Democracies assume accurate knowledge by the populace, but the human attraction to fake and untru... more Democracies assume accurate knowledge by the populace, but the human attraction to fake and untrustworthy news poses a serious problem for healthy democratic functioning. We articulate why and how identification with political parties - known as partisanship - can bias information processing in the human brain. There is extensive evidence that people engage in motivated political reasoning, but recent research suggests that partisanship can alter memory, implicit evaluation, and even perceptual judgments. We propose an identity-based model of belief for understanding the influence of partisanship on these cognitive processes. This framework helps to explain why people place party loyalty over policy, and even over truth. Finally, we discuss strategies for de-biasing information processing to help to create a shared reality across partisan divides.
In two studies we assessed the role of distinctiveness threat, group-based emotions (angst, fear,... more In two studies we assessed the role of distinctiveness threat, group-based emotions (angst, fear, and anger), and prejudice on people's willingness to engage in collective action against immigrant groups. In Study 1 (N = 222) White British participants were either informed that in the next 40 years the proportion of immigrants in the UK is unlikely to change (control condition) or that there will be more immigrants than White British people living in Britain (threat condition). We obtained support for a sequential multiple mediator model in which threat predicted British people's willingness to engage in collective action via the emotions first and then prejudice. This finding was replicated in Study 2 with an Italian sample (N = 283). These results enhance understanding of when and why advantaged groups undertake collective action against disadvantaged groups by demonstrating that distinc-tiveness threats and emotions promote such actions.
Because punishments are expected to give offenders what they deserve proportionally to the severi... more Because punishments are expected to give offenders what they deserve proportionally to the severity of their offenses, the punishment of an entire group because of the misdeed of a few of its members is generally considered as unfair. Group entitativity might increase support for such collective punishment, because members of highly entitative groups are perceived as more similar and interchangeable. We designed three experiments comparing support for third-party collective punishment of low versus high entitative groups. As comparison base-rate, we included conditions in which participants punish an individual wrong-doer (Experiments 1 & 2). Results show that although support for individual punishment is higher than support for collective punishment, this difference was reduced (Experiment 1) or absent (Experiment 2) when the group was highly entitative. Experiment 3 replicated the increasing effect of group entitativity on support for collective punishment. We conclude that group entitativity increases the likelihood of an entire group being treated as a single unit, facilitating collective punishment when a few group members commit an offense.
The present research examines the impact of ingroup favoritism on self-esteem. According to the s... more The present research examines the impact of ingroup favoritism on self-esteem. According to the self-esteem hypothesis (Abrams & Hogg, 1988), favoring the ingroup over an outgroup should lead to higher self-esteem. However , empirical tests of this hypothesis have revealed mixed results. In light of the heterogeneity of these findings, we investigate the moderating role of ingroup norms regarding intergroup discrimination. According to this nor-mative perspective, we hypothesize that believing one has favored the ingroup increases personal self-esteem to the extent that such behavior is congruent with the ingroup norm. Three studies showed a positive impact of perceived ingroup favoritism (vs. intergroup fairness) on personal self-esteem when the ingroup norm was pro-discriminatory (Studies 1–3). However, this effect disappeared when the pro-discriminatory ingroup norm was attenuated (Study 1), and was even reversed when the ingroup norm was clearly anti-discriminatory (Studies 2–3). Further, this moderation was primarily observed when the ingroup norms were injunctive (rather than descriptive ; Study 2), and among participants who highly value conformity (Study 3). These findings are discussed with regard to the classical understanding of the self-esteem hypothesis.
This paper argues that a fundamental antagonism between democracy and nondemocracy organises lay... more This paper argues that a fundamental antagonism between democracy and nondemocracy organises lay thinking on global issues. We review key findings of a longstanding experimental research program that examined the “Democracy-as-value” hypothesis across a variety of political and social contexts. This hypothesis contends that democracy is an ideological belief system that provides value to democratic individuals, groups, and institutions and thereby grants legitimacy to their actions. Based on procedural justice theories and social representations theory, we contend that western lay perceivers associate democracy with procedural equality and individual autonomy, whereas nondemocracy is associated with ingroup hierarchy and conformity. We discuss how idealised representations of democracy justify global power arrangements and emphasise the paradoxical justification function of democratic values through which nondemocratic forms of social regulation based on physical force are legitimised with the very democratic norms that call for peaceful resolution of conflicts.
According to the “democracy-as-value” hypothesis, democracy has become an ideological belief syst... more According to the “democracy-as-value” hypothesis, democracy has become an ideological belief system providing social value to democratic individuals, groups and institutions, granting legitimacy to their actions (even if dishonest or violent), and protecting them from consecutive punishments. The present research investigates the extent to which this legitimizing process is based on the individual endorsement of democratic principles. Across four experiments, following the misdeed of a (few) group member(s), respondents who valued democratic group organization and democracy in general expressed more lenient retributive justice judgments towards democratic (as compared to nondemocratic) offender groups. These findings shed light on the ways in which democratic ideology infuses justice judgments.
What factors determine the willingness to inflict collective punishment upon a group for a misdee... more What factors determine the willingness to inflict collective punishment upon a group for a misdeed committed by individual group members? This research investigates the effect of collective responsibility shared among group members and the moderating effect of the group’s political organization (democratic vs. nondemocratic). Hypothesizing that moral accountability should be greater for democratic offender groups compared to nondemocratic groups, five experiments showed that the positive effect of collective responsibility on support for collective punishment (experiment 1) was stronger for democratic groups than for nondemocratic groups (experiment 2-5). A sixth experiment revealed that the moral and social value ascribed to democracy led to higher expectations towards democratic groups, resulting in negative perceptions of the democratic offender group and ultimately in increased collective punishment. The results are discussed in terms of defense strategies of democratic values.
A recurrent observation in the field of organ donation is that organ demand exceeds supply. Organ... more A recurrent observation in the field of organ donation is that organ demand exceeds supply. Organ donation promotion is therefore required in order to diminish this gap. In this article, we focus on post-mortem organ donation and review psychosocial literature contributing to identify firstly, the determinants of donation, and secondly, the factors likely to increase the efficiency of donation promotion campaigns. Finally, we discuss the theoretical implications of our review and advance promising avenues for future research.
Scientific discoveries about the dangers of smoking and antismoking actions carried out in Western... more Scientific discoveries about the dangers of smoking and antismoking actions carried out in Western countries over recent decades have progressively helped create an antismoking social norm. Nevertheless, many smokers still refuse to quit. We conducted two studies to investigate smokers’ resistance to this norm as a function of their personal self-esteem (PSE) and group-based self-esteem (GBSE). An initial correlational study assessed smokers’ perception of the antismoking social norm, their PSE, and their antismoking attitudes. Smokers with low PSE had lower antismoking attitudes than those with high PSE when the antismoking norm was strong. The second study assessed GBSE (i.e., smokers’ satisfaction as smokers) and manipulated both the strength of the antismoking norm and PSE (i.e., focus on personal weaknesses or strengths). Smokers with lowmPSE displayed the lowest antismoking attitudes when the antismoking norm was strong and their GBSE was high. These results show that the antismoking norm can produce paradoxical effects and suggest that the way individuals cope with stigmatization is affected by the interplay between PSE and GBSE
Abstract
Democracy is positively valued. This positive evaluation extends to a democracy’s actio... more Abstract
Democracy is positively valued. This positive evaluation extends to a democracy’s actions, even if it is to wage war. The authors investigated whether the perceived legitimacy of military interventions depends on the political structure (democratic vs. nondemocratic) of the countries involved and on the aggressor country’s popular support for the government’s aggressive policy. Participants learned that an alleged country planned to attack another. The political structure of both countries was manipulated in the two experiments. The support of the aggressor’s population toward military intervention was measured in Experiment 1 and manipulated in Experiment 2. Both experiments confirmed that military intervention was perceived as being less illegitimate when the population supported their democratic government’s policy to attack a nondemocratic country.
Abstract
This research examined the support for international military interventions as a functi... more Abstract
This research examined the support for international military interventions as a function of the political system and the public opinion of the target country. In two experiments, we informed participants about a possible military intervention by the international community towards a sovereign country whose government planned to use military force against a secessionist region. They were then asked whether they would support this intervention whilst being reminded that it would cause civilian deaths. The democratic or nondemocratic political system of the target country was experimentally manipulated, and the population support for its belligerent government policy was either assessed (Experiment 1) or manipulated (Experiment 2). Results showed greater support for the intervention when the target country was nondemocratic, as compared to the democratic and the control conditions, but only when its population supported the belligerent government policy. Support for the external intervention was low when the target country was democratic, irrespective of national public opinion. These findings provide support for the democracy-as-value hypothesis applied to international military interventions, and suggest that civilian deaths (collateral damage) are more acceptable when nondemocratic populations support their government’s belligerent policy.
Democracies assume accurate knowledge by the populace, but the human attraction to fake and untru... more Democracies assume accurate knowledge by the populace, but the human attraction to fake and untrustworthy news poses a serious problem for healthy democratic functioning. We articulate why and how identification with political parties - known as partisanship - can bias information processing in the human brain. There is extensive evidence that people engage in motivated political reasoning, but recent research suggests that partisanship can alter memory, implicit evaluation, and even perceptual judgments. We propose an identity-based model of belief for understanding the influence of partisanship on these cognitive processes. This framework helps to explain why people place party loyalty over policy, and even over truth. Finally, we discuss strategies for de-biasing information processing to help to create a shared reality across partisan divides.
In two studies we assessed the role of distinctiveness threat, group-based emotions (angst, fear,... more In two studies we assessed the role of distinctiveness threat, group-based emotions (angst, fear, and anger), and prejudice on people's willingness to engage in collective action against immigrant groups. In Study 1 (N = 222) White British participants were either informed that in the next 40 years the proportion of immigrants in the UK is unlikely to change (control condition) or that there will be more immigrants than White British people living in Britain (threat condition). We obtained support for a sequential multiple mediator model in which threat predicted British people's willingness to engage in collective action via the emotions first and then prejudice. This finding was replicated in Study 2 with an Italian sample (N = 283). These results enhance understanding of when and why advantaged groups undertake collective action against disadvantaged groups by demonstrating that distinc-tiveness threats and emotions promote such actions.
Because punishments are expected to give offenders what they deserve proportionally to the severi... more Because punishments are expected to give offenders what they deserve proportionally to the severity of their offenses, the punishment of an entire group because of the misdeed of a few of its members is generally considered as unfair. Group entitativity might increase support for such collective punishment, because members of highly entitative groups are perceived as more similar and interchangeable. We designed three experiments comparing support for third-party collective punishment of low versus high entitative groups. As comparison base-rate, we included conditions in which participants punish an individual wrong-doer (Experiments 1 & 2). Results show that although support for individual punishment is higher than support for collective punishment, this difference was reduced (Experiment 1) or absent (Experiment 2) when the group was highly entitative. Experiment 3 replicated the increasing effect of group entitativity on support for collective punishment. We conclude that group entitativity increases the likelihood of an entire group being treated as a single unit, facilitating collective punishment when a few group members commit an offense.
The present research examines the impact of ingroup favoritism on self-esteem. According to the s... more The present research examines the impact of ingroup favoritism on self-esteem. According to the self-esteem hypothesis (Abrams & Hogg, 1988), favoring the ingroup over an outgroup should lead to higher self-esteem. However , empirical tests of this hypothesis have revealed mixed results. In light of the heterogeneity of these findings, we investigate the moderating role of ingroup norms regarding intergroup discrimination. According to this nor-mative perspective, we hypothesize that believing one has favored the ingroup increases personal self-esteem to the extent that such behavior is congruent with the ingroup norm. Three studies showed a positive impact of perceived ingroup favoritism (vs. intergroup fairness) on personal self-esteem when the ingroup norm was pro-discriminatory (Studies 1–3). However, this effect disappeared when the pro-discriminatory ingroup norm was attenuated (Study 1), and was even reversed when the ingroup norm was clearly anti-discriminatory (Studies 2–3). Further, this moderation was primarily observed when the ingroup norms were injunctive (rather than descriptive ; Study 2), and among participants who highly value conformity (Study 3). These findings are discussed with regard to the classical understanding of the self-esteem hypothesis.
This paper argues that a fundamental antagonism between democracy and nondemocracy organises lay... more This paper argues that a fundamental antagonism between democracy and nondemocracy organises lay thinking on global issues. We review key findings of a longstanding experimental research program that examined the “Democracy-as-value” hypothesis across a variety of political and social contexts. This hypothesis contends that democracy is an ideological belief system that provides value to democratic individuals, groups, and institutions and thereby grants legitimacy to their actions. Based on procedural justice theories and social representations theory, we contend that western lay perceivers associate democracy with procedural equality and individual autonomy, whereas nondemocracy is associated with ingroup hierarchy and conformity. We discuss how idealised representations of democracy justify global power arrangements and emphasise the paradoxical justification function of democratic values through which nondemocratic forms of social regulation based on physical force are legitimised with the very democratic norms that call for peaceful resolution of conflicts.
According to the “democracy-as-value” hypothesis, democracy has become an ideological belief syst... more According to the “democracy-as-value” hypothesis, democracy has become an ideological belief system providing social value to democratic individuals, groups and institutions, granting legitimacy to their actions (even if dishonest or violent), and protecting them from consecutive punishments. The present research investigates the extent to which this legitimizing process is based on the individual endorsement of democratic principles. Across four experiments, following the misdeed of a (few) group member(s), respondents who valued democratic group organization and democracy in general expressed more lenient retributive justice judgments towards democratic (as compared to nondemocratic) offender groups. These findings shed light on the ways in which democratic ideology infuses justice judgments.
What factors determine the willingness to inflict collective punishment upon a group for a misdee... more What factors determine the willingness to inflict collective punishment upon a group for a misdeed committed by individual group members? This research investigates the effect of collective responsibility shared among group members and the moderating effect of the group’s political organization (democratic vs. nondemocratic). Hypothesizing that moral accountability should be greater for democratic offender groups compared to nondemocratic groups, five experiments showed that the positive effect of collective responsibility on support for collective punishment (experiment 1) was stronger for democratic groups than for nondemocratic groups (experiment 2-5). A sixth experiment revealed that the moral and social value ascribed to democracy led to higher expectations towards democratic groups, resulting in negative perceptions of the democratic offender group and ultimately in increased collective punishment. The results are discussed in terms of defense strategies of democratic values.
A recurrent observation in the field of organ donation is that organ demand exceeds supply. Organ... more A recurrent observation in the field of organ donation is that organ demand exceeds supply. Organ donation promotion is therefore required in order to diminish this gap. In this article, we focus on post-mortem organ donation and review psychosocial literature contributing to identify firstly, the determinants of donation, and secondly, the factors likely to increase the efficiency of donation promotion campaigns. Finally, we discuss the theoretical implications of our review and advance promising avenues for future research.
Scientific discoveries about the dangers of smoking and antismoking actions carried out in Western... more Scientific discoveries about the dangers of smoking and antismoking actions carried out in Western countries over recent decades have progressively helped create an antismoking social norm. Nevertheless, many smokers still refuse to quit. We conducted two studies to investigate smokers’ resistance to this norm as a function of their personal self-esteem (PSE) and group-based self-esteem (GBSE). An initial correlational study assessed smokers’ perception of the antismoking social norm, their PSE, and their antismoking attitudes. Smokers with low PSE had lower antismoking attitudes than those with high PSE when the antismoking norm was strong. The second study assessed GBSE (i.e., smokers’ satisfaction as smokers) and manipulated both the strength of the antismoking norm and PSE (i.e., focus on personal weaknesses or strengths). Smokers with lowmPSE displayed the lowest antismoking attitudes when the antismoking norm was strong and their GBSE was high. These results show that the antismoking norm can produce paradoxical effects and suggest that the way individuals cope with stigmatization is affected by the interplay between PSE and GBSE
Abstract
Democracy is positively valued. This positive evaluation extends to a democracy’s actio... more Abstract
Democracy is positively valued. This positive evaluation extends to a democracy’s actions, even if it is to wage war. The authors investigated whether the perceived legitimacy of military interventions depends on the political structure (democratic vs. nondemocratic) of the countries involved and on the aggressor country’s popular support for the government’s aggressive policy. Participants learned that an alleged country planned to attack another. The political structure of both countries was manipulated in the two experiments. The support of the aggressor’s population toward military intervention was measured in Experiment 1 and manipulated in Experiment 2. Both experiments confirmed that military intervention was perceived as being less illegitimate when the population supported their democratic government’s policy to attack a nondemocratic country.
Abstract
This research examined the support for international military interventions as a functi... more Abstract
This research examined the support for international military interventions as a function of the political system and the public opinion of the target country. In two experiments, we informed participants about a possible military intervention by the international community towards a sovereign country whose government planned to use military force against a secessionist region. They were then asked whether they would support this intervention whilst being reminded that it would cause civilian deaths. The democratic or nondemocratic political system of the target country was experimentally manipulated, and the population support for its belligerent government policy was either assessed (Experiment 1) or manipulated (Experiment 2). Results showed greater support for the intervention when the target country was nondemocratic, as compared to the democratic and the control conditions, but only when its population supported the belligerent government policy. Support for the external intervention was low when the target country was democratic, irrespective of national public opinion. These findings provide support for the democracy-as-value hypothesis applied to international military interventions, and suggest that civilian deaths (collateral damage) are more acceptable when nondemocratic populations support their government’s belligerent policy.
Uploads
Papers by Andrea Pereira
Democracy is positively valued. This positive evaluation extends to a democracy’s actions, even if it is to wage war. The authors investigated whether the perceived legitimacy of military interventions depends on the political structure (democratic vs. nondemocratic) of the countries involved and on the aggressor country’s popular support for the government’s aggressive policy. Participants learned that an alleged country planned to attack another. The political structure of both countries was manipulated in the two experiments. The support of the aggressor’s population toward military intervention was measured in Experiment 1 and manipulated in Experiment 2. Both experiments confirmed that military intervention was perceived as being less illegitimate when the population supported their democratic government’s policy to attack a nondemocratic country.
This research examined the support for international military interventions as a function of the political system and the public opinion of the target country. In two experiments, we informed participants about a possible military intervention by the international community towards a sovereign country whose government planned to use military force against a secessionist region. They were then asked whether they would support this intervention whilst being reminded that it would cause civilian deaths. The democratic or nondemocratic political system of the target country was experimentally manipulated, and the population support for its belligerent government policy was either assessed (Experiment 1) or manipulated (Experiment 2). Results showed greater support for the intervention when the target country was nondemocratic, as compared to the democratic and the control conditions, but only when its population supported the belligerent government policy. Support for the external intervention was low when the target country was democratic, irrespective of national public opinion. These findings provide support for the democracy-as-value hypothesis applied to international military interventions, and suggest that civilian deaths (collateral damage) are more acceptable when nondemocratic populations support their government’s belligerent policy.
Democracy is positively valued. This positive evaluation extends to a democracy’s actions, even if it is to wage war. The authors investigated whether the perceived legitimacy of military interventions depends on the political structure (democratic vs. nondemocratic) of the countries involved and on the aggressor country’s popular support for the government’s aggressive policy. Participants learned that an alleged country planned to attack another. The political structure of both countries was manipulated in the two experiments. The support of the aggressor’s population toward military intervention was measured in Experiment 1 and manipulated in Experiment 2. Both experiments confirmed that military intervention was perceived as being less illegitimate when the population supported their democratic government’s policy to attack a nondemocratic country.
This research examined the support for international military interventions as a function of the political system and the public opinion of the target country. In two experiments, we informed participants about a possible military intervention by the international community towards a sovereign country whose government planned to use military force against a secessionist region. They were then asked whether they would support this intervention whilst being reminded that it would cause civilian deaths. The democratic or nondemocratic political system of the target country was experimentally manipulated, and the population support for its belligerent government policy was either assessed (Experiment 1) or manipulated (Experiment 2). Results showed greater support for the intervention when the target country was nondemocratic, as compared to the democratic and the control conditions, but only when its population supported the belligerent government policy. Support for the external intervention was low when the target country was democratic, irrespective of national public opinion. These findings provide support for the democracy-as-value hypothesis applied to international military interventions, and suggest that civilian deaths (collateral damage) are more acceptable when nondemocratic populations support their government’s belligerent policy.