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Love, Hate and Murder: Commitment Devices in Violent Relationships

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Listed:
  • Anna Aizer
  • Pedro Dal Bó
Abstract
Many violent relationships are characterized by a high degree of cyclicality: women who are the victims of domestic violence often leave and return multiple times. To explain this we develop a model of time inconsistent preferences in the context of domestic violence. This time inconsistency generates a demand for commitment. We present supporting evidence that women in violent relationships display time inconsistent preferences by examining their demand for commitment devices. We find that "no-drop" policies -- which compel the prosecutor to continue with prosecution even if the victim expresses a desire to drop the charges -- result in an increase in reporting. No-drop policies also result in a decrease in the number of men murdered by intimates suggesting that some women in violent relationships move away from an extreme type of commitment device when a less costly one is offered.

Suggested Citation

  • Anna Aizer & Pedro Dal Bó, 2007. "Love, Hate and Murder: Commitment Devices in Violent Relationships," NBER Working Papers 13492, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13492
    Note: CH EH LS
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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