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Parliament as a Wealth Maximizing Institution : The Right to the Residual and the Right to Vote

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  • Barzel, Y
Abstract
What could explain the emergence of parliament and its ascendancy? I argue that dictatorial kings encountered difficulties in securing the cooperation of their subjects because they could not commit not to confiscate subjects' gains. Where the gain from cooperation increased and kings were more secure, they deliberately gave up some of their power to be able to commit themselves to keep their promises.

Suggested Citation

  • Barzel, Y, 1997. "Parliament as a Wealth Maximizing Institution : The Right to the Residual and the Right to Vote," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 97-13, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:washer:97-13
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barzel, Yoram & Kiser, Edgar, 1997. "The Development and Decline of Medieval Voting Institutions: A Comparison of England and France," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(2), pages 244-260, April.
    2. DeAngelo, Harry, 1981. "Competition and Unanimity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(1), pages 18-27, March.
    3. Robert H. Bates & Da-Hsiang Donald Lien, 1985. "A Note on Taxation, Development, and Representative Government," Politics & Society, , vol. 14(1), pages 53-70, March.
    4. Yoram Barzel & Tim R. Sass, 1990. "The Allocation of Resources by Voting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(3), pages 745-771.
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    Cited by:

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    3. Hayo, Bernd & Voigt, Stefan, 2007. "Explaining de facto judicial independence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 269-290, September.
    4. Jim Rose & Simon Hay, 2001. "Three Steps Towards More Effective Development Assistance," Treasury Working Paper Series 01/26, New Zealand Treasury.
    5. Mark Koyama, 2010. "The political economy of expulsion: the regulation of Jewish moneylending in medieval England," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 374-406, December.
    6. Voigt, Stefan, 2005. "Membership has its Privileges: On the Effects of Delegating Powers Internationally," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 73, University of Kassel, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    7. Stefan Voigt, 2011. "Positive constitutional economics II—a survey of recent developments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(1), pages 205-256, January.
    8. Kyriazis, Nicholas K. & Karayiannis, Anastassios D., 2011. "Democracy, Institutional Changes and Economic Development: The Case of Ancient Athens," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 61-91.
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    11. Rosolino A. Candela & Vincent Geloso, 2019. "Coase and transaction costs reconsidered: the case of the English lighthouse system," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 331-349, December.
    12. Candela, Rosolino A. & Piano, Ennio E., 2020. "The Art and Science of Economic Explanation: Introduction to the Special Issue in Honor of Yoram Barzel," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 119-126, April.
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    14. Roland Kirstein & Stefan Voigt, 2006. "The Violent and the Weak," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(4), pages 863-889, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    POLITICS ; PARLIAMENT;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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