Papers by Assem Dandashly
The article analyses the EU’s approach for democracy promotion in Tunisia and
Egypt in the wake o... more The article analyses the EU’s approach for democracy promotion in Tunisia and
Egypt in the wake of the Arab uprisings. Contrary to arguments that focus either
on the EU institutions and member states or on the domestic policies of the
targeted countries and see the post-2010 EU democracy promotion strategies as
a continuation of previous programs, the article follows a more eclectic approach.
By considering changes both at the EU and the international level, it argues that
the EU appears as a pragmatic yet more flexible and reactive international actor.
After 2010, the EU frames for democracy promotion have changed and are
differentiated in the two MENA countries. Crucial to this cognitive change is the
EU Global Strategy (EUGS) and the role that domestic elites have played in the
two case studies.
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How can we explain the politics of euro adoption in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland? How d... more How can we explain the politics of euro adoption in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland? How did the euro crisis influence their positions regarding euro adoption? This article builds on the domestic politics literature and argues: (i) countries that had joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism-2 early had an easier time adopting the euro compared with those that did not; (ii) having a pro-euro government is a necessary but not sufficient condition to adopt the euro; (iii) the political ideology of the ruling elites is important; (iv) the existence of veto points in the domestic political system influences the entire process; (v) although the three countries have made central banks technically independent, the appointment process remains highly political and complex, which has led to conflicts between the central banks and the governments – negatively influencing euro adoption policies; and (vi) the issue does not have much salience in public opinion and thus does not usually feature high on the agenda of the political elites in the three countries. These three countries to date have not adopted the euro for various domestic political reasons. They have at different times been laggards by default or laggards by
choice.
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Poland’s road to the euro proved bumpy and its early status as a euro pacesetter developed into o... more Poland’s road to the euro proved bumpy and its early status as a euro pacesetter developed into one of euro laggard. So why, prior to the sovereign debt crisis, did Poland remain among the group of Central and East European countries that had not yet adopted the euro? What are the political barriers for euro adoption in Poland? This paper argues that domestic factors such as the existence of veto points, public opinion, central bank institutional features, and the role of political elites are key to answering the research questions. With the euro crises, the domestic problems were accompanied by declining public support for euro adoption along with an unfavorable external environment that is pushing euro adoption further away.
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What explains euro adoption strategies in the Czech Republic and Slovakia? How have each of these... more What explains euro adoption strategies in the Czech Republic and Slovakia? How have each of these two countries performed under the regime they joined (Czech Republic: flexible exchange rates; Slovakia: in the euro area)? How has that experience affected Czech and Slovak policies towards euro adoption and their performance during the euro crisis? This paper asks these questions and seeks to give an answer to the question of why Slovakia adopted the euro while the Czech Republic did not. We address these questions by taking an eclectic approach that draws on constructivism, domestic politics, and political economy. The paper examines five explanations based on these theoretical approaches: the inferiority-superiority factor; European identity and the “return” to Europe; the symbolic factor of the currency; euroskepticism; and economic structure
and trade relations. We find that each of the five explanations enriches our insight into these matters. But if forced to choose, we find that an explanation drawn on a domestic politics approach contributes the most to our overall understanding of euro adoption policies in the two cases.
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Journal of European Integration
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Journal of European Integration
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ABSTRACT
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Following their accession to the European Union (EU) on May 1st, 2004, ten New Member States (NMS... more Following their accession to the European Union (EU) on May 1st, 2004, ten New Member States (NMS), and two more that joined in 2007, are expected to fulfill the Maastricht convergence criteria and enter the last stage of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in due course thereby adopting the euro. However, nothing in the Treaty on European Union specifies a time frame for joining the euro area. Some countries have already joined; the others have not. Slovenia joined in 2007, Cyprus and Malta in 2008 and Slovakia in 2009. The other eight NMS have not yet adopted the euro. Some have made serious attempts; others are far removed from having made the necessary preparations to be ready to join. How can we explain the difference in speed of euro adoption? A cost benefit-analysis indicating positive economic effects of euro adoption and the existence of shared economic values and beliefs among central bankers are insufficient to bring about speedy euro adoption. This paper develops a domesti...
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Following the Arab Spring, one might expect a paradigm shift in the EU’s attitude towards the MEN... more Following the Arab Spring, one might expect a paradigm shift in the EU’s attitude towards the MENA — at least with respect to democracy promotion. However, the EU response has been neither consistent nor coherent. This paper seeks to answer the following questions: How did the EU react to the Arab Spring events in North Africa? Is there evidence of any change in the goals and instruments pursued by the EU after the Arab Spring? And, do these goals and instruments change coherently across countries? The paper argues, first, that EU goals remain security and stability driven. While the EU viewed the Arab Spring as a window of opportunity for democracy, as events developed the EU prioritized security concerns as a response to the threat of instability in the MENA. And second, the utilization of instruments varied across time and cases due to the domestic politics of the targeted countries.
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ABSTRACT
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Journal of European Integration, 2012
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Papers by Assem Dandashly
Egypt in the wake of the Arab uprisings. Contrary to arguments that focus either
on the EU institutions and member states or on the domestic policies of the
targeted countries and see the post-2010 EU democracy promotion strategies as
a continuation of previous programs, the article follows a more eclectic approach.
By considering changes both at the EU and the international level, it argues that
the EU appears as a pragmatic yet more flexible and reactive international actor.
After 2010, the EU frames for democracy promotion have changed and are
differentiated in the two MENA countries. Crucial to this cognitive change is the
EU Global Strategy (EUGS) and the role that domestic elites have played in the
two case studies.
choice.
and trade relations. We find that each of the five explanations enriches our insight into these matters. But if forced to choose, we find that an explanation drawn on a domestic politics approach contributes the most to our overall understanding of euro adoption policies in the two cases.
Egypt in the wake of the Arab uprisings. Contrary to arguments that focus either
on the EU institutions and member states or on the domestic policies of the
targeted countries and see the post-2010 EU democracy promotion strategies as
a continuation of previous programs, the article follows a more eclectic approach.
By considering changes both at the EU and the international level, it argues that
the EU appears as a pragmatic yet more flexible and reactive international actor.
After 2010, the EU frames for democracy promotion have changed and are
differentiated in the two MENA countries. Crucial to this cognitive change is the
EU Global Strategy (EUGS) and the role that domestic elites have played in the
two case studies.
choice.
and trade relations. We find that each of the five explanations enriches our insight into these matters. But if forced to choose, we find that an explanation drawn on a domestic politics approach contributes the most to our overall understanding of euro adoption policies in the two cases.