Evasion and time consistency in the taxation of capital income

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Cited by:

1. Selim, Sheikh, 2006. "On Policy Relevance of Ramsey Tax Rules," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2006/19, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section, revised Jul 2006.
   • Selim, Sheikh, 2007. "On Policy Relevance of Ramsey Tax Rules," Economics Discussion Papers 2007-31, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
2. Konrad, Kai A. & Erik Lommerud, Kjell, 2001. "Foreign direct investment, intra-firm trade and ownership structure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 475-494, March.
   • Konrad, K.A. & Lommerud, K.E., 2001. "Foreign Direct Investment, Intra-firm Trade and Ownership Structure," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 219, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
3. Frode Brevik & Manfred Gärtner, 2008. "Can tax evasion tame Leviathan governments?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 103-122, July.
   • Manfred Gärtner & Frode Brevik, 2006. "Can tax evasion tame Leviathan governments?," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2006 2006-19, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
4. Konrad, Kai A., 1999. "Privacy, time consistent optimal labor income taxation and education policy," IZA Discussion Papers 82, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
   • Konrad, Kai A., 1999. "Privacy, Time Consistent Optimal Labour Income Taxation and Education Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 2326, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
5. Pirttilä, Jukka, 1999. "Tax evasion and economies in transition: Lessons from tax theory," BOFIT Discussion Papers 2/1999, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
6. Dan Anderberg & Carlo Perroni, "undated". "Renegotiation of Social Contracts by Majority Rule," EPRU Working Paper Series 00-15, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
   • Anderberg, D. & Perroni, C., 2000. "Renegotiation of Social Contracts by Majority Rule," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 566, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
   • Anderberg, Dan & Perroni, Carlo, 2000. "Renegotiation of Social Contracts by Majority Rule," Economic Research Papers 269337, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
7. Buchholz, Wolfgang & Wiegard, Wolfgang, 1997. "Zeit(in)konsistente Steuerpolitik," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 115, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.
8. Leandro Arozamena & Martin Besfamille & Pablo Sanguinetti, 2010. "Optimal taxes and penalties when the government cannot commit to its audit policy," Department of Economics Working Papers 2010-10, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
9. Winand Emons, 2004. "Subgame-Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 42(3), pages 496-502, July.
   • Winand Emons, 2002. "Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders," Diskussionsschriften dp0211, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
   • Emons, Winand, 2002. "Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders," CEPR Discussion Papers 3667, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
10. Pirttilä, Jukka, 1999. "Tax evasion and economies in transition : Lessons from tax theory," BOFIT Discussion Papers 2/1999, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
11. Pääkkönen, Jenni, 2008. "Optimal law enforcement and welfare in the presence of organized crime," BOFIT Discussion Papers 30/2008, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
12. Alexander Haupt & Eckhard Janeba, 2009. "Education, redistribution and the threat of brain drain," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 16(1), pages 1-24, February.
    • Alexander Haupt & Eckhard Janeba, 2004. "Education, Redistribution, and the Threat of Brain Drain," NBER Working Papers 10618, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
13. repec:zbw:bofitp:1999_002 is not listed on IDEAS
14. Garon, Jean-Denis, 2016. "The commitment value of funding pensions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 11-14.
    • Jean-Denis Garon, 2016. "The commitment value of funding pensions," Cahiers de recherche 1602, Chaire de recherche Industrielle Alliance sur les enjeux économiques des changements démographiques.
15. Carlos Bethencourt & Lars Kunze, 2019. "Tax evasion, social norms, and economic growth," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 21(2), pages 332-346, April.
    • Bethencourt, Carlos & Kunze, Lars, 2013. "Tax evasion, social norms and economic growth," MPRA Paper 48427, University Library of Munich, Germany.
16. Oliver Lorz, 2004. "Time Consistent Optimal Redistribution Policy in an Overlapping Generations Model," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 6(1), pages 25-41, February.
17. Konrad, Kai A., 2001. "Privacy and time-consistent optimal labor income taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 503-519, March.
18. Robin Boadway & Motohiro Sato, 2000. "The Optimality of Punishing Only the Innocent: The Case of Tax Evasion," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 7(6), pages 641-664, December.

More about this item

JEL classification:

• H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
• H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
• H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General

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