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The Micro-foundations of Intertemporal Price Discrimination

Author

Listed:
  • Winston T.H. Koh

    (School of Economics and Social Sciences, Singapore Management University)

Abstract
This paper investigates the optimality of intertemporal price discrimination for a durable-good monopoly in a model where infinitely-lived households face an intertemporal budget constraint, and consume both durable goods and non-durable goods. We prove that the optimal price of the durable good is not constant, and may decrease or increase over time. Some households may choose to purchase the durable good at a later date, and pay lower or higher prices, since the gain in discounted utility of consuming more of the non-durable good more than compensates for the loss in utility from delaying the consumption of the durable good.

Suggested Citation

  • Winston T.H. Koh, 2005. "The Micro-foundations of Intertemporal Price Discrimination," Working Papers 04-2005, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:siu:wpaper:04-2005
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    File URL: https://mercury.smu.edu.sg/rsrchpubupload/4912/IPD_Jan2005.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. van Praag, Bernard & Bode, Ben, 1992. "Retail pricing and the costs of clearance sales : The formalisation of a rule of thumb," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 945-962, May.
    2. Larry M. Ausubel & Raymond J. Deneckere, 1989. "Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly," Levine's Working Paper Archive 201, David K. Levine.
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    5. Suslow, Valerie Y., 1986. "Commitment and monopoly pricing in durable goods models," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 451-460, December.
    6. Aldo Rustichini & Anne P. Villamil, 2000. "Intertemporal pricing in laboratory posted offer markets with differential information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 16(3), pages 613-637.
    7. Sobel, Joel, 1991. "Durable Goods Monopoly with Entry of New Consumers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(5), pages 1455-1485, September.
    8. Ausubel, Lawrence M & Deneckere, Raymond J, 1989. "Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 511-531, May.
    9. Nancy L. Stokey, 1981. "Rational Expectations and Durable Goods Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(1), pages 112-128, Spring.
    10. Ault, Richard W, et al, 2000. "Rebates, Inventories, and Intertemporal Price Discrimination," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 38(4), pages 570-578, October.
    11. Nancy L. Stokey, 1979. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 93(3), pages 355-371.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Melser & Iqbal A. Syed, 2017. "The product life cycle and sample representativity bias in price indexes," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(6), pages 573-586, February.
    2. Daniel Melser & Iqbal A. Syed, 2016. "Life Cycle Price Trends and Product Replacement: Implications for the Measurement of Inflation," Review of Income and Wealth, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 62(3), pages 509-533, September.
    3. Qu, Zhan & Raff, Horst & Schmitt, Nicolas, 2018. "Incentives through inventory control in supply chains," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 486-513.
    4. Artyom Shneyerov, 2014. "An optimal slow Dutch auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(3), pages 577-602, November.
    5. Eduardo Correia de Souza & Jorge Chami Batista, 2015. "Replacement cycles, income distribution and dynamic price discrimination," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(31), pages 3292-3310, July.
    6. Melser, Daniel & Syed, Iqbal, 2007. "Life Cycle Pricing and the Measurement of Inflation," MPRA Paper 16722, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 07 Jul 2008.
    7. Runco Mariano G, 2010. "A Note on the Multidimensional Monopolist Problem and Intertemporal Price Discrimination," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-8, August.
    8. Hikmet Gunay, 2014. "Waiting for Signaling Quality," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 81(2), pages 364-386, October.
    9. Lou, Weifang & Prentice, David & Yin, Xiangkang, 2012. "What difference does dynamics make? The case of digital cameras," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 30-40.
    10. Tian Xia & Richard Sexton, 2010. "Brand or Variety Choices and Periodic Sales as Substitute Instruments for Monopoly Price Discrimination," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 36(4), pages 333-349, June.
    11. Iqbal Syed & Daniel Melser, 2008. "Prices over the Product Life Cycle: An Empirical Analysis," Discussion Papers 2008-25, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Intertemporal price discrimination; durable good monopoly; optimal pricing strategy; household demand;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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