Justin Carmien
This page features writing which has followed from the publication of How to Nurture Truth and Authenticity: A Metamodern Economic Reform Proposal. Publishing the writing became necessary following a reading of Daniel Fraga’s Ontological Design: Subject is Project. Following, it became clear to me that the metaphysics which describe the foundation of an emergent politics and economics is also that which describes the foundation for an emergent design space as well. I now assume that many more possibilities exist for this metaphysics and those possibilities are not exhausted by these three fields of interest alone.
These articles extract the metaphysics which I first encountered during the construction of How to Nurture Truth and Authenticity. However, each article has come to me organically. Therefore, the metaphysical architectonic has not been delivered linearly or executed under an intentional outline. Despite this, the writing describes of a novel subiectum for metaphysical investigation. The subject matter of this metaphysics (πραξις-πολις) advances the discipline in the tradition of Kant>Hegel>Marx>Heidegger. The metamodern aesthetic periodization is also helpful in this project.
These articles extract the metaphysics which I first encountered during the construction of How to Nurture Truth and Authenticity. However, each article has come to me organically. Therefore, the metaphysical architectonic has not been delivered linearly or executed under an intentional outline. Despite this, the writing describes of a novel subiectum for metaphysical investigation. The subject matter of this metaphysics (πραξις-πολις) advances the discipline in the tradition of Kant>Hegel>Marx>Heidegger. The metamodern aesthetic periodization is also helpful in this project.
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Papers by Justin Carmien
If both Blattner’s characterization and conclusion are correct, then Heidegger’s failure may have consequence to the project of metaphysics generally. If Plotinus, Leibniz, Kant, Bergson, and Heidegger have each failed an account of the being of time, then the project of metaphysics loses much of its relevance. This would then have consequence to the metamodern project as well. If a transcendental architectonic of time fails during our time, then metamodernists may not have an original account of one of their principal objects, history. In that case, metamodern thought would be reduced to operating within postmodern understanding—which is, to be sure, an understanding of history in the sociological sense. Within this understanding, power is treated as “a causal mechanism between human animals in various forms of organization”, and history as the story of such mechanisms as they have transpired according to a calendrical metric. Within this paradigm of thought, the explanation of the being of time is glossed over and is left to physics. Yet, the political prescriptions which follow from this worldview strike us as unoriginal and exhausted. Returning to “science” reeks of liberal technocracy. Today, we must use philosophy to save ourselves from the oppression of “science”. Because of this, Blattner’s critique is not only relevant to metaphysicians, it is also relevant to metamodern political theorists and statesmen.
At least since G.W.F. Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes (“the Phenomenology of Spirit”) “the now” has been taken as the moment of phenomenal encounter in which time and space extend and the natural world may be described. For Hegel, as well as for us, this moment marks the event, in its “twofold shape as here and now”, where any scientific questioning can begin—whether that questioning proceeds from causal or ontological questions, and whether it leads to physical, metaphysical, or historical descriptions. Because Hegel’s Phenomenology stands at the inception of phenomenology, I choose to begin an understanding of power and history in the metamodern political project here. However, because of Hegel’s neglect of the conditions of possibility, and his neglect to ground the being of the actual, I must also advance beyond Hegel as well.
In this article, I will announce such a subject. I will also frame the thinking space which treats of this subject. Finally, I will conclude by considering what questions a metamodern metaphysics faces.
In order to place Dugin within the legacy of Heidegger, the Statesman, as strange as this may seem, we have to first decide upon the relationship between Dugin as a political strategist and his own theory. That is, we have to decide if Dugin has simply announced Heidegger’s da sein as the subject matter of a new political theory, or if he himself is also an activist of his Fourth Political Theory. Coming to such a decision may seem overly easy—we may want to say that Dugin, of course, is an activist of his own Fourth Political Theory. However, there is good reason for deciding otherwise. This article has been written with the intention of pursuing the legacy of Heidegger, the Statesman. In order to do so, we must firstly consider the relationship between Dugin and Fourth Political Theory. This relationship takes priority within the pursuit of this article. This is on account of the popularity which Dugin’s announcement of Fourth Political Theory was received with.
Following the reflection on Dugin, I will consider Heidegger's value metaphysics and a novel economic interpretation of his metaphysics.
If both Blattner’s characterization and conclusion are correct, then Heidegger’s failure may have consequence to the project of metaphysics generally. If Plotinus, Leibniz, Kant, Bergson, and Heidegger have each failed an account of the being of time, then the project of metaphysics loses much of its relevance. This would then have consequence to the metamodern project as well. If a transcendental architectonic of time fails during our time, then metamodernists may not have an original account of one of their principal objects, history. In that case, metamodern thought would be reduced to operating within postmodern understanding—which is, to be sure, an understanding of history in the sociological sense. Within this understanding, power is treated as “a causal mechanism between human animals in various forms of organization”, and history as the story of such mechanisms as they have transpired according to a calendrical metric. Within this paradigm of thought, the explanation of the being of time is glossed over and is left to physics. Yet, the political prescriptions which follow from this worldview strike us as unoriginal and exhausted. Returning to “science” reeks of liberal technocracy. Today, we must use philosophy to save ourselves from the oppression of “science”. Because of this, Blattner’s critique is not only relevant to metaphysicians, it is also relevant to metamodern political theorists and statesmen.
At least since G.W.F. Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes (“the Phenomenology of Spirit”) “the now” has been taken as the moment of phenomenal encounter in which time and space extend and the natural world may be described. For Hegel, as well as for us, this moment marks the event, in its “twofold shape as here and now”, where any scientific questioning can begin—whether that questioning proceeds from causal or ontological questions, and whether it leads to physical, metaphysical, or historical descriptions. Because Hegel’s Phenomenology stands at the inception of phenomenology, I choose to begin an understanding of power and history in the metamodern political project here. However, because of Hegel’s neglect of the conditions of possibility, and his neglect to ground the being of the actual, I must also advance beyond Hegel as well.
In this article, I will announce such a subject. I will also frame the thinking space which treats of this subject. Finally, I will conclude by considering what questions a metamodern metaphysics faces.
In order to place Dugin within the legacy of Heidegger, the Statesman, as strange as this may seem, we have to first decide upon the relationship between Dugin as a political strategist and his own theory. That is, we have to decide if Dugin has simply announced Heidegger’s da sein as the subject matter of a new political theory, or if he himself is also an activist of his Fourth Political Theory. Coming to such a decision may seem overly easy—we may want to say that Dugin, of course, is an activist of his own Fourth Political Theory. However, there is good reason for deciding otherwise. This article has been written with the intention of pursuing the legacy of Heidegger, the Statesman. In order to do so, we must firstly consider the relationship between Dugin and Fourth Political Theory. This relationship takes priority within the pursuit of this article. This is on account of the popularity which Dugin’s announcement of Fourth Political Theory was received with.
Following the reflection on Dugin, I will consider Heidegger's value metaphysics and a novel economic interpretation of his metaphysics.