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Sovereign Risk, Fiscal Policy, and Macroeconomic Stability

Author

Listed:
  • Corsetti, Giancarlo
  • Müller, Gernot
  • Kuester, Keith
  • Meier, André
Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of strained government finances on macroeconomic stability and the transmission of fiscal policy. Using a variant of the model by Curdia and Woodford (2009), we study a 'sovereign risk channel' through which sovereign default risk raises funding costs in the private sector. If monetary policy is constrained, the sovereign risk channel exacerbates indeterminacy problems: private-sector beliefs of a weakening economy may become self-fulfilling. In addition, sovereign risk amplifies the effects of negative cyclical shocks. Under those conditions, fiscal retrenchment can help curtail the risk of macroeconomic instability and, in extreme cases, even stimulate economic activity.

Suggested Citation

  • Corsetti, Giancarlo & Müller, Gernot & Kuester, Keith & Meier, André, 2012. "Sovereign Risk, Fiscal Policy, and Macroeconomic Stability," CEPR Discussion Papers 8779, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8779
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fiscal policy; Monetary policy; risk premium; Sovereign risk; Zero lower bound;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory

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