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Optimal Actuarial Fairness in Pension Systems - a Note

Author

Listed:
  • Hassler, John

    (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University)

  • Lindbeck, Assar

    (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University)

Abstract
A rationale for a compulsory pension system is that the government wants to correct supposedly myopic behavior by the individuals. Given the existence of such a system, we calculate the optimal relation between marginal contributions and benefits, i.e., the optimal degree of marginal actuarial fairness, as seen from the point of view of the individuals or of the government. The following is shown to hold under general assumptions of individual utility: The optimal degree of marginal actuarial fairness increases in the rate of return in the social security system and decreases in the government’s rate of time preference. If the government’s rate of time preference is lower than the individual’s, the government gains more than the individuals by making the system more actuarially fair. It is also shown that labor supply always increases when the link between marginal contributions and benefits is strengthened.

Suggested Citation

  • Hassler, John & Lindbeck, Assar, 1997. "Optimal Actuarial Fairness in Pension Systems - a Note," Seminar Papers 609, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:iiessp:0609
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Feldstein, Martin, 1996. "The Missing Piece in Policy Analysis: Social Security Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 1-14, May.
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    3. Eckstein, Zvi & Eichenbaum, Martin & Peled, Dan, 1985. "Uncertain lifetimes and the welfare enhancing properties of annuity markets and social security," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 303-326, April.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mishkin, Frederic S., 1998. "International Experiences With Different Monetary Policy Regimes," Seminar Papers 648, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    2. Hassler, J. & Lindbeck, A., 1997. "Intergenerational Risk Sharing, Stability and Optimality of Alternative Pension Systems," Papers 631, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
    3. Tim Krieger & Stefan Traub, 2008. "Back to Bismarck? Shifting Preferences for Intragenerational Redistribution in OECD Pension Systems," Working Papers CIE 13, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    4. Tim Krieger & Stefan Traub, 2009. "Wie hat sich die intragenerationale Umverteilung in der staatlichen Säule des Rentensystems verändert? Ein internationaler Vergleich auf Basis von LIS-Daten," Working Papers CIE 24, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    5. Lindbeck, Assar, 1998. "Swedish Lessons for Post-Socialist Countries," Working Paper Series 498, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    6. Góra, Marek & Palmer, Edward, 2004. "Shifting Perspectives in Pensions," IZA Discussion Papers 1369, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Taylor, John B., 1999. "The robustness and efficiency of monetary policy rules as guidelines for interest rate setting by the European central bank," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 655-679, June.
    8. Lin He & Zongxia Liang & Zhaojie Ren & Yilun Song, 2023. "Optimal Mix Among PAYGO, EET and Individual Savings," Papers 2302.09218, arXiv.org.
    9. Hassler, John & Lindbeck, Assar, 1998. "Can and Should a Pay-As-You-Go Pension System Mimic a Funded System?," Working Paper Series 499, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    10. Breyer, Friedrich & Kifmann, Mathias, 2002. "Incentives to retire later – a solution to the social security crisis?," Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(2), pages 111-130, July.
    11. Eduardo Siandra, 1998. "Sistemas de pensiones, sus reformas y los mercados de capitales," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0299, Department of Economics - dECON.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    compulsory pension; marginal actuarial fairness;

    JEL classification:

    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions

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