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Turbulence, Firm Decentralization, and Growth in Bad Times

Author

Listed:
  • Philippe Aghion

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, Collège de France - Chaire Economie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance - CdF (institution) - Collège de France)

  • Nicholas Bloom

    (Stanford University)

  • Brian Lucking

    (Stanford University)

  • Raffaella Sadun

    (Harvard Business School - Harvard University)

  • John van Reenen

    (LSE - London School of Economics and Political Science)

Abstract
What is the optimal form of firm organization during "bad times"? The greater turbulence following macro shocks may benefit decentralized firms because the value of local information increases (the "localist" view). On the other hand, the need to make tough decisions may favor centralized firms (the "centralist" view). Using two large micro datasets on decentralization in firms in ten OECD countries (WMS) and US establishments (MOPS administrative data), we find that firms that delegated more power from the central headquarters to local plant managers prior to the Great Recession outperformed their centralized counterparts in sectors that were hardest hit by the subsequent crisis (as measured by export growth and product durability). Results based on measures of turbulence based on product churn and stock market volatility provide further support to the localist view. This conclusion is robust to alternative explanations such as managerial fears of bankruptcy and changing coordination costs. Although decentralization will be suboptimal in many environments, it does appear to be beneficial for the average firm during bad times.

Suggested Citation

  • Philippe Aghion & Nicholas Bloom & Brian Lucking & Raffaella Sadun & John van Reenen, 2021. "Turbulence, Firm Decentralization, and Growth in Bad Times," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03166697, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-03166697
    DOI: 10.1257/app.20180752
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production

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