Papers by Godfrey Guillaumin
Revista de filosofia dianoia, Sep 2, 1997
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Signos Filosóficos, Mar 29, 2016
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Signos Filosóficos, 2016
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Revista Colombiana de Filosofía y Ciencia, Dec 27, 2018
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Crítica, Apr 1, 2018
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BRILL eBooks, 2004
... accepted some points of catastrophism, insofar as it was possible to explain the total ... is... more ... accepted some points of catastrophism, insofar as it was possible to explain the total ... is 8 The favorable opinion of Whewell with respect to the relation between catastrophists and Natural ... hypothesis; which was a strategy followed by Lyell to reject catastrophism (Whewell 1837 ...
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Raíces metodológicas de la teoría de la evolución de Charles Darwin, 2009
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Scientific measurement was a central factor behind the rise of modern science. Nevertheless, desp... more Scientific measurement was a central factor behind the rise of modern science. Nevertheless, despite the epistemic and methodological importance of measurement for the development and growth of scientific knowledge during the modern epoch, few historical-philosophical studies seek to understand measurement's epistemic, methodological, and cognitive aspects. This paper aims to propose a historicalphilosophical approach for scientific measurement in terms of an integration of mathematical, conceptual, and instrumental aspects. This integration was achieved after long periods of time, as result of “feedback” processes between these three aspects, where each other were mutually adjusted. I illustrate this dynamic and integrative notion of scientific measurement analyzing some of Tycho Brahe’s and Johannes Kepler’s determinations of celestial parameters.
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Among the various historical studies on the topic of “Scientific Revolution”, there is not suffic... more Among the various historical studies on the topic of “Scientific Revolution”, there is not sufficient considerationof the deep cognitive changes generated by scientific measurements, although there is usually an emphasis on the theory change. A well-known case of theory change is Copernicus’ planetary theory, which was stated as an alternative explanation to Ptolemy’s. Developing a planetary theory supposing that the earth rotates around a motionless sun was not only a simpler theory but also a stronger explanatory theory. However, an interesting methodological and cognitive issue was that Copernicus’ astronomical measurements and data were not notably different from Ptolemy’s. In fact, in many cases, Copernican data concerning key astronomical parameters was the same as in Ptolemy’s theory. Therefore, in this instance, we have two inconsistent theories concerning planetary motion derived from nearly the same measurements. However, the methodological and cognitive relationship between Copernicus’ planetary theory and Kepler’s was highly different. Kepler was a Copernican astronomer because he maintained the theory about a stationary sun, but he was not Copernican when conceiving, developing and performing astronomical measurements. Consequently, we could say that between Copernicus and Kepler, there was not a theory change but a measurement (methodological and cognitive) change, i.e., there was a cognitive change without a theory change. Elsewhere, I have analysed this situation and called Kepler’s measurement achievements a “cognitive integration”. The aim of this paper is to show that “cognitive integration” is a type of change that is more fundamental and deeper than theory change.
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Scientific measurement was a central factor behind the rise of modern science. Nevertheless, desp... more Scientific measurement was a central factor behind the rise of modern science. Nevertheless, despite the epistemic and methodological importance of measurement for the development and growth of scientific knowledge during the modern epoch, few historical-philosophical studies seek to understand measurement's epistemic, methodological, and cognitive aspects. This paper aims to propose a historicalphilosophical approach for scientific measurement in terms of an integration of mathematical, conceptual, and instrumental aspects. This integration was achieved after long periods of time, as result of “feedback” processes between these three aspects, where each other were mutually adjusted. I illustrate this dynamic and integrative notion of scientific measurement analyzing some of Tycho Brahe’s and Johannes Kepler’s determinations of celestial parameters.
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Regresando a los origenes, renovando la disciplina; o ?es la actual filosofia de la ciencia adecu... more Regresando a los origenes, renovando la disciplina; o ?es la actual filosofia de la ciencia adecuadamente historica y filosoficamente fertil?
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Larry Laudan’s normative naturalism is one of the most important proposals in the philosophy of s... more Larry Laudan’s normative naturalism is one of the most important proposals in the philosophy of science. Among other issues, it allows appraising different philosophical theories of scientific methodology because it is a descriptive and normative thesis, and, at the same time, it avoids naturalistic fallacy. From my point of view, however, normative naturalism does not satisfactorily explain a couple of roughly common historical situations in science, namely, novel methodological situations and circumstances in which successful methodological rules do not work as they should. In this paper, I confront normative naturalism against these couple of anomalies in order to see its reaction, and I conclude that this kind of naturalism exhibits substantive normative fissures.
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Oficio. Revista de Historia e Interdisciplina, 2018
Filósofos de la ciencia historicistas e historiadores de la ciencia han formulado la idea de revo... more Filósofos de la ciencia historicistas e historiadores de la ciencia han formulado la idea de revolución copernicana como el cambio de la teoría astronómica de Ptolomeo por la de Copérnico, entre los años 1543 a 1687. Aquí se presenta una versión diferente del abandono de la astronomía de Ptolomeo. Tal como aparece en el Almagesto, dicha astronomía está conformada por seis tesis interrelacionadas, las cuales se eliminaron entre 1543 y 1838. Pero lo más importante desde el punto de vista cognitivo es que cada una de tales tesis, excepto la primera, fueron eliminadas con procedimientos de medición científica, diferentes y mejores en cada caso, y crecientemente precisos y confiables. A esa sustitución se le nombra aquí eliminación creativa y al proceso completo revolución silenciosa.
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Papers by Godfrey Guillaumin
Los objetivos secundarios son varios. El primero de ellos es mostrar que hacia principios del siglo XX un selecto grupo de científicos, matemáticos y filósofos como Henry Poincaré, Ludwig Boltzmann y Ernst Mach desarrollaron ideas sueltas sobre una nueva manera de entender la naturaleza de la investigación científica, la cual la concebían como un comportamiento biológico-evolutivo. Dewey se refiere a esos tres autores como aquellos que inician el estudio de la lógica de los métodos científicos. El objetivo aquí es mostrar que, a diferencia de esos autores, Dewey fue quien logró desarrollar sistemáticamente una versión comprehensiva de esa nueva teoría de la investigación empírica. El segundo objetivo secundario es mostrar, contrariamente a la versión popular y simplista de los “pasos del método científico”, la gran complejidad del proceso de investigación. Dewey tomó muy en serio tal complejidad al grado que le llevó a reformular y refinar sucesivamente el patrón de investigación. Los estudios estándar sobre el patrón de investigación de Dewey usualmente analizan su versión final, pero aquí analizo las sucesivas correcciones, ampliaciones y precisiones que realizó porque revelan claramente, entre otras cosas, dicha complejidad. El tercer objetivo secundario recae en mostrar que Dewey le otorgó a la noción de experiencia la importancia que genuinamente tiene cuando hablamos de investigación empírica. Desde mi punto de vista, el error en la gran mayoría de teóricos del siglo XX sobre “investigación empírica” fue haber tomado la noción de experiencia en su sentido sensorialista; lo cual es muy restringido y artificial. Contrariamente, Dewey se da cuenta que antes de hablar de “investigación empírica”, requerimos una noción adecuada, robusta y amplia de “experiencia”. Aquí mi objetivo fue mostrar dicha noción y sus múltiples conexiones con la investigación.