Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]

IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/15989.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Revisiting Cap-and-Trade in Presence of Publicly Owned Polluters: The Case of Italy 2006-2018

Author

Listed:
  • Kastl, Jakub
  • Baranek, Bruno
  • Boffa, Federico
Abstract
We use the example of the Italian electricity spot market to empirically document that carbon pricing schemes may not work efficiently when the major ï¬ rms in the market are government- controlled. We show that government-controlled companies do not internalize emission prices implied by the European Union emissions trading system in their bids, which reduces pass- through of emission costs and introduces inefficiency. A vast majority of electricity generators in the world are government owned and this is especially true for fossil fuel burning ones. We argue that, as a result, contrary to conventional wisdom among economists, carbon pricing is unlikely to be an efficient way to regulate and mitigate emissions in the electricity sector. A command- and-control approach, involving emission standards, might be more suitable, especially since reliable estimates of the production functions of electric generators are readily available. Our results cast doubts on the welfare implications of the massive ETS program that China will be implementing starting in 2021.

Suggested Citation

  • Kastl, Jakub & Baranek, Bruno & Boffa, Federico, 2021. "Revisiting Cap-and-Trade in Presence of Publicly Owned Polluters: The Case of Italy 2006-2018," CEPR Discussion Papers 15989, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15989
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP15989
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Electricity; Emission permits; Multiunit auctions; Cap-and-trade regulation; Government-controlled companies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
    • Q40 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - General
    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15989. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.