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Ambiguous Beliefs on Damages and Civil Liability Theories"

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  • Gérard Mondello

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur)

Abstract
This paper analyzes the meaning of comparing the economic performance of strict liability and negligence rule in a unilateral standard accident model under Knightian uncertainty. It focuses on the cost expectation of major harm on which the injurers form beliefs. It shows first that, when the Court agree with the regulator, whatever the liability regime, the first best level of care is never reached but under both regimes the tortfeasors define the same level of care. Second, when, judge and regulator disagree, it is impossible to discriminate among liability standards because the issue depends on the injurer's optimism degree.

Suggested Citation

  • Gérard Mondello, 2013. "Ambiguous Beliefs on Damages and Civil Liability Theories"," Post-Print halshs-00929948, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00929948
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00929948
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Andrea Castellano & Fernando Tohmé & Omar O. Chisari, 2020. "Product liability under ambiguity," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 473-487, June.
    2. Nicolas Lampach & Kene Boun My & Sandrine Spaeter, 2016. "Risk, Ambiguity and Efficient Liability Rules: An experiment," Working Papers of BETA 2016-30, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    3. Nicolas Lampach & Sandrine Spaeter, 2016. "The Efficiency of (strict) Liability Rules revised in Risk and Ambiguity," Working Papers of BETA 2016-29, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    uncertainty; accident model; strict liability; negligence rule; ambiguity theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General
    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • Q01 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - General - - - Sustainable Development
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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