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Employee Cost-Sharing and the Welfare Effects of Flexible Spending Accounts

Author

Listed:
  • William Jack
  • Arik Levinson
  • Sjamsu Rahardja
Abstract
Flexible Spending Accounts (FSAs) subsidize out-of-pocket health expenses not covered by employer-provided health insurance, making health care cheaper ex post, but also reducing the incentive to insure. We use a cross section of .rm-level data to show that FSAs are indeed associated with reduced insurance coverage, and to evaluate the welfare consequences of this shift. Correcting for selection effects we find that FSAs are associated with insurance contracts that have coinsurance rates about 7 percentage points higher, relative to a sample average coinsurance rate of 17 percent. Meanwhile, coinsurance rates net of the subsidy are approximately unchanged, providing evidence that FSAs are welfare-neutral. These results show that FSAs may explain a significant fraction of the shift in health care costs to employees that has occurred in recent years.

Suggested Citation

  • William Jack & Arik Levinson & Sjamsu Rahardja, 2005. "Employee Cost-Sharing and the Welfare Effects of Flexible Spending Accounts," NBER Working Papers 11315, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11315
    Note: EH PE
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. John F. Cogan & R. Glenn Hubbard & Daniel P. Kessler, 2007. "Evaluating Effects of Tax Preferences on Health Care Spending and Federal Revenues," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 21, pages 65-82, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Cogan, John F. & Hubbard, R. Glenn & Kessler, Daniel P., 2011. "The Effect of Tax Preferences on Health Spending," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 64(3), pages 795-816, September.
    3. Barton H. Hamilton & James Marton, 2008. "Employee choice of flexible spending account participation and health plan," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(7), pages 793-813, July.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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