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Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players

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  • Maskin, Eric
  • Kreps, David
  • Fudenberg, Drew
Abstract
This paper studies the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with long- and short-run players and little discounting. Because the short-run players are unconcerned about the future, each equilibrium outcome is constrained to lie on their static reaction (best-response) curves. The natural extension of the folk theorem to games of this sort would simply include this constraint in the definitions of the feasible payoffs and minmax values. In fact, this extension does obtain under the assumption that each player's choice of a mixed strategy for the stage game is publicly observable but, in contrast to standard repeated games, the set of equilibrium payoffs is different if players can observe only their opponents' realized actions.

Suggested Citation

  • Maskin, Eric & Kreps, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 1990. "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players," Scholarly Articles 3226950, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hrv:faseco:3226950
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2008. "Subgame–Perfect Equilibria of Finite– and Infinite–Horizon Games," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 1, pages 3-20, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Roy Radner, 1986. "Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(1), pages 43-57.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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