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Performance, Promotion, and the Peter Principle

Author

Listed:
  • James Malcomson
  • James A. Fairburn
  • University of Sussex
Abstract
This paper considers why organizations use promotions, rather than just monetary bonuses, to motivate employees even though this may conflict with efficient assignment of employees to jobs. When performance is unverifiable, use of promotion reduces the incentive for managers to be affected by influence activities that would blunt the effectiveness of monetary bonuses. When employees are risk neutral, use of promotion for incentives need not distort assignments. When they are risk averse, it may - sufficient conditions for this are given. The distortion may be either to promote more employees than is efficient (the Peter Principle effect) or fewer.

Suggested Citation

  • James Malcomson & James A. Fairburn & University of Sussex, 2000. "Performance, Promotion, and the Peter Principle," Economics Series Working Papers 26, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:26
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    File URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:2fecd84d-9498-49ed-b858-409c9c72119a
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    work incentives; influence activities; job assignments; promotion; Peter Principle;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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