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Do Environmental Markets Improve on Open Access? Evidence from California Groundwater Rights

Author

Listed:
  • Andrew B. Ayres
  • Kyle C. Meng
  • Andrew J. Plantinga
Abstract
Environmental markets are widely prescribed as an alternative to open-access regimes for natural resources. We develop a model of dynamic groundwater extraction to demonstrate how a spatial regression discontinuity design that exploits a spatially-incomplete market for groundwater rights recovers a lower bound on the market’s net benefit. We apply this estimator to a major aquifer in water-scarce southern California and find that a groundwater market generated substantial net benefits, as capitalized in land values. Heterogeneity analyses point to gains arising in part from rights trading, enabling more efficient water use across sectors. Additional findings suggest the market increased groundwater levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew B. Ayres & Kyle C. Meng & Andrew J. Plantinga, 2019. "Do Environmental Markets Improve on Open Access? Evidence from California Groundwater Rights," NBER Working Papers 26268, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26268
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Costello, Christopher & Quérou, Nicolas & Tomini, Agnes, 2015. "Partial enclosure of the commons," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 69-78.
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    Cited by:

    1. Françeska Tomori & Erik Ansink & Harold Houba & Nick Hagerty & Charles Bos, 2024. "Market power in California's water market," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 106(3), pages 1274-1299, May.
    2. David Wuepper & Robert Finger, 2023. "Regression discontinuity designs in agricultural and environmental economics," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 50(1), pages 1-28.
    3. Browne, Oliver R. & Ji, Xinde James, 2023. "The Economic Value of Clarifying Property Rights: Evidence from Water in Idaho’s Snake River Basin," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).
    4. Lingling Hou & Pengfei Liu & Xiaohui Tian, 2023. "Grassland tenure reform and grassland quality in China," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 105(5), pages 1388-1404, October.
    5. H. Spencer Banzhaf & Yaqin Liu & Martin Smith & Frank Asche, 2019. "Non-Parametric Tests of the Tragedy of the Commons," NBER Working Papers 26398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Dietrich Earnhart & Nathan P. Hendricks, 2023. "Adapting to water restrictions: Intensive versus extensive adaptation over time differentiated by water right seniority," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 105(5), pages 1458-1490, October.
    7. Charles A. Taylor, 2022. "Irrigation and Climate Change: Long-Run Adaptation and Its Externalities," NBER Chapters, in: Economic Perspectives on Water Resources, Climate Change, and Agricultural Sustainability, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Ellen M. Bruno & Nick Hagerty & Arthur R. Wardle, 2022. "The Political Economy of Groundwater Management: Descriptive Evidence from California," NBER Chapters, in: American Agriculture, Water Resources, and Climate Change, pages 343-365, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. repec:ags:aaea22:335606 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Sears, Louis S. & Lin Lawell, C.-Y. Cynthia & Walter, M. Todd, 2020. "Groundwater Under Open Access: A Structural Model of the Dynamic Common Pool Extraction Game," 2020 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, Kansas City, Missouri 304276, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    11. Wichman, Casey, 2024. "Efficiency, Equity, and Cost-Recovery Trade-Offs in Municipal Water Pricing," RFF Working Paper Series 24-18, Resources for the Future.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water

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