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Coordinating cross-border congestion management through auctions: An experimental approach to European solutions

Author

Listed:
  • Céline Jullien

    (Energy Management - MTS - Management Technologique et Strategique - EESC-GEM Grenoble Ecole de Management)

  • Virginie Pignon

    (EDF R&D - EDF R&D - EDF - EDF)

  • Stéphane Robin

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Carine Staropoli

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract
Competition among producers within an integrated electricity system is impeded by any limited transmission capacity there may be at its borders. Two alternative market mechanisms have recently been designed to organize the allocation of scarce transmission capacity at cross-border level: (i) the "implicit auction", already used in some countries, and (ii) the "coordinated explicit auction", proposed by the European Transmission System Operators (ETSO) but not implemented yet. The main advantage of the explicit auction is that it allows each country to keep its own power exchange running. In the European institutional context, this is seen as a factor of success of a market reform, although the explicit auction (not coordinated) is known to be less efficient than the implicit mechanism. The addition of a coordination dimension in the explicit auction is intended to solve problems of international flows. We use an experimental methodology to identify and compare in a laboratory setting the efficiency properties of these two market mechanisms, given a market structure similar to the existing one in continental Europe, i.e. a competitive oligopoly. Our main result highlights the inefficiency of the coordinated explicit auction compared to the performance of the implicit auction, measured in terms of both energy prices and transmission capacity allocation. We suggest that the poor performance of the coordinated explicit auction in the laboratory is due to the level of individual expectations about both energy and transmission prices that the mechanism demands. One solution to resolve this problem when the mechanism is implemented in the field would be to design an additional and secondary market for "used" transmission capacity.

Suggested Citation

  • Céline Jullien & Virginie Pignon & Stéphane Robin & Carine Staropoli, 2012. "Coordinating cross-border congestion management through auctions: An experimental approach to European solutions," Grenoble Ecole de Management (Post-Print) halshs-00617026, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:gemptp:halshs-00617026
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2011.08.017
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00617026
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roger E. Bohn & Michael C. Caramanis & Fred C. Schweppe, 1984. "Optimal Pricing in Electrical Networks over Space and Time," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 360-376, Autumn.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Mulder, Machiel & Schoonbeek, Lambert, 2013. "Decomposing changes in competition in the Dutch electricity market through the residual supply index," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 100-107.
    3. Richter, Jan & Viehmann, Johannes, 2014. "The value of information in explicit cross-border capacity auction regimes in electricity markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 74-84.
    4. Chinmoy, Lakshmi & Iniyan, S. & Goic, Ranko, 2019. "Modeling wind power investments, policies and social benefits for deregulated electricity market – A review," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 242(C), pages 364-377.
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    6. Hagspiel, S. & Jägemann, C. & Lindenberger, D. & Brown, T. & Cherevatskiy, S. & Tröster, E., 2014. "Cost-optimal power system extension under flow-based market coupling," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 654-666.
    7. Hagspiel, Simeon & Jägemann, Cosima & Lindenberger, Dietmar & Brown, Tom & Cherevatskiy, Stanislav & Tröster, Eckehard, 2013. "Cost-Optimal Power System Extension under Flow-Based Market Coupling," EWI Working Papers 2013-9, Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln (EWI).
    8. Ádám Sleisz & Dániel Divényi & Beáta Polgári & Péter Sőrés & Dávid Raisz, 2022. "A Novel Cost Allocation Mechanism for Local Flexibility in the Power System with Partial Disintermediation," Energies, MDPI, vol. 15(22), pages 1-18, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    auctions; congestion management; electricity markets; experimental economics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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