Papers by László Á . Kóczy
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, Jun 26, 2002
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RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2007
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RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, Jun 1, 2009
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RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, Aug 30, 2006
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RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, Sep 1, 2007
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Countries all over the world look for ways to increase their competitiveness. The contribution of... more Countries all over the world look for ways to increase their competitiveness. The contribution of cooperating companies in the form of clusters is rather substantial and therefore, for example, the European Union and its member states have long been supporting these cooperative efforts. This support may take the form of a more entrepreneur- friendly legal environment, initiate cooperation, but it may also mean non-returnable financial contribution. This paper does not want to discuss the optimal channels to support clusters, and in particular it does not want to study the ways financial contributions are distributed among clusters. Rather, the contribution is an entirely novel way to look at the forces that keep some clusters on track while destruct others. Longstanding cooperation between companies forms a special complex process hierarchy in clusters. The main businesses of the cluster is driven by the actors’ interests in staying competitive, improving competitiveness and obtaini...
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This study introduces an entirely novel way to study the cooperative and noncooperative nature of... more This study introduces an entirely novel way to study the cooperative and noncooperative nature of clusters by looking at the selfish, profit-seeking interests of the actors within cluster initiatives. The approach provides a game theory inspired framework to study the dilemma of cluster actors between the fruitful cooperation with other actors and their own selfish – and possibly short-term – interests at three levels: intensity focussing on the overall cooperation effort; structure looking at the network of cooperation and balance discussing good ways to allocate resources. Characteristic models of cluster behaviour have been developed for all these aspects. Interviews have been conducted among cluster actors of two cluster initiatives. Both were quite matured and well managed with similar core objectives. The methodology applied has revealed that the nature of cooperation among the actors and how the cluster initiative is managed is of surprisingly different nature although both c...
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Due to the externalities, in normal form games a deviation changes the payoff of all players indu... more Due to the externalities, in normal form games a deviation changes the payoff of all players inducing a retaliation by the remaining or residual players. The stability of an outcome depends on the expectations potential deviators have about this reaction, but so far no satisfactory theory has been provided. The present paper continues the work of Tulkens and Chander (1997) where deviators consider residual equilibria, but we allow coalitions to form, moreover introduce consistency between the residual solution and the solution of the original game. Optimistic and pessimistic considerations produce a pair of cores. These cores are compared to some existing cooperative concepts such as the g- and r-cores and the equilibrium binding agreements. In our final section we discuss the predominance of the grand coalition and suggest a generalisation of the normal form where such a precedence can be removed.
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Social Science Research Network, 2021
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Kozgazdasagi Szemle, Jun 1, 2011
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Social Science Research Network, 2002
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Social Science Research Network, 2006
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Social Science Research Network, 2008
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Operations Research Letters, May 1, 2018
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Mathematical Social Sciences, Sep 1, 2015
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Energy Strategy Reviews, Nov 1, 2022
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RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2021
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Papers by László Á . Kóczy
We present an algorithm that efficiently finds an allotment such that the differences from the average district size are lexicographically minimized. This apportionment rule is a well-defined allocation mechanism compatible with and derived from the recommendation of the Venice Commission. Finally, we compare this apportionment rule with mainstream mechanisms using real data from Hungary and the United States.