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A Quantitative Analysis of Tax Competition v. Tax Coordination under Perfect Capital Mobility

Author

Listed:
  • Enrique G. Mendoza

    (University of Maryland and NBER)

  • Linda L. Tesar

    (University of Michigan and NBER)

Abstract
Theory predicts that strategically-determined tax rates induce negative externalities across countries in relative prices, the wealth distribution and tax revenue. This paper studies the interaction of these externalities in a dynamic, general equilibrium environment and its effects on quantitative outcomes of tax competition in one-shot games over capital income taxes between two governments that set time-invariant taxes and issue debt. Strategic payoffs correspond to welfare gains net of the cost of transitional dynamics in a standard neoclassical two-country model with exogenous balanced growth. The model is calibrated to European data for the early 1980s starting from a benchmark with symmetric countries. When countries compete over capital taxes adjusting labor taxes to maintain fiscal solvency, the Nash equilibrium replicates calibrated taxes, suggesting that European taxes can be the outcome of Nash competition. When consumption taxes are adjusted to maintain fiscal solvency, competition triggers a “race to the bottom” in capital taxes but this outcome is welfare-improving relative to calibrated taxes. Sensitivity analysis shows that competition can produce a “race to the top” in capital taxes and that the United Kingdom can benefit from tax competition with Continental Europe. Surprisingly, the gains from coordination in all of these experiments are small.

Suggested Citation

  • Enrique G. Mendoza & Linda L. Tesar, 2003. "A Quantitative Analysis of Tax Competition v. Tax Coordination under Perfect Capital Mobility," Working Papers 507, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
    • Handle: RePEc:mie:wpaper:507
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Herzog, Bodo, 2006. "Coordination of fiscal and monetary policy in CIS-countries: A theory of optimum fiscal area?," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 256-274, June.
    2. Enrique G. Mendoza & Linda L. Tesar, 2003. "Winners and Losers of Tax Competition in the European Union," NBER Working Papers 10051, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Souleymane COULIBALY, 2008. "Empirical Assessment of the Existence of Taxable Agglomeration Rents," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 08.01, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    4. Sokolovskyi, Dmytro, 2020. "Is Race to the bottom is modeled as Prisoner's dilemma?," MPRA Paper 99404, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Günther Rehme, 2007. "Economic Growth and (Re-)Distributive Policies in a Non-cooperative World," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 91(1), pages 1-40, May.
    6. Coenen, Günter & McAdam, Peter & Straub, Roland, 2008. "Tax reform and labour-market performance in the euro area: A simulation-based analysis using the New Area-Wide Model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(8), pages 2543-2583, August.
    7. Sokolovskyi, Dmytro, 2021. "Is tax competition necessarily a Race to the bottom? Optimal tax rate trajectories in the model of tax competition for different objective functions," MPRA Paper 109284, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Eva de Francisco, 2005. "Limited Participation, Income Distribution and Capital Account Liberalization," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 454, Society for Computational Economics.
    9. Alexandre A. Porsse & Eduardo A. Haddad & Eduardo P. Ribeiro, 2006. "Modeling Interjurisdictional Tax Competition In A Federal System," Anais do XXXIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 34th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 54, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    10. Quadrini, Vincenzo & Ríos-Rull, José-Víctor, 2024. "International tax competition with rising intangible capital and financial globalization," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 101-120.
    11. Danuše Nerudová & Svatopluk Kapounek & Jitka Poměnková, 2007. "Tax Competition in the European Union and Its Influence on the Shift in the Tax Burden [Daňová soutěž v Evropské měnové unii a její vliv na přesun daňového břemene]," Český finanční a účetní časopis, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2007(2), pages 55-72.
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    13. Dimitris Papageorgiou, 2009. "Macroeconomic Implications of Alternative Tax Regimes: The Case of Greece," Working Papers 97, Bank of Greece.
    14. Desai, Mihir A. & Foley, C. Fritz & Hines, James Jr., 2006. "Do tax havens divert economic activity?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 219-224, February.
    15. Eva de Francisco, 2005. "Limited Participation, Income Distribution and Capital-Account Liberalization: Working Paper 2005-02," Working Papers 16302, Congressional Budget Office.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F2 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission

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