CN106546908B - IC chip - Google Patents
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- CN106546908B CN106546908B CN201610959582.5A CN201610959582A CN106546908B CN 106546908 B CN106546908 B CN 106546908B CN 201610959582 A CN201610959582 A CN 201610959582A CN 106546908 B CN106546908 B CN 106546908B
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01R—MEASURING ELECTRIC VARIABLES; MEASURING MAGNETIC VARIABLES
- G01R31/00—Arrangements for testing electric properties; Arrangements for locating electric faults; Arrangements for electrical testing characterised by what is being tested not provided for elsewhere
- G01R31/28—Testing of electronic circuits, e.g. by signal tracer
- G01R31/2851—Testing of integrated circuits [IC]
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q30/00—Commerce
- G06Q30/018—Certifying business or products
- G06Q30/0185—Product, service or business identity fraud
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Abstract
IC chip and IC chip false-proof detection method, are related to integrated circuit technique.Integrated circuit chip circuits of the invention further include: antifuse memory, for storing the identity information of IC chip；Encrypting module, for generating response signal to excitation under Encryption Algorithm, the Encryption Algorithm system is using the identity information of IC chip as code key；Life sensor is connect with integrated circuit chip circuits, has used the time for detect IC chip；Output module, for exporting the response signal of encrypting module or the output signal of life sensor；The encrypting module is connect with antifuse memory, is also connect with output module, and the output module is also connect with life sensor.The present invention can accurately identify fake and inferior chip, solve the problems, such as that the chips of poor quality such as clone/forgery/recycling and reusing are spread unchecked, improve the certified product rate of chip.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to integrated circuit techniques.
Background technique
Though fake and inferior IC chip refers to those informal manufacturer's authorizations and clones production or the production of regular manufacturer but join
Number performances it is not up to standard or return receive with or through Reseal or the illegal approach of mark again manufacture circulation with legal core
The corresponding IC chip of piece.Fake and inferior IC chip brings very big threat to entire IC industry.Only exist
2011, entire IC industry circle because fake and inferior IC chip economic loss just up to as many as 7,500,000,000 dollars.Except warp
Except Ji loss, fake and inferior IC chip does not know when the time bomb to detonate just as many, to electronic system
Safety and stability bring huge threat, especially space flight, military affairs, medical treatment etc. to electronic system stability and safety
The potential threat of more demanding application field, this hidden danger is bigger.But under the driving of huge black economy interests, fake and inferior collection
Manufacture at circuit chip and circulate the trend for presenting and growing in intensity, therefore develops detection and prevent the phase of fake and inferior IC chip
Pass technology has very great economy and social effect.
Integrated circuit from design, production, encapsulation, distribution be passed to user using etc. links be counterfeited to form vacation
The possibility of bad IC chip, Fig. 1 are integrated circuit analyses the case where each link is counterfeited.
The IC chip of informal manufacturer's licensed-type production, such as illegal clone, the unauthorized excessive life of chip manufacturer
It produces, the IC chip of unauthorized excessively production etc. the generations of encapsulation manufacturer.
1, performance parameters IC chip not up to standard, for example filtered out in links such as processing and manufacturing, encapsulation, detections
Unqualified IC products, are come into the market by illegal channels.
2, the IC chip of recycling, the type accounts for very big specific gravity in fake and inferior IC chip.It is illegal
Businessman obtains IC chip by picking up, cleaning to waste printed circuit board heating, polish, beat again the recovery process such as mark, again
Circulate field sale.
3, illegally the IC chip of encapsulation, mark, refers mainly to change the original encapsulation of integrated circuit, label, by naked
Piece picks up, Reseals mark or polish off original encapsulation label, and mark is adulterated, with reaching with the production of low application level again
Product pretend to be the IC chip of high-grade product.
Currently, the effective ways that industrial circle detects fake and inferior IC chip mainly include the micro- detection of appearance, material point
Analysis, the detection of electric function performance etc..Although these methods are effectively, detection is got up laborious time-consuming, and is had centainly to integrated circuit
Damage is not suitable for the detection application to a large amount of IC chips.In recent years, academia proposes the detection side of " embedded "
Method, mainly include the following types:
1, it is based on the technology of the unclonable function PUF of physics (Physically Unclonable Functions), it is this
Method utilizes the process variations of IC chip in the fabrication process, such as path delay, and it is peculiar to generate the chip
Irreproducible identification (ID) number, and registered in the database of manufacturer.Only pass through the IC chip of registration
Side is copyrighted product, is otherwise fake and inferior product.User verifies the true and false of the integrated circuit by certification ID number.This method by
In the ID number that can not control chip in advance, there are the probability that certain different chips use the same ID, and only to illegal clone,
The fake and inferior products such as excessive production have good detection to act on, helpless to the fake and inferior product of recycling.
2, it is based on the method [1] of life sensor (aging sensor), there are mainly two types of such methods: a kind of utilization
The effect parameter, such as NBTI, HCI, EM etc. of MOS transistor or metal material to service life more sensitivity, design sensing electricity
Road characterizes the service life of integrated circuit.This sensor can design one through when sensing circuit add up longevity of integrated circuit
Order effect value, while can also design one and be used to record the initial lifetime value of sensing circuit with reference to sensing circuit, later will through when
Sensing circuit is compared to obtain the service life value of integrated circuit with reference to sensing circuit Lifetime effects value.This method is only
It is effective to the fake and inferior product surveillance of recycling, additionally, due to process variations, through when sensing circuit and refer to sensing circuit itself
There will be parameter differences, cause the detection accuracy of this method not high.Another life sensor uses timer, using one
Secondary property programmable storage, such as antifuse memory to record the service life of integrated circuit in real time.This kind of circuit area overhead is very
Greatly, since counter is to temperature-insensitive, the true lifetime of integrated circuit, such as work at high temperature can not accurately be reacted
1 year integrated circuit true lifetime of work is likely larger than the circuit to work at room temperature 2 years.And in real time to antifuse memory
The huge current flow pulse of programming also interferes the normal operation of integrated circuit, threatens to system stabilization.It is same this
Method is also only effective to the fake and inferior product surveillance of recycling.
Summary of the invention
The technical problem to be solved by the invention is to provide a kind of IC chips and IC chip anti-counterfeiting detection
Method can effectively detect the chip of poor quality such as clone, recycling.
The present invention solve the technical problem the technical solution adopted is that, IC chip, including IC chip
Circuit, which is characterized in that further include:
Antifuse memory, for storing the identity information of IC chip；
Encrypting module, for generating response signal to excitation under Encryption Algorithm, the Encryption Algorithm system is with integrated circuit
The identity information of chip is code key；
Life sensor is connect with integrated circuit chip circuits, has used the time for detect IC chip；
Output module, for exporting the response signal of encrypting module or the output signal of life sensor；
The encrypting module is connect with antifuse memory, is also connect with output module, the output module also with the service life
Sensor connection.
The antifuse memory, encrypting module, life sensor and output module are all set to outside IC chip
Within shell.
The present invention also provides a kind of IC chip false-proof detection methods, which is characterized in that includes the following steps:
1) apply pumping signal to IC chip, entered step 2) if chip response, mark core if not responding
Piece state is abnormal；
2) chip response signal and the chip identity information that prestores in chip information database are compared, if response letter
In number comprising with the information that prestores chip identity information in chip information database and be consistent, then enter step 3), otherwise mark core
Piece state is abnormal；
3) according to the chip life information prestored in the output information and chip information database of the life sensor of chip
Computing chip has used the time.
Further, the step 3) further includes following the description:
Chip information database provides chip factory packaging information, if inconsistent with the information on chip package, judgement should
Chip is recycling chip.
The present invention can accurately identify fake and inferior chip, and what the chip of poor quality such as solution clone/forgery/recycling and reusing was spread unchecked asks
Topic, improves the certified product rate of chip.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is the schematic diagram that IC chip is counterfeited in each link.
Fig. 2 is application environment schematic diagram of the invention.
Fig. 3 is the anti-fake electrical block diagram for being embedded in IC chip.
Fig. 4 is that the present invention is work flow diagram.
Fig. 5 is chip checking flow chart.
Specific embodiment
IC chip of the invention includes integrated circuit chip circuits, further includes:
Antifuse memory, for storing the identity information of IC chip；
Encrypting module, for generating response signal to excitation under Encryption Algorithm, the Encryption Algorithm system is with integrated circuit
The identity information of chip is code key；
Life sensor is connect with integrated circuit chip circuits, has used the time for detect IC chip；
Output module, for exporting the response signal of encrypting module or the output signal of life sensor；
The encrypting module is connect with antifuse memory, is also connect with output module, the output module also with the service life
Sensor connection.
The antifuse memory, encrypting module, life sensor and output module are all set to outside IC chip
Within shell.
It is described herein to refer to the time that chip has worked, in other words, power-up time " with the time ".
As shown in Fig. 2, the present invention is embedded in anti-tseudo circuit in IC chip, main function is to provide integrated circuit
The communication equipment of authentication ID and integrated circuit life information, anti-tseudo circuit and database is responsible between integrated circuit and database
Communication, and can show testing result, all relevant informations of database purchase legal copy integrated circuit, including service life sensing circuit
Marking data, procedure for producing, batch, application level etc. when factory in initial parameter value, chip package, and can be according to the service life
Model calculates integrated circuit service life.
The circuit for being embedded in IC chip includes four parts: antifuse memory, encrypting module circuit, service life sensing
Circuit, selector.Antifuse memory has uniqueness for storing authorization ID number, the ID number, is to show that the integrated circuit is
The voucher of copyrighted product.Therefore design distribute the ID number when to consider it is enough rarity so that the ID is not easy by random mould
It is quasi-.Such as ID effective length, when being 12, when design, is stored using 30 antifuse memory, and such ID is by stochastic simulation
Probability be 1/218.Select antifuse memory is as the reasons why I/D Memory: 1), the characteristics of antifuse one-time programming, makes it
It cannot be modified.2), the compatible common CMOS process of mos gate oxidation stratotype antifuse, is not necessarily to additional technique processing procedure, so that of the invention
With universality.3), the antifuse after programming (storage ID number) has very high confidentiality, can hardly pass through conventional longitudinal direction
The modes such as dissection, FIB inversely obtain storing data.
Chip after encapsulation is by reading service life sensing circuit initial parameter value, to antifuse memory after finished product detection
It is programmed into authorization ID number, while all information of the chip are recorded into database for subsequent authentication.
Encrypting module circuit is used to that ID will to be authorized as secret key pair vendor database the pumping signal sent in Encryption Algorithm
Under effect, authentication of the response signal for chip is produced.Encryption Algorithm can be using algorithms most in use such as AES.Encryption is calculated
The selection principle of method is that external illegal attacker cannot extrapolate code key data by analysis response signal and pumping signal.This
Ensure that the safety of authorization ID, illegal attacker cannot manufacture clone's chip by illegally obtaining ID.
Life sensor using integrated circuit Lifetime effects parameter, such as NBTI, HCI, EM etc., by circuit appropriate come
Characterize the service life of integrated circuit.Such as first document [1] (X.Zhang and M.Tehranipoor, Design of On-
Chip Lightweight Sensors for Effective Detection of RecycledICs,IEEE
transactions on very large scale integration systems,vol.22,no.5,2014,pp
Ring oscillator 1016-1029) mentioned, frequency of oscillation can be with integrated circuit service life corresponding changes.Due to processing
Process variations, through when sensing circuit and can inherently have certain parameter difference with reference to sensing circuit, cause the inspection of this method
It is not high to survey precision.The present invention without reference to life sensor, eliminates the influence of process variations, longevity compared with first document [1]
Life sensing circuit parameter value is only compared with its own initial value, and the factor of affecting parameters variation only is from service life, because
This service life, which calculates, has higher accuracy.
Selector derives from communication equipment for exporting ID authentication response signal and service life signal, control signal respectively.
The output signal of control signal (AR_SEL, Challenge, Prog, Data) and selector that communication equipment issues
(output) it can be realized by forms such as the general detection protocol interface JTAG of integrated circuit or similar interface or wireless interfaces
Communication between integrated circuit and communication equipment.
The communication equipment of integrated circuit and database passes through JTAG for the communication between integrated circuit and database, one end
Or other general or specialized interface Access Integration circuits, the other end access database by internet interface, and can be by database
Return the result and shown with certain forms.
Database issues various access control signals, receives response signal, integrate to this for storing legal chip information
The true and false of circuit is identified, and can be compared by reading integrated circuit service life sensing circuit parameter value with its initial value,
Application life model calculation goes out the service life of the integrated circuit.
Referring to Fig. 3-5, manufacturer designs chip data, and foundries is transferred to process, and then by the encapsulation of encapsulation factory, passes through finished product
The qualified chip of test, which comes back at manufacturer, carries out authorization ID registration, i.e., is set to Prog signal effectively with programmable device, ID number
It is programmed into anti-fuse cell according to via the Data mouth in Fig. 3, AR_SEL signal is set to output agingdata state later,
Chip passes through output mouthfuls of output service life sensing circuit initial parameter values, the data and the marking data on chip package, production
Database is written together and is used for subsequent authentication for the data such as processing procedure, batch, application level.Chip after authorization transfers to retail trader to sell
It sells, finally reaches user and use.Retail trader and user quickly and easily can carry out chip using technique device of the invention
Fake and inferior verifying.The fake and inferior verifying process of chip is as shown in figure 5, IC chip undergoes authorization test, mark test and longevity respectively
Life test.After chip accesses database by communication equipment, database issues pumping signal Challenge by communication equipment, legal
Chip can calculate response signal according to code key by encrypting module circuit, and AR_SEL signal is set to output response shape
State, chip send back to response signal by output, which is sent back to database and be compared, do not responded to such as by communication equipment
Data in signal or response signal and database mismatch, then the chip is the personation chip of unauthorized；It is tested by authorization
Chip the marking data in chip factory encapsulation can be shown by communication equipment, if beating in the data and existing encapsulation
It is inconsistent to mark data, then can determine whether that the chip is attached most importance to mark fake products；Database passes through communication equipment for AR_SEL signal later
It is set to output aging data state, reads the parameter value of service life sensing circuit in chip, database by the data and is somebody's turn to do later
Initial parameter value when chip dispatches from the factory compares, and the service life of the chip is calculated by life model, and lifetime data is returned
It returns communication equipment to show, if the service life is obviously excessive, can determine whether out that the chip is the bad chips recycled.
For the fake and inferior chip of previously described 1st class, i.e., the IC chip of informal manufacturer's licensed-type production, such as it is non-
The IC chip of the generations such as method clone, the unauthorized excessive production of chip manufacturer, the unauthorized excessive production of encapsulation manufacturer.By
In these chips with no authorized ID, can not be detected by authorization.For the fake and inferior chip of previously described 2nd class, i.e. performance parameters
IC chip not up to standard, for example the unqualified integrated circuit filtered out in links such as processing and manufacturing, encapsulation, detections is through non-
The product that method channel comes into the market.Also due to no authorized ID, can not pass through authority checking.For previously described 3rd class
Fake and inferior chip, that is, the IC chip recycled, such chip can not pass through life test link.For previously described
The 4th fake and inferior chip of class illegally encapsulates, the IC chip of mark, due to beating on existing marking data and factory encapsulation
It is inconsistent to mark data, mark testing process can not be passed through.
Only by the chip that all three links are tested be only can be safe to use legal chip.In this way, of the invention
Technology can detect all chips of poor quality, and detection accuracy is higher than the prior art.
Claims (2)
1. IC chip, including integrated circuit chip circuits, which is characterized in that further include:
Antifuse memory, for storing the identity information of IC chip；
Encrypting module, for generating response signal to excitation under Encryption Algorithm, the Encryption Algorithm system is with IC chip
Identity information be code key；
Life sensor is connect with integrated circuit chip circuits, has used the time for detect IC chip；
Output module, for exporting the response signal of encrypting module or the output signal of life sensor；
The encrypting module is connect with antifuse memory, is also connect with output module, and the output module is also sensed with the service life
Device connection.
2. IC chip as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that the antifuse memory, encrypting module, service life
Sensor and output module are all set within IC chip shell.
Priority Applications (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201610959582.5A CN106546908B (en) | 2016-10-27 | 2016-10-27 | IC chip |
| CN201811548555.4A CN109765476A (en) | 2016-10-27 | 2016-10-27 | IC chip false-proof detection method |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201610959582.5A CN106546908B (en) | 2016-10-27 | 2016-10-27 | IC chip |
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| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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| CN201811548555.4A Division CN109765476A (en) | 2016-10-27 | 2016-10-27 | IC chip false-proof detection method |
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| Publication Number | Publication Date |
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| CN106546908A CN106546908A (en) | 2017-03-29 |
| CN106546908B true CN106546908B (en) | 2019-05-21 |
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| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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| CN201610959582.5A Expired - Fee Related CN106546908B (en) | 2016-10-27 | 2016-10-27 | IC chip |
| CN201811548555.4A Pending CN109765476A (en) | 2016-10-27 | 2016-10-27 | IC chip false-proof detection method |
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| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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| CN201811548555.4A Pending CN109765476A (en) | 2016-10-27 | 2016-10-27 | IC chip false-proof detection method |
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Families Citing this family (8)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN107016555A (en) * | 2017-04-13 | 2017-08-04 | 成都奇鲁科技有限公司 | Hardware true-false detection method and device |
| US11657405B2 (en) * | 2019-09-17 | 2023-05-23 | University Of Florida Research Foundation, Incorporated | Detection of recycled integrated circuits and system-on-chips based on degradation of power supply rejection ratio |
| CN110930531A (en) * | 2019-10-18 | 2020-03-27 | 苏州浪潮智能科技有限公司 | Anti-refresh chip and verification method |
| CN111092736B (en) * | 2019-12-25 | 2020-11-24 | 清华大学 | Information anti-counterfeiting method and device |
| CN111951025B (en) * | 2020-07-28 | 2022-08-19 | 广州邦讯信息系统有限公司 | Chip anti-counterfeiting method |
| RU2757977C1 (en) * | 2020-08-24 | 2021-10-25 | Виталий Николаевич Старцев | Method for identifying used counterfeit microchips based on the degradation properties of sram |
| WO2023179882A1 (en) * | 2022-03-25 | 2023-09-28 | Imec Vzw | Tamper-aware age sensor |
| WO2024197781A1 (en) * | 2023-03-31 | 2024-10-03 | Intel Corporation | Tachometer apparatus and method to track and report processor usage |
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| CN101789071A (en) * | 2010-02-21 | 2010-07-28 | 威盛电子股份有限公司 | The management method of the identity information of chip and system |
| CN104424568A (en) * | 2013-08-22 | 2015-03-18 | 成都市易恒信科技有限公司 | Authentication false-proof traceability system employing circuit core chip ID number as identification |
| CN105138870A (en) * | 2015-10-08 | 2015-12-09 | 浪潮(北京)电子信息产业有限公司 | Chip legality authentication method and device |
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| US20140103344A1 (en) * | 2012-03-12 | 2014-04-17 | Mohammad Tehranipoor | Detection of recovered integrated circuits |
| DE102012212471B3 (en) * | 2012-07-17 | 2013-11-21 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Apparatus for realizing physical degradation / tamper detection of a digital IC by means of a (digital) PUF and distinguishing between a degradation due to physical manipulation and aging processes |
| US9083323B2 (en) * | 2013-02-11 | 2015-07-14 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Integrated circuit identification and dependability verification using ring oscillator based physical unclonable function and age detection circuitry |
| CN103197229B (en) * | 2013-04-02 | 2016-06-01 | 方波 | CDNA microarray test machine and testing method thereof |
| CN104346634A (en) * | 2013-07-31 | 2015-02-11 | 姚西昌 | Anti-counterfeiting equipment and method |
| US10069635B2 (en) * | 2014-09-10 | 2018-09-04 | Carnegie Mellon University | Methods and systems for achieving system-level counterfeit protection in integrated chips |
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- 2016-10-27 CN CN201610959582.5A patent/CN106546908B/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2016-10-27 CN CN201811548555.4A patent/CN109765476A/en active Pending
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| CN101789071A (en) * | 2010-02-21 | 2010-07-28 | 威盛电子股份有限公司 | The management method of the identity information of chip and system |
| CN104424568A (en) * | 2013-08-22 | 2015-03-18 | 成都市易恒信科技有限公司 | Authentication false-proof traceability system employing circuit core chip ID number as identification |
| CN105138870A (en) * | 2015-10-08 | 2015-12-09 | 浪潮(北京)电子信息产业有限公司 | Chip legality authentication method and device |
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Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN109765476A (en) | 2019-05-17 |
| CN106546908A (en) | 2017-03-29 |
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Granted publication date: 20190521 Termination date: 20191027 |