign a measured object in a trusted chip and adopting a trusted policy of the measured object, wherein the trusted policy package is encrypted by adopting an EK public key of the trusted chip; after signature verification of the trusted policy package comes from the remote management and control center, the EK private key of the trusted chip decrypts the trusted policy package to obtain the trusted policy.

9. The method of claim 8, wherein the BMC verifying whether the remote management center and configuration policy tool are trusted comprises:

the BMC verifies whether the remote control center is legal or not and verifies the validity and the integrity of the configuration strategy tool;

and under the condition that the verification result is that the remote control center is legal and the validity and the integrity of the configuration strategy tool are all passed, the BMC determines that the remote control center and the configuration strategy tool are credible.

10. A method of data processing, comprising:

the trusted chip checks whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted or not;

the BMC and the remote control center mutually check the validity of the other party, and the BMC checks whether the configuration strategy tool is credible or not;

under the condition that the BMC and the remote management and control center are legal and the BMC verifies that the configuration strategy tool is credible, the remote management and control center issues a credible strategy to the BMC through the configuration strategy tool;

The trusted chip obtains the trusted policy from the BMC;

Wherein the remote management and control center issuing the trusted policy to the BMC through the configuration policy tool comprises: the remote control center adopts a private key of the remote control center to sign a measured object in a trusted chip and a trusted policy corresponding to the measured object, and adopts an EK public key of the trusted chip to encrypt the measured object and the trusted policy to obtain a trusted policy package; and the remote management and control center issues the trusted policy package to the BMC.

11. A method of data processing, comprising:

When the verification result is that the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are trusted, the trusted chip reports the reliability of the BMC and the configuration strategy tool to an edge computing server;

The edge computing server issues a configuration policy request to the BMC;

The BMC and the edge computing server mutually check the validity of the other party, and the BMC checks whether the configuration strategy tool is credible or not;

when the BMC and the edge computing server are legal and the BMC verifies that the configuration strategy tool is credible, the edge computing server issues a credible strategy to the BMC through the configuration strategy tool;

the trusted chip obtains a trusted policy from the BMC;

The edge computing server issues a trusted policy to the BMC through a configuration policy tool, and the method comprises the following steps:

The edge computing server signs a measured object in a trusted chip and a trusted policy corresponding to the measured object by adopting a private key of the edge computing server, encrypts the measured object and the trusted policy by adopting an EK public key of the trusted chip, and obtains a trusted policy package; and the edge computing server issues the trusted policy package to the BMC.

12. A data processing apparatus for use with a trusted chip, comprising:

the first checking module is used for checking whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are credible or not;

The reporting module is used for reporting the credibility of the BMC and the configuration strategy tool to a remote management and control center under the condition that the checking result is that the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are credible;

The remote management and control center is used for distributing the trusted policy to the BMC through a configuration policy tool;

the first obtaining module is further configured to obtain a trusted policy package from the BMC by using the trusted chip, where the trusted policy package includes: the method comprises the steps of adopting a private key of a remote management and control center to sign a measured object in a trusted chip and adopting a trusted policy of the measured object, wherein the trusted policy package is encrypted by adopting an EK public key of the trusted chip; and after the trusted chip verifies that the trusted policy package is from the remote management and control center through the signature, decrypting the trusted policy package by adopting an EK private key of the trusted chip to obtain the trusted policy.

13. A data processing apparatus for use in a remote control center, comprising:

the first receiving module is used for receiving a report of the trusted chip, wherein the report is used for informing the BMC of the trust;

The first issuing module is used for issuing a configuration strategy request to the BMC;

the second issuing module is used for issuing a trusted policy to the BMC through a policy configuration tool and obtaining the trusted policy from the BMC by the trusted chip;

14. A data processing apparatus for use in a BMC, comprising:

the second receiving module is used for receiving a configuration strategy request issued by the remote management and control center under the condition that the trusted chip determines that the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are trusted;

the second checking module is used for checking whether the remote control center and the configuration strategy tool are credible or not;

The third receiving module is used for sending a trusted policy to the remote control center through the configuration policy tool under the condition that the test result is that the remote control center and the configuration policy tool are trusted;

the providing module is used for providing the received trusted policy to the trusted chip;

The providing module is further configured to send a trusted policy package to the trusted chip by the BMC, where the trusted policy package includes: the method comprises the steps of adopting a private key of a remote management and control center to sign a measured object in a trusted chip and adopting a trusted policy of the measured object, wherein the trusted policy package is encrypted by adopting an EK public key of the trusted chip; after signature verification of the trusted policy package comes from the remote management and control center, the EK private key of the trusted chip decrypts the trusted policy package to obtain the trusted policy.

15. A data processing system, comprising: the trusted chip, the remote management and control center, the configuration policy tool and the BMC, wherein,

The trusted chip is used for checking whether the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are trusted or not, and reporting the BMC and the configuration strategy tool to a remote management and control center when the checking result is that the BMC and the configuration strategy tool are trusted;

The remote management and control center is used for issuing a configuration strategy request to the BMC;

the BMC is used for mutually checking the validity of the other party with the remote control center and checking whether the configuration strategy tool is credible or not;

The remote management and control center is further configured to issue a trusted policy to the BMC through the configuration policy tool when both the BMC and the remote management and control center are legal and the BMC verifies that the configuration policy tool is trusted;

The trusted chip is further configured to obtain the trusted policy from the BMC;

The remote control center is further used for signing the measured object in the trusted chip and the trusted policy corresponding to the measured object by adopting a private key of the remote control center, encrypting the measured object and the trusted policy by adopting an EK public key of the trusted chip, and obtaining a trusted policy package; and the remote management and control center issues the trusted policy package to the BMC.

16. A data processing system, comprising: trusted chips, edge computing servers, configuration policy tools, and BMCs, wherein,

The trusted chip is used for checking whether the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted or not, and reporting the BMC and the configuration policy tool to the edge computing server to be trusted when the checking result is that the BMC and the configuration policy tool are trusted;

The edge computing server is used for issuing a configuration strategy request to the BMC;

The BMC is used for mutually checking the legitimacy of the other party with the edge computing server and checking whether the configuration strategy tool is credible or not;

The edge computing server is used for issuing a trusted policy to the BMC through the configuration policy tool under the condition that the BMC and the edge computing server are legal and the BMC verifies that the configuration policy tool is trusted;

The trusted chip is also used for acquiring a trusted policy from the BMC;

The edge computing server is further used for signing the measured object in the trusted chip and the trusted policy corresponding to the measured object by adopting a private key of the edge computing server, encrypting the measured object and the trusted policy by adopting an EK public key of the trusted chip, and obtaining a trusted policy package; and the edge computing server issues the trusted policy package to the BMC.

17. A storage medium storing a program, wherein the program, when executed by a processor, controls the processor to perform the data processing method of any one of claims 1 to 11.

18. A computer device, comprising: a memory and a processor, wherein the memory is configured to store,

The memory stores a computer program;

the processor being configured to execute a computer program stored in the memory, the computer program when run causing the processor to perform the data processing method of any one of claims 1 to 11.